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ECONO MIC  HISTORY 
AND  THEORY 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 

Crown  8vo. 

ENGLISH  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND 
THEORY. 

Part  I.  — THE  MIDDLE  AGES.  5s. 

Part  II.— THE  END  OF  THE  MIDDLE 
AGES.  10s.  61. 

LONDON  AND  NEW  YORK  : 

LONGMANS,  GREEN,  &  CO. 


First  Edition  of  Part  I.  printed  April,  1888;  reprinted 
May,  1889 ;  Second  Edition,  November,  1892 ;  Third  Edition, 
June,  1894. 


AN  INTRODUCTION 

/VOA  : TVri  hry;  To 

ufuT 

ENGLISH  ECONOMIC 


HISTORY  AND  THEORY 


W.  J.  ASHLEY,  M.A. 

PROFESSOR  OF  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  IN  HARVARD  UNIVFRSITY 
SOMETIME  FELLOW  OF  LINCOLN  COLLEGE,  OXFORD 


THE  MIDDLE  AGES 


THIRD  EDITION 


New  York  :  G.  P.  PUTNAM’S  SONS 
London:  LONGMANS  &  CO. 
1894 


o 


an.  so  rfaOnan 


3?O.S4Z 

4s35^  3 


n 


TO 

THE  MEMORY 

OF 


ARNOLD  TOYNBEE. 


CONTENTS 


BOOK  I. 

FROM  THE  ELEVENTH  TO  THE  FOURTEENTH  CENTURY. 
CHAPTER  I. 

The  Manor  and  Village  Community.  page 

Authorities .  3 

SECTION 

1.  The  Manorial  System . . .  5 

2.  Its  Origin.  Special  Circumstances  of  Eastern  and 

South-Western  England .  13 

3.  Increase  in  the  Number  of  Free  Tenants . .  19 

4.  Commutation  of  Services  for  Money .  29 

5.  Economic  Characteristics  of  the  Village  Community  ..  33 

6.  Appearance  of  a  “Money-Economy” .  43 

Notes . 50 

CHAPTER  II. 

Merchant  and  Craft  Gilds. 

Authorities . 67 

SECTION 

7.  The  Merchant  Gild .  68 

8.  The  Origin  of  Craft  Gilds . 76 


viii  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  PAGE 

9.  Relations  between  the  Craft  Gilds  and  the  Municipal 

Authorities .  * .  84 

10.  Internal  Organization  of  the  Craft  Gilds .  89 

11.  Economic  Characteristics  of  the  Craft  Gilds .  92 

12.  Internal  Trade . 96 

13.  Foreign  Merchants  in  England .  102 

14.  The  Hanse  and  the  Staple . 109 

Notes . 114 

CHAPTER  III. 

Economic  Theories  and  Legislation. 

Authorities .  124 

SECTION 

15.  The  Teaching  of  the  Church . 126 

16.  Aquinas  on  Just  Price .  132 

17.  The  Doctrine  of  Usury . .  148 

18.  History  of  the  Currency  ...  163 

19.  Weights  and  Measures .  178 

20.  Regulation  of  Trade .  181 

21.  The  Assizes  of  Bread,  Ale,  and  Wine .  187 

22.  Caursines  and  Jews .  195 

23.  Merchant  Law .  204 

Notes . * . . . . . .  207 

Index .  223 


PREFACE 


Two  causes,  above  all  others,  sometimes  working  sepa¬ 
rately,  sometimes  in  conjunction,  have  gradually  modified 
the  character  of  economic  science.  These  two  causes 
are  the  growing  importance  of  historical  studies,  and 
the  application  to  society  of  the  idea  of  evolution.  The 
first  to  make  itself  felt  was  history :  in  the  hands  of 
Savigny  it  became  the  foundation  of  a  new  method  of 
jurisprudence,  the  value  of  which  has  been  signally  illus¬ 
trated  in  our  own  time  by  Maine ;  and  from  the  lawyers 
the  historical  method  passed  to  the  economists.  Yet 
the  lessons  of  Eoscher,  of  Hildebrand,  and  of  Knies, 
remained  for  over  a  quarter  of  a  century  unheeded; 
nor  did  they  begin  to  carry  their  due  weight  until  the 
practical  needs  of  modern  life  had  shown  the  deficiencies 
of  older  economic  methods.  But,  meanwhile,  the  idea 
of  an  orderly  evolution  of  society  had  been  slowly 
making  itself  felt, — an  idea  which,  whether  conceived, 
as  by  Hegel,  as  the  progressive  revelation  of  spirit,  or, 
as  by  Comte,  as  the  growth  of  humanity,  or,  as  by 


X 


PREFACE. 


Spencer,  as  the  adaptation  of  the  social  organism  to 
its  environment,  had  equally  the  effect  of  opening  to 
the  economist  undreamt-of  perspectives  of  the  past 
and  the  future. 

The  nature  of  the  change  will  be  perceived  if  we 
examine  the  principles  by  which  investigation  is  now 
guided.  They  may  be  thus  stated — 

(1)  Political  Economy  is  not  a  body  of  absolutely 
true  doctrines,  revealed  to  the  world  at  the  end  of  the 
last  and  the  beginning  of  the  present  century,  but  a 
number  of  more  or  less  valuable  theories  and  general¬ 
izations. 

(2)  No  age,  since  men  began  to  speculate,  has  been 
without  its  economic  ideas.  Political  Economy  was  not 
born  fully  armed  from  the  brain  of  Adam  Smith  or  any 
other  thinker :  its  appearance  as  an  independent  science 
meant  only  the  disentanglement  of  economic  from 
philosophical  and  political  speculation. 

(3)  Just  as  the  history  of  society,  in  spite  of  ap¬ 
parent  retrogressions,  reveals  an  orderly  development, 
so  there  has  been  an  orderly  development  in  the  history 
of  what  men  have  thought,  and  therefore  in  what  they 
have  thought  concerning  the  economic  side  of  life. 

(4)  As  modern  economists  have  taken  for  their  as¬ 
sumptions  conditions  which  only  in  modern  times  have 
begun  to  exist,  so  earlier  economic  theories  were  based, 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  on  conditions  then  present. 
Hence  the  theories  of  the  past  must  be  judged  in  relation 


PREFACE. 


XI 


to  the  facts  of  the  past,  and  not  in  relation  to  those  of 
the  present. 

(5)  History  seems  to  be  proving  that  no  great  insti¬ 
tution  has  been  without  its  use  for  a  time,  and  its 
relative  justification.  Similarly,  it  is  beginning  to 
appear  that  no  great  conception,  no  great  body  of 
doctrines  which  really  influenced  society  for  a  long 
period,  was  without  a  certain  truth  and  value,  having 
regard  to  contemporary  circumstances. 

(6)  Modern  economic  theories,  therefore,  are  not 
universally  true ;  they  are  true  neither  for  the  past, 
when  the  conditions  they  postulate  did  not  exist,  nor  for 
the  future,  when,  unless  society  becomes  stationary,  the 
conditions  will  have  changed. 

So  much  all  economists  would  allow ;  and  it  need 
hardly  be  pointed  out  how  considerable  must  be  the 
effect  of  conceptions  such  as  these,  even  with  those  who 
believe  that  the  Political  Economy  of  thirty  or  forty 
years  ago  is  still  the  best  clue  to  the  questions  of  to-day. 
If  no  more  is  done,  at  any  rate  the  belief  in  the  per¬ 
petual  validity  of  modern  doctrines  is  destroyed;  and 
while  that  remained,  no  real  understanding  was  possible 
of  the  economic  life  of  the  past. 

But  the  same  two  influences  have  produced  still 
further  effects,  and,  in  particular,  a  divergence  of  opinion 
as  to  the  proper  method  to  pursue  in  the  investigation 
of  present  phenomena.  There  are  many  intermediate 
shades  of  opinion,  many  interesting  attempts  at  eclectic 


PREFACE. 


xii 

compromise,  but,  in  the  main,  economists  tend  in  one  of 
two  opposite  directions.  Either  they  use  the  method 
of  deduction,  practised  by  Eicardo  and  defended  by  John 
Stuart  Mill  and  Cairnes  ;  or  they  proceed  by  way  of  his¬ 
torical  inquiry,  and  the  observation  of  actual  facts.  The 
former  start  from  certain  assumptions,  such  as  that 
man  is  governed  by  self-interest,  that  there  is  freedom 
of  competition,  that  capital  and  labour  are  transferable : 
from  these  they  deduce  certain  hypothetical  conclusions 
— conclusions,  that  is  to  say,  only  true  so  far  as  the 
assumptions  are  true ;  and  then  they  hope,  by  intro¬ 
ducing  this  and  that  limitation,  to  arrive  at  an  ex¬ 
planation  of  particular  problems.  The  latter  try  to 
free  their  minds  at  the  outset  of  all  a  priori  theories, 
and  to  see  things  as  they  actually  are  and  have  been, 
using  deductive  reasoning  only  as  an  occasional  help  in 

interpreting  the  results  of  their  investigation.  Among 

■ 

these,  again,  there  is  considerable  divergence  of  opinion 
as  to  the  kind  of  results  to  be  aimed  at,  and  the  shape 
Political  Economy  should  assume.  An  increasing 
number, — “  the  historical  school  ”  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word, — hold  that  it  is  no  longer  worth  while 
framing  general  formulas  as  to  the  relations  between 
individuals  in  a  given  society,  like  the  old  “laws”  of 
rent,  wages,  profits ;  and  that  what  they  must  attempt 
to  discover  are  the  laws  of  social  development — that  is  to 
say,  generalizations  as  to  the  stages  through  which  the 
economic  life  of  society  has  actually  moved.  They 


PREFACE. 


Xlll 


believe  that  knowledge  like  this  will  not  only  give  them 
an  insight  into  the  past,  but  will  enable  them  the  better 
'  to  understand  the  difficulties  of  the  present. 


[Bibliography. — For  the  recent  history  of  economic  discussion,  see 
J.  S.  Mill,  Essays  on  Some  Unsettled  Questions  of  Political  Economy , 
(1844),  esplly.  Essay  V. ;  Oairnes,  Logical  Method  of  Political  Economy , 
(2nd  ed.,  1875),  esplly.  Lectures  II.,  IV. ;  Cliffe  Leslie,  Essays  in  Political 
and  Moral  Philosophy ,  (1879),  esplly.  Essays  X.,  XI.,  XIV. ;  Bagehot, 
Economic  Studies ,  (1880);  Ingram,  Article  on  Political  Economy  (in 
Ency.  Brit.,  9th  ed.),  about  to  be  published  separately;  H.  Sidgwick, 
Principles  of  Political  Economy ,  (1883),  Introduction.  For  the  present 
position  of  thought  in  Germany,  see  Nasse,  in  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  (Boston,  U.S.A.),  for  July,  1887 ;  in  France,  Gide,  Ghronique 
in  Bevue  d’Economie  Politique ,  No.  1,  1887.  The  best,  easily  accessible 
presentment  of  the  “  historical  ”  point  of  view  will  be  found  in  Knies, 
Die  Politische  Oeconomievom  Geschichtlichen  Standpuncte ,  (2nd  ed.,  1883), 
especially  the  Introduction;  and  Schmoller,  Ueher  einige  Grundfragen 
des  Rechts  and  der  Volkswirthschaft ,  (1875),  esplly.  part  2.] 


Oxford,  April,  1888. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  EDITION 


In  the  present  edition  the  opportunity  has  been  taken 
so  to  modify  a  few  passages  as  to  remove  certain  incon¬ 
sistencies  between  the  first  and  second  Parts,  and  also 
to  make  a  number  of  verbal  changes  in  the  direction  of 
greater  accuracy.  But  the  reader  will  remember  that, 
although  no  very  considerable  discoveries  have  been 
made  in  the  six  years  that  have  elapsed  since  the 
appearance  of  the  first  edition,  the  literature  of  the 
subject  has  been  enriched  in  several  directions.  Pro¬ 
fessor  Maitland  in  the  Introduction  to  the  Placita  in 
Curiis  Magnatum  Angliae  (Selden  Society,  1889),  and 
Mr.  Blakesley  in  the  Law  Quarterly  Review  (April,  1889), 
have  more  than  confirmed  the  suspicions  here  expressed 
(p.  61,  n.  99)  as  to  the  legal  doctrine  of  manorial  courts, 
and,  in  particular,  have  shown  good  reason  for  believing 
that  the  “  court  baron  ”  was  not  of  “  primitive  ”  origin, 
but  the  comparatively  late  result  of  the  growth  of  free 
tenure.  Professor  Paul  Vinogradoff’s  Villainage  in 


XVI 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 


Merchant  (Oxford,  1890)  has  presented  the  conclusions 
of  his  earlier  Gilda  Mercatoria  in  a  far  more  complete 
form,  and,  in  its  second  volume  ( Proofs  and  Illustrations ), 
has  given  us  a  mass  of  previously  unprinted  material. 
Meanwhile,  abroad,  the  second  volume  of  Dr.  Inama- 
Sternegg’s  Deutsche  Wirtscliaftsgeschichte  (1891)  has 
brought  to  our  aid  many  suggestive  parallels  and  con¬ 
trasts  ;  white  the  writings  of  Professors  Karl  Hegel 
( Stddte  und  Gilden  der  germanischen  Volker,  1891)  and 
Georg  von  Biilow  ( Entstehung  der  deutschen  Stadtgemeinde, 
1889;  Ursprung  der  deutschen  Stadtverfassung ,  1892), 
with  the  critical  and  controversial  literature  to  which 
they  have  given  rise,  have  added  a  new  interest  to  early 
town  history.  For  much  of  this  recent  literature, 
English  and  German,  the  student  may  be  referred 
provisionally  to  a  series  of  reviews  by  the  present  writer 
in  the  (New  York)  Political  Science  Quarterly ,  and  the 
(London)  Economic  Journal  since  1890. 

It  should  be  added  that,  in  regard  to  the",  two  im¬ 
portant  subjects  of  craft  organization  and  the  canonist 
doctrine,  further  consideration  has  led  the  author  to  a 
somewhat  different  judgment,  and,  he  believes,  a  more 
adequate  statement  in  the  second  Part.  The  accounts, 
therefore,  given  in  this  first  Part  of  the  earlier  history 
of  these  matters,  while,  it  is  hoped,  not  incorrect  so  far 
n.g  i.Vmy  -nfiP-d  to  be  supplemented  by  the  discussi^j 


BOOK  I. 

FROM  THE  ELEVENTH  TO  THE  FOURTEENTH 
CENTURY. 


B 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY® 

[Authorities. — The  most  important  evidence  earlier  than  the  Norman 
Conquest  is  the  A.-S.  document,  Rectitudines  Singularum  Personarum , 
printed  with  an  old  Latin  version,  probably  of  the  twelfth  century,  in 
Thorpe,  Ancient  Laws  and  Institutes  (1840),  and  with  a  German  version 
in  Schmid,  Gesetze  der  Angelsachsen  (1858).  It  records  the  duties  of 
thegn,  geneat  (in  the  Latin  version,  villanus ),  cotsetla ,  and  gebur ,  and  seems 
to  have  been  drawn  up  in  the  tenth  century  for  the  guidance  of  those  who 
had  to  manage  estates.  The  Domesday  Rook,  1086  (printed  1783;  two 
supplementary  volumes,  1816),  states  the  value,  extent,  and  number  of 
tenants  on  every  manor  at  three  periods, — in  the  time  of  the  Confessor, 
immediately  after  the  Conquest,  and  at  the  date  of  the  survey ;  but  only 
exceptionally,  e.g .  in  Middlesex,  gives  information  as  to  the  size  of  the 
villein  holdings.  Then  comes  a  series  of  surveys  or  rentals  of  the 
manors  of  several  great  ecclesiastical  corporations :  of  these  the  most 
important  are  the  Burton  Chartulary ,  between  1100  and  1113,  in  Col - 
lections  for  the  History  of  Staffordshire ,  v.  (1884);  the  Liber  Niger  of 
Peterborough,  between  1125  and  1128,  in  Appendix  to  Chronicon  Petro - 
burgense,  ed.  Camden  Soc.  (1849) ;  the  Boldon  Book  *  1 183,  for  the  estates 
of  the  Bishop  of  Durham,  in  Domesday  Book ,  iv.  (1816),  also  ed.  Green- 
well,  Surtees  Soc.  (1852)  ;  for  the  estates  of  S.  Paul’s,  a  fragment  of  the 
Domesday  of  Ralph  de  Diceto,  1181,  an  Inquest  of  1222,  a  Rental  of  1240, 
and  a  Compotus  Maneriorum  et  Firmorum  of  1300,  in  the  Domesday  of 
S.  Paid's,  ed.  Hale,  Camden  Soc.  (1858) ;  the  Register  of  Worcester  Priory , 
1240,  ed.  Hale,  Camden  Soc.  (1865);  many  manorial  Extents  in  the 
Chartulary  of  Ramsey  Monastery ,  1251-52,  i.,  Rolls’  Series  (1886),  and  in 
the  Chartulary  of  Gloucester  Monastery,  1265-66,  iii.,  Rolls’  Series  (1867) ; 
the  Custumals  of  Battle  Abbey,  1282-1312,  ed.  Scargill-Bird,  Camden 
Soc.  (1887);  the  Rotulus  Redituum,  1290,  in  Registrum  Cartarum  de 
Kelso,  ii.,ed  Bannatyne  Club  (1846);  a  Rental  of  1298  in  Coldingham 


4 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


Correspondence ,  ed.  Surtees  Soc.  (1841) ;  the  Magnus  Rotulus  of  Bp.  Bee 
of  Durham,  1307,  in  Green  well’s  Boldon  Boole,  App. ;  and  an  excerpt  for 
the  single  manor  of  Bleadon  from  the  Custumal  of  S.  Swithun,  Winchester, 
in  Proc.  Archseol.  Instit.  (1849). 

It  might,  however,  be  thought  that  ecclesiastical  estates  differed  from 
lay,  or  large  estates  from  small,  in  the  character  and  occupations  of  their 
inhabitants.  This  is  disproved  by  the  Rotuli  Hundredorum  of  1279 
(printed  1818),  much  the  most  important  authority  for  social  history  after 
Domesday.  They  give  detailed  accounts  of  every  manor  and  every  tenant 
over  a  large  part  of  Mid-England.  The  Extenta  Manerii ,  of  uncertain 
date  but  usually  ascribed  to  4  Edward  I.  ( Statutes  of  Realm,  i.  242),  is  a 
list  of  instructions,  of  general  applicability,  for  drawing  up  a  survey  of 
a  manor.  The  treatise  of  the  lawyer  Bracton,  of  the  reign  of  Henry  III., 
furnishes  definitions  of  the  status  of  different  classes :  but  the  ordinary 
text  contains  interpolations  inconsistent  with  its  general  sense,  and  until 
the  work  has  been  critically  edited  it  cannot  be  trusted  as  an  authority. 
(See  Yinogradoff  on  “  The  Text  of  Bracton,”  in  Law  Quart.  Rev.,  April, 
1885).  Fleta ,  a  contemporary  legal  handbook,  adds  colour  to  the  picture 
by  its  description  of  the  duties  of  steward,  bailiff,  reeve,  and  other  manorial 
servants.  It  was  printed  by  Selden  in  1647,  and  by  Houard  in  Coutumes 
Anglo-normandes ,  iii.,  in  1776.  A  Rental  of  1298  and  a  Bailiff's  Account 
for  1316-17,  are  printed  in  Kogers,  Hist,  of  Agriculture ,  ii.  (1866)  ;  and  a 
most  valuable  Rental  and  Custumal  of  1340  in  Scrope,  Hist,  of  Castle 
Combe  (1852).  The  close  resemblance  of  Normandy  to  England  in  respect 
of  the  relations  of  classes  will  be  seen  on  reference  to  Leopold  Delisle, 
Etudes  sur  la  Condition  de  la  Classe  Agricole,  etc.,  en  Normandie  (1852);  see 
especially  the  Rental  of  the  Abbey  of  Mont  S.  Michel ,  p.  673,  seq. 

Of  modem  writers,  the  first  that  needs  to  be  mentioned  is  John 
Mitchell  Kemble  ( Saxons  in  England :  1848).  He  describes  the  marie  as 
“  a  voluntary  association  of  freemen ,”  and  asserts  that  “  this  is  the  original 
basis  upon  which  all  Teutonic  society  rests.”  This  theory  was  worked 
out,  with  special  regard  to  Germany,  by  Georg  von  Maurer,  in  a  series  of 
writings,  of  which  the  most  important  were  the  Einleitung  zur  Geschichtc 
der  Marie-,  Hof-,  Dorf -,  und  Stadt-Verfassung  (1851),  and  Gescliichte 
der  Eronlwfe,  der  Bauernhofe  u.  der  Hof-Verfassung  in  Deutschland , 
(1862-63).  Strictly  agricultural  history  has  been  investigated  with  great 
success  by  Georg  Hanssen,  whose  papers  are  collected  in  Agrarhistorisclie 
Abhandlungen  (i.  1880;  see  especially  his  review  of  Nasse,  p.*  484,  seq.). 
The  first  to  apply  with  any  detail  the  theory  of  the  mark  to  England 
was  Nasse,  in  The  Agricultural  Community  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  In¬ 
closures  of  the  Sixteenth  Century  in  England ,  transl.  for  the  Oobden  Club 


Chap.  L]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  $ 


(1871).  Sir  Henry  Maine,  accepting  the  general  conclusions  of  Maurer 
and  Nasse,  commented  upon  their  results,  and  tried  to  confirm  them  by 
Indian  parallels  in  Village  Communities  in  East  and  West  (1871). 

For  some  time  the  theory  that  the  manor  grew  out  of  a  free  mark 
community  reigned  supreme  in  England.  Bp.  Stubbs  was  indeed  careful, 
in  his  Constitutional  History  (1873),  not  to  commit  himself  to  it  unre¬ 
servedly;  but  his  general  argument  as  to  the  growth  of  relations  of 
dependence  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  power  of  the  lord  of  the 
manor  was,  generally  speaking,  of  late  and  gradual  development. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  apparent  success  of  German  research,  another  line 
of  investigation,  represented  especially  by  French  scholars,  had  been 
singularly  neglected.  Guerard,  in  his  Prolegomena  (1844)  to  the  Poly - 
ptique  of  the  Abbot  Irminon,  a  register  of  the  lands  of  the  Abbey  of  St. 
Germain  under  Charles  the  Great,  attempted  to  trace  all  the  main  charac¬ 
teristics  of  the  manor  to  the  legislation  of  the  later  Roman  Empire.  Since 
the  Franco-German  war,  his  work  has  been  resumed  by  a  school  of  French 
critics,  who  have  called  in  question  many  of  the  positions  as  to  mediaeval 
history  which  seemed  to  be  won  by  German,  industry.  Its  leader  is  M. 
Fustel  de  Coulanges,  who  declares  ( RecJierches  sur  quelques  Problemes 
d'Ristoire ,  1885)  that  the  primitive  free  mark  community  is  a  figment  of 
the  Teutonic  brain.  (See  criticism  by  Elton,  “  Early  Forms  of  Landhold¬ 
ing,”  in  Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,  July,  1886.)  But  the  work  of  most  interest  for  us 
is  Seebohm’s  English  Village  Community  (1883),  which  aims  at  proving 
that  “  English  economic  history  begins  with  the  serfdom  of  the  masses  of 
the  rural  population  under  Saxon  rule, — a  serfdom  from  which  it  has 
taken  a  thousand  years  to  set  them  free.”  His  book  has  reopened  for 
England  the  whole  question  of  the  origin  of  the  manor ;  and  whatever 
may  be  the  ultimate  conclusion  on  that  subject,  he  certainly  has  been  the 
first  to  make  it  clearly  understood  what  the  system  of  cultivation  and 
landholding  really  was.  On  the  internal  life  of  the  manor  from  the  four¬ 
teenth  to  the  sixteenth  century  much  information  is  given  in  Rogers,  Hist, 
of  Agriculture ,  and  Six  Centuries  of  Work  and  Wages .  An  Elizabethan 
lawyer’s  view  of  the  matter,  with  interesting  particulars,  will  be  found  in 
the  popular  text-book,  Le  Court  Leete  et  Court  Baron,  “collect  per  John 
Ky tchen,”  in  French,  1 580,  and  frequently  printed  ;  published  in  English 
as  Jurisdictions ,  or  the  Lawful  Authority  of  Courts  Leet,  1653.] 

§  1.  Till  nearly  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
England  was  a  purely  agricultural  country.  Such  manu¬ 
factures  as  it  possessed  were  entirely  for  consumption  within 


6 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


the  land ;  and  for  goods  of  the  finer  qualities  it  was  dependent 
on  importation  from  abroad.  The  only  articles  of  export 
were  the  raw  products  of  the  country,  and  of  these  by  far 
the  most  important  was  the  agricultural  product,  wool.  To 
understand,  therefore,  the  life  of  rural  England  during  this 
period,  is  to  understand  nine-tenths  of  its  economic  acthdty. 

In  the  eleventh  century,  and  long  afterwards,  the  whole 
country,  outside  the  larger  towns,  was  divided  into  manors — 
into  districts,  that  is  to  say,  in  each  of  which  one  person, 
called  the  lord ,  possessed  certain  important  and  valuable 
rights  over  all  the  other  inhabitants.  Sometimes  one 
village  was  divided  between  two  manors;  sometimes  part 
of  a  village  formed  a  manor  dependent  on  that  from  which 
it  had  been  broken  off ;  but  such  conditions  were  always 
exceptional,  and  are  less  frequent  the  further  we  go  back. 
The  vast  majority  of  manors  consisted  of  but  one  village 
and  the  lands  surrounding  it  cultivated  by  its  inhabitants ; 
and  we  may  regard  that  as  the  normal  state  of  things. 

Let  us  picture  to  ourselves  an  eleventh-century  manor 
in  Middle  or  Southern  England.  There  was  a  village  street, 
and  along  each  side  of  it  the  houses  of  the  cultivators  of  the 
soil,  with  little  yards  around  them:  as  yet  there  were  no 
scattered  farmhouses,  such  as  were  to  appear  later.  Stretch¬ 
ing  away  from  the  village  was  the  arable  land,  divided  usually 
into  three  fields,  sown  one  with  wheat  or  rye,  one  with  oats 
or  barley,  while  one  was  left  fallow.  The  fields  were  again 
subdivided  into  what  were  usually  called  “  furlongs ;  ”  and 
each  furlong  into  acre  or  half-acre  strips,  separated,  not  by 
hedges,  but  by  “  balks  ”  of  unploughed  turf ;  and  these 
strips  were  distributed  among  the  cultivators  in  such  a  way 
that  each  man’s  holding  was  made  up  of  strips  -  scattered  up 
and  down  the  three  fields,  and  no  man  held  two  adjoining 
pieces.  Each  individual  holder  was  bound  to  cultivate  his 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  7 


strips  in  accordance  with  the  rotation  of  crops  observed  by 
his  neighbours.  Besides  the  arable  fields  there  were  also 
meadows,  enclosed  for  hay-harvest,  and  divided  into  portions 
by  lot  or  rotation  or  custom,  and  after  hay-harvest  thrown 
open  again  for  the  cattle  to  pasture  upon.1  In  most  cases 
there  was  also  some  permanent  pasture  or  wood,  into  which 
the  cattle  were  turned,  either  “  without  stint  ”  or  in  numbers 
proportioned  to  the  extent  of  each  man’s  holding. 

In  modern  times  arable  lands  thus  divided  have  been 
known  as  “  common,”  “  commonable,”  “  open,”  or  “  inter¬ 
mixed  ”  fields ;  and  the  meadows  are  often  called  “  Lammas 
lands,”  from  the  day  on  which  the  enclosures  are  removed.2 

Supposing  such  fields  and  meadows  were  owned  in 
common  by  a  group  of  freemen,  the  condition  of  things  would 
be  what  is  called  the  'mark  system .  But  the  manorial  system 
was  something  very  different ;  for  in  a  manor  the  land  was 
regarded  as  the  property,  not  of  the  cultivators,  but  of  a 
lord.  It  was  divided  into  that  part  cultivated  for  the 
immediate  benefit  of  the  lord,  the  demesne  or  inland ,3  and 
that  held  of  him  by  tenants,  the  land  in  villenage  ;  the  latter 
being  usually  three-fifths  or  two-thirds  of  the  whole.  The 
demesne  consisted  partly  of  separate  closes,  partly  of  acres 
scattered  among  those  of  the  tenants  in  the  common  fields ; 4 
and  we  may,  later,  see  reason  to  believe  that  originally  the 
lord’s  portion  had  consisted  entirely  of  such  scattered  acres, 
with  possibly  a  rather  larger  farmyard  around  his  house 
than  those  of  the  rest  of  the  villagers.  Of  the  land  held  in 
villenage,  far  the  greater  part  was  held  in  whole  or  half 
virgates  or  yardlands ,  known  in  the  north  as  husbandlands ,5  in 
some  parts  of  the  south  as  wistas.6  The  virgate  was  a  hold¬ 
ing  made  up  of  scattered  acre  or  half-acre  strips  in  the  three 
fields,  with  appurtenant  and  proportionate  rights  to  meadow 
and  pasture ;  and  its  extent,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  was 


8 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


usually  thirty  acres,  although  in  some  manors  it  was  as  few 
as  sixteen,  in  others  as  many  as  forty-eight.7  The  holders 
of  such  virgates  or  half  virgates  formed  a  class  socially  equal 
among  themselves,  and  all  of  them,  in  any  particular  manor, 
with  the  same  obligations  of  service  to  the  lord.  They  were 
known  as  villani,  i.e.  the  “  villagers  ”  par  excellence ,  and  in 
the  thirteenth  century  as  virgarii ,  in  English  yardlings ,  while 
in  the  north  they  often  bore  the  title  husbands. 

Below  these  was  the  class  of  bordars  and  cotters ,  most 
of  them  holding  only  a  cottage  and  one  or  two  acres,  though 
sometimes  as  many  as  five,  eight,  or  ten  acres — of  course  in 
the  common  fields.  They  seem  to  have  been  marked  off 
from  the  villeins  proper  by  not  possessing  oxen  or  plough ; 
and  probably  in  many  cases  they  were  employed  by  the 
villeins.  During  the  couple  of  centuries  which  followed  the 
Conquest  the  name  bordarius,  which  was  perhaps  a  Norman 
importation,  was  replaced  by  the  older  English  name 
cotman  or  cotter.8  In  some  cases  between  the  yardlings 
and  the  cotters  there  was  an  intermediate  class  of  holders 
of  half  virgates ;  half-villeins  and  half-yardlings ,  as  they  were 
called.9 

The  whole  of  the  land  of  the  manor,  both  demesne  and 
villenage,  was  cultivated  on  an  elaborate  system  of  joint 
labour.  The  only  permanent  labourers  upon  the  demesne 
itself  were  a  few  slaves ; 10  all  or  almost  all  the  labour  there 
necessary  was  furnished  by  the  villeins  and  cotters,  as  the 
condition  on  which  they  held  their  holdings,  and  under  the 
supervision  of  the  lord’s  bailiff.  Domesday  Booh  does  not 
itself  record  the  services  due  from  the  villeins;  but  the 
Liber  Niger  of  Peterborough,  less  than  forty  years  later, 
gives  for  each  manor  of  that  monastery  a  detailed  account 
of  the  tenants’  labour-dues — an  account  in  striking  agreement 
with  the  lists  of  services  in  the  Bectitudines  Singularum 


Chap.  L]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  Q 

Personarum ,  a  century  and  a  half  earlier  in  date.11  Of  all 
the  later  surveys,  inquests,  or  rentals  for  three  centuries, 
such  lists  of  services  form  the  most  important  and  character¬ 
istic  part.  At  first  sight  bewildering  in  their  complexity, 
the  duties  they  register  may  readily  be  distinguished  as 
falling  under  two  main  heads  :  (1)  a  man’s  labour  for  two  or 
three  days  a  week  throughout  the  year,  known  as  week  work 
or  daily  works ; 12  and  (2)  additional  labour  for  a  few  days  at 
spring  and  autumn  ploughing  and  at  harvest  time.  On  such 
occasions  the  lord  frequently  demanded  the  labour  of  the 
whole  family,  with  the  exception  of  the  housewife.13  These 
additional  services  were  known  as  precariae  or  precationes 
(i.e.  at  the  request  of  the  lord,  ad  precem ),  for  which  the 
commonest  English  expressions  were  boondays ,  loveboons ,  and 
bedrips  ( reaping  specially  bidden).1*  Besides  these,  there 
were  usually  small  quarterly  payments  to  be  made  in  money, 
and  miscellaneous  dues  in  kind,  differing  from  manor  to 
manor, — so  many  hens  and  eggs,  or  so  many  bushels  of  oats 
at  various  seasons ;  as  well  as  miscellaneous  services,  also 
differing  in  the  different  manors,  of  which  the  one  most 
frequently  mentioned  is  “carting”  ( averagium ,  summagium). 
During  the  boondays  it  was  usual  for  the  lord  to  feed  the 
labourers;  and,  in  the  later  custumals,  the  precise  definition 
of  the  days  upon  which  they  were  and  were  not  to  be  fed  at 
the  lord’s  expense,  or,  even  more  minutely,  when  they  were 
to  have  drink  and  nothing  else,  when  bread  and  no  drink — 
a  “  dry  repast,”  when  black  bread,  when  white,  when  even 
meat,  broth,  and  cheese,  often  enlivens  the  dull  record  with 
a  gleam  of  humour.  In  one  place,  indeed,  we  are  told  that 
on  the  last  two  days  of  harvesting  each  labourer  could  bring 
a  comrade  to  supper.15 

How  the  lands  were  actually  cultivated  we  have  little 
information ;  but  Field! s  statements  as  to  the  duties  of  bailiff 


10 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


and  reeve  afford  some  glimpses  into  a  system  of  common 
cultivation,  which  had  probably  not  varied  in  its  main 
features  for  centuries.  The  chief  defect  of  the  account  there 
given  is  that  it  is  written  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  lords  of 
manors  and  their  stewards,  and  that  therefore  it  speaks  only 
of  the  cultivation  of  the  demesne,  and  tells  nothing  of  the 
way  in  which  the  land  in  villenage  was  tilled;  although, 
considering  that  the  demesne  and  villenage  were  often,  if 
not  always,  in  intermixed  acres,  it  is  clear  that  the  cultiva¬ 
tion  of  the  demesne  and  of  the  villenage  could  not  have  been 
carried  on  apart  from  one  another. 

The  most  laborious  work  was  that  of  ploughing.  The 
demesne  and  the  villenage  seem  to  have  had  each  their  own 
ploughs ;  those  of  the  demesne  being  usually  heavier,  and 
needing  more  cattle  to  draw  them.  For  the  ploughing  of 
the  demesne  the  lord’s  ploughs  were  assisted  by  those  of  the 
villeins,  to  which  they  were  bound  to  furnish  oxen  and  men 
in  due  rotation  and  proportion.  The  invariable  rule  in  the 
surveys  was  either  to  state  generally  the  services  due  from 
every  villein,  and  then  those  from  every  cotter  (in  the  latter 
case  usually  fewer  days’  work  a  week — one  or  two  instead 
of  two  or  three — and  never  ploughing ,  since  cotters  did  not 
possess  oxen 1G),  or  else  to  give  in  detail  the  services  of  the 
first  virgate  holder,  half-virgate  holder  or  cotter  mentioned, 
and  add  after  each  following  name  that  he  performs  the 
same  work  as  A.  B.,  the  case  detailed.17 

The  writer  of  Fleta  describes  each  manor  belonging  to 
a  great  lord  or  corporation  as  managed  by  three  officers — 
a  steward,  a  bailiff,  and  a  reeve.18  The  steward,  or  seneschal, 
was  not  strictly  a  manorial  officer,  but  the  lord’s  representa¬ 
tive  over  a  number  of  manors ;  and  his  chief  duty,  besides 
a  general  control  of  the  bailiffs,  was  to  hold  the  manorial 
courts.  But  in  order  to  perform  these  administrative  duties 


Chap.  I.  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  II 


properly  he  must  be  acquainted  with  the  condition  of  each 
manor.  He  should  ascertain,  says  Fleta ,  the  customary 
services  due  from  each  tenant,  find  out  if  any  has  sold  his 
holding  without  permission,  and,  if  so,  who  was  bailiff  at  the 
time  and  responsible.  He  should  know  the  number  of  acres 
to  be  ploughed,  and  the  amount  of  seed  necessary  for  sowing, 
lest  his  master  should  be  defrauded  by  “  cheating  reeves ;  ” 
he  should  know  also  how  many  tenants’  ploughs  should  help 
in  tilling  the  demesne,  and  how  often  they  were  to  be 
furnished.  Above  all,  he  must  watch  the  conduct  of  the 
bailiffs,  to  see  that  they  do  not  abuse  their  power  or  injure 
their  masters  interests:  “he  shall  inquire  how  the  bailiff 
behaves  towards  the  neighbours  and  tenants  of  the  lord ; 
whether  he  mixes  in  quarrels  or  spends  his  nights  in  taverns. 
If  the  bailiff  cause  loss  to  the  lord  by  his  misconduct  he  must 
make  it  good ;  if  his  offences  are  frequent  the  steward  shall 
remove  him.”  It  was  doubtless  only  great  proprietors  wdio 
had  stewards ;  the  lord  of  a  single  manor,  living  in  the 
village,  could  himself  hold  the  courts  and  keep  the  bailiff 
in  check. 

The  bailiff  was  the  resident  representative  of  the  lord  in 
the  manor,  and  was  especially  charged  with  the  cultivation 
of  the  demesne.  “The  bailiff  should  rise  early  in  the 
morning,  and  see  that  the  plough-teams  are  yoked ;  and  then 
he  should  walk  round  and  inspect  the  tilled  fields,  woods, 
meadows,  and  pastures.  Then  he  should  visit  the  ploughs 
at  their  work,  and  take  care  that  the  oxen  are  not  unyoked 
till  a  full  day’s  work  has  been  done.”  He  is  to  direct  the 
reaping,  mowing,  carting,  and  other  work;  to  see  that  the 
land  is  properly  marled  and  manured ;  to  prevent  the  horses 
being  overworked ;  and  to  watch  the  threshers  in  the  barn. 

The  reeve,  on  the  other  hand,  is  represented  as  a  sort  of 
foreman19  of  the  villagers.  He  was,  according  to  Fleta , 


12 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


to  be  chosen  by  the  villaia ,  or  body  of  villeins,  as  the  man 
best  skilled  in  agriculture,  and  to  be  presented  to  the  lord 
or  his  steward  for  his  acceptance.  Responsible  to  the  lord  for 
the  due  performance  of  the  villein  services,  he  was  yet 
regarded  as  the  representative  of  the  villeins,  and  on  their 
behalf  he  “  kept  a  tally  of  the  day-works,  and  reckoned  them 
up  with  the  bailiff  at  the  end  of  the  week.” 20  He  was  to 
see  that  the  demesne  and  villein  ploughs  were  set  to  work 
early ;  that  the  land  was  properly  sown,  and  not  too  lightly  ; 
and  that  it  was  well  manured.  Mr.  Wallace  tells  us  that  in 
the  Russian  villages  of  to-day  there  is  usually  the  greatest 
reluctance  to  accept  the  office  of  village  elder,  and  thereby 
become  responsible  to  the  government  for  the  village  taxes ; 
so  that  a  peasant  who,  for  some  slight  offence,  was  informed 
by  an  official  that  he  was  no  longer  capable  of  filling  any 
communal  office,  “  bowed  very  low,  and  respectfully  expressed 
his  thanks  for  the  new  privilege  which  he  had  acquired.”  21 
Doubtless  the  office  of  reeve  was  regarded  with  similar 
feelings  in  England ;  else  it  would  not  have  been  necessary 
to  insert  the  note  which  we  sometimes  find  on  a  custom-roll, 
that  every  holder  of  a  virgate  or  half-virgate  could  be 
compelled  to  accept  the  office.22  It  was  usual,  however,  to 
reward  the  reeve  by  exempting  him  partially  or  wholly  from 
labour-dues  during  his  term  of  office,  or  even  by  giving  him 
an  additional  piece  of  land.23  It  may,  indeed,  be  doubted 
whether  the  description  in  Fleta  actually  corresponded  wit 
the  general  practice — whether  there  were  in  fact  both  a 
bailiff  and  a  reeve  on  every  manor.  It  is  more  likely  that 
this  was  a  lawyer’s  generalization,  never  really  true,  or 
that,  if  it  ever  had  been  true,  it  was  already,  by  the  time 
that  book  was  written,  ceasing  to  be  so.  For  certainly,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth  century  there  seems  to  have 
been  usually  only  one  person  superintending  the  cultivation 


Chap.  IJ  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  1 3 


of  the  manor,  and  called  indifferently  reeve  or  bailiff.24  But 
this  person  clearly  performed  much  the  same  duties  as  are 
ascribed  to  the  bailiff  in  Fleta ,  so  that  we  need  not  doubt 
the  general  correctness  of  the  picture  of  co-operative  agri¬ 
culture  there  given  to  us. 

Of  the  other  side  of  village  life — the  labour  of  the 
tenants  upon  their  own  virgates — we  have  no  knowledge; 
we  can  only  conjecture  that  it  also  was  carried  on  by  a  system 
of  joint  labour,  each  holder  contributing  oxen  and  men  to 
the  common  ploughs  in  proportion  to  his  holding,  probably 
also  joining  his  fellows  in  mowing  hay  and  reaping  corn 
on  some  common  plan. 

§  2.  It  has  been  necessary  to  begin  with  this  outline  of 
the  manorial  system  in  order  that  the  nature  of  the  problem 
of  early  social  history  in  England  should  be  understood.  It 
is  now  possible  to  turn  back  and  explain  why  it  is  here 
deemed  advisable  to  begin  at  the  eleventh  century  and  not 
earlier,  and  why  the  description  given  above  is  guarded  by 
the  limitation  to  the  midland  and  southern  counties. 

It  is  well  to  begin  with  the  eleventh  century,  because 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  at  that  time  the  whole 
of  central  England  was  covered  with  manors  of  substantially 
the  same  character ;  and  we  cannot  begin  earlier  because  it 
is  by  no  means  agreed  how  that  condition  of  things  came 
about.  The  most  vital  of  all  the  questions  in  the  early  social 
history  of  England  is  still  in  dispute,  namely  whether  it 
began  with  a  population  of  freemen  or  a  population  of  serfs. 
From  the  nature  of  the  case  this  must  for  the  present  remain 
a  subject  for  research.  But  it  is  impossible  altogether  to 
avoid  the  controversy,  and  a  statement  of  the  points  at  issue 
will  bring  out  more  clearly  the  character  of  the  manorial 
system  itself. 

A  lecturer,  dealing  with  this  subject  ten  years  ago,  would 


14 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


probably  have  set  out  with  the  confident  assertion  that  the 
greater  part  of  the  English  population  were  at  first  grouped 
together  in  free  self-governing  village  communities.  He 
would  indeed  have  granted  that  some  of  the  great  nobles, 
having  many  dependents,  possibly  from  the  very  first  in  a 
few  isolated  districts  created  settlements  something  like  the 
later  manors ;  and  also  that  a  similar  shape  was  probably 
taken  by  the  settlements  of  cultivators  on  the  folkland. 
But  these  he  would  have  considered  as  comparatively  ex¬ 
ceptional,  and,  speaking  generally,  the  manorial  organiza¬ 
tion  would  have  been  regarded  as  something  superimposed 
on  the  old  free  community.  The  power  of  the  lord  he 
would  have  described  as  of  very  slow  growth;  as  due  to 
royal  grants  of  jurisdiction,  to  the  dangers  which  forced 
the  freeman  to  commend  himself  to  some  more  powerful 
neighbour,  and  to  the  assimilation  of  the  free  community 
under  a  lord’s  jurisdiction  to  a  dependent  community  living 
on  a  lord’s  land.  He  would  have  argued  that  this  process 
was  hastened  by  the  Norman  Conquest ;  and  that  the  Norman 
lawyers,  with  their  rigid  terminology  of  villccnus  and  bor - 
darius ,  gave  a  seeming  uniformity  to  a  condition  of  things 
in  which  there  were  still  very  considerable  differences  of 
status. 

Such  was  the  form  into  which  the  caution  of  the  Bishop 
of  Chester  threw  the  main  proposition  of  modern  German 
historians — the  proposition,  namely,  that  Teutonic  history 
begins  with  groups  of  freemen .  But  of  late  years  this 
construction  has  been  assailed  from  two  directions.  M.  Fustel 
de  Coulanges  and  a  knot  of  French  scholars  have  shown  how 
scanty  and  ambiguous  is  the  evidence  on  which  the  German 
theories  were  built ;  and,  in  especial,  that  all  the  essential 
features  of  the  manor,  as  an  agricultural  group  subject  to  a 
lord,  with  the  exception  of  the  lord’s  jurisdiction,  may  reason- 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  1 5 


ably  be  traced  to  tlie  later  Boman  law.  Still  more  important 
is  the  recent  work  of  Mr.  Seebobm,  which  aims  at  establish¬ 
ing  the  proposition  that  the  mass  of  the  people,  in  what  is 
now  England,  were  from  the  first  in  a  servile  condition,  and 
that  their  history,  up  to  the  Norman  Conquest  and  beyond, 
has  been  one  of  progressive  amelioration.  The  strength  of 
his  argument  does  not  lie  in  the  actual  examples  adduced  by 
him  earlier  than  the  eleventh  century,  which  may  all  be 
made  out  to  be  exceptional  because  taken  from  the  royal 
demesne ;  but  in  that  he  really  makes  us  understand  what 
the  internal  organization  of  the  manor  was,  and  shows  how 
uniform  were  its  main  characteristics.  It  is  the  uniform 
agricultural  system,  the  system  of  joint  compulsory  labour, 
that  is  so  difficult  to  explain  on  the  old  hypothesis.  For, 
even  granting,  as  perhaps  the  adherents  of  the  old  theory 
would,  that  a  fourth  of  the  manors  may  have  existed  from 
the  first,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  the  other  three-fourths 
arose  out  of  free  communities,  which  had;  gradually  become 
subject  to  such  extremely  onerous  burdens.  We  should  at 
any  rate  expect  to  find  many  intermediate  stages, — cases  in 
which  the  lord,  by  his  own  servants,  cultivated  the  demesne, 
receiving  from  the  tenants  only  suit  at  his  court;  cases, 
again,  in  which  he  received  suit  and  rent  without  labour, 
and  others  in  which  the  labour  services  were  only  occasional  : 
we  should  not  expect,  on  the  theory  of  the  gradual  fall  of  free 
communities,  that  the  services  of  the  tenants  would  be  so 
burdensome,  and  so  uniformly  the  same.  But  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  the  hypothesis  of  the  original  serfdom  of 
the  bulk  of  the  population  (whether  English  or  Bomanized 
Celt)  is  not  without  its  difficulties.  The  districts  from 
which  Angles,"  Saxons,  and  Jutes  came  are  districts  in  which 
is  now  found  neither  a  three-field  system,  as  was  most  usual 
in  England,  nor  a  two-field  system,  which  also  frequently 


1 6  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I 

occurs,  but  a  one-field  system,  which  has  existed  for 
centuries, — the  plan  of  raising  the  same  crops  on  the  same 
land  without  fallow.35  It  must  be  supposed,  therefore,  that 
the  English  invaders  found  the  three-field  system  already  in 
Britain.  Mr.  Seebohm  seems  to  believe  that  the  mass  of 
the  Provincials  or  Eomanized  Celts  were  spared  by  the 
conquerors ; 26  that  the  greater  men  among  the  invaders 
became  lords  of  manors ;  while  the  rank  and  file  received 
free  allotments,  or  even  settled  in  free  village  communities, 
but  were  so  few  in  number  as  not  substantially  to  influence 
the  late  development.27  Mr.  Freeman  has  argued  that  in 
that  case  the  language  of  the  conquerors  would  have  been 
overcome,  as  in  Gaul  and  Spain,  and  that  Christianity  would 
not  so  completely  have  disappeared  as  at  Augustine’s  landing. 
These  arguments  would  be  unanswerable  could  we  suppose 
that  Britain  had  been  either  so  thoroughly  Eomanized  or  so 
thoroughly  Christianized  as  the  other  Eoman  provinces. 
But  that  was  certainly  not  the  case. 

Whatever  supposition  may  be  adopted  as  to  the  origin  of 
the  manor,  whether  it  rose  out  of  freedom  or  servitude,  there 
is  little  difficulty  in  explaining  the  origin  of  the  curious 
dispersal  of  each  man’s  tenancy  in  divided  acres.  In  the 
Welsh  laws  we  find  regulations,  applicable  to  an  earlier 
social  stage  than  any  of  which  we  have  documentary 
evidence  among  the  English,  which  regulate  the  common 
ploughing  of  the  agricultural  group.  These  lay  down  that 
every  year  the  first  strip  that  is  ploughed  shall  be  allotted 
to  the  ploughman,  the  next  to  the  irons  ( i.e .  to  him  who 
had  furnished  the  ploughshare,  etc.),  the  next  to  the  first 
ox,  i.e.  its  owner,  and  so  for  the  seven  other  oxen,  the  driver 
and  the  plough  (i.e.  the  carpenter  who  made  and  repaired 
it).  Thus  he  who  furnished  one  ox  would  have  one  strip 
out  of  every  ten  or  so;  those  furnishing  two,  twice  as 


Chap,  ij  TLtE  MANOR  ANb  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  1 7 

many.28  There  are  many  indications  that  the  ordinary 
contribution  of  a  “  full  villein  ”  to  the  communal  team  was 
two  oxen ; 29  if  the  later  state  of  things,  with  the  permanent 
individual  tenancy  of  particular  acres,  had  arisen  out  of  an 
earlier  system  of  annual  division,  we  can  readily  understand 
that  there  would  be  uniformity  in  the  amount  of  holding  of 
all  those  who  furnished  two  oxen  (the  virgarii ,  or  jpleni  villani ), 
and  of  those  who  furnished  only  one  (the  semi-virgarii ,  dimidii 
villani ),  and  that  those  who  had  contributed  no  oxen  at  all 
would  have  scanty  shares  or  no  more  than  cottages,  unless 
they  had  acted  as  ploughmen  or  carpenters.  In  the  later 
surveys  we  constantly  find  that  one  man’s  strips  adjoin  those 
of  the  same  fellow-tenant,30  which  strengthens  the  hypothesis 
that  “  intermixed  ”  fields  were  due  to  the  distribution  of  acres 
in  order  of  oxen,  so  that  each  man  might  have  his  share  both 
of  good  land  and  of  bad,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  his 
oxen. 

The  description  of  the  manor  in  the  last  section  wTas 
limited  to  central  and  southern  England,  and  this  because 
two  other  classes  besides  villeins  and  cotters  appear  in  the 
east  and  south-west.  Of  the  population  recorded  in  Domes¬ 
day,  villeins  and  bordars  are  scattered  pretty  evenly  over 
the  country,  the  average  percentage  of  the  former  being  38, 
of  the  latter  32,  making  up  between  them  seven-tenths  of 
the  whole.31  But  the  servi ,  or  slaves,  whose  average  per¬ 
centage  for  the  whole  land  is  9,  and  who  in  some  of  the 
eastern  and  midland  shires  do  not  appear  at  all,  or  fall  to 
a  percentage  of  4  or  5,  rise  in  the  country  on  the  Welsh 
border  and  in  the  south-west  to  17,  18,  21,  and  24  per  cent. 
We  cannot  but  explain  this  by  the  supposition  that  in  the 
later  stages  of  the  English  conquest  a  greater  number  of 
the  British  cultivators  were  spared,  so  that  in  these  dis¬ 
tricts  slaves  came  to  form  a  considerable  part  of  the  rural 

c 


1 8  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY,  [Book  I. 

population.  Absolute  slavery,  however,  disappeared  in  less 
than  a  century  after  the  Conquest,  and  the  servi  became  cus- 
tomaiy  holders  of  small  plots,  like  the  cotters  elsewhere 
but  on  more  onerous  conditions.82 

In  the  eastern  and  east-central  counties,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  socmen  and  liberi  homines ,  who  do  not  form  more 
than  4  per  cent,  of  the  whole  population,  and  in  the  south 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  midlands  are  entirely  absent,  rise 
to  as  much  as  27,  28,  32,  40  and  45  per  cent,  of  the  whole.83 
As  surely  as  the  slaves  in  the  west  are  connected  with  the 
Britons,  so  surely  are  the  socmen  and  freemen  of  the  east 
connected  with  the  Danish  settlements.  And  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  the  names  socman  (i.e.  one  subject  to  the  soc, 
or  jurisdiction,  of  a  lord)  and  freeman  (i.e.  one  free  from  what 
were  regarded  as  servile  conditions  of  tenure,  whatever  these 
may  have  been),  had  very  much  the  same  meaning. 

The  fact  that  Domesday  records  in  Suffolk  35  per  cent, 
of  the  population  as  freemen  and  only  5  per  cent,  as  socmen, 
in  Norfolk  16  per  cent,  of  each,  in  Lincoln  45  per  cent,  as 
socmen  and  no  freemen  at  all,  can  only  be  explained  by  the 
supposition  that  the  “  barones  regis”  who  drew  up  the 
survey  often  described  as  socmen,  in  one  shire,  persons  whom 
their  fellows  in  the  neighbouring  shire  called  freemen.  It 
may  be  gathered  from  the  scanty  evidence  of  Domesday , 
compared  with  that  furnished  in  the  Liber  Niger  of  Peter¬ 
borough  for  the  manors  of  that  monastery,  that  the  word 
socmen  covered  two  widely  differing  classes;  namely,  men 
holding  very  considerable  portions  of  manors  with  villeins 
dependent  upon  them,  and  men  holding  only  virgates  or 
portions  of  virgates  and  forming  part  of  the  labouring  village 
community.  The  former,  however,  were  but  few  in  num¬ 
ber.  They  may  be  regarded  as  landowners  who,  until 
the  Norman  Conquest,  had  not  been  considered  as  tenants  at 


Chap.  IJ  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  1 9 


all  of  the  more  powerful  neighbours  to  whose  soc  they  were 
subject ;  although,  like  the  commended  freemen ,  who  are  also 
occasionally  described  as  holding  large  estates  with  villeins 
and  bordars  upon  them,  the  result  of  the  Norman  Conquest 
must  have  been  to  turn  them  into  sub-tenants,  holding  what 
may  afterwards  have  become  sub-manors.34 

But  the  great  body  of  socmen  were  clearly  enough  in 
much  the  same  position  as  villeins,  with  two  important 
differences.  They  were  not  bound  to  week- work, 85  the  most 
distinctive  mark  of  villein  tenure ;  and  they  were,  frequently 
at  any  rate,  bound  to  military  service.36  But  they  were 
obliged  to  take  part  in  the  precariae,  to  join  in  harrowing  and 
harvesting,  and  to  assist  the  lord  for  a  few  days  with  their 
ploughs  in  autumn  and  spring.87  Their  holdings — though  not 
always  whole  virgates — are  often  estimated  in  virgates,  from 
which  it  follows  that  they  were  made  up  of  scattered  strips 
in  the  common  fields.  Like  the  villeins,  they  could  not 
sell  their  lands,88  nor  leave  the  manor  without  their  lord’s 
consent.89  The  great  body  of  socmen,  then,  were  members 
of  the  village  groups,  joining  in  the  system  of  common 
agriculture,  but  with  less  burdensome  services  and  more 
honourable  duties.  We  may  reasonably  conjecture  that  this 
state  of  things  was  due  to  Danish  chiefs  seizing  the  manor 
houses  and  putting  their  followers  in  the  place  of  some  of 
the  Saxons  villeins ;  and  that  the  new  comers,  while  willing 
to  assist  their  lords  at  busy  times,  would  not  submit  to 
labour  for  them  so  many  days  a  week,  like  those  whose  places 
they  had  taken. 

§  3.  Keeping  before  our  minds  the  typical  manor  with 
its  division  into  demesne  and  villenage,  and  its  sharply 
distinguished  classes  of  villeins  and  cotters,  let  us  attempt  to 
trace  the  changes  which  gradually  took  place  during  the 
three  centuries  which  followed  the  Norman  Conquest.  In 


20 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


so  doing  it  will  be  well  to  restrict  onr  view  to  tbe  evidence 
furnished  by  custumals  and  rentals,  and  to  pay  no  regard  to 
the  definitions  of  the  lawyers ;  and  this  because  definitions 
throw  a  fallacious  veil  of  uniformity  over  widely  differing 
circumstances;  because,  moreover,  the  lawyers  of  the  thir¬ 
teenth  century  saw  English  facts  through  the  spectacles  of 
the  Eoman  law ; 40  and  further,  with  especial  regard  to  Bracton, 
because  the  work  which  passes  under  his  name  is  full  of 
interpolations,  inconsistent  with  the  general  argument. 

When  we  compare  the  comparative  simplicity  of  Domes¬ 
day  Booh ,  in  which,  over  the  greater  part  of  England,  villeins, 
cotters  or  bordars,  and  slaves  make  up  the  whole  of  the 
population,  with  the  elaborate  division  into  six,  eight,  or 
even  ten  classes  in  the  custumals  of  the  later  part  of  the 
thirteenth  century,41  the  changes  seem  bewildering  in  their 
complexity  and  variety.  But  it  will  be  found  that  most  of 
them  may  be  grouped  under  four  heads :  (1)  the  growth  of 
of  a  large  class  of  free  tenants ;  (2)  the  commutation  of  the 
week- work  for  money  or  corn  payments  ;  (3)  the  commutation 
of  the  boon-days  and  other  special  services;  and  (4)  the 
appearance  of  a  class  of  men  dependent  wholly  or  in  part  on 
the  wages  they  received  for  agricultural  labour. 

i.  (a)  The  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  free  tenants 
after  the  Conquest  is  one  of  the  most  certain  and  important  of 
facts.  Now,  the  term  libere  tenentes  is  elastic  enough  to  cover 
men  in  very  different  positions,  from  the  military  tenant 
who  had  obtained  a  considerable  holding  in  return  for  service 
in  the  field,  down  to  the  man  who  had  received  at  a  money 
rent  one  or  two  acres  of  the  demesne,  or  of  newly  cleared 
ground.  But  the  larger  number  of  those  known  by  that 
name  were,  clearly,  virgate-holding  villeins  or  the  descen¬ 
dants  of  such,  who  had  commuted  their  more  onerous  labour 
services  of  two  or  three  days  a  week  for  a  money  or  corn 


Chap.  IJ  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  21 


payment,  and  had  been  freed  from  what  were  regarded  as 
the  more  servile  “  incidents  ”  of  their  position.42  What  these 
exactly  were,  or,  indeed,  what  was  understood  by  free  tenure, 
it  is  difficult  now  to  determine,  precisely  because  the  lawyers 
and  landlords  of  the  time  did  not  themselves  know.  The 
most  widely  spread  idea  was  that  inability  to  give  a  daughter 
in  marriage  or  to  sell  an  ox  or  a  horse  without  the  lord’s 
consent,  for  which  a  fine  had  to  be  paid,  was  the  certain 
mark  of  servile  tenure.43  These  disabilities  were,  possibly, 
survivals  from  the  time  when  such  marriage  or  sale  lessened 
the  working  power  of  the  manor.44  The  distinction  between 
free  and  servile  tenure  which  they  involved  was  confirmed 
by  judicial  decision  ;  for,  when,  in  the  fifteenth  year  of  John, 
the  question  arose  as  to  whether  a  certain  man  held  freely 
or  no,  and  the  jurors  of  the  neighbourhood  reported  that  he 
was  bound  to  plough  three  acres  of  his  lord’s  land,  to  mow 
and  carry  home  a  certain  quantity  of  hay,  and  to  assist  his 
lord  in  autumn,  but  that  “  they  never  heard  tell  that  he  paid 
a  fine  to  the  lord  on  marrying  a  daughter,  or  selling  an  ox,” 
the  judges  decided  that  services  such  as  these  did  not  make 
the  holding  a  villein  one.45  Yet  we  find  cases  in  which  men, 
not  bound  to  week- work  and  undoubtedly  regarded  as  free 
tenants,  were  still  subject  to  these  annoying  restrictions.46 
The  same  uncertainty  as  to  what  constituted  a  free  holding 
is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  those  tenants  known  as  molmen 
or  malmen ,  from  having  gained  exemption  from  the  “  greater 
services  ”  in  return  for  a  rent  mol,  or  mail,  though  they  were 
usually  registered  as  servile,  were  yet  sometimes  counted 
among  free  tenants.47 

Indeed,  all  that  can  be  said  is,  that  permanence  of  tenure, 
which  in  the  case  of  servile  holdings  was  guaranteed  only 
by  custom  and  the  morality  of  the  time,  could,  in  the  case  of 
a  tenant  able  to  satisfy  the  judges  that  his  holding  was  not 


22 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


servile,  be  maintained  by  action  in  the  royal  courts.  But 
this  does  not  show  how  the  fact  of  free  tenure  was  deter¬ 
mined.  Such  cases  can  have  occurred  but  seldom,  and 

probably  the  legal  interpretations  were  not  always  con¬ 
sistent.  In  the  thirteenth  century,  if  not  earlier,  free 

tenants  often  obtained  charters  from  their  lords  conferring 
possession  “for  ever,”  or,  “to  themselves  and  their  heirs,” 
so  that  the  holding  by  charter  came  itself  to  be  popularly 
regarded  as  a  sign  of  freedom.48  But  there  were  free  tenants 
who  never  had  charters.49 

The  process  of  commutation  had  probably  begun  before 
the  Conquest,  and,  if  so,  this  will  help  us  to  explain  the 
entries  in  the  Domesday  Survey  relative  to  some  few 
hundred  persons  described  as  censores  or  censarii , 50  and  coli- 
berti .51  The  itinerant  barons  who  drew  up  the  survey 

must  have  come  across  men  whose  position  was  the  same  as 
that  of  the  villeins,  save  that  they  paid  rent  instead  of  daily 
service,  and  for  these  men  they  would  naturally  make  use 
of  terms  in  general  use  on  the  continent  to  describe  tenants 
intermediate  in  position  between  the  altogether  free  and  the 
altogether  servile.  The  Norman  Conquest  would  not  hinder, 
would  rather  hasten  the  process  of  commutation.  There 
are  indeed  isolated  cases  of  men  being  unjustly  degraded  by 
the  new  lords  from  the  position  of  free  tenants  to  that  of 
villeins,62  but  acts  of  oppression  like  these  had  no  special 
connection  with  the  Conquest,  and  might  easily  have 
happened  long  before,  as  we  know  they  happened  long 
after,53  that  event.  Indeed,  when  we  begin  to  understand 
the  character  of  the  agricultural  system,  we  can  see  that  with 
the  lords  it  was  not  at  all  a  question  of  sentiment  either  for 
or  against  free  tenure,  but  merely  a  question  of  relative 
advantage.  The  man  who  became  a  free  tenant  continued 
to  provide  his  lord  with  labour  at  those  seasons  when  it  was 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  23 


most  needed;  and  the  money,  which  he  paid  in  exchange 
for  his  week-work,  might  be  much  more  useful  to  the  lord 
than  the  work  itself.  Accordingly  we  should  expect,  with 
the  greater  security  which  the  Norman  rule  brought,  and 
the  increased  population  and  cheaper  labour  consequent  upon 
it,  that  commutation  would  take  place  with  increasing 
frequency.  This  is,  in  fact,  exactly  what  we  find.54  For 
example,  in  the  reign  of  Henry  I.  all  the  manors  of  the 
Abbot  of  Burton  were  already  divided  between  demesne , 
land  at  work ,  and  land  at  rent  ( ad  opus  and  ad  malam 56)  ;  the 
holders  of  the  latter  (who  are  also  described  by  the  Domes¬ 
day  term  censarii 56),  were  free  from  such  week-work,  but  were 
still  bound  to  lend  their  ploughs  twice  a  year,  and  three 
times  to  assist  in  reaping. 

The  general  development,  however,  and  the  use  of  the 
term  “  free  tenants  ”  for  men  in  the  position  of  censarii, 
will  be  best  illustrated  from  a  particular  manor,  which 
we  have  excellent  means  of  studying  during  two  centuries. 
The  manor  of  Beauchamp,  in  Essex,  belonging  to  the 
Chapter  of  S.  Paul’s,  appears  in  the  survey  of  1086,  in 
a  fragmentary  Domesday ,  which  the  Dean  and  historian 
Balph  de  Diceto  caused  to  be  drawn  up  in  1181,  and  in 
the  Domesday  of  S.  Haul's  of  1222  :  we  have  also  a  rent- 
roll  for  certain  of  its  lands  in  1240 ;  and  there  is  in  exist¬ 
ence  a  survey  of  1279,  from  which,  however,  only  a  few 
particulars  have  been  printed.57  Now,  in  the  Domesday 
Book  the  tenants  are  stated  to  be  twenty-four  villeins,  ten 
bordarii,  five  servi ;  there  are  no  free  tenants  or  socmen  of 
any  sort.  But  in  1181  there  are  not  only  thirty-five  tenants- 
in-demesne  (of  whom  many  have  very  small  pieces,  and  may 
reasonably  be  regarded  as  the  descendants  of  servi ,  to  whom 
small  holdings  have  been  given),  but  there  are  eighteen 
liberi  tenentes ,  all  of  whose  holdings  are  reckoned  in  virgates 


24 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY, \  [Book  I. 


or  fractions  of  virgates,  and  all  of  whom,  though  they  pay 
considerable  sums  annually  for  their  land,  are  still  bound 
to  precariae,  so  that  they  are  evidently  the  descendants  of 
the  villeins  of  Domesday ,68  Besides  these  there  are  ten 
holders  of  terrae  ojoerariae  corresponding  to  the  “work- 
land”  of  other  documents;69  and  at  this  point  the  record 
breaks  off,  and  we  do  not  know  how  many  more  holders  of 
half  virgates  there  may  have  been,  or  how  many  cotters  with 
still  smaller  portions.  In  the  lists  of  1222  the  number  of 
tenants-in- demesne  has  increased;  but  so  has  also  that  of 
free  tenants — in  the  latter  case  from  eighteen  to  thirty-four  ; 
though,  as  the  area  held  by  them  has  only  increased  from  667 
to  744  acres,  this  greater  number  must  be  due  chiefly  to 
subdivision.  But  the  last  two  names  there  given  seem  to 
be  those,  in  the  one  case,  of  a  man  who  had  himself  held 
work-land  in  1181,  and  in  the  other  of  the  son  of  a  man  in 
that  position ;  so  that  we  may  regard  these  as  having  risen  to 
free  tenure  in  the  forty  years  that  had  elapsed. 

After  the  free  tenants  follow  the  names  of  sixteen  holders 
of  work-lands,  each  with  half  a  virgate.  This  last  entry  is 
significant ;  for  we  find,  in  some  districts  at  least,  a  very 
marked  increase,  in  the  century  after  the  Conquest,  in  the 
number  of  dimidii  virgarii ,  holders  of  half  virgates,60  owing, 
perhaps,  to  more  land  being  put  under  the  plough,  or  to  the 
division  of  virgates  between  two  persons.  And,  as  we  might 
expect,  while  the  ^ardlings  were  often  able  to  commute 
their  services  and  become  free  tenants,  the  half-yardlings, 
as  in  the  Beauchamp  case  just  cited,  and  in  many  others, 
long  remained  bound  to  week- work.61 

The  Beauchamp  rental  illustrates  another  very  important 
point.  It  is  that  while  servile  holdings  retain  their  uniformity 
of  size  in  each  manor — continue,  that  is  to  say,  to  consist  of 
yard  lands  or  half  yardlands, — the  free  holdings  on  an  estate 


Chat*.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  25 


differ  very  considerably  in  size  from  one  another.  But  it  is 
noticeable  that,  whatever  the  holdings  may  be — and  some 
of  them  are  very  small, — they  are  all  multiples  or  fractions 
of  thirty  acres,  i.e.  of  virgates.  Some  of  the  holdings,  indeed, 
are  of  sizes  that  are  only  explicable  as  fractions  of  the 
virgate,  e.g.  22 ^  acres  as  three-quarters,  and  acres  as 
a  quarter  of  such  a  unit.  In  a  few  cases  they  are  larger : 
one  tenant  holds  fifty  acres,  i.e.  a  virgate  and  two-thirds, 
together  with  two  whole  virgates,  two  half  virgates,  and  a 
third ;  and  two  other  tenants  have  two  virgates  each.  Cases 
in  which  a  similar  difference  of  size  appears  are  frequently  to 
be  met  with.62  The  curiously  fractional  holdings  can  scarcely 
be  due  to  any  other  cause  but  division  between  children; 
and  the  aggregation  of  holdings  may  have  been  caused  by 
inheritance  or  purchase.  However  this  may  be  explained, 
even  if  we  do  not  accept  Mr.  Seebohm’s  theory,  that  equality 
of  holding  is  itself  a  mark  of  the  servile  origin  of  the 
tenure,63  it  is  clear  that  free  tenure  tended  to  cause  holdings 
to  become  subdivided  or  aggregated  either  by  succession  or 
otherwise;  that  increasing  personal  freedom,  in  this  as  in 
many  other  things,  brought  greater  economic  inequality. 
This  tendency  would  be  checked  as  soon  as  primogeniture, 
instead  of  division,  became  the  rule  of  succession  to  free 
non-military  holdings — a  change  which  seems  to  have  taken 
place  pretty  generally  before  the  fourteenth  century.64  We 
know  nothing  of  the  cause,  and  can  only  conjecture  that  it 
was  due  to  the  contagious  example  of  the  rule  of  primogeni¬ 
ture  in  holdings  in  chivalry. 

(/ 3 )  There  was  an  increase  also  of  another  class  of  men 
freed  from  the  more  servile  burdens  of  villenage,  viz.  the 
class  of  socmen ; 65  and  this  increase  was  so  marked 
that  socage  became  the  lawyer’s  term  for  free  non-military 
tenure, 


2  6 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


It  has  been  seen  that  in  many  cases  a  holding  was  spoken 
of  as  free  though  the  tenant  was  still  bound  to  precariae, 
to  assist  at  ploughing,  harvesting,  etc.  But  this  seems  to 
be  in  districts  where  there  were  no  socmen;  where  both 
classes  are  found,  and  their  positions  can  be  compared,  the 
distinction  seems  to  be  that  in  such  districts  the  term  free 
tenants  is  employed  exclusively  for  those  who  were  free  from 
labour  altogether,  while  the  term  socmen  was  used  for  those 
who  were  still  bound  to  precariae,  though  released  from 
other  services.  Hence  an  inquisition  at  the  end  of  the 
thirteenth  century  distinguishes  between  the  two  classes, 
which  it  puts  at  the  head  of  the  tenants,  as  “  freeholders  by 
charter,”  and  “  freeholders  who  are  called  free  socmen.” 65 

(y)  In  some  manors  it  was  possible  for  the  number  of  free- 
holdings  to  be  raised  by  an  increase  in  the  extent  of  culti¬ 
vated  land.  Near  most  villages  was  a  stretch  of  “  waste  ” 
land,  covered  with  trees  and  bushes  and  used  for  common 
pasturage.  As  the  increase  of  population  strengthened  the 
labour  forces  of  the  manor,  it  became  the  lord’s  interest  to 
enclose  portions  of  the  waste,  and  either  add  them  to  his 
demesne  or  let  them  to  the  villagers.  By  the  statute  of  Merton, 
indeed,  in  1235,  the  lord’s  right  of  “approver,”  or  improve¬ 
ment,  was  limited  by  the  condition  that  he  should  leave  suffi¬ 
cient  pasture  for  “  knights  and  freeholders  .  .  .  infeoffed  of 
small  tenements  ”  in  the  manor ; 67  and  a  custom  which  grew 
up  in  many  places  made  the  consent  of  the  “  homage,”  i.e.  the 
body  of  free  tenants,  necessary  before  any  grant  from  the  waste 
could  be  made.68  But  as  the  freeholders  were  few  in  number, 
the  action  of  manorial  lords  would  be  but  little  hampered 
by  this  restriction.  The  grants  seem  almost  invariably  to 
have  been  small ;  cases  in  which  they  are  as  large  as  ten  or 
twelve  acres  are  very  rare,  and  usually  they  are  only  five,  four, 
three,  or  two  acres,  very  frequently  one  acre  or  even  one  rcod : 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  27 


and  they  were  always  let  at  money  rents,  and  never  subject 
to  labour  obligations.  Among  the  names  of  the  tenants  of 
the  essart ,  or  clearance,  we  find  many  who  held  at  the 
same  time  either  virgates  in  free  tenure  or  land  in  villenage ; 
but  probably  in  most  cases  the  new  holdings  were  given  to 
the  younger  sons  of  tenants — especially  cotters — who  other¬ 
wise  would  have  held  no  land  at  all.69  It  was  here,  and  on 
the  demesne,  that  cottages  and  plots  of  land  were  found 
for  the  artisans,  mostly  weavers™  who  first  show  themselves 
in  the  villages  in  the  thirteenth  century.  This  is  itself  a 
sign  of  an  increasing  division  of  employments;  for  before 
this  time  the  housewives  had  woven  the  cloth  which  their 
families  needed.71 

(8)  Hitherto  all  the  free  holdings  described  were  such  as 
were  created  on  the  land  held  in  villenage,  or  on  land  which 
the  villeins  had  previously  used  in  common.  Allusion,  how¬ 
ever,  has  already  been  made  to  tenants  holding  demesne  land. 
The  letting  of  portions  of  the  demesne  for  money  rents  had 
in  many  instances  taken  place  quite  as  early  as  any  of  the 
other  changes  which  have  been  described ; 72  but  it  was 
thought  well  to  reserve  its  consideration  to  this  point,  in 
order  to  keep  clearly  marked  the  distinction  between  the 
two  parts  into  which  the  lands  of  every  manor  were  divided, 
the  lands  in  villenage  and  the  lands  in  demesne.  It  has 
been  seen  that  the  whole  organization  of  the  manor  was 
directed  towards  providing  labour  for  the  cultivation  of  that 
part  which  the  lord  kept  in  his  own  hands.  It  is  therefore 
evident  that  if  the  lord  found  it  his  interest  to  let  portions 
of  the  demesne  instead  of  cultivating  it  through  his  bailiff  or 
reeve,  his  need  for  the  services  of  the  villeins  would  be  pro 
tanto  diminished,  and  he  would  be  readier  to  accept  commu¬ 
tation.  The  letting  of  the  demesne  would  do  more,  then, 
than  any  other  cause  to  change  the  relations  between  the 


28 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


lord  and  the  villagers.  Not,  indeed,  that  it  would  to  anything 
like  the  same  extent  disturb  the  system  of  joint  agriculture 
pursued  by  the  villagers.  For  the  demesne,  as  has  been 
seen,  was  itself  usually  partly  made  up  of  virgates,  i.e.  of 
scattered  acres  in  the  intermixed  fields.  The  new  tenant,  if 
the  land  he  received  was  made  up  of  such  scattered  strips, 
would  be  bound  by  the  rotation  of  crops  observed  by  his 
neighbours ;  and  if  there  was  a  co-operative  system  of 
ploughing,  as  is  probable,  would  take  his  share  in  it. 
Moreover  the  labour  obligation  of  each  villein  had  often 
been  defined  as  the  ploughing,  harrowing,  and  reaping  of 
a  certain  number  of  acres.  In  an  age  when  the  tendency 
towards  definition  was  so  strong,  it  is  likely  enough  that 
custom  had  fixed  which  particular  acres  of  demesne  a  man 
was  bound  to  cultivate.  And  if,  as  may  naturally  be 
supposed,  the  renting  of  demesne  land  often  meant  only 
that  a  man  who  had  previously  been  bound  to  cultivate 
certain  acres,  the  lord  taking  the  produce,  now  promised 
to  pay  a  certain  fixed  amount  in  return  for  whatever  the 
produce  might  chance  to  be,  there  would  be  absolutely 
no  disturbance  at  all  in  the  actual  method  of  cultivation. 

In  most  cases  apparently  the  bulk,  if  not  the  whole,  of 
the  demesne  was  retained  in  the  hands  of  the  lord.  But 
frequently  as  much  as  a  fourth  was  let  to  free  tenants — one 
person  occasionally  receiving  a  half  virgate  or  a  virgate, 
though  usually  the  holdings  are  very  small,  from  four  acres 
to  half  an  acre,  and  it  is  sometimes  added  after  the  names  of 
the  holders  that  it  is  “  in  addition  to  land  ”  they  held  other¬ 
wise,  i.e .  in  the  common  fields  by  free  or  villein  tenure.73 
Occasionally,  however,  the  whole  demesne  was  divided  in  this 
way  ;  in  one  instance  into  thirty  holdings  each  of  one  nohe 
(a  quarter  of  a  virgate),  with  three  of  two  nokes  each,  and 
four  of  only  half  a  noke.74  And  in  this  and  similar  cases  it 


Chap.  IJ  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  2g 


followed,  almost  of  necessity,  that  all  the  labour-dues  of  all 
the  tenants  were  commuted.75  Such  grants  might  be  either 
tenancies  at  will,  or  might  be  in  perpetual  freehold;  and 
tenants  in  the  former  position  were  sometimes  able  to  gain  a 
perpetual  holding  by  promising  to  pay  a  higher  quit  rent.76 

Thus,  then,  a  body  of  free  tenants  had  been  created  in  three 
ways :  by  the  elevation  of  villeins  on  the  commutation  of 
their  services  for  money  payment;  by  the  enclosure  and 
letting  out  of  portions  of  the  waste ;  and  by  the  letting  out 
of  portions  of  the  lord’s  own  demesne. 

§  4.  ii.  In  all  the  cases  previously  noticed  the  commutation 
of  labour- dues  for  money  had  been  accompanied  by  a  rise 
from  servile  to  free  tenure.  But  from  the  beginning  of  the 
thirteenth  century  we  notice  a  much  more  general  and  far- 
reaching  change — the  commutation  of  week- work,  or  even  of 
all  labour  services,  without  the  tenant  being  thereby  raised 
to  a  free  tenure.  "We  find  in  many  of  the  custumals  of  the 
thirteenth  century  that,  even  where  the  labour  is  not  generally 
commuted,  each  item  of  it — a  day’s  work  of  each  sort — is 
precisely  valued,  at  a  halfpenny,  a  penny,  or  the  like.77  At 
first,  probably,  this  was  in  order  to  assess  the  fines  to  be  paid 
by  a  villein  who  neglected  his  due  task.  But  very  often  the 
money  would  be  more  welcome  than  the  labour ;  and  in  Fleta 
the  reeve  is  directed  to  look  carefully  after  arrears  of  labour, 
and  to  try  to  get  money  for  them.  This  would  naturally 
lead  to  the  total  money  value  of  all  the  services  being  added 
up,  and  to  commutation  being  effected  by  the  more  prosperous 
and  ambitious  villeins.  The  change  can  be  most  clearly 
traced  in  the  manors  belonging  to  S.  Paul’s,  where,  in  1222, 
the  alteration  had  only  recently  been  made,  and  the  name  of 
the  canon  who  had  brought  about  the  commutation  when  he 
had  “farmed”  the  manor  could  still  be  remembered.78  In 
some  manors  no  labour-dues  had  been  commuted ;  in  others, 


30 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


some  had  and  some  had  not.79  There  is  even  an  instance 
where  land  held  “  for  rent  ”  had  been  unjustly  given  to 
another  to  hold  “  for  labour.” 80  Yet  the  lords  were  not 
equally  indifferent  with  regard  to  all  services,  as  to  whether 
they  received  money  or  labour.  The  extra  labourers  needed 
at  the  busy  seasons  could  not  so  easily  be  obtained  for  hire  ; 
and  consequently  we  find  that  in  most  cases  the  lords  retain 
the  precariae  and  exceptional  services  long  after  the  week- 
work  has  disappeared.81  The  jurors  who  furnished  the 
evidence  upon  which  the  Domesday  of  S.  Paul's  was  drawn 
up  in  1222,  marked  this  by  describing  some  tenants  as 
holding  “  for  both  rent  and  labour.”  82 

Twenty  years  later,  on  the  estates  of  Worcester  Priory, 
we  find  that  the  change  has  taken  place  in  regard  to  every 
tenant,  with  the  same  exception  as  to  precariae  and  other 
occasional  services.  The  new  arrangement  is  there  frequently 
described  as  “  the  new  assize,”  as  opposed  to  “  the  old  assize.” 83 
But,  with  noticeable  caution,  the  register  contains  in  all 
cases  a  list  of  the  old  services  as  well  as  of  the  new  pay¬ 
ments  ; 84  and  it  may  be  that  this  practice  of  preserving  a 
record  of  the  labour-dues — a  practice,  doubtless,  common — 
was  afterwards  of  some  practical  importance.  As  we  might 
expect,  the  cotters  with  their  small  holdings  are  still  in 
some  cases  not  sufficiently  prosperous  to  commute  their 
services.85  Commutation  was  carried  out  very  gradually 
over  the  country.  In  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century 
it  does  not  seem  to  have  been  effected  in  any  case  on  the 
estates  of  Piamsey  Abbey;  nor  was  it,  apparently,  often 
the  practice  on  the  estates  of  Gloucester  Abbey  twenty  years 
later,  or  of  Battle  Abbey  even  at  the  end  of  the  century, 
though  the  value  of  the  services  is  given  in  money.  Yet, 
even  where  it  had  not  taken  place,  we  notice  a  very  marked 
difference  of  tone.  The  tenants  are  said  to  be  bound  to  find  a 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  3 1 


man,  or  two  men,  or  a  woman,  as  tlie  case  might  be,86  implying 
that  they  do  not  usually  perform  the  service  themselves,  but 
are  able  to  hire  men  to  do  it  for  them ;  and  they  are  fre¬ 
quently  registered  in  the  later  part  of  the  thirteenth  century 
as  customary  tenants  ( consuetudinarii ,  custumarii )  rather  than 
as  villeins. 

iii.  The  more  prosperous  the  free  tenants  and  customary 
tenants  became,  the  more  eager  they  would  be  to  get  rid  of 
the  obligation  of  furnishing  labour,  even  if  only  at  certain 
seasons.  This  would  be  especially  irksome  for  the  smaller 
customary  tenants  and  cotters,  who  might  in  many  cases 
have  to  leave  their  own  acres  at  the  time  when  they  were 
most  anxious  to  attend  to  them ;  and  the  first  English  writer 
on  agriculture,  Walter  of  Henley,  whose  Dite  de  Hosbon - 
dereye  has  been  assigned  to  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth 
century,  especially  urges  the  bailiff  and  the  lord’s  reaper  to 
keep  careful  watch  over  the  customary  tenants,  to  see  that 
they  do  not  shirk  their  work.87  There  would  be  a  tendency, 
therefore,  for  all  services  to  be  commuted  for  money  pay¬ 
ments,  with  which  the  bailiff  could  hire  labourers  more  easily 
controlled. 

Instances  of  the  commutation  of  the  whole  of  the  services 
— week- work  and  boon- work — occur  occasionally  as  early 
as  1240,  in  manors  where  the  demesne  was  wholly  left  to 
tenants.88  The  service  with  which  the  lord  could  least  easily 
dispense  seems  to  have  been  that  of  carting,  and  so  in  one 
case  we  find  the  entry  as  to  the  villeins,  “  Whether  they 
pay  rent  or  no,  they  shall  cart.”89  But  with  the  reign  of 
Edward  II.  complete  commutation  became  very  common.90 

iv.  Now,  it  is  evident  that  the  lord  would  not  have  con¬ 
sented,  first  to  partial  and  then  to  complete  commutation,  had 
he  not  been  able  to  hire  labourers  either  for  regular  service 
during  the  whole  or  part  of  the  year,  or  at  specially  busy 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY, \  [Book! 


3^ 

seasons.  These  changes,  then,  imply  that  a  class  of  labourers 
had  come  into  existence ;  a  class  of  men,  that  is  to  say,  who, 
although  they  undoubtedly  often  held  pieces  of  land—  even 
two  or  three  acres, — yet  had  not  enough  land  to  occupy  their 
whole  attention,  and  were  partially  dependent  upon  wages. 
The  same  conclusion  is  suggested,  even  where  commutation 
had  not  taken  place,  by  the  phrase  already  mentioned,  stating 
the  obligation  of  customary  tenants  as  the  “  finding  ”  so  many 
labourers  for  so  many  days. 

But  this  body  of  labourers  must  as  yet  have  been  com¬ 
paratively  small.  There  are  several  lists  extant  of  the 
permanent  servants  on  a  manor.  They  seem  to  have  been 
few  in  number — a  reaper,  two  or  three  ploughmen,  a  carter, 
a  woodward  or  swineherd,  one  or  two  shepherds,  one  or  two 
oxherds  or  co  wherds,  and  a  dairy  woman.91  Some  of  these, 
such  as  the  shepherds  and  oxherds,  were  probably  descended 
from  the  slaves  of  the  demesne ; 92  while  the  messor ,  or  reaper, 
( [i.e .  the  superintendent  of  the  reapers),  seems  to  have  been 
an  officer  little  inferior  to  the  reeve,  with  certain  duties  in 
connection  with  the  manor  courts,  besides  the  supervision  of 
the  ploughing  and  sowing.  It  does  not  appear  that  com¬ 
mutation  had  the  effect  of  greatly  increasing  the  number  of 
permanent  hired  servants  on  the  demesne.  Additional  labour 
was  hired  when  it  was  needed,  for  threshing  and  winnowing, 
for  hoeing  and  mowing ; 93  and,  later  on,  in  cases  where  all 
the  occasional  services  and  precariae  were  commuted,  for 
ploughing  also.94 

It  has  not  hitherto,  I  believe,  been  noticed  that  the 
appearance,  about  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century,  of 
bailiffs’  account-rolls,  containing  a  list  of  all  the  receipts  and 
expences  on  the  demesne,95  was  the  result  of  the  changes 
which  substituted  money  payments  for  labour.  When  none 
but  inconsiderable  money  payments,  or  no  payments  at  all, 


Chap.  I.J  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY .  33 


were  made  by  the  tenants;  when  payments  in  kind  were 
consumed  by  the  lord,  his  family,  and  servants ;  when  all  the 
labour  needed  on  the  manor  was  furnished  by  the  tenants ; 
there  was  no  need  for  anything  more  than  a  list  of  services. 
But  when  rents  were  received  from  free  and  customary 
tenants  (whether  all  their  labour  or  only  week-work  was 
commuted) ;  when  it  was  necessary  to  pay  considerable  sums 
in  wages  to  labourers  hired  in  varying  numbers  and  for 
varying  periods ;  still  more  when  the  lords  were  non-resident 
and  required  that  the  proceeds  of  each  manor  should  be  sent 
to  them  in  money,  not  in  kind,  so  that  corn  and  cattle,  butter 
and  cheese  had  to  be  sold  as  best  the  bailiff  could, — then  a 
systematic  keeping  of  accounts  became  necessary.96  Not  that 
the  bailiff  himself  put  them  into  the  shape  in  which  they 
were  forwarded  to  the  lord :  this  was  the  work  of  itinerant 
“  clerks,”  who  were  paid  for  each  piece  of  work.97  But  the 
change  gave  him  new  opportunities  for  dishonesty ;  and 
therefore,  almost  as  soon  as  such  accounts  appear  at  all,  we 
find  an  enactment  for  dealing  with  defalcating  bailiffs.98  But 
the  new  system  of  accounts  was  part  of  a  wider  development, 
which  must  be  dealt  with  later. 

§  5.  The  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  manorial  group, 
regarded  from  the  economic  point  of  view,  was  its  self-suf¬ 
ficiency ,  its  social  independence.  The  introduction  of  new 
tenants  from  outside  was  indeed  always  possible,  either  to 
take  the  place  of  villeins  who  had  died  without  children, 
or  to  occupy  portions  of  the  demesne  or  waste.  But  it  was 
probably  very  rare ;  the  same  families  tilled  the  village  fields 
from  father  to  son.  Each  manor  had  its  own  law  courts  for 
the  maintenance  of  order.  Every  three  weeks  the  Court 
Baron  was  held  in  the  Manor  House,  attended  by  all  the 
villagers  who  cared  to  come,  for  the  punishment  of  petty 
offences,  and  to  witness  the  transfer  of  holdings.99  At  longer 


34 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


intervals  came  together  the  Court  Leet,  if  the  lord  had  a 
grant  of  criminal  jurisdiction,  for  the  punishment  of  graver 
crimes ; 100  and  punishment  may  he  supposed  to  have  exerted 
all  its  deterrent  influence  when  thieves  were  hanged  at  the 
places  where  they  had  sinned.  Then,  as  now,  every  village 
had  its  church ;  with  this  advantage,  or  disadvantage,  which¬ 
ever  it  may  he  reckoned,  as  compared  with  modern  times, 
that  the  priest  did  not  belong  to  a  different  social  class 
from  his  parishioners.  Indeed,  in  perhaps  one-half  of  the 
villages,  he  was  as  poor  as  most  of  them :  for  when  the 
advowson  belonged  to  an  ecclesiastical  body,  the  patrons 
took  to  themselves  the  tithes,  and  appointed  a  vicar  who  had 
often  to  be  contented  with  the  altar-dues  for  his  subsistence,101 
so  that  he  was  glad  enough  to  get  a  few  acres  and  add  to  his 
income  by  joining  in  the  common  agriculture. 

The  village  included  men  who  carried  on  all  the  occupa¬ 
tions  and  crafts  necessary  for  every-day  life.  There  was 
always  a  water  or  wind  mill,  which  the  tenants  of  the  manor 
were  bound  to  use,  paying  dues  which  formed  a  considerable 
fraction  of  the  lord’s  income.102  Again  and  again  we  find 
the  lord’s  servants  seizing  the  handmills  of  which  the  tenants 
had  dared  to  make  use  in  detriment  of  his  rights.103  For  a 
long  time  the  lords  kept  the  mills  in  their  own  hands,  under 
the  care  of  bailiffs,  making  what  profit  they  could  thereby ; 104 
but  in  the  twelfth  century  it  began  to  be  the  practice  to  let 
the  mill  to  one  of  the  villeins,  at  an  annual  rent,  or  ferm.105 
Many  villages,  though  not  all,  had  their  own  blacksmith  and 
carpenter,  who  probably  were  at  first  communal  officers, 
holding  land  on  condition  of  repairing  the  ploughs  of  the 
demesne  and  of  the  villagers ; 106  though,  in  the  course  of  the 
thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries,  this  service  also  came  to 
be  commuted  for  money,  and  the  craftsmen  received  pay  for 
each  piece  of  work.  Another  village  officer,  who  sometimes 


Ciiap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  35 


appears  as  nolding  land  in  virtue  of  liis  office,  was  the 
pounder.107 

The  village  “  general  shop  ”  had  not  yet  come  into  exist¬ 
ence;  in  many  places  it  did  not  appear  until  the  present 
century :  partly  because  many  of  the  wants  which  it  meets 
were  not  yet  felt,  partly  because  such  wants  as  were  felt 
were  supplied  either  by  journeys  at  long  intervals  to  some 
distant  fair  or  market,  or  by  the  labour  of  the  family  itself. 
The  women  wove  rough  woollen  and  linen  cloth  for  clothing ; 
the  men  tanned  their  own  leather. 

Thus  the  inhabitants  of  an  average  English  village  went 
on — year  in,  year  out — with  the  same  customary  methods 
of  cultivation,  living  on  what  they  produced,  and  scarcely 
coming  in  contact  with  the  outside  world.  The  very 
existence  of  towns ,  indeed,  implied  that  the  purely  agri¬ 
cultural  districts  produced  more  than  they  required  for 
their  own  consumption ;  and  corn  and  cattle  were  regularly 
sent,  even  to  distant  markets,  by  lords  of  manors  and 
their  bailiffs,  in  increasing  quantities  as  the  great  lords  or 
corporations  came  to  desire  money  payments  instead  of  pay¬ 
ments  in  kind.108  But  the  other  dealings  of  the  villagers 
with  the  outside  world  were  very  few.  First,  there  was  the 
purchase  of  salt ,  an  absolute  necessity  in  the  mediaeval 
world,  when  people  lived  on  salted  meat  for  five  months 
in  the  year.  The  salt  most  commonly  used  came  from  the 
southern  coast,  especially  the  Cinque  Ports,109  where  it  was 
made  by  the  evaporation  of  sea- water.  The  west  of  England 
drew  large  supplies  from  the  salt-works  at  Droitwicli,  be¬ 
longing  to  Worcester  Priory.  There  was  a  large  importation 
also  of  salt  of  a  better  quality  from  Guienne.110  Secondly, 
iron  was  continually  needed  for  the  ploughs  and  other  farm 
implements.  It  was  to  be  had  both  of  home  manufacture, 
especially  from  the  weald  of  Sussex,  and  of  foreign  importa- 


36 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


tion,  chiefly  from  Spain ; 111  and  it  was  bought  at  fairs  and 
markets.  It  was  the  general  practice  for  the  bailiff  to  make 
large  purchases  of  iron  and  keep  it  in  stock,  handing  over  to 
the  blacksmith  the  necessary  quantities  as  they  were  needed 
for  the  repair  of  the  lord’s  ploughs.112  A  very  dry  summer 
caused  much  wear  and  tear  of  implements,  and  consequently 
an  increased  demand  and  a  higher  price ;  so  that  the  bailiffs’ 
accounts  frequently  mention  the  “  dearness  of  iron  on  account 
of  drought.”113  A  further  need  was  felt  when,  at  the  end  of 
the  thirteenth  century,  a  fresh  disease,  the  scab,  appeared 
among  the  sheep,  and  tar  became  of  great  importance  as  a 
remedy.  It  was  produced  in  Norway,  and  exported  by  the 
Ilanse  merchants  from  Bergen  to  the  Norfolk  ports.  In  years 
of  murrain  the  cost  incurred  under  this  head  was  a  con¬ 
siderable  item  in  the  bailiff’s  expenses.114  Perhaps  the  only 
other  regular  recurring  need,  which  the  village  could  not 
itself  supply,  was  that  of  millstones .  Of  these  the  better 
qualities  came  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Paris,  and  were 
brought  to  the  ports  on  the  eastern  and  southern  coast, 
whither  we  often  find  the  bailiff  or  miller  journeying  to 
purchase  them.115  The  duty  of  assisting  the  bailiff  in  con¬ 
veying  the  millstone  from  the  neighbouring  town  was  some¬ 
times  an  obligation  weighing  on  all  the  tenants  of  a  manor, 
free  and  villein  alike.116 

Not  only  was  the  village  group  thus  self-contained  and 
complete  within  itself;  the  sense  of  unity  was  so  strong 
that  it  was  able  to  act  as  a  corporate  body.  From  early 
times  great  lords,  possessing  manors  at  a  distance  which  they 
could  not  easily  inspect  themselves  or  by  their  stewards, 
had  let  them  for  fourteen,  twenty-one,  or  thirty-five  years 
at  a  ferm ,  or  fixed  annual  payment,  to  men  who  would 
take  the  place  of  the  lord  and  try  to  make  a  profit.117  Now, 
we  find  many  cases,  even  as  early  as  1183,  in  which  the 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  37 


whole  body  of  villeins,  the  villata  of  particular  manors,  made 
contracts  with  their  lords  identical  with  those  which  an 
individual  firmar  might  have  made,  promising  an  annual  sum, 
and  taking  the  management  of  the  land  into  their  own 
hands.118  It  is  even  sometimes  expressly  said  that  they  hold 
at  farm  “the  court  ( i.e .  the  fines  of  the  court),  with  the 
meadows  and  the  heriots  (succession  dues),  and  the  villenage,” 
i.e.  the  villein  services.119  It  will  be  seen  that  this  is  pre¬ 
cisely  analogous  to  “  the  purchase  of  th efirma  burgi”  i.e.  the 
commutation  of  all  dues  for  a  fixed  annual  payment  by  the 
town  communities,  and  throws  some  light  on  the  transference 
of  seigneurial  or  royal  jurisdiction  to  the  town  magistrates. 

Such,  then,  were  the  chief  characteristics  of  the  manorial 
community  as  a  whole, — self-sufficiency  and  corporate  unity. 
Now  let  us  look  at  the  position  of  the  individual  members 
of  the  group.  Some  had  risen  to  the  position  of  free  tenants, 
but  the  great  majority  (holding  an  even  larger  proportion  of 
the  land, — for  the  free  tenancies,  as  we  have  seen,  were  often 
very  small,)  had  continued  to  hold  by  servile  tenure,  as 
villeins  or  customary  tenants,  even  when  they  had  commuted 
all  or  most  of  their  services  and  had  greatly  gained  in 
comfort  and  general  well-being.  Of  the  position  of  this 
great  majority  the  characteristic  was  permanence,  with  its 
disadvantages  and  also  with  its  advantages.  Though  it 
is  seldom  distinctly  expressed,120  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that, — as  is  implied  in  the  common  description  of  villeins  in 
the  law  books,  “  ascriptitii  terrae,” — they  were  bound  to  the 
soil ;  in  the  sense,  at  any  rate,  that  the  lord  would  demand 
a  heavy  fine  before  he  would  give  one  of  them  permission 
to  leave  the  manor.121  A  father  might  buy  permission  for 
his  son  to  become  a  clerk  or  monk,  and  younger  sons  might 
go  off  to  the  towns  to  seek  their  fortunes  in  one  of  the  craft 
guilds  :  but  a  yardling  would  not  be  likely  to  leave  his  manor 


38 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [.Book  I. 


unless  lie  could  get  a  virgate  elsewhere.  This  he  could 
not  gain  if  he  went  empty-handed ;  and  that  he  should  go 
empty-handed  was  secured  by  the  universal  rule  of  all  manors 
that  villeins  should  not  sell  ox  or  horse  without  license.122 

On  the  other  hand,  the  villeins  had  security  of  tenure,  and 
their  holdings  passed  from  father  to  son  :  it  is  even  probable 
that  they  were  pretty  generally  permitted  to  transfer  their 
holdings  to  other  persons  on  paying  a  fine  to  the  lord.123,  Tho 
legal  doctrine,  indeed,  from  the  time  of  Glanvill  to  that  of 
Edward  IV.,  was  that  the  villein  could  have  absolutely  no 
property  at  all,  and  that  the  king’s  courts  would  not  protect 
him  against  any  arbitrary  injustice  on  the  part  of  his  lord. 
And  we  do  occasionally  come  across  cases  of  violent  disposses¬ 
sion.  But  it  would  seldom  be  to  a  lord’s  interest  to  lessen 
the  working  outfit  of  his  estate  by  getting  rid  of  a  tenant ; 
and  custom  constantly  tended  to  become  law.  Yet  the  legal 
claims  of  the  lords  were  never  definitely  abandoned  ;  and  their 
survival  down  to  the  fifteenth  century  would  help  to  explain 
some  of  the  obscurer  features  of  the  period  of  Enclosures. 

The  collision  between  the  legal  theory  and  the  plain 
matter  of  fact  that,  until  the  fifteenth  century,  the  villeins 
were  regarded  as  having  a  customary  hereditary  right  to 
their  holdings,  has  created  so  many  difficulties,  that  it  is 
worth  while  telling  at  length  a  case  which  has  only  recently 
been  published,  and  which  occurred  in  1280.124  A  quarrel 
had  arisen  between  the  Abbot  of  Burton  and  his  tenants  on  a 
manor  called  Mickleover,  in  Derbyshire,  concerning  certain 
services,  to  escape  which  the  tenants  claimed  that  they  wrere 
on  ancient  demesne  of  the  crown.  This  was  disproved  by 
appeal  to  Domesday ,  and  the  villeins  were  declared  by  the 
judges  to  be  “  at  the  abbot’s  mercy,  on  account  of  their  false 
claim.”  Thereupon  the  abbot,  to  show  that  he  was  not  to  be 
trifled  with,  instead  of  demanding  a  moderate  fine,  sent  a  large 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  39 


body  of  servants,  commanded  by  six  monks  and  five  knights, 
who  drove  off  from  the  village  27  boars,  140  oxen,  50  cows  and 
heifers,  506  sheep,  and  77  pigs — doubtless  all  the  cattle  the 
tenants  possessed.  They  appealed  to  the  king,  and  Edward  I., 
ready  to  seize  every  opportunity  for  limiting  baronial  power, 
issued  a  writ  ordering  that  the  cattle  should  be  restored. 
Nothing  daunted,  the  abbot  ejected  ten  of  the  villeins  from 
Iheir  holdings,  though  he  permitted  their  wives  and  children 
to  remain ;  and  then,  as  there  seemed  some  likelihood  that 
the  villeins  would  bring  an  action  of  novel  disseisin ,  which 
would  raise  the  whole  question  of  their  status,  and  it  was 
technically  necessary  for  this  that  the  ejectment  should  be 
complete,  he  proceeded  to  turn  out  the  wives  and  children 
also.  Such  an  action,  however,  the  villeins  did  not  bring  : 
they  preferred  to  follow  the  king  about  for  several  days,  and 
get  another  writ  ordering  the  sheriff  to  see  that  the  cattle 
were  restored.  But  the  sheriff,  though  energetic  enough  to 
make  the  monks  complain  of  his  malevolence,  had  no  force 
to  carry  out  the  writ ;  some  of  the  bailiffs  of  the  manors  to 
which  the  cattle  had  been  sent  obeyed  his  summons,  while 
others  flatly  refused.  The  villeins  got  a  third  writ ;  but  it  was 
useless, — their  cattle  were  still  in  the  abbot’s  hands,  and  they 
felt  themselves  beaten.  Some  of  them  came  to  the  abbot’s 
court  and  craved  forgiveness ;  they  were  made  to  appear  at 
the  county  court,  and  there  solemnly  acknowledge  that  they 
were  “  serfs  at  the  will  of  their  lord.”  But  others  would 
not  yield,  and  brought  an  action  for  theft ;  the  abbot  replied 
that  what  he  had  taken  was  his  own,  for  being  villeins 
they  possessed  nothing  but  their  own  bodies  ( extra  ventrem). 
They,  on  the  contrary,  claimed  to  be  freemen,  and  demanded 
a  jury.  After  this  the  proceedings  are  difficult  to  follow; 
apparently  no  inquest  by  jury  ever  really  took  place  as  to 
whether  they  were  free  or  no.  Gradually  they  all  submitted, 


40 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


and  acknowledged  that  they  held  at  the  will  of  the  abbot. 
Those  who  came  readily  were  replaced  in  their  holdings, 
their  cattle  restored,  and  only  a  small  fine  exacted.  But  two 
were  obstinate  to  the  last,  and  would  not  yield  till  they  had 
been  carried  off  to  Burton  and  put  in  the  stocks.  A  few„hours 
in  the  stocks  so  broke  their  spirit,  that  next  day  they  came 
and,  as  a  sign  of  humility,  voluntarity  submitted  to  be  put  in 
the  stocks  again.  And  then  they  were  pardoned,  but  made 
to  pay  a  heavier  fine  than  their  neighbours, — to  wit,  half  of  all 
the  corn  then  growing  on  their  land. 

It  is  clear,  in  this  instance,  that  the  abbot,  though  ready 
to  use  a  legal  doctrine  to  overawe  the  villeins,  did  not  intend 
to  dispossess  them,  and  did  not  dispossess  even  the  ring¬ 
leaders  of  the  opposition.  And  when,  in  the  fifteenth  century, 
the  profits  of  sheep-farming  did  induce  lords  of  manors  here 
and  there  unjustly  to  dispossess  customary  tenants,  it  was 
laid  down  by  the  chief  justice  (in  7  Ed.  IV.)  that  “  the  tenant 
by  the  custom  is  as  well  inheritor  to  have  his  land  according 
to  the  custom  as  he  which  hath  a  freehold.” 125  The  yardling 
and  the  cotter  were  thus  tied  to  the  soil,  but  the  soil  was  also 
tied  to  them.  No  very  great  accession  of  wealth  was  possible 
to  them,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  always  had  land  upon 
which  they  could  live, — and  live,  except  in  very  occasional 
seasons  of  famine,  in  rude  plenty.126 

It  is  instructive  to  compare  the  village,  as  we  have  seen 
it,  with  the  village  of  to-day. 

i.  In  one  respect  there  might  seem  to  be  a  close  resem¬ 
blance.  Then,  as  usually  now,  the  village  was  made  up  of 
one  street,  with  a  row  of  houses  on  each  side.  But  the  in¬ 
habitants  of  the  village  street  now  are  the  labourers,  the  one 
or  two  village  artisans, — such  as  a  tailor,  blacksmith,  saddler, 
cobbler, — and  one  or  two  small  shopkeepers.  The  farmers  live 
in  separate  homesteads  among  the  fields  they  rent,  and  not  in 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  4 1 


the  village  street.  Then,  all  the  cultivators  of  the  soil  lived 
side  by  side. 

ii.  Secondly,  notice  the  difference  as  to  the  agricultural 
operations  themselves.  Now  each  farmer  follows  his  own 
judgment  in  what  he  does.  He  sows  each  field  with  what 
he  thinks  fit,  and  when  he  sees  fit,  and  chooses  his  own  time 
for  each  of  the  agricultural  operations.  But  the  peasant- 
farmer  of  the  period  we  have  been  considering,  and  for  long 
afterwards,  was  bound  to  take  his  share  in  a  common  system 
of  cultivation,  in  which  the  time  at  which  everything  should 
be  done  and  the  way  in  which  everything  should  be  done 
were  regulated  by  custom  enforced  by  the  manor  courts. 

iii.  A  further  difference  is  seen  in  the  relations  of  lord  and 
tenant  as  to  the  cultivation.  Nowadays,  either  the  landlord 
does  not  himself  farm  any  land  in  the  parish,  or,  if  he  does, 
his  management  of  it  is  as  independent  of  the  cultivation 
of  any  other  land  by  any  tenants  he  may  have  as  that  of 
his  tenants  is  of  his  own  farming.  But,  then,  almost  all 
the  labour  upon  the  demesne  was  furnished  by  the  villein 
tenants,  who  contributed  ploughs,  oxen,  and  men  for  the 
bailiff’s  disposal.  Long  after  commutation  of  services  had 
largely  taken  place,  the  lords  retained  the  right  to  assistance 
in  all  the  more  important  processes, — ploughing,  reaping, 
threshing,  carting.  And  the  demesne  itself  was  often  made 
up  in  great  part  of  virgates  in  the  common  fields,  so  that  the 
lord  himself  was  bound  to  submit,  so  far  as  these  were  con¬ 
cerned,  to  the  same  rigid  system  of  joint  cultivation  as  was 
maintained  by  the  rest  of  the  members  of  the  village 
community. 

iv.  Compare,  finally,  the  classes  in  a  manor  with  those  in 
a  village  to-day.  In  a  modern  parish  there  will  usually  be  a 
squire,  some  three  or  four  farmers, — all  of  them  large  farmers 
when  compared  with  peasant  holders, — and  beneath  them  a 


42 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


comparatively  large  number  of  agricultural  labourers.  Even 
when  the  agricultural  labourer  has  a  good  garden  or  an 
allotment,  there  is  still  a  social  gap  between  him  and  the 
farmer  of  a  couple  of  hundred  acres.  But  in  the  medieval 
manor,  as  we  have  seen,  much  the  greater  part  of  the  land 
was  cultivated  by  small  holders.  Between  the  lord  of  the 
manor  and  the  villein  tenants  there  was,  indeed,  a  great  gulf 
fixed, — a  gulf  wider  far  than  that  between  the  farmer  and 
the  squire  of  to-day.  And  it  was  probably  a  hard  matter  for 
the  cotter  to  rise  to  be  a  yardling.  But,  putting  the  lord 
on  one  side,  there  was  nothing  like  that  social  separation 
between  the  various  classes  of  actual  cultivators  that  there  is 
to-day.  The  yardling  and  cotter  worked  in  the  same  way ; 
their  manner  of  life  was  the  same ;  and  in  the  system  of 
joint  cultivation  and  the  life  of  the  village  street  they  were 
made  to  feel  their  common  interests. 

It  may  be  well  to  notice  the  non-existence  in  the  village 
group  of  certain  elements  which  modern  abstract  Economics 
is  apt  to  take  for  granted.  Individual  liberty ,  in  the  sense  in 
which  we  understand  it,  did  not  exist;  consequently,  there 
could  be  no  such  complete  competition  as  we  are  wont  to 
postulate.  The  payments  made  by  the  villeins  are  not  rents 
in  the  abstract  economist’s  sense :  for  the  economist  assumes 
competition, — assumes  that  landlord  and  farmer  are  guided 
only  by  commercial  principles ;  that  there  is  an  average  rate 
of  profit,  which  the  farmer  knows ;  that  he  will  not  take  less 
and  cannot  get  more.127  However  the  labour  services  came 
to  be  fixed,  they  were  fixed  in  the  eleventh  century;  they 
remained  unchanged  till  they  were  commuted  for  money; 
and,  once  commuted,  no  increase  took  place  in  the  money- 
rent.  The  chief  thought  of  lord  and  tenant  was,  not  what 
the  tenant  could  possibly  afford,  but  what  was  customary. 
And,  finally,  there  was  as  yet  no  capital  in  the  modern 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  43 


sense.  Of  course  there  was  capital  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
word  is  defined  by  the  orthodox  economists — “  wealth  appro¬ 
priated  to  reproductive  employment ;  ”  for  the  villeins  had 
ploughs,  harrows,  oxen,  horses.  But  this  is  one  of  the  most 
unreal  of  economic  definitions.  As  has  been  well  said,  “  by 
capital  we  habitually  mean  more  than  this ;  we  mean  a  store 
of  wealth  which  can  be  directed  into  new  and  more  profitable 
channels  as  occasion  arises.”128  In  this  sense  the  villeins 
certainly  had  no  capital,  and  it  was  only  gradually,  as  com¬ 
mutation  began,  that  the  landlord  was  getting  to  have 
something  that  he  could  “  capitalize,”  i.e.  that  he  could  save 
with  the  intention  of  gaining  a  profit  from  it  by-and-by.129 

§  6.  Little  as  the  mere  substitution  of  money  payments 
for  labour  dues  may  seem  to  have  affected  the  relations  of 
classes,  it  marked  the  beginning  of  a  change  of  supreme 
importance.  The  German  economist  Hildebrand  was  the 
first  to  point  out  that  whatever  difference  there  may  have 
been  between  the  economic  development  of  the  different 
European  nations,  there  is  one  characteristic  common  to 
all,  the  transition,  namely,  from  payment  in  kind  to  payment 
in  money.  Such  a  way  of  phrasing  it,  indeed,  but  very 
inadequately  represents  what  Hildebrand  meant  by  the 
transition  from  Natural- wirthschaft  to  Geld-wirtliscJiaft , — the 
development  of  a  society  in  which  exchange,  and  the  dis¬ 
tribution  of  wealth  generally,  are  effected  by  means  of,  or 
expressed  in  terms  of  a  metallic  currency,  from  one  in  which 
land  was  given  for  service,  service  given  for  land,  goods 
exchanged  for  goods,  without  the  intervention  of  a  currency 
at  all.130  This  change  is  what  we  see  in  all  directions  during 
these  three  centuries. 

In  examining  the  character  of  the  village  group,  wo  saw 
that  in  the  eleventh  century,  and  in  most  cases  long  after¬ 
wards,  the  lord  and  his  family  lived  upon  the  produce  of  his 


44 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


demesne,  cultivated  by  the  customary  labour  services  of  his 
tenants,  and  the  tenants  upon  the  produce  of  the  lands 
which  they  held  in  return  for  such  services ;  and  we  have 
noticed  how  very  gradually  these  services  were  exchanged 
for  money,  so  that  the  lord  should  receive  a  rent  with  which 
he  might  hire  wage-labourers.  What  is  true  of  the  several 
manorial  groups  was  true  also  of  the  relations  between  the 
tenants  and  the  seigneurial  household  in  those  cases  where 
a  lord  held  a  great  number  of  manors.  The  lords  received 
from  their  bailiffs,  not  sums  of  money,  but  certain  amounts 
of  agricultural  produce,  for  the  maintenance  of  their  house¬ 
holds. 

No  detailed  accounts  are  extant  of  the  management  of 
great  lay  estates,  but  several  such  exist  for  ecclesiastical 
possessions,  which  were  managed  precisely  in  the  same  way; 
with  this  difference  only,  that  the  natural  conservatism  of 
corporate  bodies  caused  old  methods  of  management  to  be 
retained  long  after  they  had  been  abandoned  elsewhere. 

The  domestic  economy  of  the  Chapter  of  S.  Paul’s  is  set 
forth  at  length  in  certain  documents  of  the  later  part  of  the 
thirteenth  century,  which  have  been  sympathetically  com¬ 
mented  upon  by  a  modem  member  of  the  same  Chapter, 
Archdeacon  Hale.131  It  owned  thirteen  manors,  each  of  which 
was  in  the  hands  of  a  firmarius,  who  held  a  lease  of  it,  usually 
for  life.  lie  occupied,  in  regard  to  the  manor,  exactly  the 
position  of  a  lord,  holding  the  courts,  supervising  the  bailiff, 
and  making  agreements  with  the  tenants.  He  was  bound 
to  make  certain  payments  in  kind  and  in  money  at  regular 
intervals  to  the  Chapter :  but  any  surplus  produce  or  rent 
he  had  the  right  of  retaining ;  and  so  considerable  a  source 
of  profit  was  this,  that  the  office  of  firmar  was  monopolized 
by  the  residentiary  canons,  who,  upon  any  vacancy,  had  the 
right  in  order  of  seniority  of  taking  up  the  lease.  The 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  45 


unit  of  payment  was  a  firma,  which,  in  the  case  of  S.  Paul’s, 
besides  its  ordinary  meaning  of  a  definite  or  regular  payment 
instead  of  arbitrary  or  fluctuating  payments,  had  the  further 
meaning  of  the  food  for  a  single  iceelc.  It  consisted  of  sixteen 
quarters  of  wheat,  sixteen  quarters  of  oats,  and  three  quarters 
of  barley.  The  thirteen  manors  furnished  in  the  course  of 
the  year  forty-five  such  “firms,” — of  which  ten  came  from 
one  manor,  six  from  another,  four  each  from  two,  three  each 
from  four,  two  each  from  four,  and  one  from  the  remaining 
manor ;  the  total  quantity  in  the  year  being  seven  hundred 
and  twenty  quarters  of  wheat,  seven  hundred  and  twenty  of 
oats,  and  a  hundred  and  thirty-five  of  barley. 

Adjoining  the  cathedral  were  a  horse-mill,  a  bakehouse, 
and  a  brewery,  where  the  grain  was  ground,  bread  baked 
five  times  a  fortnight,  and  beer  brewed  twice  a  week,  under 
the  supervision  of  a  warden  of  the  brewhouse,  himself 
usually  a  canon.  He  was  bound  to  provide  each  of  the 
thirty  canons  with  three  loaves  a  day,  and  thirty  gallons  of 
beer  a  week ; — doubtless  they  had  separate  households,  and 
the  greater  part  of  the  beer  and  bread  went  to  their  servants  ; 
to  five  other  persons  went  two  loaves  a  day  and  six  gallons 
of  inferior  beer  a  week ;  to  the  rest  of  the  minor  canons  one 
loaf  and  three  gallons,  and  a  certain  number  of  loaves  and 
gallons  to  the  other  clergy  and  servants ;  making  in  all  some 
40,400  loaves  a  year,  and  67,800  gallons  of  beer. 

This  primitive  system  continued  far  into  the  fourteenth 
century.  But  from  a  date  certainly  as  early  as  the  middle 
of  the  twelfth  century,  certain  money  payments  had  been 
made.  Of  these  the  unit  was  a  dizena ,  each  dizena  being 
three  marks  and  sevenpence,  thus  allotted, — two  marks  and 
a  half  for  the  weekly  wages  of  the  cathedral  vicars,  minor 
canons,  sacristan,  and  other  officials,  half  a  mark  to  purchase 
wood  for  the  brewery  and  bakehouse,  and  sevenpence  for 


46 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


alms.  Thus  money  payments  for  both  rent  and  wages  had 
already  commenced.  Moreover,  as  we  cannot  suppose  that 
the  canons  lived  exclusively  on  bread  and  beer,  it  is  clear 
that  they  must  have  purchased  meat,  as  well  as  cloth  for 
their  robes,  in  the  London  market,  with  the  money  which 
they  received  as  tithes  and  offerings.  Still,  the  larger  part 
of  the  food  of  the  cathedral  body  was  for  several  centuries 
derived  from  the  manors  of  which  it  was  lord ;  how  close 
the  dependence  was  is  illustrated  by  the  statute  of  Ealph  de 
Diceto  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century,  that  in  case  of 
dearth  or  pestilence  upon  the  estates,  the  non-resident 
members  of  the  body  should  have  one  loaf  and  one  gallon 
of  beer  less  a  day.  Early  in  the  fifteenth  century,  we  find 
the  system  breaking  down ;  money  payments  to  the  canons 
are  substituted  for  the  supply  of  beer,  the  supply  of  bread 
falls  into  arrears,  and  finally  considerable  money  rents  took 
the  place  of  the  firms. 

The  transition  from  payments  in  kind  to  payments  in 
money,  which,  on  the  manors  of  the  S.  Paul’s  Chapter, 
and  doubtless  on  those  of  many  other  ecclesiastical  corpora¬ 
tions,  was  delayed  until  the  fifteenth  century,  had  upon  the 
royal  demesne  taken  place  early  in  the  twelfth.  It  is 
described  by  the  author  of  the  Dialogus  de  Scaccario ,  writing 
in  1178,  in  language  which  deserves  quotation.  “In  the 
early  state  of  the  kingdom  after  the  Conquest,  the  kings 
used  to  receive  from  their  manors  certain  quantities,  not  of 
gold  or  silver,  but  of  provisions,  from  which  were  supplied 
the  daily  necessities  of  the  royal  household.  Those  who 
were  charged  with  the  matter  knew  what  quantity  each 
manor  was  accustomed  to  supply.  Coined  money,  however, 
was  provided  for  the  pay  of  soldiers  and  other  needs,  from 
the  pleas  of  the  crown,  and  from  those  towns  and  fortified 
places  where  agriculture  was  not  practised.  This  system 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  47 


lasted  during  the  whole  reign  of  William  I.,  down,  indeed, 
to  the  days  of  Henry  I. ;  I  myself  have  met  men  who 
had  seen  provisions  brought  to  the  court  at  appointed 
times  from  the  manors.  The  royal  officials  knew  precisely 
from  which  counties  wheat  was  owing,  from  which  various 
kinds  of  flesh,  or  provender  for  horses,  or  other  necessaries. 
And  when  these  had  been  paid  in  the  proper  quantity,  the 
officials  reckoned  it  all  up  with  the  sheriff  at  fixed  rates  in 
money, — thus,  for  a  measure  of  wheat  that  would  make  bread 
for  a  hundred  men,  a  shilling ;  for  the  carcase  of  a  fatted  ox, 
a  shilling ;  for  a  ram  or  an  ewe,  fourpence ;  the  provender  for 
twenty  horses,  fourpence  likewise.  But  as  time  went  on, 
and  Henry  was  obliged  to  cross  the  sea  to  suppress  distant 
insurrections,'  he  had  need  of  coined  money  to  meet  these 
expenses.  About  the  same  time,  crowds  of  complaining 
villeins  began  to  flock  to  the  court,  or,  what  distressed  him 
more,  met  him  as  he  journeyed,  and  held  up  their  plough¬ 
shares  to  show  that  agriculture  was  failing ;  for  they  suffered 
many  hardships  from  this  carrying  of  provisions  away  from 
their  own  homes.  Accordingly  the  king  inclined  his  ear  to 
their  complaints,  and,  after  taking  counsel  with  the  magnates, 
appointed  the  best  men  he  could  find  for  the  work,  and  sent 
them  all  over  the  kingdom  to  visit  every  manor,  and  there 
estimate  in  money  the  value  of  the  payments  in  kind;  and 
they  made  the  sheriff  of  each  county  responsible  at  the 
Exchequer  for  the  total  amount  due  from  all  the  manors  in 
the  county.”  132 

There  are  many  points  of  interest  in  this  account ;  such 
as  the  primitive  character  of  those  conditions  in  which  the 
natural  unit  of  reckoning  was  food  for  a  hundred  men ,  or 
provender  for  tiventy  horses ;  or  the  description  of  the  king’s 
need  for  money  as  chiefly  due  to  the  employment  of  paid 
troops.  But  what  is  especially  important  to  observe  is  that 


48 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


it  shows  that  a  currency  can  he  used  as  a  common  measure 
of  value ,  long  before  it  is  actually  employed  in  everyday 
transactions  as  a  medium  of  exchange . 

These  two  examples  are  sufficient  to  illustrate  the  character 
of  the  change.  But  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  it  was  not  confined 
to  the  relations  between  individuals  :  so  intimately  was  the 
system  of  government  bound  up  with  the  condition  of  society 
that  the  same  transition  was  sure  also  to  take  place  in  the 
relations  between  the  sovereign  and  his  subjects.  Thus  in 
the  reign  of  Ethelred  is  found  the  beginning  of  regular 
taxation  in  the  shape  of  the  Danegeld  ;  by  the  time  of  Canute, 
the  heriot ,  originally  a  gift  of  horses  and  armour,  had  come  to  be 
a  money  payment ;  Henry  II.  obtained  the  payment  called 
scutage ,  in  lieu  of  military  service,  from  the  great  body  of  the 
knights ;  and  under  Edward  I.  regular  money  payments  by 
the  merchants  finally  took  the  place  of  gifts  or  seizures  of 
wares. 

Such  a  change  implies  two  conditions  :  first,  the  existence 
of  an  adequate  currency;  and  secondly,  the  existence  of 
markets,  where  men  might  be  confident  of  obtaining  money 
for  their  wares,  or  of  obtaining  wares  for  their  money.  Tc 
take  the  first  of  these.  There  was  no  considerable  coinage 
in  England  until  the  second  half  of  the  eighth  century  under 
Ofia.133  With  Athelstan  began  the  long  series  of  laws  for  the 
regulation  of  the  coinage ;  he  ordained  that  only  one  kind  of 
money  should  be  used  throughout  the  realm,  and  that  none 
should  coin  save  in  a  town  :  from  this  time  begins  the  practice 
of  stamping  upon  the  coins  the  name  of  the  town  where  they 
were  struck.134  For  centuries  the  local  authorities  in  centres 
of  trade  were  allowed  to  have  their  own  money ers :  there 
were  several  in  every  considerable  town ;  and  the  increase  in 
the  bulk  of  the  currency  may  be  roughly  estimated  hy  the 
number  of  names  of  towns  found  on  the  coins.  Under  Canute 


Ciiap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  49 


the  mints  were  more  numerous  than  ever  before.136  Under 
Henry  I.  there  were  ninety-four  moneyers,  all  of  them  pun¬ 
ished  by  mutilation  in  1125  for  debasing  the  currency.186  To 
remedy  the  evils  of  clipping,  there  were  new  coinages  in  1125, 
1158, 1180, 1248,  and  1300.137  In  1220,  round  halfpennies  and 
farthings  were  for  the  first  time  issued :  that  the  practice 
of  breaking  the  coin  into  halves  and  quarters  should  have 
remained  so  late  as  this  proves  how  little  retail  trade  there 
could  have  been.138  On  the  other  hand,  the  ill  success  of 
Henry  III.  in  his  attempt,  in  1257,  to  imitate  his  contem¬ 
poraries  in  Fiance  and  Italy  in  issuing  a  gold  currency, 
proves  how  far  England  was  behind  other  countries  in  com¬ 
mercial  development  ; 139  for  with  the  increase  of  trade,  coins 
of  higher  denominations  become  more  and  more  convenient. 
The  remonstrances  of  the  city  of  London  forced  him  to  issue 
a  proclamation  that  no  one  should  be  compelled  to  accept  the 
new  gold  pennies.  The  coinage  was  small,  and  soon  discon¬ 
tinued;  and  no  similar  attempt  was  made  until  1343,  when 
Edward  procured  the  assistance  of  certain  Florentine  moneyers 
in  the  issue  of  his  gold  nobles.140  During  the  intervening 
century,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  a  considerable 
commerce  had  grown  up ;  so  that  the  king  was  now  able  to 
ordain  that  no  one  should  refuse  to  take  his  nobles  in  pay¬ 
ment  of  debts  of  twenty  shillings  or  above.  It  was  with 
Flanders  that  this  trade  was  most  considerable,  and  therefore 
it  was  that  in  1345-46  Edward  negotiated  with  the  magis¬ 
trates  of  the  Flemish  towns  for  the  establishment  of  a 
uniform  coinage  to  be  current  in  both  countries.141 

How  the  second  condition  was  fulfilled,  and  markets  grew 
up,  will  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter. 


E 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


SO 


NOTES. 


1.  Seebolim,  1-4,  7-13,  21-29. 

2.  Maine,  Village  Communities ,  85-87 ;  but  it  is  incorrect  to  speak  of 
“  common  fields  .  .  .  divided  into  three  long  strips.”  There  were  three 
great  fields ,  or  three  large  ones  and  three  smaller  ones,  as  in  Hitchen  (see 
the  map  at  the  beginning  of  Seebohm,  and  p.  450) ;  and  each  field  was 
divided  into  several  score  of  acre  strips. 

3.  Dominium ,  or  dominicum ,  and  villenagium  are  the  usual  terms. 
Inland  is  more  rare :  it  appears  as  early  as  956,  Seeb.  149 ;  occurs  some¬ 
times  in  Domesday ,  e.g.  in  Yorkshire,  three  cases  on  p.  317,  col.  1 ;  is  the 
usual  term  for  the  demesne  in  the  Burton  Chartulary ,  e.g.  pp.  18,  19,  20 ; 
and  occurs  as  late  as  1 240,  “  terrae  de  dominico  quas  vocant  Inlandes,” 
Domesday  of  S.  Paul's ,  lxxii. 

4.  In  a  map,  dated  1624,  in  the  possession  of  Lincoln  College,  Oxford, 
representing  the  manor  of  Pollicot,  co.  Bucks,  the  college,  which  has 
stepped  into  the  position  of  lord  of  the  manor,  is  marked  as  holding 
alternate  strips  in  the  common  fields.  Cf.  Seebohm,  38. 

5.  Seebohm,  61.  * 

6.  Oust.  Battle ,  xiii. 

7.  Dugdale,  writing  of  Stoneleigh  in  Warwickshire,  describes  each 
tenant  as  holding  one  yardland,  and  “  paying  30 d.,  viz.  Id.  an  acre,  in  regard 
every  yardland  contained  30  acres  and  no  more ;  ”  Antiq.  of  Warwichsh 
254,  qu.  Gomme,  Primitive  Folk-Moots ,  128.  For  virgates  consisting  of 
16  acres,  see  Ramsay  Chart.,  284;  of  18  acres,  ib.  295;  see  also  Worcester 
Reg.,  lxxv.  lxxx. 

8.  The  persons  to  whom  the  term  bordarii  was  applied  seem  usually 
to  have  been  in  a  somewhat  better  position  than  the  cotseti  and  cotmanni. 
But  the  terms  are  used  interchangeably :  e.g .  the  Fiber  Niger  of  Peter¬ 
borough,  161,  where,  after  dividing  the  tenants  on  a  certain  manor  into 
pleni  villani,  dimidii  villani  and  cotsetes ,  the  services  of  the  full-villeins  and 
half-villeins  are  given  and  then  those  of  the  bordarii .  In  Domesday, 
according  to  the  lists  in  Ellis,  Introd.  to  Domesday  (1833),  ii.  511,  there 
are  recorded  108,456  villani  and  dimidii  villani,  82,624  bordarii,  and  only 
6819  cotarii,  coteri,  and  coscets ;  yet  the  division  of  the  servile  population 
in  the  so-called  Leges  Henrici  jprimi  is  into  “  villani,  vel  cotseti,  vel  fer- 
dingi ;  ”  Stubbs,  Sel.  Charters,  106,  xxix. 

9.  Besides  the  above  examples  of  dimidii  villani,  cf.  “  Isti  subscripti 
vocantur  Halferdlings,”  Cust.  Battle,  77. 

10.  Of  eight  manors  in  Northamptonshire  belonging  in  1086  to  the 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY,  5 1 


monastery  of  Peterborough,  in  four  there  was  only  one  slave,  in  one  an 
ancilla ,  in  one  three  slaves,  and  in  two  four;  Domesday ,  i.  221,  2216. 
In  the  western  counties,  indeed,  there  was  a  much  larger  proportion ;  but 
to  this  reference  will  be  made  later. 

11.  The  Bectitudines  give  first  the  law  of  the  thegn ,  then  the  duty  of 
the  geneat, — a  term  which  is  best  explained  as  including  all  the  servile 
cultivators, — and  then  the  duty  of  the  cotsetla  and  the  duty  of  the  gebur, 
which  may  be  regarded  as  “  subsections  ”  of  the  clause  concerning  the 
geneat.  Seebohm,  129,  seq.  Compare  the  services  of  the  gebur , — “  in  some 
places  heavy,  in  others  lighter  or  moderate.  On  some  land  he  must  work 
at  week- work  two  days  at  such  work  as  he  is  required  through  the  year 
every  week,  and  at  harvest  three  days  for  week- work,  and  from  Candlemas 
to  Easter  three,” — with  such  entries  as,  “  quaeque  virga  operatur  iii  diebus 
in  ebdomada,”  in  Citron.  Petrob .,  158. 

12.  “  On  sumen  lande  is  paet  he  sceal  wyrean  to  wic-weorce ,  ii  dagas ;  ” 
in  the  Latin  version,  “operatur  opus  septimane Bectitudines ,  375, 
Schmid.  Three  centuries  later  occurs  the  phrase  “  opera  diurna ;  ”  Cust. 
Battle ,  viii. 

13.  E.g.  “  Omnes  firmarii  fac*  iiii  p’cac’  (i.e.  precationes)  in  autumpn* 
cu*  tota  familia  exta  husewiva;  ”  Boldon  Booh ,  in  Domesday,  iv.  570,  571. 
Cf.  the  custom  of  Bright  Walton,  12  Ed.  I. :  “  Nec  licebit  alicui  metere 
in  eadem  villa  eodem  die  quo  dominus  habet  magnam  precariam  nisi  in 
campo  domini ;  ”  Cust.  Battle ,  59 ;  and  an  instance  in  the  Hundred  Bolls, 
qu.  Seebohm,  43. 

14.  In  drawing  this  distinction  between  weeh-worh  and  boon-days  I  am 
following  Seebohm,  41,  78,  and  it  seems  to  be  justified  by  such  phrases  as 
“  facit  aruras ,  lovebones,  averagia  ”  (carting),  in  Chart.  Bamsey ,  314.  But 
in  some  cases  the  term  precariae ,  or  precationes ,  is  given  to  only  one  or 
two  additional  days  in  the  year,  as  distinguished  even  from  the  heavier 
services  at  harvesting. 

15.  Cust.  Battle ,  xxxix.  There  is  a  charming  piece  of  Latinity  in 
another  case,  “  Percipiet  per  diem  in  dicto  prato  ii  panes  nigros  et  dimi- 
dium,  potagium,  et  potum,  (i.  galonem  communiter)  et  medietatem  unius 
fcrculi  et  caseum,”  ib.,  5.  Sometimes  the  days  were  distinguished  accord¬ 
ing  to  whether  meat  was  given  or  only  ale,  as  mete-bedrip  and  ale-bedrip. 
Hale,  Domesday  of  S.  Paul's,  cxxxv.  In  one  case,  hunger-bedripe ,  a  day 
on  which  no  food  was  given,  is  distinguished  from  lovebone;  “metet 
etiam  unum  sellionem  ad  hunger-bedripe,  et  unum  sellionem  pro  love- 
bone  ;  ”  Chartulary  of  Bamsey ,  i.  470. 

16.  This  is  abundantly  illustrated  in  the  Liber  Niger  and  the  Boldon 
Booh ,  from  which  translations  are  given  in  Seebohm,  73,  68. 


0.  OF  ILL  LIB. 


52 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


17.  The  latter  is  the  later  plan;  and  it  is  illustrated,  e.g.  in  the 
Domesday  of  8 .  Paul's ,  3,  where,  of  those  who  hold  per  vilenagium ,  Eobert 
the  smith  is  mentioned  first  as  holding  half  a  virgate,  and  his  services  are 
recorded,  and  then  the  names  are  registered  of  five  other  persons  holding 
half  virgates,  with  the  addition  in  each  case  per  idem  servicium.  In  the 
Chartulary  of  Ramsey  the  model  list  of  services  often  occupies  three  pages, 
e.g.  298-301,  and  to  the  following  names  is  added,  “et  facit  in  omnibus 
sicut  dictus  N.”  In  the  Chartulary  of  Gloucester  the  phrase  is  eadem 
faciet,  29,  38. 

18.  The  sections  on  the  bailiff  and  reeve  will  be  found  printed  in  the 
Appendix  to  Cunningham,  Growth  of  Eng.  Industry  and  Commerce  (1  ed.) 

19.  In  a  manor  belonging  to  S.  Paul’s  there  is  an  instance  in  which 
it  is  not  clear  whether  “  forman”  is  the  name  of  an  office  or  a  surname  ; 
probably  it  was  passing  from  one  to  the  other :  “  Johannes  forman  v.  acras 
pro  i.  operatione  qualibet  septimana  et  averat  Lond’  ad  cibum  domini 
quum  Dominus  jubet.  .  .  .  et  furem  captum  in  curia  custodiet  et  judica- 
tum  suspendet ;  ”  Domesday  of  8.  Paul's ,  38. 

20.  See  the  account  in  Hale’s  Introduction  to  Domesday  of  S.  Paul's , 
xxxvi. 

21.  Russia ,  ch.  viii. 

22.  “  From  the  survey  of  1279  (not  yet  printed)  we  learn  that  certain 
of  the  tenants  (on  the  manors  of  S.  Paul’s)  were  compellable  to  accept  this 
office :  that  it  was  an  annual  one ;  and  that  whilst  performing  its  duties 
the  tenant  was  exonerated  from  other  services ;  ”  Hale,  Introduction  to 
8.  Paul's  D.y  xxxvi.  For  other  examples  of  compulsory  reevedom,  see 
Custumal  of  Bleadon ,  209 ;  Cust.  of  Battle,  66  (“  Memorandum  quod 
dominus  potest  pro  voluntate  sua  quern  voluerit  de  custumariis  eligere 
in  Prepositum  et  qui  tenet  integram  virgatam  terrae  relaxabitur  ei  de 
redditu  suo  quinque  solidorum  xld.);  and  Castle  Combe ,  146,  where, 
in  a  Kental  of  1340,  after  the  names  of  four  of  the  tenants  each  holding 
a  virgate,  and  after  that  of  a  miller,  is  added,  “  Et  erit  prepositus,”  while 
after  the  name  of  another  miller  is,  “Et  non  debet  esse  prepositus  ;  ”  and 
of  twelve  holders  of  virgates  “  in  bondagio  ”  it  is  said,  “  Et  erit  prepositus 
vel  messor  si  domino  placuerit  et  tunc  erit  quietus  de  v.  solidis  et  de 
omnibus  operibus  suis  in  autumno.” 

23.  For  exemption  from  services,  see  previous  note.  For  land  attached 
to  the  office,  see  Cust.  of  Bleadon :  “  Habebit  unum  ferdellum  terrae  sine 
messuagio  quod  vocatur  revelond." 

24.  Thus  the  Compotus  of  1316,  in  Kogers,  Eist.  of  Agric.,  ii.  617,  is 
presented  by  “  Eobertus  Oldman  prepositus  de  Cuxham ;  ”  and  the  same 
documents  give  examples  of  election  of  reeve  in  1286  (“Clemenes 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  S3 

Henewy  electus  ad  officium  praepositi  de  Stockton  de  communi  assensu 
totius  villae  ”),  609,  and  in  1331  (per  totum  homagium  electus ),  613 ;  and 
of  his  being  fined  or  removed  for  unsatisfactory  accounts  (“  pro  pluribus 
celamentis  et  transgressionibus  in  computo  suo  inventis,  610,  and 
“  amotu3  est  super  hunc  compotum 613). 

25.  See  Hanssen,  as  quoted  in  Seebohm,  372,  373. 

26.  lb .,  418. 

27.  16.,  422-423. 

28.  See  Seebohm,  117-125. 

29.  Ib .,  61,  62. 

30.  Ib .,  24-26,  113. 

31.  The  percentages  I  have  taken  from  Mr.  Seebohm’s  maps,  p.  86. 

The  total  recorded  population,  as  given  by  Ellis,  Introd.  to  Domesday ,  ii. 
511,  is  283,242.  Of  these  108,407  are.  registered  as  villani ,  49  as  dimidii 
villani ;  there  are  82,119  bordarii,  490  bordarii  pauperes ,  15  dimidii 
bordarii ,  5054  cotarii ,  16  coteri  (merely  a  different  spelling),  1749  coscets. 
The  number  of  servi  is  25,156.  % 

32.  This  is  clearly  the  explanation  of  the  “  copyholds  of  imperfect 
tenure/’  still  frequently  found  in  the  western  counties.  Pollock,  Land 
Laws ,  203. 

33.  Ellis  gives  10,097  liberi  homines ,  of  whom  Suffolk  has  5344 ; 
2041  liberi  homines  commendati,  of  whom  Suffolk  has  1895;  and  23,072 
sochemanni. 

34.  For  examples  of  socmen  with  considerable  estates,  see  Domesday ,  i. 
3146  (Yorks.)  ;  i.  3366  (Stamford)  ;  ii.  182  (Norfolk).  For  &  freeman  in  a 
similar  position,  ii.  345  (Suffolk). 

35.  There  is  an  instance  to  the  contrary  in  the  Liber  Niger  (Chron. 
Petrob .,  164 :  “  Et  ibi  sunt  xxix.  sochemanni  et  operantur  i  die  in  ebdo- 
rnada  per  totum  annum.” 

36.  E.g.  “In  Estona  ix.  sochemanni  .  .  .  et  serviunt  cum  militibus 
quantum  illis  jure  contingit ;  ”  Chr.  Pet.,  172 :  on  p.  173  the  phrase 
“  serviunt  cum  militibus  ”  oocurs  thrice  of  socmen,  and  twice  “cum  mili¬ 
tibus  ”  only.  On  p.  169  there  is  a  curious  case  of  fractional  respon¬ 
sibility  :  “  Eicardus  Enganie  ii.  hidae  in  Hamtonascira  et  servit  pro  i. 
milite.  Sed  socemanni  faciunt  quartam  partem  militis,  et  ipse  iii.  partes 
unius  militis.” 

37.  Thus  the  Liber  Niger ,  Chr.  Petr.,  158,  records  in  one  village  only 
8  villeins,  but  44  socmen :  “  Et  omnes  isti  sochemanni  habent  viii.  car- 
rucas,  et  inde  arant  iii.  vicibus  per  annum.  Et  quisquis  eorum  metit  in 
Augusto  de  blado  domini  dimidiam  acram  et  ii.  vicibus  in  Augusto  pre- 
cationem.  Et  quisquis  herciat  i.  die  ad  tremeis  (in  spring).” 


54 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


38.  Thus,  in  Domesday ,  ii.  317  (Suffolk)  :  “  Huic  manerio  pertinent 
v.  sochemanni  de  lvi.  acris.  ...  Hi  v.  non  potuerunt  vendere  terram 
suam  nec  dare  alicui ;  ”  and  ib.,  324,  “  In  eadem  i.  sochemannus  cum  xxx. 
acris  et  non  potuit  vendere  nec  dare.” 

39.  Thus,  in  Domesday ,  ii.  66  (Essex) :  “  Isti  sochemanni,  sic  comi- 
tatus  testatur,  non  poterant  removere  ah  illo  manerio.” 

40.  Maine  speaks  of  Bracton  as  “  putting  off  on  his  countrymen  as  a 
compendium  of  pure  English  law  a  treatise  of  which  the  entire  form 
and  a  third  of  the  contents  were  directly  borrowed  from  the  Corpus 
Juris;”  Ancient  Law ,  82. 

41.  Thus,  in  a  Wiltshire  manor  belonging  to  Battle  Abbey,  there  were, 
in  the  reign  of  Ed.  I.,  Liberi  tenentes,  Majores  Erdlinges  scilicet  Yir- 
garii,  Minores  Erdlinges,  Halferdlinges  et  majores  Cotarii,  Minores  Cot- 
tarii,  and  Coteriae,  Cust.  Battle ,  72-81 ;  and  an  Inquisition  of  19  Ed.  I. 
presents  the  following  gradation  of  ranks, — Liberi  tenentes  per  cartam, 
Liberi  tenentes  qui  vocantur  fresokemen,  Sokemanni  qui  vocantur  mol- 
men,  Custumarii  qui  vocantur  werkmen,  Consuetudinarii  tenentes  4  acras 
terrae,  et  Consuetudinarii  tenentes  2  acras  terrae ;  Vinogradoff  in  Engl. 
Hist.  Rev.,  i.  757.  On  the  manors  of  Gloucester  monastery  were  Liberi 
tenentes,  Consuetudinarii,  Lundinarii,  Tenentes  Honilond,  Ferendelli, 
Tenentes  Penilond  ad  vitam  et  ad  voluntatem  domini,  Medii,  Cotlan- 
darii(and  Cotarii),  Tenentes  forlonde,  Akermauni;  Historia  Glouc.,  iii.  cv, 
121-149;  but  some  of  these  names  are  probably  equivalents. 

42.  Thus  in  certain  Articles  of  Visitation  of  1320  occurs  the  clause, 
“  Item,  an  aliqua  terra,  quondam  custumaria,  teneatur  libere  a  serviciis 
et  consuetudinibus  quas  faeere  consueverunt :  quae,  per  quern,  qualiter, 
et  a  quo  tempore ;  et  qualiter  nunc  teneatur,  per  quae  servicia ;  ”  Domes¬ 
day  of  S.  FauVs ,  157*. 

43.  The  fine  for  giving  a  daughter  in  marriage  was  known  as  mercheta , 
maritagium ,  and  culage.  That  it  was  regarded  as  a  distinguishing  mark  of 
servile  tenure  is  shown  by  the  entry  in  the  Hundred  Rolls  for  Bedford¬ 
shire  (ii.  329) :  “  Sunt  illi  villani  ita  servi  quod  non  possunt  maritare 
filias  nisi  ad  voluntatem  domini ;  ”  Seebohm,  41  and  n.  1.  Entry  of  pay¬ 
ment  frequently  occurs  in  the  manor  rolls ;  examples  are  given  in  Bogers, 
Hist,  of  Agric.y  ii.  608,  seq. 

44.  A  son  would  be  much  less  likely  to  leave  the  manor  owing  to 
marriage  than  a  daughter,  and  this  may  be  the  reason  why  the  fine  was 
only  exacted  in  the  latter  case.  In  later  times  the  fine  seems  to  have 
been  heavier  when  the  woman  was  leaving  the  manor,  than  when  she 
was  marrying  an  inhabitant  of  the  manor.  Thus,  in  one  of  the 
cases  given  by  Mr.  "Rogers,  a  woman  pays  a  shilling  in  1308,  “pro  se 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  55 


maritanda  infra  manerium”  while  another  pays  two  shillings  in  1318, 
“ut  possit  maritari  extra  Ubertatem  domns;  ”  Hist,  of  Agric.,  ii.  611.  Cf. 
Articles  of  Visitation ,  1320:  “Item,  an  nativi  custumarii  maritaverint 
filias  suas  intra  manerium  vel  extra ,  vel  vendiderint  vitulum  pullanum 
vel  bovem  de  propria  nutritura  sine  licencia  domini,  vel  arbores  in  haiciis 
suis  extirpaverint  vel  succiderint  sine  licencia  ;  ”  D.  of  S.  P.,  157*.  So 
also  on  the  estates  of  the  Norman  abbey  of  Mont  S.  Michel,  the  fine 
for  “  licentia  maritandi  ”  was  only  “  si  maritaverit  filiam  suam  extra 
terram  S.  Michael  is  ;  ”  Delisle,  679. 

45.  The  case  recorded  in  the  Placitorum  Abbreviate  (ed.  1811),  p.  90, 
is  important  enough  to  be  quoted  in  full :  “  Assisa  venit  et  recognovit  si 
Cicilia  etc.  injuste  etc.  disseisiavit  Baldwinum  juvenem,  de  libero  tene- 
mento  suo.  Jurati  dicunt  quod  ipsi  certi  sunt  quod  predictus  Baldwinus 
fuit  seisitus  de  i.  virgata  terrae  .  .  .  et  quod  ipsi  eum  disseisiatum,  sed 
nesciunt  si  sit  liberum  tenementum  vel  non.  Quia  si  ipse  habuerit  caru- 
cam  ipse  arabit  domino  suo  tres  acras  ad  cibum  suum  proprium,  ita  tamen 
quod  in  estate  dum  arat  habeat  herbagium  ad  boves  suos  tantummodo 
dum  arat.  Dicunt  etiam  quod  ipse  et  alii  debent  falcare  tres  turnos  et 
introducent  fenum  in  grangiam  domini  sui,  et  habuerunt  pro  hoc  meliorem 
multonem  quern  eligere  possint  in  falda  domini  sui.  Debent  etiam  in 
autumno  facere  precarias  ad  cibum  domini  et  reddere  ad  Pascha  de 
qualibet  acra  quam  tenent  unum  ovum.  Dicunt  etiam  quod  nunquam 
audiverunt  did  de  filiabus  eorum  quod  finem  facerent  cum  domino  de  eis 
maritandis ,  neque  de  bobus  suis  vendendis.  Dicunt  etiam  quod  antiquitus 
in  septennio  solebat  dominus  eorum  petere  auxilium,  et  ei  auxiliebantur. 
Consideratum  est  quod  per  servicia  ilia  non  est  tenementum  illud  villa - 
num.  Et  ideo  ipse  habeat  seisinam.” 

46.  Thus  in  the  Chartulary  of  Gloucester,  Hist.,  iii.  134,  among  four 
persons  in  a  manor  who  “  tenent  per  cartam  in  perpetuum  ”  it  is  specially 
noticed  of  one  holding  half  a  virgate  of  land  “  non  potest  vendere  equum 
nec  bovem  sine  licentia  domini,  et  si  vendiderit  dabit  tonnutum  (tax) 
pro  equo  quatuor  denarios :  et  non  potest  maritare  filiam  suam  nec  filium 
alienare.” 

47.  Vinogradoff  in  Engl.  Hist.  Rev.,  i.  736,  737. 

48.  See  note  46,  and  cf.  the  quotation  from  the  Register  of  S.  Edmunds - 
bury  of  18  Ed.  I.,  where,  among  the  arguments  that  certain  molmen  were 
“  servilis  conditiones  ”  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  abbots  “  relaxarunt  eis 
servicia  majora  et  consuetudines  pro  certa  pecunia it  is  alleged  that  they 
do  not  hold  “  per  cartam  sed  per  virgam  in  curia ;  ”  qu.  Hist.  Rev.,  i.  736. 

49.  This  is  clear  from  the  article  in  the  Extenta  Manerii  ( Statutes  of 
the  Realm,  i.  242) :  “  De  libere  tenentibus  .  .  .  inquirendum  est  .  .  .  qui 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


56 

tenent  per  cartam  et  qui  non.”  There  is  a  noteworthy  example  in  the 
Ibstone  rental  of  1298,  printed  in  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric .,  ii.  656,  where 
among  thirty-one  free  tenancies  of  all  sizes  from  a  virgate  downward, 
only  eight  are  said  to  he  held  “  per  cartam,”  while  four  are  expressly  said 
to  be  held  “ad  terminum  vitae,”  /‘ad  voluntatem  domini,”  and  one 
“  sine  scripto.” 

50.  According  to  Ellis,  the  number  of  these  recorded  is  159,  of  whom 
54  are  in  Yorkshire,  42  in  Derbyshire,  36  in  Essex,  more  than  14  in 
Lincolnshire,  11  in  Dorsetshire,  2  in  Nottinghamshire.  In  some  cases, 
like  the  more  important  socmen  and  liberi  homines  already  referred  to, 
they  have  villeins  holding  of  them,  e.g.  “Ibi  ii.  censores  habent  ix. 
villanos  cum  iii.  carrucis ;  ”  Domesday ,  i.  331  (Yorkshire).  For  the 
continental  use  of  the  word,  see  Ducange,  s.vv.  Censarii  (defined  by  him 
as  “  villani  censui  obnoxii,  qui  censum  praestant  ”),  and  Censualis. 

51.  Of  a  total  of  858  coliberti  in  Domesday ,  260  are  in  Wilts,  216  in 
Somerset,  103  in  Gloucestershire,  98  in  Hampshire,  49  in  Cornwall,  and 
the  rest  scattered  over  the  other  western  counties.  Ducange  elaborately 
discusses  Colliberti  with  the  conclusion  that  they  occupied  a  middle 
position  between  what  he  calls  “  servi  ”  and  “  liberi,”  and  paid  census. 

52.  Domesday ,  ii.  1,  “In  hoc  manerio  erat  tunc  temporis  quidam 
liber  homo  de  dimidia  hida,  qui  modo  effectus  est  unus  de  villanis ;  ”  cf.  ib., 
350 b,  “  Huic  manerio  addidit  normannus  filius  tanredi  iii.  liberos  homines 
regi  commendatos.” 

53.  Rotuli  Curiae  Regis.,  i.  357.  The  jurors  declare  in  a  case  tried  at 
the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  John,  “Wilhelmus  et  antecessores  ejus 
tenuerunt  illam  terram  libere  usque  x.  annos  obitum  suum,  et  tunc 
intravit  in  consuetudinem  nesciunt  utrum  vi  vel  aliter.” 

54.  Besides  the  instances  of  the  Burton  and  S.  Paul’s  estates  com¬ 
mented  on  later,  it  may  be  noticed  that  in  twelve  manors  belonging  to 
the  Priory  of  S.  Mary  of  Worcester  there  are  recorded  in  Domesday  only 
three  liberi  homines,  and  apparently  no  socmen  at  all,  while  in  1240  there 
wrere  fifty-five  liberi  and  eighty-five  socmen ;  Hale,  Introd.  to  Register  of 
Wore.,  vi.,  xvii.  Archdeacon  Hale  indeed  here,  as  in  his  other  writings, 
argues  that  the  omission  of  free  tenants  from  Domesday  does  not  prove 
their  non-existence.  But  he  gives  no  sufficient  proof  of  the  proposition, 
which  would,  indeed,  throw  early  social  history  into  inextricable  confusion  : 
and, — to  mention  no  other  objection, — it  is  inconsistent  with  the  statement 
of  the  English  chronicle  that  “  not  a  yard-land  ”  was  omitted  from  the 
survey. 

55.  Malmen,  molmen ,  and  molland  appear  in  many  parts  of  England, 
and  their  position  has  recently  been  discussed  in  the  Engl.  Hist.  Rev. ; 


Chap.  I  ]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  57 


see  especially  Vinogradoff  in  i.  734.  But  it  has  not  there  been  noticed 
that  “  mails  and  duties  ”  was,  until  perhaps  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
common  term  for  rent  in  Scotland ;  see  Stair,  Institutions ,  326,  376.  Scott 
frequently  uses  “mail,”  “mail-duties,”  and  “mailing,”  e.g .  where  he 
makes  the  dying  Dumbiedikes  bid  his  son  to  “  let  the  creatures  stay  at 
a  moderate  mailing ;  ”  Heart  of  Midlothian ,  ch.  vii.  The  word  “  mailen  ” 
was  often  used  for  a  farm ;  as  in  the  lines  of  Burns  beginning,  Last  May 
a  braw  lover. 

56.  One  of  the  passages  in  which  the  term  occurs  is  also  valuable  as 
describing  the  division  among  the  sons  of  a  previous  tenant:  “  Terra  quae 
fuit  Ormi  habent  iii.  filii  ejus  hoc  modo.  Uivetus  habet  ii.  bovatas  pro  ii, 
soiidis  et  debet  facere  consuetudines  (occasional  labour  services)  ceterorum 
censariorum.  Kaven  et  Leysingus  habent  ceteram  terram,  id  est  vi. 
bovates  de  Warlanda  et  iiii.  de  Inlanda  pro  viii.  soiidis  quoque  anno  et 
debet  ire  ad  Offelawe  hundred  et  praeter  hoc  facere  omnia  sicut  alii 
censarii;  ”  Collections  for  Hist  Staff or  dsh.,  v.  19.  The  meaning  of  warlandt 
here  frequently  used,  is  not  clear.  It  seems  to  be  frequently  opposed 
to  inland  or  demesne,  e.g.  “  In  terra  warlanda  sunt  xxxii.  bovatae  ad  opus , 
et  inter  warlanda  et  inlanda  xxxii.  ad  malam,  id  est  totum  Ixiiii.  bovatae 
terrae,”  where  it  appears  to  be  the  same  as  land  in  villenage.  Possibly  it 
was  land  specially  subject  to  some  military  burden  or  tax  for  military 
purpose  ;  cf.  “  Liberi  ab  omnibus  armorum  oneribus,  quod  warscot  Anglici 
dicunt,”  in  the  apocryphal  Constitutions  of  the  Forest  of  Canute  (Cn.  iii. 
9,  Schmid,  319),  and  in  this  case  connected  with  hidage.  But  the 
whole  subject  of  Saxon  land-measures  and  terminology  is  still  in  the 
greatest  obscurity.  For  other  examples  of  censarii,  see  Staf.  Collections , 
v.  24,  where  in  an  extent,  or  survey,  of  1114,  the  tenants  are  regularly 
divided  into  villani  (bound  to  full  services)  and  censarii  (bound  “  bis  in 
anno  praestare  aratrum  et  ter  in  augusto  secare  cum  suis  ”). 

57.  Domesday  of  S.  Paul's ,  xxii.  114,  27,  118,  lv. 

58.  The  precise  holdings  of  the  libere  tenentes  were  one  holding  50  + 
30  +  15  +  15-1-10-1-1  acres  +  1\  virgates,  one  with  4  virgates,  oue  with 
3  virgates  +  5  acres,  one  with  2  virgates,  three  with  1  virgate,  one 
with  22|  acres,  one  with  10  +  1\  acres,  two  with  half  virgates,  and  one 
with  15  acres,  three  with  10  acres,  two  with  7\  acres,  and  one  with  5  acres. 

59.  Mollond  and  Werhlond  are  distinguished  from  one  another  in  an 
entry  in  a  S.  Paul’s  Inquisition  of  1279;  “Terra  cum  pertinentiis  de 
mollond  et  werklond ;  ”  Plale,  D.  of  S.  P.  lxxv.  Cf.  werhmen  in  n.  31 
above. 

60.  Thus  on  the  manor  of  Thorp,  belonging  to  the  monastery  of  Peter¬ 
borough,  at  Domesday  Survey  there  were  twelve  villani,  two  bordarii,  four 


S3 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


servi ;  at  the  time  when  the  Liber  Niger  was  drawn  up  (1125-28)  there 
were,  besides  two  free  tenants  with  dependent  villeins,  and  one  socman, 
six  bordarii,  twelve  plene-villani,  and  six  dimidii  villani.  But  here  the 
plene-villanus  holds  only  eleven  acres ;  Chron.  Petrob .,  158.  Cf.  also 
the  change  in  Castre,  Werminton,  Esctona,  and  Stannige.  In  Werminton, 
temp.  Liber  Niger ,  “  xx.  pleni  villani  et  xxix.  semi-villani  tenent  xxxiv. 
virgas  et  dimidiam  ”  (p.  160),  which  is  obviously  a  virgate  for  each  full- 
villein,  and  half  a  virgate  for  each  half-villein. 

61.  Thus,  e.g.,  on  a  manor  belonging  to  the  monastery  of  S.  Peter  of 
Gloucester  (Hist,  iii.,  187),  ten  consuetudinarii  each  hold  “dimidiam 
virgatum  terrae  servilis,,f  and  fourteen  hold  half  a  virgate  between  every 
two  of  them  “  conjunctim.”  So,  as  late  as  1298,  on  one  manor  belonging  to 
Merton  College,  there  are  thirteen  holders  of  half  virgates  described  on 
the  roll  itself  as  cusiumarii ,  but  in  the  side  rubric  as  nativi ;  Rogers,  Hist. 
Agric .,  ii.  654;  cf.  also  658. 

62.  Besides  the  example  in  n.  58  above,  see  the  Wore.  Reg.  60a, 

where  the  three  free  tenants  on  one  manor  hold  li,  3,  and  2  virgates 
respectively;  81a,  where  the  free  holdings  are  of  2,  5,  1,  2,  1,  2,  1J,  3| 

virgates.  The  latter  case  is  very  interesting,  for  most  of  the  holdings  seem 
to  have  passed  to  tenants  in  chivalry,  who  held  them  “  pro  homagio  ”  or 
“  per  homagium  ;  ”  in  some  cases  it  is  added  “  sine  servicio  ”  or  “  nihil  inde 
solvit,”  in  others  “  solvit  inde  annuatim  ”  a  certain  amount.  But  it  is 
very  clear  that  all  the  holdings,  free  and  servile,  were  reckoned  in 
virgates,  i.e.  bound  together  by  the  compulsory  rotation  of  crops,  and 
probably  by  a  co-operative  system  of  agriculture  :  thus  “  xl.  virgatae  terrae 
tarn  liberorum  quam  villanorum  sunt  geldantes  ”  and  “  summa  virgatarum 
liberarum ,”  etc. 

63.  Engl.  Village  Community ,  178,  309. 

64.  See  the  discussion  in  Pollock,  Land  Laws ,  206-209.  It  is  true  that 
“  Borough  English  (inheritance  by  the  youngest  son)  was  very  widely  held 
in  mediaeval  England  to  imply  servile  occupation  of  land ;  ”  VinogradofF  in 
Engl.  Hist.  R.,  i.  736:  but  that  custom  seems  to  have  prevailed  only  in 
certain  districts  of  Kent,  Surrey,  Sussex,  around  London,  and  in  Somerset, 
and  to  a  still  less  extent  in  Essex  and  East  Anglia,  and  Hampshire; 
Elton,  Origins  of  Engl.  Hist.,  118-119. 

65.  As,  for  instance,  on  the  estates  of  Worcester  Priory,  n.  54  above. 
On  one  of  the  manors,  Pillesgate,  in  Northamptonshire,  belonging  to  Peter¬ 
borough  Monastery  there  were,  in  1086,  26  socmen ;  forty  years  later,  44. 

66.  Wore.  Reg.,  52 b,  67 a,  7Sa,  80 b.  In  some  cases  they  are  registered 
as,  like  the  villeins,  holding  technically  at  will :  e.g.  “  de  sokemannis  ad 
placitum,”  ib.,  17 b.  Cf.  Vinogradoff,  u.s. 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  59 


67.  Statutes  of  the  Realm ,  i.  2. 

68.  Thus  in  a  manorial  Presentment  as  late  as  1819  occurs  the  clause  : 
“  The  Homage  do  further  present  that  by  the  custom  of  this  manor  the 
-lord  may,  with  the  consent  of  the  Homage ,  grant  by  copy  of  court  roll  any 
part  of  the  waste  thereof,  to  be  liolden  in  fee  according  to  the  custom  of 
the  manor,  at  a  reasonable  rent  and  by  the  customary  services,  or  may, 
with  such  consent,  grant  or  demise  the  same  for  any  lesser  estate  or 
interest ;  ”  Seebohm,  447. 

69.  Examples  of  “tenentes  de  veteri  essarto”  and  “novo  essarto”  are 
very  frequent  in  the  Domesday  of  S.  Paul's  (e.g.  6,  8,  11,  12,)  and  the 
Wore.  Register. 

70.  For  weavers ,  see  Dom.  S.  PauVs ,  28,  30 ;  Oust.  Battle ,  63 ;  Hist . 
Glouc .,  iii.  167;  tailor ,  in  Reg.  Wore .,  896;  Battle ,  63. 

71.  Sir  Henry  Maine,  Village  Communities ,  122,  135-136,  compares 
the  village  waste  to  the  national  folkland,  and  represents  the  rights  of 
the  lord  over  the  waste  as,  like  those  of  the  king  over  the  royal  demesne, 
due  to  usurpation.  But  there  is  no  direct  evidence  of  this,  and  the  statute 
of  Merton,  as  well  as  the  custom  requiring  the  consent  of  the  homage  to 
enclosure,  may  equally  well  be  represented  as  limitations  of  an  earlier 
arbitrary  power  of  the  lord. 

72.  There  are  abundant  examples.  As  a  specimen,  see  the  Domesday 
of  Ralph  de  Diceto,  1181,  in  Domesday  of  S.  PauVs ,  114.  There  the  “  Inqui- 
sitio”  of  Beauchamp  begins  with  “  Isti  tenent  de  dominio,,,  35  in  all,  hold¬ 
ing  158  acres  ;  “remanent in  dominio  de  terra  arabili  circiter  ccccc.  acras,” 
as  well  as  meadow  and  woodland  ;  forty  years  later  there  were  44  tenants  of 
demesne  land,  holding  180  acres.  In  1181,  “Robertus  persona”  holds 
more  than  34  acres,  Ralph  the  reeve  24  acres,  and  a  certain  widow  half  a 
virgate,  but  the  other  holdings  are  all  very  small.  And  “  in  augmentum 
terrae  suae”  occurs  12  times.  The  lists  sometimes  mention  to  whom  the 
change  was  due,  e.g.  “  Michael  Alius  Adae  i.  acram  pro  ii.  denariis,  quas 
(quam?)  nicholaus  canonicus  dedit  ei  in  augmentum.”  The  manors 
belonging  to  the  Chapter  of  S.  Paul’s  were  distributed  among  the  canons, 
who  paid  a  fixed  ferm  to  the  common  fund  and  made  what  profit  they  could. 

73.  See  previous  note. 

74.  Reg.  Wore .,  416,  42a. 

75.  16.,  476-50a. 

76.  In  the  1222  Domesday  of  S.  PauVs  (70-71),  in  the  list  of  those  who 
“tenent  de  antiquo  dominico  ”  on  a  certain  manor,  is  inserted  in  14  cases 
(mostly  in  a  later  hand),  “  Item  .  .  .  de  cremento  per  capitulum  ut  sit  per- 
petuum.”  In  one,  and  that  apparently  the  earliest  case,  the  addition  is  very 
small,  only  one  penny  to  a  previous  payment  of  27 d.  ;  but  in  the  other 


6o 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


cases  it  is  an  addition  of  about  half,  e.g.  where  previously  10d.,  5d.  is 
added ;  where  4 d.  or  5d.,  2d.  This,  as  Hale  suggests,  Introd.,  lxxxix., 
probably  explains  the  meaning  of  the  obscure  opening  sentence  in  the 
Beauchamp  Rental  of  1240 :  “  Homines  infra  scripti,  tenentes  terras  de 
dominico  quas  vocant  Inlandes  sine  auctoritate  capituli,  augmentaverunt 
redditum  assisum  ut  auctoritas  capituli  inter veniret.” 

77.  E.g.  “Valet  dicta  arura  quatuor  denarios;”  “Valet  hersura 
quatuor  denarios  et  obolum ;  ”  “  et  plantabit  fabas  per  unum  diem,  et  valet 
obolum  ; 99  Hist.  Glouc.,  iii.  37,  38,  et  passim.  Cast.  Battle ,  passim. 

78.  “  Terra  ista  fuit  operaria  usque  ad  tempus  Hugonis  de  Runewell, 
servientis  {i.e.  bailiff)  Ricardi  archiediaconi  qui  primo  posuit  earn  ad 
denarios ;  ”  D.  of  S.  Paul’s ,  49. 

79.  In  some  cases  there  seems  a  threefold  division,  e.g.  “  Inferius  notati 
tenent  ad  censum,”  yet  bound  to  a  few  “  precariae  ;  ”  “  inferius  notati  sunt 
operarii,”  working,  in  addition  to  precariae,  two  days  a  week,  and  “  Isti 
faciunt  magnas  operationes,”  free  from  week-work,  but  with  a  great  number 
of  services ;  lb.,  61, 62.  For  an  instance  of  the  retention  of  boon-days  and 
of  the  tenants  remaining  in  villenage  in  spite  of  commutation,  Beg.  Wore., 
73 a,  “  De  vilenagio  :  In  hoc  manerio  sunt  xi.  virgatae  terrae  de  vilenagio, 
quarum  quaelibet  posita  ad  jirmam  reddit  per  annum  iiii.  solidos  .  .  .  et 
arabit  bis  per  annum  et  faciet  iii.  benrip,  quamlibet  cum  iii.  hominibus,  et 
falcabit  i.  die  cum  uno  homiuo,  et  levabit  fenum  et  dabit  auxilium  et  merchet. 
Si  autem  fuerint  ad  operationem,”  they  are  bound  to  heavy  week-work, 
which  is  recorded.  The  same  careful  distinction  is  observed  throughout : 
thus,  to  take  another  example  :  “  In  vilenagio  sunt  xvii.  dimidiae  virgatae, 
quarum  quaelibet  cum,  censat  reddit,  etc. ;  cum  vero  fuerit  ad  operationem 
invenit  qualibet  ebdomada  duos  homines,”  etc.,  ib .,  56a. 

80.  “  Dimidia  virgata  quam  tenuit  ad  censum  modo  tradita  est  alio  ad 
operationem  ; 11  D.  of  S.  Paul’s.  23. 

81.  Besides  the  instance  given  inn.  79,  see  Wore.  Beg.,  1  85,  19 a,  and  in 
many  other  places. 

82.  “  Isti  tenent  tarn  ad  censum  quam  ad  operationem ;  99  D.  of  S.  Paul's, 
49,  55. 

83.  Wore.  Beg.,  185,  435,  and  elsewhere.  “Rent  of  assize”  became  a 
technical  phrase, — thus  in  the  Extenta  Manerii  it  is  directed  that  inquiry 
should  be  made  as  to  free  tenants,  “  quantum  valeant  per  annum  et  reddant 
per  annum  de  Reditu  assisae,”  and  as  to  the  custumarii  “  quantum  valeant 
opera  et  consuetudines  .  .  .  per  annum,  et  quantum  reddat  de  redditu 
assisae  per  annum  praeter  opera  et  consuetudines;”  St.  of  Bealm,  i.  242. 
For  other  examples  of  increase,  see  the  Great  Boll  of  the  twenty-fifth  year 
of  Bp.  Bee,  of  Durham,  1307,  printed  in  appendix  to  the  Boldon  Bit.  of  the 


Chap.  L]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY,  6 1 

Surtees  Society :  of  the  “  redditus  assisae  ”  a  very  small  part  is  said  to  be 
u  de  novo  incremento  nunc  primo  incipiente,”  xxvii. ;  while  for  the  manors 
in  another  district  only  the  “  novus  redditus  ”  is  given,  xxx. 

84.  Besides  the  instances  in  n.  79,  notice  the  rubric  “  De  consuetudinibus 
villanorum  cum  fuerint  ad  operationem ;  ”  Reg.  Wore.,  105. 

85.  Thus  the  aukermonni  and  cotmanni  on  a  Worcester  manor,  ib.,  43 b; 
though  they  apparently  had  the  option  of  commuting  for  a  lump  sum. 

86.  Examples  abound ;  a  convenient  one  is  given  by  the  Ibstone  Rental 
of  1298,  printed  in  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric .,  ii.  656. 

87.  Rogers,  Six  Centuries ,  71,  76. 

88.  Reg.  Wore.,  105,  495. 

89.  Ib.,  56a :  “  Sive  censat  sive  non,  summagiabit.” 

90.  Six  Centuries,  218.  It  probably  took  place  first  on  the  smaller 
manors,  e.g.  Brodeham,  in  Cust.  Battle,  159  (5  Ed.  II.). 

91 .  Reg.  Wore .,  1195.  Fleta  quoted  in  Hale’s  Introd.  to  Wore.  Reg.,  xevi., 
c. ;  Cust.  Battle,  xxix. ;  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  ii.  329,  seq. 

92.  It  may  be  conjectured  from  the  fact  that  one  person  is  especially 
described  in  Domesday  as  a  liber  bovarius,  Ellis,  Introd .,  ii.  511-514,  that  the 
oxherds  were  at  that  time  usually  slaves.  When  we  compare  the  descriptions 
of  the  Peterborough  manors  in  Domesday  and  the  Liber  Niger,  we  find  that 
servi  appear  in  the  former  and  not  in  the  latter,  and  bovarii  in  the  latter 
and  not  in  the  former.  But  there  are  traces  that  they  wrere  in  1125  only 
gradually  rising  from  slavery,  as  in  the  entry  on  one  manor :  “  Et  unus- 
quisque  bovarius  dat  i.  denarium  pro  capite  suo,  si  liber  est.  Et  si  servus 
est,  nichil  dat ;  ”  Chr.  Petr.,  163. 

93.  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  ii.  620,  621. 

94.  15.,  578,  col.  1. 

95.  Specimens  ibid.,  617,  seq. ;  described  in  Six  Cent.,  48. 

96.  This  will  explain  what  Mr.  Rogers  wonders  at,  in  Six  Cent.,  18. 

97.  “  In  stipendio  clerici  qui  fecit  compotum  ii.  s.,  et  ii.  de  gracia ;  ” 
Hist,  of  Agric.,  ii.  621. 

98.  Provisions  of  Westminster  (1259),  Statute  of  Marlborough  (1267), 
Statutes  of  the  Realm,  i.  11.  24.  Select  Charters ,  404,  §  19. 

99.  A  sharp  distinction  in  theory  was  early  drawn  by  the  lawyers 
between  the  Court  Baron  and  the  Court  Customary:  though  it  was 
acknowledged  that  they  might  be  held  at  the  same  place  and  time,  the  Court 
Baron  was  defined  as  the  court  of  the  free  tenants ;  and  it  was  laid  down 
that,  for  the  holding  of  a  Court  Baron  (and  therefore  for  the  very  existence 
of  a  manor,  since  the  possession  of  a  Court  Baron  was  regarded  as  the  essence 
of  a  manor),  two  freeholders  at  least  were  necessary.  But  it  is  doubtful 
whether  this  distinction  was  ever  generally  recognized.  Thus  Kitchen, 


62 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY .  [Book  I. 


in  bis  Court  Leete  (1580),  p.  4a,  says  most  precisely,  “Mes  note  que  divers 
sont  appel  maners  deins  queux  ne  sont  ascuns  qui  tient  de  ceux  manors 
forsque  copiholders,  ‘ad  voluntatem  domini  secundum  consuetudinem 
manerii/et  ne  sont  ascuns  franktenants  que  tient  par  charter,  et  uncore  ceux 
seignories  sont  appel  maners  et  en  eux  sont  Court  Barons.” 

100.  “  Hall-moot  ”  seems  to  have  been  the  old  English  term,  possibly, 
however,  only  for  a  court  with  criminal  jurisdiction,  i.e.  a  Court  Leet.  It 
occurs  in  the  so-called  Leges  Henrici  Primi ,  ix.  4  (Select' Charters,  106) : 
“  Omnis  causa  terminetur  vel  hundredo,  vel  comitatu,  vel  halimoto  socam 
habentium ,  vel  dominorum  curiis,”  etc.,  where,  possibly,  the  last  two 
phrases  are  equivalents  ;  and  it  is  found  as  late  as  1222 :  “  Inquisitio  facto 
in  Halemoto  de  Thorp,”  where  the  exercise  of  criminal  jurisdiction  is 
shown  by  the  mention  of  the  duty  of  the  “  foreman,”  or  reeve,  “  Furem 
captum  in  curia  custodiet  et  judicatum  suspendet ;  ”  D.  of  S.  Paul's,  88, 
39.  For  the  official  record  of  the  trial  and  execution  of  a  man,  in  1337, 
for  stealing  a  robe  worth  ten  shillings,  see  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  ii.  666. 

101.  Notice  the  naive  hypocrisy  of  the  canons  of  S.  Paul’s,  who  write 
of  the  vicar  that  “  dum  servit  altari  sit  contentus  altario ;  ”  D.  of  S.  Paul's , 
1 46  ;  cf.  xlv.  Mr.  Hatch,  in  his  recent  Groivth  of  Church  Institutions  (chap, 
iii.),  has  shown  that  the  early  history  of  parochial  revenues  is  not  one  of 
usurpation  by  patrons,  but  of  the  gradual  limitation  of  the  arbitrary  rights 
of  ownership  of  the  lord  of  the  manor  over  the  Church  fabric  and  its 
revenues. 

102.  This  was  technically  known  as  sequela  or  secta  molendini — in 
English,  suit  and  grist.  See  Wore.  Beg.,  x.,  xi.,  32a. 

103.  E.g.  Chron.  Petrob.,  67,  s.a.  1284.  Hand-mills,  known  as  querns , 
were  still  used  last  century  in  the  Hebrides.  Pennant  describes  a  quern  as 
“  made  of  two  stones  about  two  feet  broad.  .  ,  .  In  the  centre  of  the  upper 
stone  is  a  hole  to  pour  in  the  corn,  and  a  peg  by  way  of  handle.  The 
whole  is  placed  on  a  cloth ;  the  grinder  pours  the  corn  into  the  hole  with 
one  hand  and  with  the  other  turns  round  the  upper  stone  with  a  very  rapid 
motion,  while  the  meal  runs  out  at  the  sides  on  the  cloth.”  In  some 
manors  there  was  also  a  common  oven  or  bakehouse,  which  the  tenants 
were  bound  to  use,  paying  a  fee  known  as  fornagium :  for  an  example,  as 
late  as  1714,  see  Yorkshire  Weekly  Post,  March  19,  1887.  Cf.  for  New¬ 
castle,  as  to  hand-mills  and  oven,  Select  Charters ,  112. 

104.  E.g.  Boldon  Book  in  Domesday,  iv.  570:  “Molendinum  est  in 
manu  episcopi,  nondum  ad  firmam  positum,” — proving  that  already  it  was 
usual  to  let  it.  Cf.  D.  of  S.  Paul's,  28  :  “In  dominico  est  unum  molendi¬ 
num  ad  ventum  quod  potest  poni  ad  firmam  pro  una  marca  deductis 
expensis.” 


Chap.  I.]  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY.  63 


105.  The  accounts  of  half  the  manors  in  the  Liber  Niger  contain  the 
phrase,  “Est  ibi  unus  molendinus  cum  molendinario  et  .  .  .  solidos 
reddit.”  The  importance  of  the  mill  is  shown  by  its  being  separately 
mentioned  when  the  whole  manor  was  let;  thus,  “Manerium  est  ad 
firmam,  cum  dominio  et  villanis  et  molendino  et  cum  instauratione,”  etc. ; 
Boldon  Boole ,  D.  B .,  iv.  579.  The  miller  might  either  hold  it  at  a  fixed 
quit-rent  or  at  the  will  of  the  lord:  hence  the  Wore.  Beg.,  12 a,  dis¬ 
tinguishes  the  mill  in  one  manor  as  a  “molendinum  ad  placitum;”  with 
which  may  be  compared  the  entry,  “  De  molendinis  ad  firmam  mutabilem  ” 
in  the  Mont  S.  Michel  Survey,  c.  1250,  in  Ddisle ,  679. 

106.  The  communal  character  of  these  offices  is  shown  best  in  the  Boldon 
Booh ,  where,  in  many  manors,  the  entries  occur  one  after  the  other,  “  Pre- 
positus  tenet  .  .  .  acras,  pro  suo  servicio,  Faber  .  .  .  pro  suo  servicio,” 
Carpentarius  .  .  .  pro  suo  servicio ;  ”  e.g,  in  three  manors,  on  p.  568.  The 
amount  of  land  is  usually  twelve  acres,  as,  to  take  another  example, 
“  Faber  tenet  xii.  acras  pro  ferramentis  carucarum  fabricandis.”  Cf.  D.  of 
S.  P.,  68;  Wore.  Beg.,  66a;  Chart .  Bamsay ,  xxxiii.  In  the  later  entries 
the  obligation  is  sometimes,  as  in  the  case  of  other  labour-dues,  “to 
furnish  ”  a  blacksmith,  e.g.  “Alicia  relicta  Petri  Fabri  tenet  ferdellum 
terrae  et  inveniet  unum  fabrum  domino  et  toti  villae.” 

107.  Boldon  Booh,  568,  569.  But  as  the  keeping  of  the  pound  is  not 
likely  to  be  onerous,  he  has  other  services  and  payments  in  kind  to  render. 

108.  Cf.  Roscher’s  sketch  of  the  economic  character  of  mediaeval 
society  in  his  Gesch .  der  Nat .  Oehonomih ,  2. 

109.  Riley,  Introd.  to  Liber  Albus  ( Munimenta  Gildliallae,  i.),  lxxxv. 

110.  Wor.  Beg.  xi. ;  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  i.  455. 

111.  Rogers,  ib.,  i.  469. 

112.  E.g.  Beg.  Wore.,  56a:  “N  :  .  .  facit  ferra  carrucarum  ct  Prior 
inveniet  ei  ferrum  et  carbonem,  vel  ii.  solidos  pro  carbone.” 

113.  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  ii.  606,  seq. 

114.  lb.,  i.  460,  seq. 

115.  See  the  very  interesting  account  of  the  journey  to  London  of 
Robert  Oldman,  the  bailiff  of  Cuxham,  in  Oxfordshire,  in  1331,  ib.,  506, 
and  Six  Cent.,  113. 

116.  The  account  of  one  manor  in  the  Wore.  Beg.,  132 a,  contains  the 
amusing  entry :  “  Omnes,  tarn  liberi  quam  villani,  excepta  persona,  debent 
adjuvare  cum  hominibus  et  bobus  ad  summonitionem  servientis,  ad  tra- 
hendam  molam,  vicissim,  successive,  quantum  necesse  fuerit,  excepto  opere. 
Prior  vero  inveniet  karram  (the  cart)  et  hominem  et  duos  boves  subtus 
karram.” 

117.  In  the  Boldon  Booh ,  in  some  eight  cases  the  phrase  occurs  towards 


64 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


the  end  of  the  account  of  a  manor,  “  Dominium  est  ad  firmam  et  reddit . . . ;  ” 
in  some  seven  cases,  u  Dominium  est  in  manu  episcopi.”  Sometimes  the 
villein  dues  are  expressly  included,  e.g.  579,  quoted  in  n.  105,  above.  Cf. 
Rogers,  Six  Cent.,  50. 

118.  Boldon  Boole,  568 :  “  Villani  de  Southbydyk  tenent  villam  suam  ad 
firmam,”  though  they  are  still  bound  to  labour-dues  at,  apparently,  a 
neighbouring  village, 

119.  E.g.  1240,  Wore.  Beg.,  47a :  “  Curia  cum  pertinentiis,  et  duae  car- 
rucatae  terrae  de  dominico,  cum  prat  is  et  proventibus  et  herietibus  et  vile - 
nagio  traditae  sunt  villanis  ad  firmam  pro  c.  quarterns  frumenti,,,  and 
other  payments  in  kind.  The  Prior  still  kept  in  his  hands  a  granary,  land 
which  had  once  been  a  vineyard,  a  little  arable  land,  and  some  meadow. 
In  another  case,  54 b,  where  the  holding  by  the  villeins  at  ferm  is  described 
as  “  ab  antiquo,”  the  advowson  is  excepted ;  the  ferm  is  “  ad  placitum ;  ” 
half  of  the  proceeds  of  the  court  of  heriots  go  to  the  Prior ;  and  the  villeins 
are  bound  to  certain  services  at  neighbouring  villages. 

120.  As  in  Wore.  Beg.,  15a:  “Nullus  exeat  de  terra  sine  licentia;” 
where  it  is  also  said,  “  Rediment  filios  si  de  terra  recesserint,”  and  “  Nullus 
faciat  filium  clericum  sine  licentia.”  This  latter  clause,  with  the  addition 
of  a  prohibition  to  “  coronare,”  i.e.  “  make  a  monk  of  him,”  is  very 
frequently  found. 

121.  The  Dialogus  de  Scaccario  speaks  of  the  “  ascriptitii  qui  villani 
dicuntur,  quibus  non  est  liberum  obstantibus  dominis  suis  a  sui  status  con- 
ditione  recedere ;  ”  Sel.  Charter?,  202. 

122.  Examples  abound  ;  e.g.  Wore.  Beg.,  15a :  “  Nullus  vendet  bovem 
sine  licentia  vel  equum.  Si  quis  vendiderit  bovem  vel  equum  dabit  Thol, 
scilicet  i.  denariurn.” 

123.  In  a  case  reported  in  the  Year  Boohs ,  13-14  Ed.  III.,  ed.  Pike 
(Rolls*  Series),  xxvi.,  “  the  plaintiff  pleaded  that  there  were  ‘  in  ecclesia 
S.  Pauli  *  twenty-four  hides  of  land,  and  that  within  them  there  were 
divers  tenures  of  which  one  was  called  customers-lond .  .  .  •  The  tenants  of 
this  customers-lond,  she  said,  might  grant  their  tenements  to  any  persons 
with  whom  they  might  agree,  to  hold  to  the  grantees  and  their  heirs,  or 
for  life,  according  to  the  estate  held  by  the  tenants  themselves.  The 
grantor  was  to  come  into  the  court  of  the  lord,  and  there  in  full  court 
surrender  the  tenements  to  the  use  of  the  person  with  whom  the  agreement 
had  been  made,”  whereupon  the  bailiff  ought  to  put  him  in  possession. 
“  The  defendant  admitted  the  tenure  of  customers-lond,  but  said  that  every 
tenant  wishing  to  grant  his  estate  to  another  had  to  come  into  the  court  of 
the  lord,  and  there  in  full  court  surrender  the  tenements  into  the  hand  of  the 
lord,  whereupon  the  bailiff  of  the  lord  of  the  court  would  deliver  the  tene- 


Chap.  IJ  THE  MANOR  AND  VILLAGE  COMMUNITY, \  65 


ments,  per  virgam ,  to  be  held  at  the  will  of  the  lord  and  not  otherwise.”  “  The 
jurors  decided  that  the  bailiff  had  to  place  in  seisin  the  person  to  whose 
use  the  surrender  was  made,  not  on  malting  a  certain  fine,  e.g.  12 d.for  every 
acre ,  but  on  malting  a  fine  at  the  will  of  the  lord.”  It  would  seem  from 
this  case  that  such  a  transference  was  so  usual  that  tenants  were  beginning 
to  omit  the  formal  act  of  surrender  into  the  hands  of  the  lord,  to  claim  the 
right  to  make  grants  for  life  or  for  ever,  although  their  own  holdings  were 
technically  only  at  will,  and  to  do  this  on  paying  only  a  small  and  fixed 
fine.  This  evidence  from  the  fourteenth  century  may  be  compared  with 
the  entry  in  Domesday ,  i.  179,  about  the  103  “ homines”  in  Hereford,  a 
town  on  the  royal  demesne.  They  had  clearly  risen  from  the  position  of 
villeins ;  each,  besides  a  rent  of  7Jd.,  paid  4 d.  “  ad  locandos  caballos,”  and 
was  still  bound  to  certain  labour  services, — “tribus  diebus  in  Augusto 
fecabat,  et  una  die  ad  fenum  congregandum  erat,  ubi  vicecomes  volebat.’, 
Yet  “si  quis  eorum  voluisset  recedere  de  civitate,  poterat,  concessu  pre- 
positi,  domum  suum  vendere  alteri  homini  servitium  inde  debitum  facere 
volenti,  et  habebat  prepositus  tertium  denarium  hujus  venditionis.,, 

124.  An  abstract  of  the  documents  in  the  Burton  Chariulary  is  given 
in  Staffordsh.  Collections ,  v.  82,  seq.  For  Glanvill  see  Sel .  Charters ,  162. 

125.  Littleton ,  quoted  in  Digby,  Hist,  of  Law  of  Beal  Property ,  253. 

126.  “I  know  of  only  one  distinct  period  of  famine  in  the  whole 
economical  history  of  England.  This  is  the  seven  years,  1315-1321, 
especially  in  the  first  two  and  the  last ;  ”  Rogers,  Six  Cent.,  62. 

127.  Mill.,  Pol.  Econ.,  bk.  ii.  ch.  xvi.  §  4  :  “  The  farmer  requires  the 
ordinary  rate  of  profit  on  the  whole  of  his  capital ;  .  .  .  whatever  it  returns 
to  him  beyond  this  he  is  obliged  to  pay  the  landlord,  but  will  not  consent 
to  pay  more.” 

128.  Cunningham,  Groivth  of  Engl.  Industry ,  249. 

129.  Cf.  Lassalle,  Bastiat-Schulze  de  Delitzsch ,  ch.  iv. 

130.  Hildebrand  in  Jalirbiicher  fur  Nationalokonomie ,  ii.  (1864),  p.  1, 
seq.  He  distinguishes  three  stages,  the  third  being  Credit-wirthscliaft ; 
“  Either  goods,”  including  services,  “  are  exchanged  directly  for  gopds ;  or 
use  is  made  of  a  means  of  exchange,  the  precious  metals,  money ;  or,  finally, 
goods  are  exchanged  for  a  promise  in  the  future  to  give  back  the  same  or 
a  like  value,  i.e .  on  credit.  In  all  these  three  methods  of  exchange,  what 
may  be  the  measure  of  value  used  in  the  exchange  is  quite  indifferent. 
On  the  basis  of  these  three  possible  means  of  exchange  three  Economic 
systems  develop  themselves,— Natural-wirthschaft,  Geld-wirthschaft ,  and 
Credit-wirtlischaft ;  ”  p.  4.  Knies,  criticising  this  statement,  says  that  the 
distinction  between  Natural-wirtlischaft  and  Geld-wirthscliaft  is  valuable, 
“the  third  stage,  however,  is  not  at  all  a  contrast  to  the  other  two,— a 


F 


66 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


mistake  due  to  misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  credit.  Our  whole 
system  of  credit  is  one  based  on  money Politische  (Economie  vom  geschicht- 
lichen  Standpuncte  (1883),  382.  Wagner  accepts  this  criticism:  “ Credit - 
wirthschaft  is  not  a  development  from  Geld-wirthschaft ,  in  the  same  way 
as  that  is  of  Natural-wirthschaft,  for  it  implies  the  maintenance  of  a  metal 
currency  as  a  standard  and  measure  of  price ;  ”  Lehrbuch  der  Pol.  Oekon . 
i.  194.  As  Roscher  says,  the  ideas  represented  by  the  three  terms  are 
not  co-ordinate ;  Nat.  Oekonomik  in  Deutschland ,  1038.  The  application 
of  the  distinction  to  the  England  of  this  period  is  pointed  out  by  Ochen- 
kowski,  a  pupil  of  Hildebrand,  in  Englands  wirthschaftliche  Entwicke- 
lung ,  9. 

131.  Introduction  to  Domesday  of  S.  Paul's ,  xlvi.-li. 

132.  Select  Charters ,  93,  194. 

133.  Hawkins,  Silver  Coins  of  England,  (2nd  ed.  1876),  36. 

134.  Ruding,  Annals  of  the  Coinage  (3rd  ed.  1840),  i.  126. 

135.  Ib .,  i.  137. 

136.  “  Before  Christmas,  King  Henry  sent  from  Normandy  to  England 
and  commanded  that  all  the  moneyers  should  be  mutilated.  And  this 
because  a  man  might  have  a  pound,  and  yet  not  be  able  to  spend  ono 
penny  at  a  market.  And  Roger,  bishop  of  Salisbury,  sent  over  all 
England,  and  desired  all  of  them  to  come  to  Winchester  at  Christmas; 
and  when  they  came  thither  his  men  took  them  one  by  one,  and  cut 
off  their  right  hands.  All  this  was  done  within  the  twelve  days,  and 
with  much  justice,  because  they  had  ruined  this  land  with  the  great 
quantity  of  bad  metal ;  ”  Engl.  Chronicle ,  s.a.  1125. 

137.  Ruding,  i.  165,  170,  171,  184,  202.  For  the  two  coinages  of 
Henry  II.,  see  Balph  de  Diceto  (Rolls*  Series),  i.  302  ;  ii.  7. 

138.  Ruding,  i.  181,  182.  Round  halfpennies  are  said,  but  on  little 
evidence,  to  have  been  issued  by  Henry  I.  The  government  must  at 
this  time  have  been  anxious  to  issue  them  to  a  large  amount,  for  twice 
as  many  dies  for  halfpence  and  farthings  were  issued  to  the  moneyers  as 
for  pennies,  and  also  several  weeks  earlier.  None  of  these  halfpennies, 
according  to  Ruding,  now  remain ;  and  he  supposes  that,  as  they  were 
much  disliked  by  the  people,  they  were  recalled,  and  no  new  ones  struck 
till  1248. 

139.  15.,  i.  186.  Kenyon,  Gold  Coins  of  England ,  14, 15. 

140.  Ruding,  i.  216-218. 

141.  Ib.,  i.  222. 


c 


CHAPTEB  II. 

MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 

[Authorities. — (a)  The  Merchant  Gild.  The  best  work  on  this 
subject  is  Gross,  Gilda  Mercatoria  (Gottingen,  1883),  which  has  for  the 
first  time  shown  the  universality  of  this  organization  in  English  towns, 
and  its  functions  in  the  thirteenth  century.  The  only  two  bodies  of  gild 
statutes  that  have  been  preserved  are  those  of  Southampton  (13th  c.) 
and  Berwick  (1249-94)  :  of  the  former  the  French  text  will  be  found  in 
Archseol.  Journal ,  xvi.  (1859),  translated  in  Davies,  Ilist.  of  Southampton 
(1883);  the  Latin  text  of  the  latter  is  in  Cosmo  Innes,  Acts  of  Pari. 
Scotland  (1844),  and  an  English  abstract  in  English  Gilds  (Early  Eng. 
Text  Soc.,  1870).  The  only  Merchant  Gild  surviving,  though  but 
in  name,  till  the  present  time  is  that  of  Preston,  of  which  ordinances  of 
1308  and  1328,  and  gild  rolls  from  1397  are  printed  in  Abram,  Memorials 
of  the  Preston  Guilds  (1882),  and  Preston  Guild  Polls  (Record  Soc.  Lane, 
and  Chesh.,  1884).  The  gild  rolls  of  two  other  towns,  Leicester  and 
Totnes,  have  been  preserved  :  accounts  of  them  are  given  in  Thompson, 
Hist,  of  Leicester  (1849),  and  for  Totnes  in  Third  Pep.  Hist.  MSS.  Comm. 
(1872).  For  general  sketches  of  early  town  history,  see  Kemble,  Saxons 
in  England ,  bk.  ii.  ch.  vii. ;  Thompson,  Engl.  Munic.  Hist.  (1S67)  5  Stubbs, 
Const.  Hist.,  chs.  v.,  xi.,  xiii. 

(6)  The  Craft  Gilds.  The  first  and,  up  to  the  present,  the  only  work 
in  English  on  craft  gilds  is  Brentano’s  Essay,  prefixed  to  English  Gilds 
(1870),  appearing  later  in  German  as  Einleitung  to  the  same  writer’s 
Arheitergilden  der  Gegenwart  (1871).  Brentano  exaggerated  both  their 
independence  and  their  economic  importance,  as  is  pointed  out,  with  some 
exaggeration  in  the  opposite  direction,  by  Ochenkowski,  Englands  wirtli- 
schaftliche  Entwickelung  im  Ausgange  des  Mittelalters  (1879).  A  clearer 
idea  may  be  obtained  by  reference  to  the  craft  ordinances  translated  in 


68 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY. 


[Book  I. 


Riley,  Memorials  of  London  (1868);  with  which  may  be  compared  for 
Paris  the  Livre  des  Metiers  dy Etienne  JBoileau ,  ed.  Depping  (1857).  la 
the  Early  Hist,  of  the  Woollen  Industry  in  England  (Amer.  Econ.  Assoc., 
1 887),  by  the  present  writer,  will  be  found  an  attempt  to  trace  the  history 
of  England’s  most  important  craft.  Much  scattered  information  is  given 
in  Herbert,  Hist,  of  the  London  Livery  Companies  (1837) ;  and  the  rela¬ 
tion  of  the  craft  gilds  to  the  municipal  organization  is  examined  in  Stubbs, 
Const.  Hist .,  III.,  xxi.  For  France,  see  also  Gasquet,  Precis  des  Institutions 
de  VAncienne  France  (1885),  and  for  Germany,  Maurer,  Gesch.  der  Stiidte- 
verfassung,  II.  (1870).  The  most  detailed  analysis  of  the  mediaeval  organi¬ 
sation  of  industry  is  that  of  Schonberg,  Zur  wirthschaft .  Bedeutung  d. 
deutschen  Zunftwesens  im  Mittelalter ,  in  Hildebrand’s  Jahrbucher  fiir 
N.  Oehonomie  (1867);  and  the  characteristics  of  the  various  forms  of  in¬ 
dustry  are  briefly  compared  by  Held,  Zwei  Bucher  zur  Socialen  Gesch . 
Englands  (1881),  bk.  ii.,  ch.  iii. 

(c)  Trade.  The  history  of  the  treatment  of  foreign  merchants  has 
been  for  the  first  time  adequately  investigated  by  Schanz,  in  Englisclie 
Handelspolitih  gegen  Ende  des  Mittelalters  (1881),  pt.  ii.,  ch.  iii. ;  and  the 
relations  between  English  and  foreign  towns  are  illustrated  by  the 
Calendar  of  Letters ,  1350-1370 ,  ed.  Sharpe,  printed  (1885)  by  authority 
of  the  Corporation  of  London.  For  the  Ilanse  of  London,  see  Warn- 
koenig,  Eistoire  de  Flandre  (1835-46),  trans.  Gheldolf ;  for  the  Teutonic 
Hanse  and  the  Steelyard,  Lappenberg,  Geschichte  des  Hansisclien  Stahl - 
hofes  zu  London  (1851),  and  the  popular  article  on  the  Steelyard,  by 
Pauli,  in  Pictures  of  Old  England  (1 861).  Much  information  on  markets, 
fairs,  and  means  of  communication  may  be  gathered  from  Rogers,  History 
of  Agriculture ,  and  Kitchin,  Winchester  Cathedral  Records ,  No.  2  (1886  , 
and  some  little  from  Jusserand,  Vie  Nomade  dy Angleterre  au  xiv.  Siecle 
(1884).  The  Statutes  of  the  Realm  are  of  especial  value  for  this  subject.] 

§  7.  The  Merchant  Gild .  At  the  time  of  the  Norman  Con¬ 
quest  there  were  seme  eighty  towns  in  England.1  Most  of 
these  were  what  we  should  now  consider  hut  large  villages ; 
they  were  distinguished  from  the  villages  around  only  by  the 
earthen  walls  that  surrounded  them,  or  the  earthen  mounds 
that  kept  watch  over  them.  London,  Winchester,  Bristol, 
Norwich,  York,  and  Lincoln  were  far  in  advance  of  the  rest 
in  size  and  importance  ;  but  even  a  town  of  the  first  rank 
cannot  have  had  more  than  seven  or  eight  thousand  inhabi- 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


69 


tants.2  We  shall  perhaps  be  not  far  wrong  if  we  estimate 
the  town  population  at  about  a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand, 
out  of  a  total  population  of  about  a  million  and  a  half.3 

As  to  how  these  towns  had  come  into  existence,  it  were 
scarcely  profitable  to  construct  any  definite  theory  until  the 
condition  of  the  body  of  the  population  of  early  England  has 
been  more  satisfactorily  determined  than  it  is  at  present. 
But  it  is  readily  seen  that  population  would  tend  to  congre¬ 
gate  at  places  where  high  roads  crossed  one  another,  or  where 
rivers  could  be  forded ;  such  places,  indeed,  would  in  many 
cases  be  of  strategic  importance,  and  so  would  come  to  be 
fortified.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any  monastic 
orders,  before  the  Cistercians,  “  lived  of  set  purpose  in  the 
wilderness;  ” 4  monasteries  and  cathedral  churches  were  placed 
where  villages  were  already  in  existence.  But  beneath  the 
shelter  of  the  monasteries  the  villages  soon  grew  into  small 
towns  ; 6  the  labour  services  to  which  their  inhabitants  were 
bound,  or  the  commutation  for  them  which  they  paid,  long 
testifying  to  the  originally  servile  character  of  the  holdings.6 
Many  a  village  around  the  fortified  house  or  castle  of  some 
great  noble  had  a  similar  history. 

Such  towns  necessarily  became  centres  of  what  little 
internal  trade  there  was.  For  although  agriculture  long 
remained  one  of  the  principal  employments  of  the  burgesses, 
yet  it  must  have  early  been  necessary  for  supplies  of  food  to 
be  brought  from  the  country  around  :  this  is  the  most  primi¬ 
tive  and  essential  form  of  trade.  The  lords,  to  whom  the 
towns  were  subject,  would  see  their  interest  in  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  markets,  in  which  protection  was  guaranteed,  and 
paid  for  in  the  shape  of  tolls :  and  so  came  into  existence 
those  weekly  or  half- weekly  market  days  7  which,  in  spite  of 
improved  means  of  communication,  are  still  so  important  in 
England. 


70 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


Commerce  with  the  Frank  kingdom  had  long  been  carried 
on  from  London  and  the  ports  of  Kent,  especially  Sandwich 
and  Dover.  Traffic  with  the  Danish  settlements  on  the  Irish 
coast,  a  traffic  in  which  slaves  were  the  chief  commodities, 
brought  Chester  and  Bristol  into  prominence  in  the  tenth  and 
eleventh  centuries;  and  the  connection  with  the  Scandi¬ 
navian  kingdoms,  caused  by  Canute’s  conquest,  brought  York, 
Grimsby,  Lincoln,  Norwich,  Ipswich,  and  many  other  ports 
along  the  eastern  coast,  into  active  commercial  communica¬ 
tion  with  the  Baltic  countries.8  Yet  the  trade  with  foreign 
countries  cannot  have  been  large ;  the  wares  which,  in  an 
old  English  dialogue,  the  merchant  describes  himself  as 
bringing  with  him,  seem  to  be  all  articles  of  luxury  such  as 
would  be  needed  only  by  the  higher  classes — “  purple  cloth, 
silk,  costly  gems  and  gold,  garments,  pigments,  wine,  oil, 
ivory  and  brass,  copper  and  tin,  sulphur,  glass,  and  such 
like.” 9  The  mention  of  merchants  in  the  English  laws  is  so 
infrequent 10  that  we  can  hardly  suppose  that  any  considerable 
trading  class  had  come  into  existence. 

In  the  troublous  years  which  followed  the  landing  of  the 
Conqueror  the  more  important  English  towns  suffered  greatly ; 
in  some  cases  a  third  or  half  the  houses  were  destroyed,  and 
the  population  reduced  in  like  proportion, — a  result  to  which 
the  chances  of  war  and  William’s  policy  of  castle-building 
contributed  in  equal  measure.11  But  even  during  the  twenty 
years  before  the  great  survey  of  1086,  the  towns  on  the 
southern  coast  had  begun  to  profit  by  the  closer  connection 
with  the  opposite  shore.12  And  as  soon  as  the  Norman  rule 
was  firmly  established,  it  secured  for  the  country  an  internal 
peace  and  order  such  as  it  had  never  before  enjoyed;  the 
temporary  retrogression  was  more  than  made  up  for ;  and  in 
town  after  town  arose  the  merchant  gild. 

The  merchant  gild,  or  hanse,  for  the  words  are  used 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS.  7 1 

synonymously,  was  a  society  formed  primarily  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  and  maintaining  the  privilege  of  carry¬ 
ing  on  trade, — a  privilege  which  implied  the  possession  of 
a  monopoly  of  trade  in  each  town  by  the  gild  brethren  as 
against  its  other  inhabitants,13  and  also  liberty  to  trade  in 
other  towns.14  The  exact  character  of  the  monopoly  probably 
varied  somewhat  from  place  to  place.  Everywhere,  appa¬ 
rently,  non-members  were  left  free  to  buy  and  sell  victuals  ; 15 
but  if  they  went  further  and  engaged  in  regular  trade  they 
became  subject  to  tolls  from  which  the  gild  brethren  were 
free.16  If  the  trader  was  prosperous  enough  to  pay  the  en¬ 
trance  money  and  become  a  member  of  the  gild,  but  obstinately 
refrained  from  doing  so,  he  was  coerced  into  compliance  by 
repeated  fines.  In  some  places  a  promise  to  inform  the  gild 
officers  of  any  man  trafficking  in  the  town  and  able  to  enter 
the  gild  was  part  of  the  entrance-oath  of  every  brother.17 
Each  member  paid  an  entrance  fee,  and  probably  other  dues 
to  the  gild  chest,  which  were  spent  for  the  common  purposes 
of  the  gild,  especially  in  festivities.  And  since  no  society 
could  be  conceived  of  in  the  Middle  Ages  without  some  sort 
of  jurisdiction  over  its  members,18  the  gild  merchant,  in  its 
meetings  known  as  “morning-speeches,”19  drew  up  regula¬ 
tions  for  trade  and  punished  breaches  of  commercial  morality. 

Now,  there  certainly  had  existed  before  the  Conquest  both 
religious  gilds  and  frith  gilds,  i.e .  clubs  or  societies  for  the  per¬ 
formance  of  certain  pious  offices,  and  for  mutual  assistance  in 
the  preservation  of  peace.20  It  is  quite  possible  therefore 
that  similar  societies  for  the  purpose  of  trade  may  have 
been  formed  equally  early ;  but  the  first  positive  mention  of 
a  merchant  gild  is  certainly  not  earlier  than  1093.21  With 
the  reign  of  Henry  I.  begins  the  long  series  of  charters 
granted  to  towns  by  the  king  or  other  lords.  Under  Henry  II. 
such  charters  were  obtained,  among  other  places,  by  Bristol, 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  1. 


7* 

Durham,  Lincoln,  Carlisle,  Oxford,  Salisbury,  Southampton ; 
and  in  all  these  charters  the  recognition  of  a  merchant  gild 
occupies  a  prominent  place.22  Indeed,  the  lawyer  Glanvill, 
writing  at  this  time,  regards  the  commune ,  i.e.  the  body  of 
citizens  with  rights  of  municipal  self-government,  as  identical 
with  the  gild  merchant.23  Such  merchant  gilds  may  have 
been  in  existence  for  some  time  before  they  were  recognized 
by  charter :  the  value  of  the  charter  lay  rather  in  the  sanc¬ 
tion  which  it  gave  to  the  coercive  action  of  the  society,  and 
the  rights  which  it  secured  for  its  members  in  other  than 
their  own  towns.  In  spite  of  the  paucity  of  evidence,  the 
existence  of  a  merchant  gild  can  be  definitely  proved  in 
ninety-two  towns  out  of  the  hundred  and  sixty  represented 
at  one  time  or  other  in  the  parliaments  of  Edward  I.  No 
considerable  name, — with  two  exceptions,  namely  London 
and  the  Cinque  Ports — is  wanting  from  the  list.  It  is  im¬ 
possible  not  to  conclude  that  every  town,  down  to  those  that 
were  not  much  more  than  villages,  had  its  merchant  gild. 
This  fact  of  itself  is  enough  to  prove  the  great  part  it  must 
have  played  in  the  town  life  of  the  time. 

The  evident  similarity  of  the  regulations  of  those  four 
gilds  whose  ordinances  have  been  preserved,  in  places  so  far 
apart  as  Totnes,  Southampton,  Leicester  and  Berwick,  can 
only  be  explained  by  supposing  that  merchant  gilds  all  over 
England  had  much  the  same  organization.  Each  was  presided 
over  by  an  alderman  (in  some  cases  two),  with  two  or  four 
assistants,  usually  known  as  wardens  or  echevins ;  and  some¬ 
times  there  were  stewards  also.  There  was  generally  a  small 
inner  council  of  twelve  or  twenty-four.  The  alderman  and 
wardens,  besides  summoning  and  presiding  over  the  meetings 
and  festivities,  managed  the  funds  of  the  society,  as  well  as 
its  estates  when,  as  was  frequently  the  case,  the  gild  had 
purchased  or  otherwise  acquired  land.24 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


73 


Who  were  eligible  for  membership  it  is  impossible  with 
certainty  to  determine.  It  is  clear  that  the  association  in¬ 
cluded  a  very  considerable  number  of  persons,  e.g.  as  many 
as  two  hundred  in  the  small  town  of  Totnes ; 25  that  while 
it  embraced  merchants  travelling  to  distant  markets,  it 
did  not,  at  any  rate  at  first,  exclude  craftsmen  as  such ; 2(5 
that  the  eldest  sons  or  heirs  of  gildsmen  had  a  right  to 
free  admission,  and  younger  sons  on  paying  a  smaller 
entrance  fee  than  others ;  and  that,  certainly  also  at  first, 
members  could  give  or  sell  their  rights,  and  transmit  them 
to  heiresses,  who  might  exercise  them  themselves  or  give 
them  to  their  husbands  or  sons.27  The  most  usual  term  for 
the  rights  of  membership  was  seat,  sedes :  members  were 
said  to  seeJc ,  have,  sell,  or  give  their  seat,29  which  was  often 
described  as  below  or  above  that  of  another — a  phrase  possibly 
referring  originally  to  a  place  in  the  market.  The  word 
gild  is  also  sometimes  used  for  all  the  rights  of  member¬ 
ship,  though  more  frequently  for  the  meetings  of  the 
society,  especially  for  the  solemn  gatherings  once  or  twice 
a  year.29 

We  know  that  merchants  from  other  towns  were  admitted 
to  membership,  and  that  the  same  privileges  were  often  ob¬ 
tained  by  neighbouring  monasteries  and  lords  of  manors.30 
But  clearly  the  bulk  of  the  members  belonged  to  the  town 
itself;  and  there  are  strong  reasons  for  supposing  that,  of 
the  inhabitants,  only  such  were  admitted  to  membership  as 
held  land  within  the  town  boundaries, — the  burgage  tenants, 
burgenses  or  cives,  burgesses  or  citizens  jpar  excellence,  who 
alone  were  fully  qualified  members  of  the  town  assembly.81 
We  must  not,  however,  regard  the  members  of  the  gild  as 
being  all  of  them  great  merchants.  In  most  towns,  agri¬ 
culture  was  still  one  of  the  main  occupations  of  the  bur¬ 
gesses  ; 82  but  most  holders  of  land  would  find  it  desirable 


74 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


to  sell  at  any  rate  tlieir  surplus  produce.  The  articles  most 
frequently  mentioned  in  the  gild  documents — skins,  woo], 
corn,83  etc. — show  that  the  trade  consisted  almost  entirely  in 
the  sale  and  purchase  of  the  raw  products  of  agriculture. 
It  has  already  been  noticed  that  non-members  were  often 
permitted  to  buy  and  sell  subject  to  the  payments  of  tolls, 
but  in  some  cases  trade  in  certain  articles  was  entirely  for¬ 
bidden  to  them,  e.g.  in  skins.84  More  important  still  is  it 
to  observe  that  in  some  places  the  manufacture  of  cloth 
had  become  so  considerable  that  the  merchant  gild  thought 
it  worth  while  to  obtain  from  the  king  a  monopoly  of  the 
retail  sale  of  the  dyed  cloth  used  by  the  upper  classes,85  or 
even  of  the  retail  sale  of  all  cloth.86  We  shall  see  later 
how  these  privileges  brought  them  into  conflict  with  the 
craft  gilds. 

,  We  have  noticed  that  the  gild  assemblies,  or  its  officers 
on  its  behalf,  drew  up  regulations  and  exercised  a  juris¬ 
diction  in  matters  of  trade.  These  regulations  illustrate 
clearly  a  characteristic  common  both  to  the  merchant  and 
craft  gilds,  namely  that,  while  each  individual  member  was 
within  certain  limits  allowed  to  pursue  his  own  interest  as 
he  thought  best,  there  was  nevertheless  a  strong  feeling  that 
the  trade  or  industry  was  the  common  interest  of  the  whole 
body ;  that  each  was  bound  to  submit  to  regulations  for  the 
common  good,  and  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  his  fellow- 
members.  Thus  it  was  ordered  in  Leicester  that  the  dealers 
in  cloth,  going  to  the  fair  of  S.  Botolph  at  Boston,  should  place 
themselves  on  the  southern  side  of  the  market,  and  the  wool 
dealers  on  the  northern.  Somewhat  later  it  was  provided 
that  the  Leicester  merchants  at  Boston  should  always 
display  their  cloth  for  sale  within  the  “  range  ”  in  which 
the  Leicestershire  men  were  accustomed  to  stand,  under 
penalty  of  having  to  pay  a  tun  of  ale.  A  man  might,  indeed, 


CiiAr.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


75 


for  the  sake  of  security,  take  his  cloth  home  with  him  at  night 
to  a  lodging  outside  the  “  range,”  but  he  was  not  to  sell  it 
outside  the  row.87  Only  in  such  a  way  was  it  possible  to 
exercise  any  supervision  over  those  who  claimed  to  come 
from  Leicester;  and  only  in  this  way  could  a  fraudulent 
dealer  be  hindered  from  ruining  the  good  credit  of  the 
town’s  wares.  But  in  return  for  these  restrictions  the  gilds- 
man  gained  the  benefit  of  protection.  If  a  gildsman  of 
Southampton  were  put  into  prison  in  any  part  of  England, 
the  alderman  and  the  steward  with  one  of  the  echevins  were 
bound  to  go  at  the  cost  of  the  gild  to  procure  his  deliverance. 
At  Berwick,  “two  or  three  of  the  gild”  were  bound  to 
“  labour  ”  on  behalf  of  any  one  in  danger  of  losing  life  or 
limb,  though  only  for  two  days  at  the  gild’s  expense.88 
Individuals  were  not  to  monopolize  the  advantages  of  trade. 
In  Southampton,  while  a  bargain  was  being  made,  any  other 
member  could  come  up  and  claim  to  join  in  it  on  giving 
security  that  he  could  pay  for  the  portion  he  desired.  In 
Berwick,  a  man  who  bought  a  lot  of  herrings  must  share 
them  at  cost  price  with  the  gildsmen  present,  and  any  one 
not  present  could  have  his  share  on  paying  the  price  and 
twelvepence  to  the  buyer  for  profit.89 

The  jurisdiction  of  the  gild  had,  of  course,  for  one  of  its 
chief  purposes  the  maintenance  of  the  society’s  privileges. 
There  are  frequent  ordinances  against  acting  as  agents  for 
the  sale  of  goods  belonging  to  non-members,  or  teaching  or 
aiding  a  strange  merchant  to  purchase  to  the  injury  of  the 
gild.40  But  an  equally  important  object  was  the  main¬ 
tenance  of  fair  dealing  and  of  a  high  standard  of  quality  in 
the  goods  sold.  The  rolls  contain  numerous  records  of  fines 
for  dishonestly  dyeing  wool,  for  mixing  bad  wool  with 
good,  for  short  weight,  for  selling  at  more  than  the  assize 
or  fixed  price,  as  well  as  for  the  offence  of  forestalling, 


7 6  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

which  we  shall  see  later  to  have  been  so  carefully  guarded 
against.41 

The  brotherhood,  moreover,  was  unlike  a  modern  society 
aiming  at  some  particular  material  advantage,  in  that  it 
entered  into  a  great  part  of  everyday  life.  Sick  gildsmen 
were  visited,  and  wine  and  food  sent  to  them  from  the 
feasts ;  brethren  who  had  fallen  into  poverty  were  relieved ; 
their  daughters  were  dowered  for  marriage  or  the  convent  ; 
and  when  a  member  died  his  funeral  was  attended  by  the 
brethren  and  the  due  rites  provided  for.42 

§  8.  It  was,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  second  half  of  the 
eleventh  century  that  merchant  gilds  began  to  come  into 
existence ;  during  the  twelfth  century  they  arose  in  all  con¬ 
siderable  English  towns.  The  rise  of  craft  gilds  is,  roughly 
speaking,  a  century  later ;  isolated  examples  occur  early  in 
the  twelfth  century,  they  become  more  numerous  as  the  cen¬ 
tury  advances,  and  in  the  thirteenth  century  they  appear  in 
all  branches  of  manufacture  and  in  every  industrial  centre. 

Craft  gilds  were  associations  of  all  the  artisans  engaged 
in  a  particular  industry  in  a  particular  town,  for  certain 
common  purposes :  what  those  purposes  were  will  be  seen 
later.  Their  appearance  marks  the  second  stage  in  the  his¬ 
tory  of  industry,  the  transition  from  the  family  system  to 
the  artisan  (or  gild )  system.  In  the  former  there  was  no  class 
of  artisans  properly  so  called ;  no  class,  that  is  to  say,  of 
men  whose  time  was  entirely  or  chiefly  devoted  to  a  par¬ 
ticular  manufacture;  and  this  because  all  the  needs  of  a 
family  or  other  domestic  group,  whether  of  monastery  or 
manor-house,  were  satisfied  by  the  labours  of  the  members  of 
the  group  itself.  The  latter,  on  the  contrary,  is  marked  by 
the  presence  of  a  body  of  men  each  of  whom  was  occupied 
more  or  less  completely  in  one  particular  manufacture.43 
The  very  growth  from  the  one  to  the  other  system,  there- 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS . 


77 


fore,  is  an  example  of  “  division  of  labour,”  or,  to  use  a  better 
phrase,  of  “  division  of  employments.”  If,  like  Adam 
Smith,44  we  attempted  to  determine  “the  natural  progress 
of  opulence,”  we  might  formulate  the  law  of  development 
thus :  in  an  agricultural  community  the  first  division  of 
employments  that  will  appear  will  be  between  the  great 
bulk  of  the  population  who  continue  to  be  engaged  in  agri¬ 
culture,  and  that  small  number  of  persons  who  occupy  them¬ 
selves  in  transferring  the  surplus  raw  produce  of  one  place 
to  other  places  where  there  is  need  of  it.  When,  however, 
as  in  the  case  of  England,  a  country  is  surpassed  by  others 
in  the  arts,  or  is  unable  to  furnish  itself  with  articles  of 
luxury,  such  as  precious  stones,  dealers  in  such  imported 
commodities  desired  by  the  wealthier  classes  will  appear 
even  before  there  is  a  class  of  dealers  in  the  raw  produce 
of  the  country.  But  in  any  case  the  growth  of  a  small 
merchant  or  trading  class  precedes  that  of  a  manufacturing 
class. 

When  the  place  of  the  young  manufactures  of  the  twelfth 
century  in  the  development  of  mediaeval  society  is  thus  con¬ 
ceived,  the  discussion  as  to  a  possible  Boman  “  origin  ”  of 
the  gilds  loses  much  of  its  interest.45  No  doubt  modern 
historians  have  exaggerated  the  breach  in  continuity  be¬ 
tween  the  Roman  and  the  barbarian  world;  no  doubt  the 
artisans  in  the  later  Roman  Empire  had  an  organization 
somewhat  like  that  of  the  later  gilds.  Moreover,  it  is  pos¬ 
sible  that  in  one  or  two  places  in  Gaul,  certain  artisan  cor¬ 
porations  may  have  had  a  continuous  existence  from  the 
fifth  to  the  twelfth  century.  It  is  even  possible  that  Roman 
regulations  may  have  served  as  models  for  the  organization 
of  servile  artisans  on  the  lands  of  monasteries  and  great 
nobles, — from  which,  on  the  continent,  some  of  the  later  craft 
gilds  doubtless  sprang.  But  when  we  see  that  the  growth 


78  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

of  an  artisan  class,  as  distinguished  from  isolated  artisans 
here  and  there,  was  impossible  till  the  twelfth  century, 
because  society  had  not  yet  reached  the  stage  in  which  it 
was  profitable  or  safe  for  a  considerable  number  of  men  to 
confine  themselves  to  any  occupation  except  agriculture ; 
and  that  the  ideas  which  governed  the  craft  gilds  were  not 
peculiar  to  themselves  but  common  to  the  whole  society  of 
the  time  ;  then  the  elements  of  organization  which  may  con¬ 
ceivably  have  been  derived  from  or  suggested  by  the  Koman 
artisan  corporations  become  of  quite  secondary  importance. 

There  is,  as  we  have  said,  little  doubt  that  some  of  the 
craft  gilds  of  France  and  Germany  were  originally  organi¬ 
zations  of  artisan  serfs  on  the  manors  of  great  lay  or  eccle¬ 
siastical  lords.  This  may  also  have  been  the  case  in  some 
places  in  England,  but  no  evidence  has  yet  been  adduced  to 
show  that  it  was  so.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  as 
yet  we  know  very  little  of  the  early  history  of  the  towns ; 
and  just  as  it  is  possible  that  in  many  cases  the  burgesses 
who  afterwards  formed  the  merchant  gild  were  originally 
villeins  bound  to  labour  services  to  their  lords,  so  it  is  pos¬ 
sible  that  there  were  in  some  places  groups  of  artisans  work¬ 
ing  for  a  lord,  and  under  regulations  and  officers  appointed 
by  him,  who  gradually  freed  themselves  from  servitude,  and 
became  free  craftsmen.  But  this  is  no  more  than  specula¬ 
tion  ;  at  the  time  when  the  craftsmen  first  appear  in  such 
documents  as  are  at  present  accessible,  they  are  personally 
free,  and  not  subject  to  seigneurial  supervision. 

The  relation  of  the  craft  gilds  to  the  merchant  gild  is  a 
still  more  difficult  question.  In  many  of  the  towns  of  Ger¬ 
many  and  the  Netherlands  a  desperate  struggle  took  place 
during  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries  between  a 
burgher  oligarchy,  who  monopolized  the  municipal  govern¬ 
ment,  and  were  still  further  strengthened  in  many  cases  by 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


79 


union  in  a  merchant  gild,  and  the  artisans  organized  in  their 
craft;  gilds;  the  craftsmen  fighting  first  for  the  right  of  having 
gilds  of  their  own,  and  then  for  a  share  in  the  government 
of  the  town.  These  facts  have  been  easily  fitted  into  a 
symmetrical  theory  of  industrial  development ;  the  merchant 
gilds,  it  is  said,  were  first  formed  for  protection  against 
feudal  lords,  but  became  exclusive,  and  so  rendered  necessary 
the  formation  of  craft  gilds  ;  and  in  the  same  way  the  craft 
gilds  became  exclusive  afterwards,  and  the  journeymen  were 
compelled  to  form  societies  of  their  own  for  protection  against 
the  masters.  It  was  not  difficult  to  explain  the  much 
scantier  notices  as  to  English  affairs  by  the  light  of  this 
theory,  and  to  make  up  for  the  silence  of  English  chroniclers 
by  foreign  analogies.46 

The  very  neatness  of  such  a  theory,  the  readiness  with 
which  it  has  been  accepted  by  popular  writers  in  spite  of 
the  paucity  of  English  evidence,  have  perhaps  led  some  his¬ 
torians  to  treat  it  with  scant  consideration.  It  is  urged  that 
there  is  no  evidence  of  any  such  contest  in  this  country 
between  burghers  and  artisans.47  It  is  further  maintained 
that  the  craft  gilds  had  but  little  independence,  and  are  to 
be  regarded  as  merely  the  machinery  by  which  municipal 
authorities  supervised  manufacture.48  Yet  this  view  does  not 
seem  satisfactory  in  view  of  the  information  which  has  been 
lately  brought  to  light  with  regard  to  the  merchant  gild. 
The  following  theory  as  to  the  relations  of  the  various  bodies 
cannot  be  regarded  as  more  than  a  theory ;  but  it  does  not 
seem  to  be  in  collision  with  facts,  and  it  is  confirmed  by 
much  indirect  evidence. 

Membership  of  the  town  assembly,  the  court  leet ,  or  port- 
manmote ,  seems  to  have  been  originally  bound  up  with  the 
possession  of  land  within  the  town  boundaries ;  and  it  was 
the  right  to  appear  in  such  an  assembly  that  must  originally 


So 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


have  made  a  man  a  burgess  or  citizen.  Of  such  burgesses 
the  merchant  gild  of  each  town  was  constituted.49  At  first 
the  term  “  merchant,”  or  “  trader,”  would  cover  all  those 
who  had  occasion  to  sell  or  buy  anything  beyond  provisions 
for  daily  use ;  and  the  holder  of  a  plot  of  land,  however 
small,  who  was  also  a  craftsman,  would  not  be  excluded. 
But  this  harmonious  union  must  have  been  disturbed  in  two 
ways.  There  came  into  existence  a  class  of  landless  in¬ 
habitants  of  the  towns, — owing  probably  in  the  main  to  the 
natural  increase  of  the  town  population  itself,  but  also  per¬ 
haps  partly  to  some  influx  of  serfs  from  the  country  districts. 
These  landless  inhabitants  could  not  be  regarded  as  bur¬ 
gesses  at  all,  and  therefore  could  not  be  admitted  into  the 
merchant  gild,  even  if  they  had  desired,  and  had  been  able 
to  pay  the  entrance  money.  Many  of  them  would  become 
servants  to  the  richer  citizens,  but  some  would  turn  to 
handicrafts.  And,  secondly,  although  in  a  small  town,  such 
as  Totnes,  the  traders’  gild  might  long  continue  to  include 
craftsmen,  in  the  larger  towns  there  would  be  a  tendency 
for  the  management  of  the  gild  to  fall  entirely  into  the  hands 
of  “  merchants  ”  in  the  modem  sense  of  the  word ;  until  at 
last  they  could  venture  to  impose  and  enforce  the  rule  that 
before  admission  to  the  gild  an  artisan  must  abjure  his 
craft.50  But  by  this  time  the  merchant  gild,  whose  members 
must  from  the  first  have  exercised  a  predominant  influence 
in  the  town,  had  become  practically  identical  with  the 
governing  body;  or,  rather,  a  municipal  organization  had 
come  into  existence  which  combined  the  rights  of  jurisdic¬ 
tion  of  the  court-leet  with  the  rights  of  trade  of  the  mer¬ 
chant  gild.51  Thus  two  distinct  issues  were  raised  :  were  the 
craftsmen  to  obtain  for  their  gilds  rights  of  supervision  and 
jurisdiction  over  their  members,  apart  from  and  independent 
of  the  powers  of  the  municipal  authorities  ?  and  were  they  to 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS.  8 1 

continue  to  submit  to  the  trading  monopoly  of  the  gild 
merchant  ? 

The  first  craft  gilds  that  come  into  notice  are  those  of 
the  weavers  and  fullers  of  woollen  cloth.  It  was  the 
weavers’  gild,  all  over  western  Europe,  that  began  and  led 
the  struggle  against  the  old  governing  bodies.  The  reason 
is  obvious:  the  manufacture  of  materials  for  clothing  was 
the  first  industry  in  which  a  wide  demand  would  make  it 
worth  while  for  men  to  entirely  devote  themselves  to  it,  and 
therefore  it  was  the  first  in  which  a  special  body  of  crafts¬ 
men  appeared.  Gilds  of  bakers,  indeed,  are  to  be  found 
almost  as  early ; 62  but  so  much  less  skill  is  required  in 
baking  than  in  weaving,  that  it  long  remained,  as  it  still 
does  to  a  great  degree,  a  family  employment.  Hence  bakers 
could  never  be  so  numerous  as  weavers ;  and  as  the  former 
manufactured  for  immediate  consumption,  they  scarcely  came 
into  conflict  with  the  trading  monopoly  of  the  merchants.53 

We  owe  to  the  chance  existence  of  the  Pipe  Poll  for  1130 
the  knowledge  that  in  that  year  there  were  gilds  of  weavers 
in  London,  Lincoln,  and  Oxford,54  making  annual  payment  to 
the  king  in  return  for  his  authorization  of  their  existence ;  the 
weavers  of  Oxford,  referring  in  the  reign  of  Edward  I.  to  the 
time  when  the  payment  was  fixed,  declared  that  their  gild  then 
contained  sixty  members.55  In  the  same  reign  there  was  also 
a  gild  of  corvesars,  or  leather-dressers,  in  Oxford.56  During 
the  early  years  of  Henry  II.  gilds  of  weavers  are  also  found 
at  York,  Winchester,  Huntingdon,  and  Nottingham,  and  a  gild 
of  fullers  at  Winchester,  each  making  annual  payments  to  the 
Exchequer.57  The  annual  payment  was  not  merely  a  tax ;  it 
was  the  condition  upon  which  they  received  the  sanction  of 
the  Government.  Gilds  that  the  king  had  not  authorized 
were  amerced  as  “adulterine,”  as  was  the  case  in  1180  in 
London  with  the  gilds  of  goldsmiths,  butchers,  pepperers, 


82 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY,  [Book  I. 


and  cloth-finishers.58  But  there  seems  to  have  been  no  attempt 
to  forcibly  dissolve  the  adulterine  societies;  they  were  not 
large  enough  to  arouse  the  jealousy  of  the  London  burgesses  ; 
and  every  one  of  them  survived  to  take  its  place  among  the 
later  companies. 

The  only  definite  provision,  besides  a  general  confirmation 
of  “  liberties  and  customs,”  in  the  earliest  charters, — such  as 
those  granted  to  the  weavers  of  London  and  York  by  Henry  II., 
— was  that  no  one  within  the  town  (sometimes  the  district) 
should  follow  the  craft  unless  he  belonged  to  the  gild.59  The 
right  to  force  all  other  craftsmen  to  join  the  organization, — 
Zunft-zwang,  as  German  writers  call  it, — carried  with  it  the 
right  to  impose  conditions,  to  exercise  some  sort  of  super¬ 
vision  over  those  who  joined.  It  wras  natural  that  the  earliest 
gilds,  growing  up  in  a  certain  antagonism  to  the  burgesses, 
should  seek  to  make  their  jurisdiction  as  wide  as  possible.  But 
such  an  independent  authority  would  intensify  the  jealousy  of 
the  governing  bodies  in  the  towns.  The  lengths  to  which  the 
antagonism  between  the  burghers  and  artisans  might  go  is 
clearly  illustrated  in  London.  We  do  not  know  whether 
there  had  ever  been  a  gild  merchant  in  London  ;  however,  in 
1191,  by  the  recognition  of  its  “  commune”  the  citizens  ob¬ 
tained  complete  municipal  self-government,  and  consequently 
the  recognition  of  the  same  rights  over  trade  and  industry  as 
a  gild  merchant  would  have  exercised.60  Almost  immediately 
they  offered  to  make  an  annual  payment  to  the  Exchequer  if 
the  weavers’  gild  were  abolished.  John  accepted  the  offer, 
and  in  1200  the  gild  was  abolished  by  royal  charter.61  For 
some  reason  or  other  it  was  again  restored  in  two  or  three 
years ;  but  long  afterwards  the  weavers  did  not  feel  them¬ 
selves  out  of  danger.62 

In  other  towns  it  is  the  economic  struggle  that  is  most 
clearly  discernible.  We  have  seen  that  the  charters  to 


83 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 

towns,  granting  permission  to  have  a  merchant  gild,  usually 
contained  a  clause  to  the  effect  that  none  but  members  of  that 
society  were  to  engage  in  trade,  and  that  it  is  expressly  stated 
in  one  case  that  they  are  to  have  the  monopoly  even  of  the 
retail  sale  of  cloth.63  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  this  was 
a  monopoly  very  generally  insisted  upon.  The  London  “Book 
of  Customs  ”  contains  certain  entries  64  entitled  the  “  laws  ” 
of  the  weavers  and  fullers  of  Winchester,  Oxford,  Beverley, 
and  Marlborough, — reports  or  copies  which  the  London  magis¬ 
trates  must  have  obtained  some  time  in  the  thirteenth  century, 
to  strengthen  their  cause.  These  “laws  ”  draw  a  sharp  dis¬ 
tinction  between  the  craftsman  and  the  freeman,  franJce  homme , 
of  the  town.  No  freeman  could  be  accused  by  a  weaver  or 
fuller,  nor  could  an  artisan  even  give  evidence  against  one.65 
If  a  craftsman  became  so  rich  that  he  wished  to  become  a  free¬ 
man,  he  must  first  forswear  his  craft  and  get  rid  of  all  his 
tools  from  his  house.  No  weaver  or  fuller  might  go  outside  the 
town  to  sell  his  own  cloth,  and  so  interfere  with  the  monopoly 
of  the  merchants ;  nor  was  he  allowed  to  sell  his  cloth  to  any 
save  a  merchant  of  the  town.66  Indeed,  he  must  get  the  con¬ 
sent  of  the  “  good  men  ”  of  the  town  before  he  can  even  carry 
on  his  craft ;  and  he  was  not  to  work  for  any  but  the  good 
men  of  the  town.67  This  last  rule  reappears  in  an  order  of 
the  gild  merchant  of  Leicester  as  late  as  1265,  prohibiting  the 
craftsmen  of  that  town  from  weaving  for  the  men  of  other 
places  so  long  as  they  had  sufficient  work  to  do  for  the  burgesses 
of  Leicester.68 

The  materials  are  not  yet  accessible  which  would  allow  us 
to  trace  the  way  in  which  the  old  organization  of  the  burgesses 
lost  its  exclusive  rights ;  or,  what  is  perhaps  only  the  other 
side  of  the  same  change,  the  way  in  which  the  craftsmen 
gained  the  rights  of  burgesses.  The  trading  monopoly  was 
lost,  probably,  before  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century. 


84 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


It  is,  at  any  rate,  evident  that  the  statute  of  1335  allowing 
foreign  merchants  to  trade  freely  in  England  is  framed  in 
such  terms  as  clearly  to  include  English  craftsmen  in  the 
permission  it  gives,  and  that  it  must  have  had  the  effect  of 
weakening  any  monopoly  which  the  governing  class  in  any 
of  the  towns  might  still  claim.  “  The  king  hath  ordered,”  it 
runs,  “  that  all  merchants,  aliens,  and  denizens,  and  all  other , 
and  every  of  them,  of  zohatever  estate  or  condition  they  may  he 
that  will  buy  or  sell  corn,  wine,  avoir  du  poys,  flesh,  fish,  and 
all  other  articles  of  food,  wool,  cloth,  wares,  merchandise,  and 
all  other  things  vendible,  from  whencesoever  they  come,  .  .  . 
at  whatsoever  place  it  be,  city,  borough,  town,  port  of  the  sea, 
fair,  market,  .  .  .  within  franchise  or  without,  .  .  .  may  freely 
without  interruption  sell  them  to  what  persons  it  shall  please 
them” 69  With  the  loss  of  their  trading  monopoly  disap¬ 
peared  the  raison  d’etre  of  the  gilds  merchant,  and  with  it  of 
the  gilds  themselves  as  separate  organizations.  In  many 
towns  the  name  long  survived,  but  only  as  a  term  to  describe 
certain  functions  of  the  municipal  authorities,  especially  the 
admission  of  apprentices  to  the  freedom  of  the  city.  In 
others  the  gild  reorganized  itself  in  the  shape  of  a  social 
and  religious  society;  while  in  one  or  two,  it  is  possible 
that  the  later  company  of  Merchant  Adventurers  grew  out  of 
the  gild  merchant.  But  the  latter  development,  which  is  of 
extreme  interest,  has  not  yet  been  adequately  investigated.70 

§  9.  The  result  of  the  contest  between  the  municipal 
government  and  the  craft  gilds  in  the  matter  of  jurisdiction 
cannot  be  precisely  defined,  because  it  was  not  precisely  de¬ 
fined  at  the  time.  Brentano  represents  craft  gilds  as  entirely 
independent ;  as  issuing  regulations  concerning  prices,  wages, 
the  character  of  the  work,  and  the  processes  of  manufacture ; 
and  as  exercising  an  independent  jurisdiction  in  trade  matters 
over  their  members.  His  critics,  on  the  other  hand,  point  out 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


85 


that  regulations  such  as  the  gilds  issued  were  certainly  also 
issued  both  by  municipal  authorities  and  in  statutes ;  they 
are  even  inclined  to  deny  to  the  gilds  all  real  judicial  power, 
attributing  to  them  only  what  may^be  called  police  functions 
— the  power,  that  is  to  say,  of  bringing  offenders  before  the 
municipal  tribunal.  A  truer  statement  would  seem  to  be 
this  :  the  town  magistrates  were  recognized  as  having  a  vague 
but  real  authority  over  the  gilds,  enabling  them,  if  they 
pleased,  to  issue  ordinances  binding  upon  any  craft ;  but 
most  of  the  gild  statutes  were  really  drawn  up  by  the  crafts¬ 
men  themselves,  and  the  approval  of  the  town  magistrates, 
necessary  to  give  them  binding  force,  was  granted  as  a  matter 
of  course.  The  every-day  regulation  and  supervision  of  manu¬ 
facturing  processes  was  surrendered  to  the  gild  officials.  As 
to  jurisdiction,  however,  there  were  almost  certainly  wide 
differences  between  the  various  gilds.  Most  gilds,  or  crafts 
(mestiers,  mysteresf  as  they  came  to  be  called,  were  empowered 
to  deal  in  their  courts  with  petty  disputes  or  breaches  of 
rule  on  the  part  of  their  members,  though  the  accused  person 
could  demand  to  be  tried  before  the  mayor ;  and,  indeed,  the 
municipal  authorities  could  bring  the  offender  before  them  in 
the  first  instance,  if  they  thought  proper.  But  some  of  the 
crafts  were  brought  within  the  gild  organization  compara¬ 
tively  late,  and  rather  to  enable  the  municipal  authorities  the 
more  easily  to  control  them  than  for  any  advantage  the 
craftsmen  might  themselves  have  seen  in  union ;  these  had, 
apparently,  no  judicial  powers  at  all,  and  the  only  duty  of 
their  wardens  was  to  present  offenders  against  the  regula¬ 
tions  before  the  mayor.  On  the  other  hand,  the  London 
weavers,  and  probably  some  others  of  the  older  gilds,  had 
courts  with  considerable  independent  judicial  authority,  and 
their  members  could  claim  to  be  tried  by  the  court  of  their 
gild  and  by  no  other. 


86 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


Tlie  London  weavers  held  a  “  gild  ”  once  a  year,  and  a 
court  every  Thursday.  The  court  was  presided  over  by  four 
bailiffs  elected  by  the  men  of  the  craft  and  accepted  by  the 
mayor.  There  was  a  clerk  to  assist  in  holding  the  court,  and 
there  was  a  sergeant  to  summon  offenders  before  it:  these 
two  officials  were  paid  half  a  mark  a  year  out  of  the  fines 
received  by  the  court.  Any  of  the  folk  of  the  craft  impleaded 
in  the  sheriffs’  court  could  be  removed  from  it  to  the  gild 
court  on  the  demand  of  one  of  the  bailiffs  :  two  bailiffs  acting 
together  had  the  power  of  removing  to  the  gild  court  pleas 
brought  against  weavers  even  by  non-members,  though  it 
was  added  later  that  it  was  not  to  have  the  power  of  fining 
non-members.  The  matters  in  which  the  gild  court  had 
jurisdiction  are  defined  as  “  pleas  of  debt,  contract,  agreement, 
and  petty  offences,” — limited  only  in  the  case  of  disputes 
with  the  burellers ,  who  prepared  yarn  for  them,  by  an  agree¬ 
ment  in  1300  that  such  cases  should  be  decided  in  the  mayor’s 
court  by  a  jury  composed  equally  of  members  of  the  two 
bodies.71  When  we  find  that  the  charters  conferred  on  other 
gilds  by  Henry  II., — as,  for  example,  that  to  the  corvesars  of 
Oxford, — were  drawn  up  in  precisely  the  same  terms  as  that 
to  the  London  weavers,  we  cannot  help  conjecturing  that 
much  the  same  powers  as  those  exercised  by  the  weavers 
may  have  been  exercised  by  some  other  of  the  more  ancient 
gilds,  both  in  London  and  elsewhere. 

At  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Edward  III.  there  were  in 
London  forty-eight  companies  or  crafts,72  each  with  a  separate 
organization  and  officers  of  its  own,  a  number  which  had 
increased  to  at  least  sixty  before  the  close  of  the  century. 
Other  important  towns  must  have  seen  a  like  increase  in  the 
number  of  artisans  and  a  like  formation  of  companies,  though 
the  subdivision  did  not  go  so  far.  In  towns  of  the  second 
rank,  such  as  Exeter,  the  development  is  later,  and  occupies 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS \ 


87 

the  following  century 78 :  while  in  smaller  towns  companies 
were  only  formed  when  there  was  a  considerable  body  of 
men  employed  in  the  same  craft;  so  that  many  artisans  re¬ 
mained  unbound  by  any  such  organization,  and  subject  only 
to  the  regulations  imposed  by  statute,  or  by  the  mayor  or 
bailiff. 

We  are  able  roughly  to  determine  the  period  at  which  the 
formation  of  companies,  instead  of  being  opposed,  began  to  be 
forwarded  by  the  municipal  authorities.  Until  the  reign  of 
Edw'ard  I.,  seemingly,  craft  gilds  had  arisen  spontaneously, 
for  the  mutual  help  and  advantage  of  the  craftsmen  :  they 
had  been  obliged  to  make  annual  payments  to  the  king  or 
other  lords  to  secure  recognition ;  and  they  had  found  it  diffi¬ 
cult  to  maintain  their  rights  against  the  municipal  authorities. 
The  reign  of  Edward  I.  appears  to  mark  the  turning-point  in 
their  history.  He  saw  that  they  might  be  a  useful  counter¬ 
poise  to  the  power  of  the  governing  bodies  in  the  towns,  and 
therefore  exerted  his  influence  on  their  side.74  On  the  other 
hand,  the  establishment  of  a  strong  central  authority  made  it 
less  necessary  and  less  possible  for  the  newly  rising  gilds  to 
obtain  such  extensive  rights  of  jurisdiction  as  the  Ziinfte  in 
Germany,  or  the  weavers’  gild  in  London  in  the  previous 
century.  Accordingly  we  see  a  new  policy  in  the  craft 
ordinances,  which  from  the  reign  of  Edward  II.  have  been 
preserved  in  such  numbers.  The  gild  system  was  no  longer 
merely  tolerated;  it  was  fostered  and  extended,  though 
doubtless  primarily  for  police  purposes, — to  ensure  due  super¬ 
vision  of  the  craft,  and  the  punishment  of  offenders  against 
regulations,  through  persons  chosen  by  the^  craft  but  respon¬ 
sible  to  the  municipal  authorities.  Up  to  this  time  the  gilds 
had  been  few  in  number,  because  there  had  been  few  artisans, 
and  those  only  such  as  were  engaged  in  meeting  most 
elementary  wants,  food  and  clothing ;  such,  namely,  as 


88 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


bakers,  butchers,  leather-dressers, — above  all,  those  engaged  in 
the  manufacture  of  cloth,  weavers,  fullers,  and  dyers.  But 
now  a  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  artisans  takes  place ; 
new  wants  begin  to  be  felt,  and  each  new  want  is  supplied 
by  a  separate  body  of  craftsmen.  Consequently  we  find  the 
municipal  authorities  confirming  or  creating  companies,  not 
only  of  such  wholesale  dealers  as  grocers  and  drapers,  but  also 
of  such  artisans  as  spurriers,  helmet-makers,  brace-makers, 
farriers,  wax-chandlers,  scriveners,  and  piemakers.  It  is  often 
not  easy  to  determine  whether  the  ordinances  which  first 
mention  these  companies  actually  created  them.  In  many 
cases,  probably,  they  had  come  into  existence  spontaneously, 
somewhat  before  the  date  of  the  ordinances  “  accepted  by  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  at  the  suit  and  request  of  the  folk  of  the 
trade.” 75  But  in  many  cases,  also,  the  organization  was 
imposed  from  without  by  the  municipal  rulers ;  as  with  the 
masons  in  1356,  “because  that  their  trade  has  not  been 
regulated  in  due  manner  by  the  government  of  folk  of  their 
trade,  in  such  form  as  other  trades  are :  ”  while  in  one  case, 
that  of  the  wax-chandlers  in  1371,  “the  reputable  men  of 
the  trade,”  show  the  mayor  and  aldermen  how  that  “  their 
trade  has  been  badly  ruled  and  governed  heretofore,  and  there 
still  is  great  scandal  .  .  .  because  they  have  not  Masters 
chosen  of  the  said  trade,  and  sworn  before  you,  as  other  trades 
Lave,  to  oversee  the  defaults  that  are  committed  in  their  said 
trade,  and  to  present  them  to  the  mayor  and  aldermen.” 76  This 
last  sentence  illustrates  the  limited  character  of  the  jurisdic¬ 
tion  of  the  new  companies.  In  some  the  only  duty  of  the 
masters,  wardens,  or  overseers  was  to  present  offenders  to  the 
mayor’s  court77:  in  all  the  new  crafts  an  offender  had 
the  right  of  appeal  from  the  decision  of  the  gild  officials  to 
the  mayor,78  who  however  seems  to  have  always  called  in  the 
aid  of  a  small  jury  chosen  from  the  particular  craft,79 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


89 


It  must  be  remembered,  as  to  the  relation  of  the  gild  to  the 
municipal  authorities,  that  in  London  during  the  fourteenth 
century, — and  doubtless  the  same  was  the  case  elsewhere  in 
'this  and  the  following  century, — the  municipal  organization 
was  itself  changing.  The  master  craftsmen  were  becoming 
more  prosperous ;  and  before  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Edward 
III,,  instead  of  the  craftsmen  being  incapable  of  citizenship, 
citizenship  came  to  be  bound  up  with  membership  of  one  of 
the  companies.  The  old  jealousy  between  craft  gild  and 
“  commune  ”  disappeared  when  the  leading  men  of  the  gilds 
came  to  exercise  influence  in  the  government  of  the  commune. 
But  by  that  time  the  gilds  themselves  had  assumed  a  dif¬ 
ferent  character.80 

§  10.  The  internal  organization  of  the  gilds  can  be  briefly 
described.  The  most  important  part  of  it  was  the  authority 
of  the  wardens,  overseers,  bailiffs,  or  masters,  whose  chief  duty 
was  to  supervise  the  industry  and  cause  offenders  to  be 
punished.81  They  were  elected  annually  at  full  assemblies  of 
the  men  of  the  craft,  absence  from  which  was  punished  by 
fine ; 82  and  it  was  at  such  or  similar  gatherings  that  from 
time  to  time  new  regulations  were  drawn  up  to  be  submitted 
to  the  approval  of  the  mayor  and  aldermen.  No  one  could 
work  at  the  craft  who  had  not  been  approved  and  admitted 
to  the  gild  by  its  officials ;  and  it  would  seem  that  in  London, 
from  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century,  admission  to  the 
freedom  of  the  city  and  to  a  craft  took  place  at  one  and  the 
same  time.83 

In  the  early  part  of  the  fourteenth  century,  apprenticeship 
was  only  gradually  becoming  an  absolutely  necessary  pre¬ 
liminary  to  setting  up  as  a  master  ;84  to  the  same  period  is 
due  the  fixing  of  the  term  of  apprenticeship  at  seven  years. 
A  separate  class  of  journeymen  was  also  only  just  coming  into 
existence.  It  was  still,  apparently,  the  usual  practice  for  a 


90 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


man,  on  coming  out  of  his  apprenticeship,  to  set  up  for  himself. 
Such  “  serving-men  ”  as  there  were,  made  contracts  with 
master-craftsmen  to  work  for  them  for  a  certain  terra,  some¬ 
times  for  a  period  of  several  years.  But  from  the  frequency 
with  which  the  rule  is  "repeated,  that  “  no  one  shall  receive 
the  apprentice,  serving-man,  or  journeyman  of  another  in  the 
same  trade  during  the  term  agreed  upon  between  his  master 
and  him,”  and  the  frequency  also  with  which  the  mayor  of  one 
town  has  to  write  to  the  mayor  of  another  to  ask  that  runaways 
should  be  sent  back,  it  appears  that  apprentices  often  became 
discontented,  and  absconded.85  The  gild  ordinances  imply 
that,  as  a  rule,  only  master  craftsmen  took  part  in  the  govern¬ 
ment  of  the  fraternity,  but  there  is  at  least  one  case  where 
ordinances  are  described  as  agreed  to  “  as  well  by  serving- 
men  as  masters.” 86  It  does  not  appear  that  as  yet  the  number 
either  of  journeymen  or  of  apprentices  that  one  master  could 
take  was  limited  by  legislation  or  ordinance :  but  we  shall 
see  later  that  the  limitation  of  number  in  the  sixteenth  century 
was  in  order  to  maintain  an  existing  state  of  things,  so  that 
it  is  probable  that  at  this  time  a  master  artisan  would  not 
usually  have  more  than  one  or  two  journeymen  and  one  or 
two  apprentices.87 

The  regulations  drawn  up  by  the  crafts  aimed  at  the 
prevention  of  fraud,  and  the  observance  of  certain  standards 
of  size  and  quality  in  the  wares  produced.  Articles  made  in 
violation  of  these  rules  were  called  “  false,”  just  as  clipped  or 
counterfeit  coin  was  “  false  money.”  For  such  “  false  work  ” 
the  makers  were  punished  by  fines  (one  half  going  to  the 
craft,  the  other  half  to  the  town  funds),  and,  upon  the  third 
or  fourth  offence,  by  expulsion  from  the  trade.  Penalties 
were  provided,  as  far  as  possible,  for  every  sort  of  deceitful 
device ;  such  as  putting  better  wares  at  the  top  of  a  bale 
than  below,  moistening  groceries  so  as  to  make  them  heavier, 


Chap.  II.] 


MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


91 


selling  second-hand  furs  for  new,  soldering  together  broken 
swords,  selling  sheep  leather  for  doe  leather,  and  many  other 
like  tricks.88  It  was  for  the  same  reason  that  night-work 
was  forbidden ;  not,  as  Brentano  says,  with  the  philan¬ 
thropic  object  of  providing  work  for  all,  but  because  work 
could  not  be  done  so  neatly  at  night,  and  because  craftsmen, 
knowing  they  were  not  likely  to  be  visited  at  that  time  by 
the  wardens,  took  the  opportunity  to  make  wares  “  falsely,”  or 
because  working  at  night  disturbed  the  neighbours.89  It 
seems,  however,  to  have  been  a  general  rule  that  men  should 
not  work  after  six  o’clock  on  Saturday  evening,  or  on  the 
eves  of  Double  Feasts.90  There  is,  indeed,  one  regulation 
which  does  seem  designed  to  ensure  men’s  having  work,  and 
that  is,  that  “  no  one  shall  set  any  woman  to  work,  other 
than  his  wedded  wife  or  his  daughter.” 91 

It  is  certain,  from  the  analogy  of  the  gilds  merchant,  as 
well  as  from  what  we  know  of  the  later  usages  of  the 
companies  and  of  the  practices  of  similar  bodies  abroad,  that 
in  each  of  the  craft  gilds,  besides  regulations  as  to  manu¬ 
facture,  there  were  rules  providing  for  mutual  assistance  in 
difficulties,  for  meetings,  festivities,  and  common  worship. 
But  the  documents  which  would  throw  light  on  the  subject 
have  not  yet  been  published.  The  craft  statutes  contained 
in  the  archives  of  the  corporation  of  London  deal  almost 
exclusively  with  the  regulation  of  processes;  and  this  is 
easy  to  explain,  for  only  the  action  of  the  gilds  in  the 
supervision  of  industry  would  fall  beneath  the  view  of  the 
city  authorities ;  with  their  internal  life  as  friendly  societies 
the  corporation  had  nothing  to  do.  Fortunately  one  set  of 
ordinances  therein  contained,  those  of  the  white-tawyers  or 
leather-dressers,  in  1346,  are  more  detailed;92  and  from 
these  we  may  conjecture  similar  customs  in  other  crafts. 
They  have  a  common-box  for  subscriptions  :  out  of  this 


92 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY,  [Book  I. 


sevenpence  a  week  is  paid  to  any  man  of  the  trade  who 
has  fallen  into  poverty  from  old  age  or  inability  to  work, 
and  sevenpence  a  week  likewise  to  a  poor  man’s  widow,  so 
long  as  she  remains  unmarried.  “  If  any  one  of  the  said 
craft  shall  depart  this  life,  and  have  not  wherewithal  to  be 
buried,  he  shall  be  buried  at  the  expense  of  the  common-box  ; 
and  when  any  one  of  the  said  trade  shall  die,  all  those  of  the 
said  trade  shall  go  to  the  vigil  and  make  offering  on  the 
morrow.”  Some  of  the  companies,  as  we  learn  later,  had 
chantries  and  side  chapels  in  parish  churches,  and  solemn 
services  at  intervals.  The  white-tawyers  are  only  able  to 
afford  “  a  wax  candle  to  burn  before  Our  Lady  in  the  Church 
of  All  Hallows,  near  London  Wall.”  And  there  is  one  clause 
which  clearly  displays  the  effort  after  fraternal  union :  it  is 
one  ordaining  that  “  those  of  the  trade  ”  shall  aid  a  member 
who  cannot  finish  work  he  has  undertaken,  “  so  that  the  said 
work  be  not  lost.” 

§  11.  In  the  first  half  of  the  fourteenth  century,  the  gild 
system  reached  its  highest  point  of  efficiency.  For  two  cen¬ 
turies  afterwards  this  form  of  organization  continued  to  be 
adopted  by  one  industry  after  another  as  it  arose  in  each 
town.  Yet,  as  early  as  this,  signs  of  decay  may  be  observed ; 
new  difficulties  begin  to  show  themselves ;  and,  in  the 
one  considerable  manufacture  that  England  possessed,  the 
increase  of  foreign  demand  led  to  the  breakdown  of  the 
gild  system  altogether.93  Deferring,  however,  the  examina¬ 
tion  of  these  changes  till  a  later  section,  let  us  look  at  the 
economic  characteristics  of  the  gild  system  while  it  was  still 
intact. 

i.  It  was  distinguished  from  the  earlier  “ family  system” 
of  industry,  in  that  manufacture  was  carried  on  for  the 
purpose  of  supplying  consumers  outside  the  domestic  group. 
There  was  a  market ,  in  the  sense  of  a  number  of  purchasers.; 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


91 


and  therefore  the  goods  produced  can  he  called  wares,  as  they 
could  not  before.  To  use  modern  technical  phraseology, 
there  were  values-in-exchange ,  as  well  as  values-in-use.  But 
the  market  was  very  limited ;  in  most  cases  restricted  to  the 
people  of  a  particular  town  or  district.  Indeed,  looking  at 
England  as  a  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  there  were  then  a 
number  of  local  markets ;  not  as  there  tends  to  be  now,  one 
market.  To-day,  for  instance,  the  price  of  corn  is  affected 
by  the  whole  demand  of  England,  or  rather  of  a  much  larger 
area ;  then  it  would  have  been  determined,  but  for  legis¬ 
lative  action,  by  the  demand  of  a  comparatively  small  area. 
It  was  this  local  limitation  of  demand  that  made  the  regu¬ 
lation  of  prices  and  methods  of  manufacture  so  much  easier 
than  it  would  be  in  modern  times.94  The  same  smallness  of 
the  market,  and  the  fact  that  most  of  the  articles  demanded 
were  called  for  by  necessity  and  not  by  fashion,  caused 
demand  to  be  stable :  none  of  the  social  difficulties  now 
caused  by  the  rapid  and  incalculable  fluctuations  in  demand 
had  as  yet  begun  to  show  themselves. 

ii.  Capital  played  a  very  small  part.  In  order  to  set  up 
as  a  master-artisan  a  man  needed  to  be  able  to  hire  a  house, 
and  buy  the  necessary  tools,  as  well  as,  in  many  crafts,  a 
little  money  to  buy  materials.  But  slcill  and  connection ,  the 
ability  to  produce  good  wares,  and  the  steady  demand  of  a 
small  group  of  customers  were  far  more  important.  This 
element  of  technical  skill  modern  machinery  has  driven  far 
into  the  background. 

iii.  There  was  as  yet  no  large  class  of  wage-labourers, 
no  “  working-class  ”  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term.  By 
“  working-men  ”  we  mean  a  number  of  men,  from  among 
whom  individuals  may  indeed  rise  to  become  masters,  but 
the  majority  of  whom  cannot  hope  ever  to  rise  to  a  higher 
position.  But  in  the  fourteenth  century  a  few  years’  work 


94 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


as  a  journeyman  was  but  a  stage  through  which  the  poorer 
men  had  to  pass,  while  the  majority  probably  set  up  for 
themselves  as  master  craftsmen  as  soon  as  apprenticeship 
was  over.  There  were,  therefore,  no  collisions  between 
“capital  and  labour,”  though  there  might  be  occasional 
quarrels  between  individuals.  The  hard-working  journey¬ 
man  expected  to  be  able  in  a  few  years  to  become  an 
independent  master ;  and  while  he  remained  a  journeyman 
there  was  no  social  gulf  between  himself  and  his  employer. 
They  worked  in  the  same  shop,  side  by  side,  and  the  servant 
probably  earned  at  least  half  as  much  as  his  master. 

iv.  If,  therefore,  we  compare  the  working-class  of  to-day 
with  that  of  the  fourteenth  century,  it  is  not  with  the 
journeymen,  but  with  the  master  craftsmen,  that  the  com¬ 
parison  must  be  made.  The  most  important  contrast  that 
strikes  us  is  that  the  mediaeval  craftsmen  were  personally 
independent,  in  a  sense  in  which  the  modern  workman  is 
not.  He  worked  in  his  own  shop,  owned  his  own  tools,  and 
worked  at  what  hours  he  pleased,  subject  to  the  restrictions 
as  to  work  at  night  or  on  Sunday.  In  some  crafts,  it  is  true, 
he  received  the  raw  material  from  customers,  giving  back 
finished  articles  for  the  customers’  own  use ;  in  some  he  was 
more  or  less  dependent  on  the  men  of  other  crafts,  receiving 
half-finished  goods  from  them  and  returning  them  one  stage 
further  advanced.  But  in  many  industries  the  craftsman 
bought  his  own  materials,  and  sold  the  goods  to  such 
customers  as  presented  themselves,  i.e.  he  combined  the 
functions  of  a  trader  with  those  of  a  manufacturer.95  The 
shopkeeper  class  was  only  beginning  to  come  into  existence. 

v.  "We  have  seen  that  the  gilds  were  not  independent,  but 
were  subject  to  the  control  of  the  municipal  and  central 
authorities.  The  chief  object  of  this  control,  as  of  the  gild 
statutes,  was  to  secure  the  good  quality  of  the  wares  pro- 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAET  GILDS.  95 

duced.  The  modern  state  has  abandoned  the  attempt,  except 
in  the  case  of  certain  articles  of  food.  But  it  must  bo 
recognized  that  the  task  ‘was  an  easier  one  in  the  Middle 
Ages.  Wants  were  comparatively  few  and  unchanging; 
they  were  supplied  by  neighbouring  craftsmen ;  consumer 
and  producer  stood  in  direct  relation  with  one  another. 
Such  regulations  had  regard,  not  only  to  the  interests  of  the 
consumers,  but  also  to  those  of  the  craft  itself,  which  would 
be  injured  by  the  knavery  of  individual  members.96  They 
only  disappeared  when  production  became  much  greater, 
and  aimed  at  satisfying  a  wide  and  changing  market.  As 
we  should  expect,  the  doctrine  caveat  emptor 97  first  appears 
in  the  cloth  industry :  a  petition  of  the  London  fullers,  in 
1369,  urges  that  those  who  bought  cloths  with  patent  defects 
should  do  so  at  their  peril.98 

vi.  The  supervision  of  the  processes  of  manufacture  -was 
the  chief  reason  for  the  action  of  the  central  and  local  authori¬ 
ties  in  encouraging  and  even  insisting  on  the  separate  organi¬ 
zation  of  different  branches  of  the  same  industry ,  and  the  rule 
that  every  craftsman  should  choose  his  craft  and  abide  by  it. 
An  Act  of  Parliament  of  1363  ordained  that  “  artificers  and 
men  of  mysteries  ( mestiers ,  i.e.  crafts)  shall  each  join  the  craft 
he  may  choose  between  this  time  and  the  next  Candlemas ;  ” 
“  trespassers  ”  were  to  be  punished  by  imprisonment  for  half 
a  year,  and  by  a  fine  to  the  king.99  This  was  followed  up  by 
special  ordinances  “  that  no  dyer  or  weaver  shall  make  any 
cloth,”  i.e.  interfere  with  the  trade  of  the  cloth-finishers.100 
The  division  was  sometimes  amusingly  minute :  bowyers  were 
not  to  make  arrows, — that  was  to  be  left  to  the  fletchers ;  cord- 
wainers,  “  the  craft  of  workers  in  new  leather,”  were  not  to 
retail  or  make  up  old  boots  and  shoes  for  sale,  and  so  interfere 
with  the  “  cobelers,”  though  the  cobelers  were  specially  per¬ 
mitted  to  use  new  leather  for  resoling  old  boots.101 


£6 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  1 

vii.  The  members  of  each  craft  usually  lived  in  the  same 
street  or  neighbourhood.  Thus  in  London  the  saddlers  lived 
round,  and  attended,  the  church  of  S.  Martin-le-Grand ;  the 
lorimers  lived  in  Cripplegate,  the  weavers  in  Cannon  Street, 
smiths  in  Smithfield,  and  bucklers  in  Bucklersbury.102  So  in 
Bristol  there  were  Tucker  Street,  the  home  of  the  tuckers  or 
fullers,  Corn  Street,  Knifesmith  Street,  Butcher  Bow,  Cooks’ 
Bow,  and  the  like.103  Such  a  grouping  must  have  enormously 
strengthened  the  sense  of  corporate  life  in  each  craft,  and 
must  also  have  made  the  work  of  supervision  comparatively 
easy. 

So  large  a  part  of  the  manufacturing  work  of  the  country 
was  arranged  on  the  gild  system,  that  that  term  may  be  fairly 
used  to  describe  the  whole  organization  of  industry.  But  in 
some  occupations  and  districts,  while  there  was  a  sufficient 
demand  for  some  commodity  to  induce  men  to  give  up  them¬ 
selves  to  a  particular  sort  of  labour,  there  could  never  be  a 
demand  large  enough  to  call  into  existence  a  body  of  men  of 
the  same  craft  large  enough  to  form  a  gild  or  company.  Thus 
most  villages  had  a  smith,  but  only  in  the  largest  town  was 
there  a  smiths’  gild.  Isolated  weavers  and  fullers  were 
probably  to  be  found  scattered  up  and  down  the  country. 
In  such  cases  the  individual  craftsman  would  be  without  the 
support  and  control  of  the  gild;  but  the  essential  charac¬ 
teristics  of  his  position  were  the  same  as  of  the  position  of  the 
gild  member.  His  capital  was  very  small ;  he  dealt  directly 
with  the  customer ;  and  between  himself  and  the  one  or  two 
men  or  boys  he  might  employ,  there  was  no  social  gulf.104 

§  12.  Internal  Trade .  Under  conditions  such  as  are  above 
described,  a  much  smaller  part  must  have  been  played  in  the 
economic  life  of  society  by  domestic  and  foreign  trade  than 
in  the  England  of  to-day.  Such  trade  as  there  was,  was 
regulated  by  the  strong  government  of  the  Angevins  on 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


97 


principles  which  the  circumstances  of  the  time  readily  ex¬ 
plain.  Unless  traders  were  brought  together  at  definite 
centres  at  definite  times,  it  was  impossible  either  to  protect 
them,  or  to  supervise  their  dealings  in  the  interest  of  the  con¬ 
sumer,  or  to  obtain  from  them  those  payments  which  formed 
a  considerable  part  of  the  royal  revenue.  Hence  the  policy 
of  the  government  was  to  create  for  trade  regular  channels 
within  which  it  might  be  compelled  to  move. 

The  roads  were  bad,  though  probably  not  so  bad  as  they 
became  in  the  seventeenth  century ;  the  chief  highways  were 
of  Eoman  construction,  and  tended  to  become  worse  rather 
than  better  as  time  went  on.  No  general  law  for  the  repair 
of  roads  was  passed  until  the  Statute  2  &  3  Philip  and 
Mary.105  The  Statute  of  Winchester,  1285,  provided  that 
bushes  and  underwood,  though  not  oaks  or  great  trees,  should 
be  cleared  away  for  two  hundred  feet  on  each  side  of  high¬ 
ways  leading  from  one  market  town  to  another ;  but  this  was 
only  to  prevent  men  “  lurking  in  them  to  do  hurt.” 106  The 
obligation  of  repairing  highways  lay,  by  common  law,  upon 
the  parish,  except  in  those  cases  where  the  burden  was 
attached  to  a  property  through  or  near  which  the  road  passed  : 
neglect  could  be  dealt  with  by  indictment ; 107  and  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  bridges  and  roads  was  one  of  the  subjects  into  which 
the  sheriffs  were  bound  to  inquire  in  the  view  of  frankpledge. 
Moreover,  the  great  proprietors  whose  estates  were  scattered 
over  many  counties  had  an  interest  in  the  maintenance  of 
roads,  which  was  lessened  in  succeeding  centuries  by  the 
greater  consolidation  of  estates.  Yet  the  roads  were  often 
almost  impassable.  In  London  the  plan  was  adopted,  in  1356, 
of  charging  tolls  for  every  cart  or  packhorse  entering  or  leaving 
one  of  the  city  gates, — except,  curiously  enough,  those  of  great 
people  and  other  folks  bringing  victuals  for  use  in  their  own 
houses, — for  the  repair  of  the  roads  immediately  outside  the 


98 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


metropolis.108  The  maintenance  of  bridges  was  recognized  as 
especially  important,  and  as,  in  some  measure,  a  religious 
duty.  Yery  often  they  were  entrusted  to  special  wardens,  who 
were  empowered  to  take  toll ;  thus  Eochester  Bridge,  on  the 
main  route  to  the  ports  for  France  and  the  Low  Countries, 
was  in  the  hands  of  wardens  and  assistants,  who  had  an 
organization  similar  to  that  of  a  gild,  and  administered,  for 
the  repair  of  the  structure,  revenues  derived  from  “  proper  ” 
and  “  contributory  ”  lands.109  But  the  right  of  receiving 
bridge  toll  was  often  obtained  by  persons  who  neglected  their 
duties ;  and,  in  the  case  of  bridges  not  specially  entrusted  to 
individuals,  it  was  often  a  difficult  matter  to  determine  which 
of  the  neighbouring  landowners  was  responsible,  and  still 
more  difficult  to  make  him  pay.110  Inns  were  plentiful ;  the 
warden  of  Merton  and  two  of  the  fellows,  travelling  on  busi¬ 
ness  to  Northumberland  and  back  in  1332,  stayed  almost  every 
night  at  inns  on  their  way.111  Apparently  it  was  only  the 
very  poor,  from  charity,  or  the  very  powerful,  from  fear,  who 
were  entertained  in  monasteries.112 

Every  town  had  a  market  and  fixed  market  days,  where, 
as  now,  the  surplus  produce  of  the  country  districts  was  sold 
to  the  townsfolk,  and  the  manufactures  of  the  town  artisans 
were  sold  to  the  farmers.  The  possession  of  a  market  could 
be  claimed  only  on  the  ground  of  a  royal  grant,  or  of  imme¬ 
morial  usage ;  and  as  it  was  a  valuable  right,  and  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  a  market  in  the  neighbourhood,  by  diminishing 
the  trade  of  those  already  established,  lessened  the  lords’ 
profits,  there  was  always  the  greatest  jealousy  of  any  rival, 
a  jealousy  which  furnished  frequent  occasion  for  lawsuits. 
Thus,  in  the  reign  qf  Henry  II.,  the  men  of  Oxford  and  Wal¬ 
lingford  declared  that  at  the  Abingdon  markets  in  old  time 
nothing  had  been  sold  except  bread  and  beer,  or  at  any  rate 
that  nothing  used  to  be  taken  there  in  boats  or  waggons. 


Chap.  It]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


99 


Tlie  king,  however,  was  on  the  side  of  the  monastery,  and 
granted  permission  to  hold  a  “  full  market,”  though  goods 
were  not  to  be  brought  to  it  in  any  but  the  abbot’s  boats.113 
Bract  on  lays  down  that  a  market  shall  never  be  estab¬ 
lished  nearer  than  six  miles  and  two-thirds  to  one  already 
existing,114  but  it  is  not  probable  that  any  such  rule  was  ever 
observed.  The  Oxford  market  on  Wednesdays  and  Saturdays 
was  regulated  by  the  University  as  early  as  1319.  The  articles 
sold  were  hay  and  straw,  faggots,  timber,  pigs,  beer,  coal  and 
roots,  leather  and  gloves,  furs,  linen  and  cloth,  leather,  corn 
and  dairy  produce;  and  the  place  in  the  High  Street  and 
Corn  Market  at  which  each  kind  was  to  be  sold  was  strictly 
determined.116  Pigs,  for  instance,  were  to  be  stationed  for 
sale  between  S.  Mary’s  and  All  Saints  ;  the  setting  apart  in 
our  towns  of  a  piece  of  ground  for  a  cattle  market  away  from 
the  main  streets  is  a  refinement  of  a  later  age. 

To  buy  foreign  goods,  or  the  products  of  distant  counties, 
men  had  to  wait  until  the  great  fairs,  of  which  the  traces 
are  now  everywhere  gradually  disappearing.  They  usually 
began  on  a  saint’s  day,- — a  fact  pointing  to  their  origin  in  the 
concourse  of  people  to  particular  shrines  on  great  festivals  ; 
the  disorders  in  churchyards  on  such  occasions  were  a  frequent 
subject  of  condemnation  by  early  Church  councils.  An  espe¬ 
cially  convenient  day  was  September  1,  the  festival  of  S.  Giles, 
for  then  stores  could  be  laid  in  for  the  winter ;  and  the  chapel 
of  the  hermit  saint,  always  outside  the  walls,  was  a  convenient 
place  of  gathering.  The  most  important  fairs  were  those  of 
Stourbridge,  near  Cambridge,  for  East  Anglia  and  the  trade 
with  Flanders,116  and  of  Winchester  for  the  southern  counties 
and  the  t^ade  with  France  :  the  former  retained  considerable 
importance  down  to  the  last  century;  the  latter  fell  into 
decay  in  the  fifteenth  century,  so  that  more  particular  notice 
must  be  given  to  it  in  this  place.11* 


100  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  t. 

A  fair  for  three  days,  on  the  eastern  hill  outside  Winchester, 
was  granted  to  the  bishop  by  William  II. ;  his  immediate  suc¬ 
cessors  granted  extensions  of  time,  until  by  a  charter  of 
Henry  II.  it  was  fixed  at  sixteen  days,  from  August  31st  to 
September  15th.  On  the  morning  of  August  31st,  “  the  jus¬ 
ticiars  of  the  pavilion  of  the  bishop  ”  proclaimed  the  fair  on  the 
hilltop,  then  rode  on  horseback  through  the  city,  receiving  the 
keys  at  the  gates,  took  possession  of  the  weighing-machine  in 
the  wool  market  of  the  city  to  prevent  its  being  used,  and 
then,  with  the  mayor  and  bailiffs  in  their  train,  rode  back  to 
the  great  tent  or  pavilion  on  the  hill,  where  they  appointed  a 
special  mayor,  bailiff,  and  coroner  to  govern  the  city  in  the 
bishop’s  name  during  fair-time.  The  hill-top  was  quickly 
covered  with  streets  of  wooden  shops :  in  one  the  merchants 
from  Flanders,  in  another  those  of  Caen  or  some  other  Norman 
town,  in  another  the  merchants  from  Bristol.  Here  were 
placed  the  goldsmiths  in  a  row,  and  there  the  drapers ;  while 
around  the  whole  was  a  wooden  palisade  with  guarded  en¬ 
trance, — precautions  which  did  not  always  prevent  enter¬ 
prising  adventurers  from  escaping  payment  of  toll  by  digging 
a  way  in  for  themselves  under  the  wall.  On  the  first  day 
also  had  appeared,  with  horses  and  armour,  before  the  bishop’s 
justiciars,  those  tenants  of  the  bishop  who  were  bound  so  to 
appear  by  their  tenure ;  from  among  them  three  or  four  were 
appointed  to  see  that  the  sentences  of  their  court  and  the  orders 
of  the  bishop’s  marshal  were  duly  executed  in  the  fair,  in 
Winchester  and  in  Southampton.  ‘  All  trade  was  compulsorily 
suspended  at  Winchester,  and  within  a  “  seven-league  circuit,” 
guards  being  stationed  at  outlying  posts,  on  bridges  and  other 
places  of  passage,  to  see  that  the  monopoly  was  not  infringed. 
At  Southampton,  outside  the  circuit,  nothing  was  to  be  sold 
during  the  fair-time  but  victuals,  and  even  the  very  craftsmen 
of  Winchester  were  bound  to  transfer  themselves  to  the  hill, 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS.  IOI 

and  there  carry  on  their  occupation  during  the  fair.118  There 
was  a  graduated  scale  of  tolls  and  duties :  all  merchants  of 
London,  Winchester,  or  Wallingford  who  entered  during  the 
first  week  were  free  from  entrance  tolls ;  after  that  date  new 
comers  paid  tolls,  except  the  members  of  the  merchant  gild 
of  Winchester.119  For  weighing  a  bale  of  wool,  fourpence  was 
paid  as  “  bishop’s  weighing-money,”  as  well  as  a  penny  from 
the  seller  and  a  penny  from  the  buyer  as  the  weigher’s  fee  ; 
and  there  were  similar  dues  on  other  goods.  In  every  fair 
there  was  a  court  of  pie-powder  (of  dusty  feet),  in  which  the 
lord’s  representative  decided  by  merchant  law  in  all  cases  of 
dispute  that  might  arise,  suspending  for  a  time  the  ordinary 
jurisdiction  of  the  town ;  at  Winchester  this  was  called  the 
Pavilion  Court.  Hither  the  bishop’s  servants  brought  all  the 
weights  and  measures  to  be  tested ;  here  the  justices  deter¬ 
mined  upon  an  assize,  or  fixed  scale,  for  bread,  wine,  beer, 
and  other  victuals,  adjudging  to  the  pillory  any  baker  whose 
bread  was  found  to  be  of  defective  weight ;  and  here,  every 
day,  disputes  between  merchants  as  to  debt  were  decided  by 
juries  upon  the  production  and  comparison  of  the  notched 
wooden  tallies.120 

Similar  in  general  character  to  the  Winchester  fair,  but 
of  less  importance,  were  those  of  Boston,  S.  Ives  in  Hunting¬ 
donshire,  Stamford,  and  S.  Edmundsbury, — all,  it  will  be 
noticed,  in  the  south-eastern  half  of  England.  At  Oxford 
there  was  S.  Erideswide’s  fair  for  seven  days  in  July,  during 
which  time  the  government  of  the  city  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  prior.121 

To  escape  tolls,  merchants  often  tried  to  linger  on  after 
the  fair  was  legally  over.  This  was  forbidden  by  a  Bishop 
of  Winchester  in  the  first  year  of  the  fourteenth  century,  on 
pain  of  excommunication.  The  lords  of  fairs  themselves  some¬ 
times  tried  to  unduly  prolong  their  fairs,  and  so  both  injure 


102 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY .  [Book  I. 


other  lords  of  fairs  and  also  defeat  the  royal  policy  of  forcing 
trade  into  particular  channels.  Accordingly  the  statute  of 
Northampton  in  1328  enacted  that  proclamation  should  he 
made  at  the  beginning  of  each  fair  how  long  it  was  going  to 
last:  if  the  lord  permitted  it  to  last  longer  than  the  time 
limited  by  charter,  the  franchise,  i.e.  the  right  of  receiving 
tolls,  would  be  forfeited ;  and  an  act,  somewhat  later,  imposed 
on  merchants  who  sold  goods  after  the  closing  day  a  fine  of 
double  the  value  of  the  wares  sold,  and  of  this  the  informer 
was  to  have  a  quarter.122 

§  13.  In  the  history  of  the  foreign  trade  of  England 
three  periods  may  be  roughly  distinguished.  In  our  own 
day  it  is  the  “  world-market  ”  to  which  attention  is  chiefly 
and  of  necessity  directed.  We  are  accustomed  to  compare 
the  amount  of  exports  from  England  to  all  other  countries  with 
that  of  the  imports  to  England  from  all  other  countries.  In 
an  earlier  period,  what  occupied  the  thoughts  of  merchants 
and  statesmen  was  rather  the  relation  between  the  amount 
of  exports  to  each  particular  country,  and  of  imports  from 
that  country.  But,  during  both  these  periods,  it  has  been 
the  trade  of  the  whole  of  England  that  men  have  usually 
had  before  their  eyes.  There  has,  in  fact,  during  both  been 
a  national  trade.  But  there  was  a  yet  earlier  period,  and  it 
is  with  that  we  have  now  to  do,  in  which  there  was  nothing 
that  could  be  called  inter-national  commerce;  what  existed 
was  scarcely  more  than  a  trade  between  certain  towns,  an 
inter-communal  or  inter-municipal  commerce. 

To  fully  realize  the  contrast,  we  must  endeavour  to 
picture  to  ourselves  the  state  of  society  in  the  twelfth  and 
thirteenth  centuries.  Modern  towns  include  so  many  pro¬ 
fessions  aud  industries,  so  many  classes  with  divergent 
interests,  yet  each  with  some  influence  on  the  government 
of  the  town ;  so  much  manufacture  is  carried  on  outside  the 


Chai\  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS.  103 

limits  of  towns,  so  much  trade,  also,  directed  from  outside ; 
moreover,  the  control  of  the  central  authority  representing 
the  interests  of  other  towns  and  districts  is  so  constant  and 
effectual,  that  it  would  he  absolutely  impossible  nowadays 
for  municipal  authorities  to  regulate  the  economic  affairs  of 
citizens  in  the  exclusive  interest  of  one  class.  But,  as  we 
have  seen,  that  was  both  possible  and  actually  effected  in 
the  English  towns  of  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries. 
In  each,  a  part  of  the  inhabitants  which  constantly  tended 
to  become  smaller,  the  “  burgesses  ”  proper,  held  alike  the 
government  of  the  town  and  the  monopoly  of  trade  to  and 
from  it.  What  is  true  of  England,  is  also  probably  true  of 
the  whole  of  western  Europe.  But  as  England  was  indus¬ 
trially  and  commercially  far  behind  other  lands,  foreign 
merchants  visited  this  country  and  carried  on  a  considerable 
trade  both  of  export  and  import,  at  a  time  when  few 
Englishmen  ventured  to  cross  the  sea.  This  trade  was  not 
carried  on  by  isolated  individuals:  just  as  the  merchants 
from  a  particular  town,  attending  a  distant  fair,  held  to¬ 
gether  and  occupied  neighbouring  booths,  so  the  merchants 
of  a  foreign  town,  coming  to  England,  clung  together,  and 
sought  privileges  to  be  enjoyed  in  common. 

This  fact  also  is  closely  connected  with  the  character 
of  municipal  government  at  the  time.  Nowadays,  to  a 
merchant  who  goes  from  Manchester  to  reside  in  a  foreign 
country,  there  is  no  particular  advantage  in  entering  into 
partnership  with  another  merchant  from  Manchester,  rather 
than  with  one  from  Bochdale;  the  custom-duties  he  will 
have  to  pay,  in  either  case,  will  be  the  same,  and  in  any 
difficulty  it  will  be  the  English  consul  to  whom  he  must 
appeal.  But  in  the  thirteenth  century  the  merchants  of, 
let  us  say,  Amiens,  residing  in  England,  formed  part  of  that 
body  of  burghers  that  governed  Amiens ;  they  were  regarded 


104 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


as  representing  the  interests  of  Amiens;  their  treatment 
depended  on  particular  treaties  with  or  conditions  granted 
to  Amiens ;  and,  in  any  difficulty,  it  was  to  the  magistrates 
of  Amiens  that  they  would  look  for  assistance. 

The  towns  of  Flanders  and  northern  France,  and  those 
of  northern  Germany  and  on  the  Khine,  were  able  to  carry 
out  an  arrangement  for  partially  remedying  the  defects  of 
such  a  system, — the  plan,  namely,  of  a  union  of  towns  for 
the  joint  protection  of  their  commerce ;  and  thus  arose  the 
two  Hanses,  the  Hanse  of  London  and  the  Teutonic  Hanse, 
of  which  we  shall  speak  later.  Their  efforts  must  not  be 
considered  as  directed  towards  the  creation  of  a  national 
trade,  towards  the  safeguarding  of  the  interests  of  France 
or  Germany,  as  such;  they  were  rather  alliances  of  the 
merchant  oligarchies  of  several  towns  for  their  mutual 
advantage ;  and  they  were  obstacles  rather  than  aids  to  the 
growth  of  nationalities. 

When  foreign  traders  arrived  at  an  English  port  they 
found  themselves  face  to  face  with  a  governing  body  of  the 
same  character  as  that  to  which  they  themselves  belonged  at 
home.  They  were  not,  indeed,  unwelcome ;  for  they  carried 
away  the  raw  produce  of  the  country,  wool,  woolfells,  and 
leather,  which  the  merchants  of  the  town  had  bought  at 
fair  or  market ;  and  they  brought  fine  cloth  from  Flanders, 
wine  from  Gascony,  and  other  wares,  which  the  town 
merchants  could  gain  profit  by  retailing.  But  they  were 
regarded  with  constant  suspicion,  lest  they  should  succeed 
in  what,  of  course,  they  were  ever  attempting,  viz.  in  break¬ 
ing  down  the  monopoly  of  the  English  merchants  themselves 
in  the  internal  trade.  Hence  we  find  them  subjected  to  a 
stringent  code  of  regulations,  drawn  up  and  enforced  by  the 
municipal  authorities.  They  must  buy  their  goods  only  of 
?<  burgesses ;  ”  they  must  sell  only  to  “  burgesses,”  and  that 


Chap.  IX.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


105 


only  on  market  days,  i.e.  in  full  publicity ;  they  must  not 
venture  on  retail  trade ;  they  must  not  go  inland  with  their 
goods;  and,  to  ensure  their- not  going  beyond  the  limits 
.  marked  out  for  them,  they  are  not  to  remain  in  this  country 
more  than  forty  days. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  things  at  the  date  of  Magna 
Carta.  Two  articles  of  the  Charter  provided  that  merchants 
should  have  safe  passage  to  and  from  England,  and  should 
be  free  from  exorbitant  customs.  This  was  but  a  vague  and 
indefinite  promise,  and  by  no  means  secured  freedom  of 
trade.  For  almost  a  century  the  English  burgesses  were  able 
to  maintain  their  exclusive  rights;  but  these  rights  were 
opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  great  nobles,123  who  thought 
that  by  dealing  directly  with  the  foreign  merchants,  and 
dispensing  with  the  English  middleman,  they  could  get  a 
better  price  for  the  produce  of  their  manors,  as  well  as  buy 
at  a  cheaper  rate  the  luxuries  from  foreign  countries.  The 
king,  himself  the  greatest  landowner  in  the  country,  could 
not  fail  to  share  these  views ;  with  the  additional  stimulus 
to  action  in  the  knowledge  that  the  foreign  merchants  were 
ready  to  pay  higher  duties,  and  so  add  very  considerably  to 
his  revenue,  if  only  they  were  given  larger  opportunities  for 
making  profit  themselves. 

No  direct  attempt  was  made  to  break  down  the  burgher 
monopoly  until  the  time  of  Edward  I.  During  the  long 
reign  of  Henry  III.,  however,  with  the  increase  of  the 
number  of  foreign  merchants,  especially  from  southern 
France  and  Italy,  came  a  slight  relaxation  of  the  restrictions 
to  , which  they  were  subject.  Instead  of  being  obliged  to 
reside  in  the  houses  of  citizens,  they  were  permitted  to  have 
warehouses  and  residences  of  their  own;124  and  it  became 
usual  for  the  king  to  grant  licenses  to  trade,  or  safe-conducts, 
to  whole  towns,  and  not,  as  before,  to  individual  merchants. 


10 6  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

In  1237,  indeed,  the  merchants  of  Amiens,  Corbie,  and 
Nesle, — three,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  most  important  towns  of 
the  Hanse  of  London, — were  fortunate  enough  to  secure 
from  the  merchants  of  London  a  relaxation  of  their  reg-ula- 
tions,  in  return  for  a  subscription  of  £100  “towards  making 
the  conduit  for  bringing  water  from  the  spring  of  Tyburn,” 
and  a  promise  to  pay  £50  three  times  a  year, — at  the  fairs 
of  S.  Ives,  of  Holland  (i.e.  S.  Botolph  at  Boston),  and  of 
Winchester.125  Henceforth  they  were  allowed  to  carry  any 
of  their  merchandise,  except  wine  and  corn,  to  any  place 
they  pleased  in  England,  to  trade  therewith  as  they  thought 
fit ;  while  of  the  merchandise  disposed  of  within  London  itself, 
woad,  garlic,  and  onions  could  be  sold  to  non-citizens. 

The  quarrel  between  Edward  I.  and  the  burgesses  of 
London  gave  the  king  his  opportunity.  For  fourteen  years 
(1285-1298)  the  privileges  of  London  were  in  the  hands  of 
the  king,  and  the  city  was  governed  by  wardens  of  his 
appointment.  The  natural  result  was  that  both  native 
artisans  and  foreign  merchants  profited  at  the  expense  of 
their  common  enemy.  It  was,  as  we  have  seen,  during  this 
period  that  the  London  weavers’  gild  was  finally  successful 
in  securing  its  privileges,  and  that  the  foreign  merchants  first 
ventured  to  remain  in  England  more  than  forty  days.  The 
Commons,  i.e.  the  English  merchant  class,  complained  in 
Parliament  that  “whereas  foreign  merchants  had  not  been 
wont  to  stay  more  than  forty  days,  during  which  they  used 
to  sell  to  natives  who  lived  by  the  profit  (i.e.  of  retailing),  now 
the  foreigners  themselves  carry  off  that  profit.” 126  As  soon 
as  the  Londoners  regained  their  powers  of  self-government 
they  renewed  and  re-inforced  the  ancient  restrictions.  But 
in  1303  Edward  was  ready  for  the  great  stroke,  which  for 
some  time  he  had  been  preparing.  In  that  year  he  granted 
to  the  foreigners  the  Carta  Mer catena,  wherein,  in  return  for 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS, 


107 


the  payment  of  additional  customs,  he  abolished  all  the 
previous  limitations  as  to  the  time  and  place  of  residence,  and 
as  to  the  persons  to  whom  goods  might  be  sold  ;  and  although 
of  the  retail  sale  of  most  articles  the  English  burgesses  were 
still  to  retain  a  monoply,  that  of  spiceries  and  merceries, — 
wares  of  increasing  importance, — was  especially  permitted  to 
the  foreigners.  At  the  same  time,  severe  penalties  were 
threatened  against  municipal  authorities  who  refused  to  do 
justice  to  a  foreigner ;  and  it  was  ordered  that  in  such  suits 
as  might  in  future  arise  between  natives  and  aliens,  one  half 
of  the  jury  should  consist  of  merchants  from  the  town  whence 
the  foreigner  in  question  came. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  follow  the  details  of  the  struggle 
which  occupied  the  next  fifty  years.  In  1309  the  burgess 
members  complained  in  Parliament  that  the  new  duties 
increased  the  prices  of  imported  goods  :  Edward  II.  thereupon 
removed  them  for  a  time,  to  see  if  this  really  was  the  case ; 
but  re-imposed  them  in  1310,  declaring  that  prices  had  not 
diminished  after  the  change.  Taking  advantage  of  the 
disputes  between  the  king  and  the  barons,  the  burgesses 
secured  the  abolition  of  the  new  custom-dues  by  the  ordi¬ 
nances  of  1311,  only  in  order  that  they  might  immediately 
put  into  force  the  old  restrictions  as  to  time  of  residence,  etc., 
on  the  ground  that  on  ceasing  to  pay  the  additional  imposts 
the  foreigners  lost  their  new  liberties.  Edward,  victorious 
over  the  barons  in  1322,  restored  the  foreign  merchants  to 
their  former  position ;  with  the  consequence  that  violent 
riots  took  place  in  London,  and  the  houses  of  the  Bardi  were 
sacked.  The  weak  Government  of  the  early  years  of  Edward 
III.  was  at  first  obliged  to  restore  to  the  towns  their  old 
privileges ;  but  bit  by  bit  they  were  gradually  put  aside :  in 
1335,  foreign  merchants  were  again  permitted  to  deal  with 
any  natives  they  pleased ;  in  1343  they  were  allowed  to  stay 


I08  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

more  than  forty  days,  on  condition  that  in  that  case  they 
should  become  liable  to  the  ordinary  taxation;  in  1351  they 
were  given  the  right  to  sell  by  retail;  and  in  1353  the 
additional  customs  imposed  in  1303  were  at  last  confirmed  by 
act  of  Parliament.  The  sequel  must  be  deferred  till  later. 

It  must  be  noticed,  in  order  fully  to  understand  the 
matter  at  issue,  that  the  burgesses  treated  the  merchants  of 
other  English  towns  in  much  the  same  way  as  they  treated 
foreigners.  Thus  we  meet  with  a  petition  from  the  merchants 
of  Southampton  that  merchants  coming  to  the  town  from 
Winchester  or  Salisbury  should  be  prohibited  from  buying 
from  any  save  burgesses ;  and  the  same  request  was  sent 
from  Lynn  with  regard  to  the  traders  of  Ely  and  Cambridge¬ 
shire.127  Other  instances  of  the  same  policy  of  monopoly  have 
been  already  given  in  describing  the  merchant  gild.  The 
word  foreigner ,  indeed,  is  used  for  any  non-burgess,  whether 
English  or  alien ;  and  it  is  sometimes  not  easy  to  determine 
which  is  meant.  Doubtless  there  was  always  a  certain  feel¬ 
ing  of  national  antagonism.  Yet  it  is  clear  that  foreign 
traders  were  hindered  and  watched,  not  so  much  because  they 
were  aliens,  as  because  they  were  not  burgesses  of  the  town 
to  which  they  came. 

The  inter-municipal  character  of  the  trading  relations  of 
the  time,  and  the  fact  that  the  civic  authority  treated  all 
other  towns  alike,  whether  they  were  English  or  foreign,  is 
illustrated  by  the  recently  printed  Calendar  of  Letters  from 
the  mayor  and  corporation  of  London  during  the  years 
1350-1370.  They  are  all  directed  to  the  magistrates  of  other 
towns,  and  almost  all  insist  on  the  payment  of  debts  alleged 
to  be  owing  to  Londoners.  The  same  phraseology  is  em¬ 
ployed  whether  the  letter  is  to  the  “  Mayor  and  Commonalty 
of  the  Town  of  Bristol,”  or  to  the  “  Chief-Executor  of  the 
Ordinance  of  Justice,  the  Priors  of  the  Arts,  and  Gonfalonier, 


Chap,  it]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS.  tC>9 

the  People  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Florence ;  ”  to 
Colchester,  Yarmouth,  Oxford,  or  to  Bruges,  Ghent,  or 
Dendermonde.  In  each  case  the  magistrates  of  the  town 
addressed  are  requested  to  cause  justice  to  be  done,  “  in  such 
manner  as  they  would  wish  their  folk  to  be  treated :  ” 128  or 
threatened  that,  if  the  debt  is  not  paid,  reprisal  will  be 
taken  upon  the  folk  of  that  town  repairing  to  London. 129 

§  14.  It  remains  now  only  to  speak  of  the  associations 
formed  by  the  foreign  merchants  and  of  the  organization 
which  the  English  merchants  themselves  received  in  the 
first  half  of  the  fourteenth  century.  Of  the  former,  the 
Hanse  of  London  and  the  Teutonic  Hanse  were  by  far 
the  most  important.  Flanders  and  the  north  of  France  were 
industrially  far  in  advance  both  of  England  and  of  the  rest 
of  northern  Europe :  and  the  wool,  needed  for  their  main 
industry,  cloth-making,  had  always  been  obtained  from 
England.  For  a  long  time  the  Low  Countries  furnished 
probably  by  far  the  most  considerable  number  of  traders 
visiting  England ;  and  the  towns  engaged  in  the  trade  are 
found,  in  the  early  part  of  the  thirteenth  century,  united  in  a 
league,  known  as  the  Hanse  of  London,  for  mutual  help.130 
But  its  members  had  other  objects  besides  the  maintenance 
of  freedom  of  trade  for  themselves  :  they  rigidly  excluded  all 
artisans  of  their  own  towns  from  either  buying  the  raw 
material  in  England,  or  selling  there  the  finished  produce ; 
and  there  are  many  signs  that  the  organization  strengthened 
the  hold  of  the  burgesses  on  the  government  of  their  towns. 
The  Hanse  of  London  at  one  time  included  as  many  as  seven¬ 
teen  towns,  among  them  all  those  in  Flanders  of  any  import¬ 
ance,  and  for  a  while  even  Chalons,  Eheims,  fc>.  Quentin, 
Cambray,  Amiens,  and  Beauvois.  It  lingered  on  until  the 
fifteenth  century,  but  it  had  long  fallen  into  the  background 
before  the  new  wealth  and  vigour  of  the  Teutonic  Hanse. 


no 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


The  first  German  town,  outside  the  Netherlands,  to  rise  to 
commercial  importance  was  Cologne,  which  in  manufactures, 
especially  in  the  manufacture  of  cloth,  was  far  in  advance  of 
the  rest  of  Germany.131  As  early  as  1157  we  find  mention,  in 
a  letter  of  protection,  of  the  hanse  of  the  men  of  Cologne  in 
London. 132  In  a  writ  of  Eichard  I.,  issued  at  Cologne  itself 
on  his  return  from  captivity  in  Austria,  they  were  granted 
permission  to  trade  over  the  whole  of  England,  especially  at 
the  fairs,  and  the  payment  of  two  shillings  yearly  “  for  their 
guildhall  in  London  ”  was  for  a  time  remitted.  The  mer¬ 
chants  from  all  other  German  towns  trading  in  England  found 
it  desirable  to  join  the  Cologne  Hanse.  This  arrangement 
did  not  present  any  difficulties  so  long  as  the  only  other 
towns  of  commercial  activity  were  those  of  western  Germany. 
But  early  in  the  thirteenth  century  the  towns  of  the  Baltic, 
chief  among  them  Liibeck,  began  to  rise  into  eminence,  owing 
largely  to  the  fact  that  the  Baltic  was  at  that  time  the  only 
home  of  the  herring.  The  efforts  of  Cologne  to  exclude  them 
from  trade  with  England  were  fruitless  :  they  were  granted 
a  safe  conduct  by  Henry  III.  in  1238 ;  in  1267  they  were 
permitted  to  form  a  separate  Hanse.  And  before  the  end  of 
the  thirteenth  century,  Liibeck,  which  by  its  alliance  with 
Hamburg  had  gained  the  entire  control  of  the  Baltic  trade, 
had  forced  Cologne  into  a  position  of  subordination,  and  the 
old  Hanse  of  Cologne  had  been  swallowed  up  in  the  Teutonic 
Hanse  under  Liibeck’s  presidency.133 

It  does  not  enter  into  our  present  purpose  to  show  how 
from  this  alliance  of  merchants  in  London  and  other  trading 
centres,  especially  Bruges,  Novgorod,  and  Bremen,  arose  an 
alliance  of  the  towns  from  which  they  came,  an  alliance  to 
which  the  struggle  against  Waldemar  III.  of  Denmark  (1361- 
1370)  gave  the  character  of  a  confederate  state.  We  have  at 
present  only  to  do  with  the  settlement  in  London.  It  is 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


Ill 


obvious  that  the  compact  organization  of  the  Hanseatic 
merchants, — the  facility  with  which  they  could  act,  and  be 
treated,  as  a  corporate  body, — must  have  powerfully  con¬ 
tributed  to  the  break-down  of  the  monopoly  of  the  English 
burgesses  in  the  internal  trade. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  society  at  the  Steelyard 
the  name  early  given  to  their  establishment  in  London  or. 
the  Thames*  side,  had  the  characteristics  as  it  were  of  a 
merchant  gild  within  a  fortress.  None  but  unmarried  men 
could  reside  there.  They  dined  together  in  a  common  hall, 
the  masters  at  a  high  table,  the  apprentices  below ;  their 
dwellings,  warehouses,  wharves,  and  gardens  were  surrounded 
by  a  strong  wall,  with  gates  which  were  closed  at  curfew. 
Every  master  had  his  own  suit  of  armour.134  Like  all  other 
gilds,  their  corporate  business  and  funds  were  managed  by  an 
alderman,  assistants,  and  a  council  chosen  by  themselves. 
Like  other  gilds,  also,  each  member  was  left  free  to  pursue 
his  own  interests :  trading  was  individual,  not  corporate,  yet 
within  limits  imposed  for  the  common  good. 

Down  to  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  the  export 
of  English  commodities, — wool,  woolfells,  leather,  tin,  and  lead, 
— was  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  foreign  merchants.  But 
about  that  time  we  begin  to  trace  the  growth  of  a  body  of 
English  merchants  exporting  English  products  to  foreign 
markets,  and  it  is  then  that  the  organization  known  as  the 
Staple  first  makes  its  appearance.  The  Staple,  in  its  primary 
meaning,  was  an  appointed  place  to  which  all  English  mer¬ 
chants  were  to  take  their  wool  and  other  “  staple  ”  commo¬ 
dities  for  sale.  Its  purpose  was  to  bring  merchants  so  closely 
together  that  trade  might  be  more  easily  regulated  and 
supervised ;  and,  especially,  in  order  that  the  custom  duties 
might  be  more  easily  levied.  The  institution  was  due  to 
royal  policy  and  initiative;  for  a  long  time  it  was  opposed 


ill  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  1. 

by  many  of  the  merchants.  We  cannot,  indeed,  help  seeing 
that  fiscal  motives  largely  prompted  the  various  regula¬ 
tions  ; 135  and  that  the  power  of  removing  the  staple  from  one 
foreign  town  or  state  to  another  was  valued  by  the  sovereigns 
as  a  useful  weapon  of  diplomacy.  Yet  the  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  foreign  trade  were  so  great  that  some  such  system  was 
necessary,  at  a  time  when  Englishmen  were  but  beginning  to 
venture  on  foreign  trade,  and  were  without  the  strength  which 
numbers  and  wealth  gave  to  the  Flemish  and  Hanse  merchants. 
As  late  as  1363  the  Commons  complained  of  the  injuries  done 
to  English  subjects  in  lands  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
king — injuries  which  he  was  therefore  unable  to  redress.136 

For  a  century  there  was  no  fixed  policy  as  to  the  town  in 
which  the  staple  should  be  placed.  Usually  it  was  in  Flanders, 
and  then  almost  always  at  Bruges;  but  political  considerations 
again  and  again  caused  it  to  be  removed  to  Brabant,  especially 
to  Antwerp.  The  ministers  in  the  minority  of  Edward  III., 
doubtless  under  pressure  from  the  English  merchants,  for  a 
time  removed  all  restrictions  as  to  place  of  sale ;  but  after 
a  few  years  the  staple  was  again  fixed  in  Flanders.  For 
some  years,  from  1353  onward,  the  plan  was  tried  of  estab¬ 
lishing  some  half  a  dozen  staple  towns  in  England,  and 
forcing  foreign  merchants  to  come  to  England  to  buy,  a  plan 
to  which  Bichard  II.  once  again  resorted.  The  conquest  of 
Calais,  however,  furnished  a  place  which  combined  the  advan¬ 
tage  of  being  abroad,  and  therefore  near  the  foreign  market, 
with  that  of  being  within  English  territory,  and  there  were 
some  obvious  political  reasons  for  favouring  the  new  posses¬ 
sion.  Accordingly,  after  the  staple  had  been  again  and  again 
placed  at  Calais  for  short  periods,  from  the  middle  of  the  reign 
of  Bichard  II.  it  became  fixed  there  permanently.  Whatever 
might  be  the  staple  town,  the  management  of  the  trade  was 
the  same.  In  each  place  there  were  mayors  of  the  staple, 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS.  1 13 

usually  two  in  number,  nominated  at  first  by  the  king  and 
later  elected  by  the  merchants  of  the  staple  themselves,  and 
there  was  a  certain  number  of  aldermen.  It  was  their  duty 
to  try  suits  which  arose  between  merchants,  by  “law 
merchant ;  ”  to  fix  prices  below  which  wool  and  other  wares 
were  not  to  be  sold  ;  and  to  see  that  the  royal  customs  were 
duly  paid.137 


1 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


1 14 


NOTES. 

1.  Seventy-nine  towns  that  can  be  identified  are  mentioned  in  the 
English  Chronicle  (see  list  in  App.  c.  to  Kemble,  Saxons  in  England ,  ii.), 
and  eighty  boroughs  appear  in  Domesday .  The  relative  importance  of 
the  towns  in  the  south  of  England  in  the  early  part  of  the  tenth  century 
may  be  roughly  estimated  according  to  the  number  of  moneyers  permitted 
to  them  by  the  law  of  Athelstan  (Schmid,  Gesetze  der  Angelsaclisen ,  140), 
viz.  to  London  8,  to  Canterbury  7  (owing  however  to  the  archbishop 
retaining  the  right  to  two  and  the  abbot  to  one),  to  Winchester  6,  to 
Rochester  3  (of  whom  one  depends  on  the  bishog);  to  Lewes,  South¬ 
ampton,  Wareham,  Shaftesbury,  Exeter,  2;  to  Hastings,  Chichester 
Dorchester,  1. 

2.  Cf.  Pearson,  Hist,  of  Engl .,  i.  381. 

3.  The  total  population  recorded  in  Domesday ,  according  to  Ellis,  is 
283,242 ;  but  there  are  considerable  omissions,  not  only  of  the  northern 
counties,  but  also  of  London  and  Winchester,  and  several  smaller  places, 
and  of  the  members  of  monastic  bodies  and  clergy.  If  we  take  the 
number  of  households  to  be  300,000,  and  multiply  by  4  to  get  the 
number  of  women  and  children,  we  should  arrive  at  a  total  population  of 
1,500,000.  This  estimate  is  probably  too  high,  for  as  late  as  the  end  of 
the  reign  of  Edward  III.  the  population  was,  at  most,  but  2,500,000; 
Rogers,  Six  Centuries ,  117-121.  The  number  of  Burgenses  recorded  in 
Domesday  is  7968;  but  in  the  time  of  the  Confessor  it  had  been 
17,105.  Allowing  8000  for  omissions,  we  should  have  a  total  of  25,000, 
which  multiplied  by  5  gives  125,000.  But  it  must  be  noticed  that 
“  burgensis  ”  means  only  a  full- citizen ;  there  was  probably  in  many 
towns  a  considerable  number  of  more  or  less  servile  inhabitants.  Thus  in 
Norwich  ( Domesday ,  ii.  116-118)  there  had  been  1320  “  burgenses ; ”  at 
the  time  of  the  survey  there  were  only  665  “  burgenses  anglici ;  ”  some  32 
“  burgenses  ”  had  gone  to  neighbouring  villages ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  new  borough  had  grown  up  in  which  there  were  36  French  and  6  English 
“  burgenses.”  But  in  addition  to  these  there  are  480  “  bordarii  qui  propter 
pauperiem  nullam  reddunt  consuetudinem.”  It  is  not  clear  whether  this 
is  to  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  there  had  always  been  a  population 
of  “  bordarii,”  or  whether  they  were  “  burgenses  ”  deprived  of  their  hold¬ 
ings.  In  the  former  case  they  would  form  a  third  of  the  population ;  and 
if  there  were  a  similar  condition  of  things  elsewhere,  we  should  have  to 
add  some  41,000  to  125,000,  producing  a  total  of  166,000  for  the  town 
population  in  its  most  flourishing  time  before  the  Conquest. 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS . 


US 


4.  Freeman,  Norman  Conquest,  v.  233. 

5.  See,  for  a  typical  example,  Freeman,  Cathedral  Church  of  Wells ,  3, 
143,  and  184,  n.  35. 

6.  See  Carlyle,  Past  and  Present ,  bk.  ii.,  ch.  v.,  for  the  difficulties  the 
-  Cellarer  of  S.  Edmundsbury  had  in  collecting  repselver.  Of.  the  case  of 

Cambridge,  where  “  burgenses  T.R.E.  accommodabant  vicecomiti  carrucas 
suas  ter  in  anno ;  modo  novem  vicibus  exiguntur ;  ”  Domesday ,  i.  189 ;  and 
Leicester,  where  certain  payments  originally  rendered  in  lieu  of  reaping 
were  given  up  by  the  Earl  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century ;  Thompson, 
Leicester ,  51. 

7.  Cf.  Turner,  Anglo-Saxons ,  iii.  114. 

8.  Green,  Conquest  of  England ,  440-452. 

9.  Turner,  113.  This  is  a  good  illustration  of  the  fact  that  trade,  as  an 
independent  occupation,  grew  up  first  in  the  service  of  luxury ;  cf.  Lexis 
in  Schonberg,  Bandbuch  d.  Politischen  Oehonomie ,  1021. 

10.  The  word  ceapman  occurs  only  three  times ;  Schmid,  Gesetze  der 
Angelsachsen ,  Glossar. 

11.  See  Freeman,  Norman  Conquest ,  v.  806. 

12.  See  Pearson,  381. 

13.  Gross,  Gilda  Mercatoria,  35.  The  town  charters  usually  contain 
some  such  clause  as,  “  Et  quod  nullus  qui  non  sit  de  gilda  ilia  mercandisam 
aliquam  faciat  in  predicta  civitate,  vel  in  suburbio,  nisi  de  voluntate 
eorundem  civium.,,  The  charter  of  Henry  II.  to  Oxford  runs,  “  Sciatis 
me  eoncessisse  .  .  .  civibus  meis  in  Oxenforde  omnes  libertates  .  .  .  quas 
habuerunt  tempore  regis  Henrici  avi  mei,  nominatim  gildam  suam  merca- 
toriam  .  .  .  ita  quod  aliquis  qui  non  sit  de  gildhalla  aliquam  mercaturam 
non  faciet  in  civitate  vel  suburbiis ;  ”  Stubbs,  Select  Charters ,  167. 

14.  Gross,  63.  See,  however,  now  infra ,  pt.  ii.  p.  44. 

15.  lb.y  53.  The  penalty  imposed  on  a  gild  brother  in  Stamford  for 
refusing  to  let  another  share  in  a  purchase  was,  “  He  shall  neither  buy  nor 
sell  in  that  year  except  victuals.” 

16.  lb.  Even  in  the  little  town  of  S.  Edmundsbury  the  members  of 
the  merchant  gild  demanded  payment  of  toll  from  all  non-members  selling 
in  the  market;  Chron.  Jocelin  de  Brahelond ,  74;  see  also  n.  27  below. 

17.  Thompson,  Hist,  of  Leicester,  30. 

18.  “Es  lasst  sich  nach  germanischen  Ideen  keine  Genossenschaft 
ohne  genossenschaftliche  Gerichtsbarkeit  denken ;  ”  Maurer,  Gesch.  der 
Stadleverfassung,  ii.  389. 

19.  The  actual  terms  used  are  morwenspeacli,  morgespreche,  morroiv- 
epeche ,  marwinspeche,  morrowspeche.  It  is  not  certain  whether  these  are 
to  be  interpreted  as  morning-speech  or  rnorroio-speech,  as  meetings  on  the 


1 1 6 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


morning  of  feast-days,  or  on  tlie  morrow  of  feast-days.  The  former 
interpretation  is  rendered  the  more  probable  by  such  modern  analogies 
as  college  “  chapter-days ;  ”  and  by  the  use  of  maneloquium  at  Andover ; 
Proofs  and  Illustrations ,  p.  10,  to  Gross’s  (forthcoming)  Gild  Merchant. 
Morgensprache  was  the  general  term  in  Germany ;  Maurer,  iii.  382. 

20.  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist. ,  i.  469  ;  Kemble,  Saxons ,  i.  511. 

21.  The 46  cnichten  on  Cantwareberig  of  ceapmannegilde  ”  appear  during 
Anselm’s  primacy  (1093-1109)  ;  Gross,  32,  n.  1. 

22.  Gross,  37,  seq. 

23.  This  is  in  the  well-known  passage  stating  that  under  certain  con¬ 
ditions  a  villein  remaining  in  a  town  for  a  year  and  a  day  became  free. 
But  it  will  be  noticed  that  Glanvill  only  says  this  is  the  case  when  the 
villein  obtained  the  full  rights  of  a  burgher;  and  we  shall  see  later,  that 
there  was  in  most  towns  a  considerable  body  of  inhabitants  who  were  not 
burgesses :  “  Si  quis  nativus  quiete  per  unum  annum  et  unum  diem  in  aliqua 
villa  privilegiata  manserit,  ita  quod  in  eorum  communam ,  scilicet  gilclam, 
tanquam  civis ,  receptus  fuerit ,  eo  ipso  a  villenagio  liberabitur  ;  ”  Select 
Charters ,  162.  The  rights  of  burgess  are  moreover  definitely  stated  in 
one  of  the  town  charters  to  be  conditional  on  the  possession  of  land  in 
the  town  :  “  Si  aliquis  nativus  alicujus  in  civitate  manserit,  et  terram  in 
ea  tenuerit  et  fuerit  in  gilda  et  hansa  et  scot  et  lot  cum  eisdem  civibus 
aostris  per  unum  annum  et  unum  diem,  deinceps  non  possit  repeti  a 
domino  suo  sed  in  eadem  civitate  liber  permaneat ;  ”  Gross,  35. 

24.  Gross,  Gilda  Mercatoria ,  46,  47.  Thompson,  Leicester ,  30,  seq. 

25.  This  was  in  1260  ;  Report  Hist.  MSS.  Commission ,  iii.  (1872),  342, 

26.  Thus  the  names  of  those  admitted  at  Leicester  include  a  carpenter, 
a  farrier,  a  miller,  a  baker  ;  Thompson,  54. 

27.  All  these  points  are  illustrated  by  the  rolls  of  Totnes,  Leicester, 
and  Southampton  (Davies,  Hist .,  140,  seq.).  Notice  especially  the  entry 
at  Totnes:  “Be  it  remembered  that  Bob.  Fina  was  put  upon  the  roll 
by  Lucy  his  wife,  so  long  as  the  said  Lucy  should  live  ;  and  if  he  should 
survive  her,  he  was  to  have  the  said  gild  until  such  time  as  he  should 
marry  again,  and  no  longer.”  On  the  other  hand,  the  statutes  of  South¬ 
ampton,  §§  9,  10,  limit  the  right  of  inheritance  to  a  seat  to  an  elder  son 
or  a  nephew  succeeding  to  his  uncle’s  property :  a  younger  son  must  pay 
ten  shillings,  and  a  man  cannot  obtain  a  seat  through  his  wife,  nor  by 
purchase  or  donation  from  a  member.  It  can  be  readily  understood  that 
at  a  considerable  port  a  small  number  of  merchants  might  easily  get 
control  of  the  gild,  and  make  membership  the  exclusive  right  of  a  certain 
number  of  families. 

28.  Thus,  in  the  Leicester  roll  of  1198,  it  is  added  after  the  names  of 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


II 7 


some  of  the  new  members,  “  Et  habet  sedem  patris ;  ”  Thompson,  Leicester , 

53.  There  is  an  entry  in  a  Totnes  roll,  “  Kobert  Fela  sits  below  the  seat  of 
Jordan  de  la  Stocke,  on  the  gift  of  the  said  Jordan,  the  fordele  (entrance- 
fee)  paid,”  and  written  above  is  the  note,  “  He  withdrew  and  surrendered 
-the  freedom  to  the  commonalty,  and  now  pays  toll.” 

29.  Southampton,  §  6  in  Davies,  Hist.  Southampton ,  140.  Hence  the 
odd  phrase,  “Bevre  (=  boire)  gilde  markande ;  ”  Gross,  49. 

30.  Thus  the  abbot  and  convent  of  Buckfastleigh  were  admitted  at 
Totnes,  in  1236.  Cf.  Ipswich,  in  Gross,  57. 

31.  See  the  second  quotation  in  n.  23  above.  In  an  Exchequer  roll  of 
John,  David  the  dyer  of  Carlisle  is  recorded  as  paying  a  mark  in  order 
that  the  messuage  which  he  has  in  Carlisle  may  be  a  burgage,  “  Et  quod 
ipse  habeat  easdem  Libertates  quas  alii  Burgenses  de  Kaerleolo ;  ”  Madox, 
Exchequer ,  278.  We  are  led  to  believe  that  the  possession  of  land  was 
the  condition  of  membership  even  where  the  language  of  charters  would 
seem  to  imply  the  opposite.  Thus  the  charter  of  Henry  II.  to  Lincoln 
says  that  if  a  man  dwell  for  a  year  and  a  day  in  Lincoln  unclaimed  “  et 
dederit  consuetudines,”  he  is  to  remain  in  peace  “  sicut  civis  meus ;  ” 
Select  Charters ,  166.  Yet  in  the  reign  of  John,  when  the  fullers  and  dyers 
of  Lincoln  complained  of  a  seizure  of  their  cloth  by  the  aldermen  and 
reeves,  claiming  the  right  of  dyeing  as  they  pleased  as  free  citizens  of 
Lincoln,  the  aldermen  and  reeves  declare  that  the  craftsmen  “  non  habent 
legem  vel  communiam  cum  liberis  civibus ;  ”  Placitorum  Abbreviatio 
(ed.  1811),  65;  Ashley,  English  Woollen  Industry ,  23.  Cf.  for  Flanders, 
Vanderkindere,  Le  Siecle  des  Artevelde ,  63. 

32.  E.g.  Thompson,  Leicester ,  51.  Swine  and  oxen  seem  to  have  been 
reared  within  the  city  of  London  far  into  the  thirteenth  century ;  Liber 
Albus ,  xli.-xlii. 

33.  E.g.  Berwick  Statutes,  §  20 ;  English  Gilds ,  312. 

34.  Gross,  55. 

35.  Ashley,  English  Woollen  Industry ,  19-24. 

36.  Thus  in  a  charter  of  Henry  II.  to  Chichester  :  “  Nullus  in  civilate 
Cicestr’  vendat  pannos  per  detaillum  nisi  sit  de  gilda  mercatoria ;  ”  Gross, 

54.  Among  the  “  customs  ”  of  Newcastle  (temp.  Henry  I.)  was  one  that 
none  save  a  burgess  could  buy,  make  (i.e.  finish),  or  cut  cloth  for  dyeing ; 
Select  Charters ,  112. 

37.  1261.  Thompson,  89. 

38.  Davies,  Southampton ,  140,  §  11 ;  for  Berwick,  Houard,  Cout  times 
Anglo-normandes ,  ii.  471,  §  12. 

39.  Davies,  §  24 ;  English  Gilds ,  345,  §  37. 

40.  Davies,  §  21 ;  Thompson,  78,  79. 


1 1 8 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


41.  This  is  especially  illustrated  by  the  documents  analyzed  in 
Thompson.  One  Roger  Alditch  gave  them  much  trouble.  He  was 
turned  out  of  the  gild  for  attaching  vermilion  cloth  of  a  low  quality  to 
a  piece  of  good  manufacture,  and  for  two  other  previous  offences ;  was  re¬ 
admitted  after  a  year  and  a  day  on  paying  a  fine  and  finding  sureties ; 
and  some  time  later  was  again  in  trouble  for  sending  to  a  purchaser 
worse  cloth  than  had  been  shown  when  the  bargain  was  made,  pp.  68,  77, 
81.  On  one  occasion  the  mayor  and  several  of  the  gild  brethren  were 
amerced  in  a  measure  of  ale  for  fraudulently  colouring  wool ;  p.  78. 

42.  These  are  illustrated  by  the  Berwick  and  Southampton  statutes. 
The  Berwick  provision  for  an  orphan  daughter  (§  10,  Houard,  ii.  471)  is 
amusing :  “  Si  quis  confratrum  nostrorum  Gildae  relinquat  post  obitum 
suum  filiam  ex  uxore  conjugata,  qui  sit  laudabilis  conversation^,  et  bonae 
famae,  et  non  habeat  de  proficiis  unde  sibi  providere  valeat  de  viro,  aut  si 
in  domo  religionis  caste  vivere  voluerit,  secundum  aestimationem  et  dis- 
positionem  aldermanni,  decani,  et  confratrum,  secundum  facultatates 
Gildae,  sibi  de  viro  vel  de  domo  religionis  provideatur The  clause  is 
headed,  “  De  relevatione  filiarum  Gildae.” 

43.  For  a  comparison  of  the  conditions  of  industry  under  what  have 
been  distinguished  as  the  family  system,  the  gild  system,  the  domestic 
system  and  the  factory  system,  see  Thun,  Die  Industrie  am  Niederrhein, 
ii.  246;  Held,  Zwei  Bucher  zur  Socialen  Geschichte  Englands ,  541;  and 
cf.  Ashley,  English  Woollen  Industry ,  71-75. 

44.  Wealth  of  Nations ,  bk.  iii.  ch.  i. 

45.  See  for  the  extreme  view  tracing  such  organizations  to  Roman 
constitutions,  Gasquet,  Freds  des  Institutions  de  VAncienne  France ,  ii. 
233-243. 

46.  This  is  the  view  taken  by  Brentano,  in  his  Essay  prefixed  to 
English  Gilds  (Early  Engl.  Text  Soc.);  and  shortly  restated  in  his 
Arbeiterverhaltniss  gemdss  dem  heutigen  Becht,  13-42. 

47.  Bp.  Stubbs  says  cautiously,  “  The  struggles  between  the  patrician 
burghers  of  the  merchant-guild,  and  the  plebeians  of  the  craft-guilds, 
which  mark  the  municipal  history  of  Germany,  have  no  exact  parallel  in 
England  ;  ”  Const.  Hist.,  i.  474  (Libr.  Ed.).  Mr.  Cunningham  more  boldly 
declares  that  “  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  of  oppression  by  the  richer 
classes,  or  of  artisan  opposition  to  them ;  ”  Formation  and  Decay  of  Craft 
Guilds  (Trans.  Boyal  Hist,  Soc.),  p.  11. 

48.  Ochenkowski,  Englands  Wirthscliaftliche  Entwickelung ,  55,  74-79. 

49.  See  n.  31  above.  Bp.  Stubbs  believes  that  “  the  merchant- guild 
contained  all  the  traders,  whether  or  no  they  possessed  an  estate  of  land ;  ” 
Const.  Hist.,  474  :  but  there  seems  no  evidence  for  so  general  a  proposition. 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


119 


50.  This  was  the  case  certainly  at  Winchester,  Marlborough,  and 
Beverley.  Liber  Custumarum  (Rolls’  Series),  60,  130,  1.  Cf.  the 
Flemish  towns  in  Warnkonig,  Hist,  de  Flandre  (trans.  Gheldolf),  ii.  208, 
seq.  506,  seq. ;  Gilliodts,  Inventaire  des  Archives  de  Bruges ,  iv.  272,  seq. 

51.  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist .,  iii.  608-610. 

52.  “  Bolengarii  debent  i.  marcam  et  vi.  uncias  auri ;  ”  Pipe  Boll ,  5 
Henry  II. ;  Madox,  Hist,  of  the  Exchequer ,  231. 

53.  Cf.  Ashley,  English  Woollen  Industry ,  13, 14. 

54.  Botulum  magnum  Pipae  (ed.  Record  Comm.,  1833),  144, 2, 109.  For 
the  Oxford  weavers  and  corvesars,  see  Boase,  Oxford ,  36,  37. 

55.  “Eo  tempore  quo  promissionem  dictae  marcae  auri  fecerant 
Tellarii  predicti  erant  numero  sexaginta  et  plures  in  villa  praedicta,  et 
ipsi  jam  ad  tantam  inopiam  devenerint  quod  vix  sint  numero  quin- 
decim;”  Madox,  Exchequer ,  232. 

56.  An  Inspeximus  of  Henry  III.,  printed  in  Archaeol.  Journal,  vi.  146, 
recites  a  charter  of  Henry  II.  confirming  the  rights  enjoyed  by  the  “  corver- 
sarii,”  in  the  time  of  Henry  I.,  “  Ita  quod  nullus  faciat  officium  eorum  in 
villa  de  Oxon’  nisi  sit  de  Gilda  ilia.” 

57.  The  Great  Bolls  of  the  Pipe ,  2-4,  Henry  II.  (ed.  1844),  39,  90,  153. 
For  York,  Close  Bolls  (ed.  1833),  i.  421. 

58.  Madox,  Exchequer ,  390.  I  have  borrowed  a  few  sentences  from 
my  paper  on  the  Woollen  Industry,  16,  seq. 

59.  “Sciatis  me  concessisse  Telariis  Londoniarum  Gildam  suam  in 
Londoniis  habendam  cum  omnibus  libertatibus  quas  habuerunt  tempore 
regis  Henrici  avi  mei ;  et  ita  quod  nullus  nisi  per  illos  se  intromittat  infra 
civitatem  de  eo  ministerio,  et  nisi  sit  de  eorum  Gilda ,  neque  in  Sudwerke 
neque  in  aliis  locis  Londoniis  pertinentibus ;  ”  Liber  Custumarum,  33. 
In  the  case  of  York  no  one  was  to  make  cloth  in  the  county  save  with  the 
consent  of  the  weavers  of  that  city ;  see  writ  of  Henry  III.  ordering  the 
sheriff  to  enforce  this  rule,  in  Close  Bolls ,  i.  421.  Cf.  note  56,  above. 

60.  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist.,  i.  701. 

61.  The  list  of  charters  in  the  Liber  Albus,  134  (vol.  i.  of  Nun.  Gildli.), 
mentions,  “  alia  charter  equidem  Joannis,  quod  Gilda  Telaria  non  sit  do 
cetero  in  civitato  Londoniarum,  nec  ullatenus  suscitetur :  ”  the  copy  in 
the  Liber  Custumarum  of  Henry  II.’s  charter  to  the  weavers  has  the 
joyful  heading,  “Quae  adnihilata  esfc  per  chartam  Regis  Joannis.  The 
Pipe  Boll  of  4  John  contains  the  entry,  “Cives  Londoniae  debent  lx. 
marcas  pro  Gilda  Telaria  delenda,  ita  ut  de  cetero  non  suscitetur;” 
Madox,  Exchequer ,  279. 

62.  Liber  Custumarum ,  Riley,  Introd.  lxiii. 

63.  See  notes  13,  36,  above. 


120 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


64.  60, 130, 131.  Riley,  Introd.  Ixi.  See  Engl.  Woollen  Industry ,  20-22. 

65.  “Ne  nul  franke  komme  ne  puet  estre  atteint  par  telier  ne  par 
fulour ;  ne  il  ne  poent  tesmoign  porter,”  in  almost  identical  words  in  eack 
case. 

66.  “  Ces  est  a  savoir,  qe  nul  telier  ne  nul  fuloun  ne  puet  drap  secchir 
ne  teindre,  ne  a  nul  marchandise  hors  de  la  ville  aller,”  at  Winchester 
and  Beverley.  “  II  ne  poent  a  nul  forein  lour  draps  vendre,  for3  as  mar- 
chauns  de  la  cite,”  at  Winchester. 

67.  The  necessity  of  obtaining  consent  is  mentioned  for  Oxford.  “Ne 
nulle  ne  puet  tistre  (tisser)  ne  overer  (ouvrer,  O.F.)  fors  as  prudeshommes 
de  la  vile,”  at  Marlborough. 

68.  Thompson,  Hist,  of  Leicester ,  84. 

69.  Statutes  of  the  Realm ,  i.  269. 

70.  Gross,  Gilda  Mercator ia,  87. 

71.  Liber  Custumarum ,  121, 126.  Nominally  the  mayor  had  the  right  to 
preside  over  the  weekly  court :  “  Et  si  le  meire  ne  y  soit,  il  deit  assigner 
quatre  prodeshommes  du  mester  jurez  ...  a  tenir  la  Court :  les  queux 
quatre  soient  chescun  an  remuables  a  la  volunte  du  mester,  et  deyvent 
estre  chescun  an  presentez  au  Meyre ;  ”  Art  3.  The  cognisance  of  the 
court  was  declared  to  extend  to  “  placita  debiti,  contractus,  conventionis, 
et  parvae  transgressionis  ”  by  a  jury  empanelled  in  14  Ed.  II. ;  ib.,  422. 

72.  List  in  Herbert,  Livery  Companies ,  34. 

73.  Freeman,  Exeter ,  168. 

74.  “Edward  I.  seems  to  have  encouraged  the  development  of  tho 
guild  jurisprudence,  and  may  have  been  induced  to  do  so  by  his  hostility 
to  the  magnates  of  the  commune  ;  ”  Stubbs,  Const .  Hist.,  iii.  618. 

75.  This  is  a  phrase  frequently  used ;  e.g .  Articles  of  the  Heaumers, 
or  Helmet-makers,  1347,  in  Riley,  Memorials  of  London ,  237.  From  the 
Articles  of  the  Pouch-makers,  1371,  ib .,  360,  it  would  seem  that  a  craft 
might  have  ordinances  not  authorized  by  the  municipal  authorities.  They 
pray  the  mayor  and  aldermen  “  whereas  they  have  some  Articles  of  their 
trade  before  you  enrolled ;  and  some  Articles  of  that  trade  which  are  very 
profitable  to  the  common  profit  of  the  people  are  not  as  yet  enrolled ,  it  will 
please  you  to  accept  these  Articles  to  be  enrolled.” 

76.  Ib.,  280,  358.  So  also  the  Forcer  (or  casket)  makers  pray,  in  1406, 
that  they  may  have  power  to  elect  two  wardens  annually,  because  “  divers 
folk  of  the  said  trade  ...  do  make  forcers  of  false  and  rotten  wood ;  ” 
ib.,  563. 

77.  E.g.  the  ordinance  of  the  Braelers,  or  Bracemakers,  in  1355, — “If 
any  one  shall  be  found  making  false  work,  let  the  same  work  be  brought 
before  the  mayor  and  aldermen,  and  before  them  let  it  be  adjudged  upon 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS \ 


1 2 1 


as  being  false  and  forfeited ;  and  let  such  person  go  bodily  to  prison ;  ” 
Memorials ,  278. 

78.  E.g.  the  Articles  of  the  Cutlers  in  1344, — “  As  to  all  those  of  the 
said  trade  who  do  not  wish  to  be  judged  by  the  wardens  of  the  trade  for 
the  time  being,  the  names  of  such  shall  be  presented  to  the  mayor  and 
aldermen,  and  by  them  they  shall  be  judged ;  ”  ib .,  218. 

79.  lb.,  242 ;  259  (evidence  of  the  wardens  accepted  as  to  false  salt¬ 
cellars)  ;  440,  §  7. 

80.  The  general  theory,  as  to  their  own  powers  over  the  crafts,  held  by  the 
municipal  authorities  was  stated  in  an  argument  presented  by  the  mayor 
and  aldermen  of  London  in  1583  against  a  patent  recently  granted  to  the 
Tallow-chandlers :  “  The  mayor  and  aldermen  of  the  city  and  all  other 
the  chief  governors  thereof,  and  their  predecessors,  always,  time  out  of 
mind,  had  and  used  to  have  the  view,  search,  and  direction  of  all  mysteries 
and  crafts  within  the  city,  for  and  concerning  all  manner  of  deceits  and 
defaults  in  all  things  touching  these  mysteries,  which  was  to  be  proved 
as  well  by  the  daily  usage  as  also  by  a  great  number  of  records  and  prece¬ 
dents  of  the  said  city ;  ”  Strype’s  Stowe ,  ed.  1720,  ii.  211 ;  Herbert,  Livery 
Companies ,  i.  47. 

81.  See,  among  many  other  examples,  Memorials ,  91, 118, 146, 178,  234, 
239. 

82.  Ib.,  233 ;  440,  §§  8,9. 

83.  lb.,  227,  bottom,  237,  245.  For  an  example  of  expulsion  for  absence 
without  reasonable  cause  from  the  annual  assembly  for  the  third  time, 
233 ;  for  v/orking  at  night  for  the  third  time,  239. 

84.  lb.,  217, 218,  227, 238,  242,  244.  That  it  was  only  beginning  to  be 
necessary  in  1347  is  shown  by  the  ordinance  of  the  White  Tawyers  (234), 
“  that  no  one  who  has  not  been  an  apprentice  and  has  not  finished  his 
term  of  apprenticeship  in  the  said  trade,  shall  be  made  free  of  the  same 
trade ;  unless  it  be  attested  by  the  overseers  for  the  time  being,  or  by  four 
persons  of  the  said  trade,  that  such  person  is  ab2e  and  sufficiently  skilled 
to  be  made  free  of  the  same.” 

85.  For  the  position  of  serving-men,  ib.,  219,  227,  238,  244.  The  ordi¬ 
nances  of  the  Bracemakers,  1355,  insist,  not  that  journeymen  shall  have 
served  an  apprenticeship,  but  that  they  shall  be  “  first  proved  and  assayed 
by  the  masters  of  the  same  trade  as  being  skilled  in  their  trade ;  ”  278. 

86.  The  Bowyers,  ib.,  348. 

87.  Ochenkowski,  110  n.,  135.  For  a  possible  exception  among  the 
Fishmongers,  see  Liber  Albus,  383. 

88.  Memorials,  121,  153,  259,  364. 

89.  lb.,  217,  226,  239,  243,  245.  Cf.  Ochenkowski,  73,  who  however 


122 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


mentions  one  exceptional  case,  that  of  the  Cappers,  whose  articles  contain 
the  clause,  “ Quod  nullus  eorum  operetur  de  nocte  sed  de  die:  et  pro  utilitate 
et  commoditate  pauperum  illius  officii  (craft),  cum  multi  sunt,  concessum 
est Liber  Custumarum ,  101,  §  4. 

90.  Memorials ,  218,  278,  307. 

91.  Ib .,  217,  278. 

92.  lb.,  232 ;  English  Gilds ,  179. 

93.  See  Engl.  Woollen  Industry ,  45-53,  75-84. 

94.  Cf.  Schonberg,  Zur  wirthschaf (lichen  Bedeutung  des  Deutschen 
Zunftwesens  (Hildebrand’s  Jalirbiicher ),  viii.  14.  Compare  modern  defini¬ 
tions  of  “  market”  in  Jevons,  Theory  of  P.  E.,  90,  and  Bagehot,  Economic 
Studies,  104. 

95.  Cf.  Schonberg,  30. 

96.  The  Cutlers  and  Bladesmiths  ask  in  1408  that  certain  rules  may  be 
enforced  “  for  preserving  the  character  of  the  two  trades ;  ”  Memorials , 
569. 

97.  “  It  is  the  general  rule  of  law  that  no  warranty  of  the  quality  of  a 
chattel  is  implied  by  the  mere  fact  of  sale.  The  rule  in  such  cases  is 
caveat  emptor ,  by  which  is  meant,*  that  when  the  buyer  has  required  no 
warranty  he  takes  the  risk  of  quality  upon  himself,  and  has  no  remedy  if 
he  chose  to  rely  on  the  bare  representation  of  the  vendor,  unless,  indeed, 
he  can  show  that  representation  to  be  fraudulent ;  ”  Benjamin,  On  Sale , 
G06. 

98.  Memorials ,  341. 

99.  Statutes  at  Large ,  ed.  1735,  i.  297. 

100.  Liber  Albus,  742.  Cf.  Woollen  Industry ,  56-58. 

101.  Memorials ,  341,  539. 

102.  Liber  Custumarum ,  Introd.  lviii.  lxv. 

103.  Hunt,  Bristol ,  52. 

104.  Cf.  Woollen  Industry ,  73,74. 

105.  Held,  Zwei  Bucher  zur  Socialen  Gescliichte  Englands ,  571. 

106.  Select  Charters,  474. 

107.  Chalmers,  Local  Government  (English  Citizen  Series),  134. 

108.  Memorials,  291. 

109.  Ninth  Report,  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.,  285. 

110.  Jusserand,  Vie  Nomade,  30,  31. 

111.  Rogers,  Six  Centuries  of  Work  and  Wages,  137. 

112.  Jusserand,  66. 

113.  Chronicon  Monasterii  de  Abingdon  (Rolls’  Series),  ii.  Preface, 
lxxv.-lxxix. 

114.  On  the  authority  of  Boase,  Oxford,  14. 


Chap.  II.]  MERCHANT  AND  CRAFT  GILDS. 


123 


115.  lb.,  57,  58. 

116.  Seo  Bogers,  Six  Centuries ,  149,  seq. 

117.  The  following  account  is  taken  from  Dean  Kitchin’s  valuable 
introduction  to  the  Charter  of  Edward  III.  for  S.  Giles ’  Fair,  1347, 
"  Winchester  Cathedral  Records ,  No.  2 , 1886. 

118.  “  Quod  corvesarii,  sutores,  vel  alii  operarii  sive  artifices  quicunque 
in  predicta  civitate  alibi  quam  in  eadem  feria  operationes  seu  opera  sua 
sub  forisfactura  eorundem  non  exercebunt  nec  vendere  possunt  nec  aliqui 
ea  emere  debent ;  ”  Charter  of  1347,  ed.  Kitchen,  38. 

119.  lb.,  54. 

120.  “  Omnia  placita  debitorum  inter  mercatores  quoscunque  durante 
feria  tenebuntur  et  totis  temporibus  retroactis  teneri  consueverunt  coram 
prefatis  Justiciariis  per  probationes  talliarum ,  secundum  legem  merca- 
toriam,  si  pars  querens  hoc  voluerit ;  ”  ib.,  32. 

121.  For  the  three  Oxford  fairs,  see  Boase,  71. 

122.  Statutes  of  the  Realm,  i.  260,  266. 

123.  “Bex  intendit,  quod  mercatores  extranei  sunt  ydonei  et  utiles 
magnatibus  et  non  habet  consilium  eos  expellandi ;  ”  Rot.  Pari.,  1.  55  ; 
quoted  in  Schanz,  Englische  Handelspolitik,  i.  390,  n. 

124.  Schanz,  i.  386. 

125.  Liber  Custumarum ,  64. 

126.  Rot.  Pari.,  i.  55 ;  qu.  Schanz,  i.  389,  n.  8. 

127.  Rot.  Pari.,  i.  87,  93;  qu.  Schanz,  i.  396,  n.  3. 

128.  Calendar  of  Letters  from  Mayor  and  Corporation  of  London,  p.  2 
(Colchester),  11  (Ghent),  11  (Bruges). 

129.  lb.,  2  (Florence),  17  (Gloucester),  et  passim. 

130.  The  first  mention  of  the  Hanse  of  London  is  in  a  charter  of 
Bruges,  1240,  Warnkoenig,  Histoire  de  Flandre,  trans.  Gheldolf,  ii.  207. 

131.  Schmoller,  Strassburger  Tucher  und  Weberzunft,  366. 

132.  Lappenberg,  Urkundliche  Geschiclite  des  Hansisclien  Stalilhofes  zu 
London,  bk.  2.  This  is  not  the  later  Steelyard ;  late  in  the  thirteenth 
century  the  guildhall  of  the  Cologne  merchants  and  that  of  the  Teutonic 
(i.e.  Baltic)  merchants  were  still  distinct ;  Biley,  Introd.  to  Liber  Albus, 
xcvi. 

133.  See  the  brief  history  of  the  Hanse,  by  Mr.  Lodge,  in  Ency.  Brit. 

134.  See  Pauli’s  article  in  Pictures  of  Old  England. 

135.  Ochenkowski,  Englands  Wirthschaftliche  Entwichelung ,  191,  195. 

136.  Cunningham,  Engl.  Industry,  178,  n.  2. 

137.  Ochenkowski,  187-201. 


CHAPTER  III 


ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION. 

[Authorities. — For  mediaeval  theories  as  to  property,  industry,  and 
trade,  and  the  duties  of  Christians  in  relation  to  them,  the  chief  authority 
is  the  Corpus  Juris  Canonici.  Many  of  the  rules  which  it  contains  were 
expressly  intended  for  the  guidance  of  ecclesiastical  courts  ;  but  at  least 
an  equally  large  part  of  its  contents  must  be  regarded  rather  as  the 
expression  of  opinion  than  as  law  which  could  actually  be  enforced.  But 
as  all  its  decisions,  whatever  may  have  been  their  original  source,  were 
confirmed  by  successive  pontiffs,  they  could  not  fail  to  influence  the  more 
conscientious  clergy  in  their  treatment  of  social  questions,  especially  in 
the  pulpit  and  confessional.  Of  the  Canon  Law  the  first  and  most  important 
half  was  made  up  of  the  Decretum  of  Gratian,  a  monk  of  Bologna,  who, 
inspired  by  the  revived  study  of  the  civil  jurisprudence,  aimed  at  putting 
together  a  body  of  ecclesiastical  law  derived  from  the  writings  of  the 
Fathers,  canons  of  councils,  Frankish  capitularies,  papal  letters  or  de¬ 
cretals,  and  penitentials,  which  should  bear  the  same  relation  to  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  jurisprudence  as  the  codification  of  Justinian  to  secular  jurisprudence. 
His  work,  composed  about  the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century,  contained 
no  papal  decisions  later  than  1139.  Accordingly  Gregory  IX.  issued,  in 
1234,  a  compilation  from  subsequent  decisions,  known  as  the  Decretals  of 
Gregory  IX.  ;  Boniface  VIII.  added  to  these,  in  1298,  the  Liber  Sextus  ;  and 
John  XXII.,  in  1317,  the  Clementinae .  During  the  fifteenth  century,  col¬ 
lections  of  decretals  omitted  from  the  Clementinae  or  issued  later,  were 
made  by  canonists;  and  two  such,  the  Extravagantes  Joannis  XXII.  and  the 
Extravagantes  Communes ,  were  admitted  to  equal  authority  with  the  earlier 
works,  by  being  published  with  them  by  Gregory  XIII.  in  1582.  For  a 
more  detailed  account  of  the  Canon  Law,  see  the  article  under  that  title  in 
the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  vol.  v.,  and  as  to  the  extent  to  which  the 
Canon  Law  was  received  in  England,  see  two  lectures  in  Stubbs,  Lectures 
on  Mediaeval  and  Modern  History  (188G),  and  the  criticism  of  them  in 
the  Dublin  Review,  October,  1887. 

The  best  modern  works  on  the  economic  doctrines  of  the  Canon  Law 
are  those  of  W.  Endemann,  Die  Nationalolconomischen  Grundsdtze  der 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 25 


Canonisiischen  Lehre ,  published  in  Hildebrand’s  Jalirhiicher  fur  National - 
okonomie ,  vol.  i.,  and  afterwards  separately  (1863),  and  Studien  in  der 
Romanisch-canonistischen  Wirthschafts  und  Rechtslehre  (vol.  i.,  1874 ;  vol.  ii., 
1883).  Invaluable  for  their  learning  and  completeness,  the  usefulness  of 
these  works  is  lessened  by  the  slight  attention  which  the  author  pays  to 
the  historical  development  of  the  teaching  he  is  criticizing.  He  is  too 
much  inclined  to  systematize,  and  follows  too  closely  the  canonists  of  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  especially  Scaccia,  in  the  reasons 
they  assign  to,  and  the  deductions  they  draw  from,  the  simple  prescriptions 
of  the  early  Canon  Law.  W.  Rosclier  has  a  very  brief  but  admirable  section 
on  the  Canon  Law  in  the  introduction  to  his  Geschichte  der  National - 
okonomik  in  Deutschland  (1874).  Mr.  Cunningham  is  the  only  English 
writer  who  has  called  attention  to  the  true  character  and  significance  of 
mediaeval  economic  ideas, — in  his  English  Industry  and  Commerce  (1882), 
§§  36,  43,  45,  and  Politics  and  Economics  (1885),  ch.  2 ;  and,  still  better, 
with  especial  regard  to  Usury,  in  a  paper,  City  Opinion  on  Banking  in  the 
Fourteenth  to  the  Seventeenth  Centuries ,  in  the  Journal  of  the  Institute  of 
Bankers ,  February,  1887.  His  Christian  Opinion  on  Usury  (1884)  is 
unfortunately  out  of  print.  But  long  before  other  writers  had  touched  the 
subject,  Karl  Knies,  in  the  half-dozen  pages  devoted  to  the  subject  in  his 
Politisclie  (Ekonomie  vom  Standpuncte  der  Geschichtliclien  Methode  (1853), 
had  gone  to  the  root  of  the  matter,  and  shown  the  relative  justification 
of  what  had  hitherto  been  ascribed  merely  to  “  ignorance  of  Political 
Economy”  (pp.  115-120  of  the  new  edition,  1883,  under  the  title  P.  E. 
vom  Geschichtliclien  Standpuncte').  The  teaching  of  Aquinas  has  been 
commented  on  by  several  modern  writers,  especially  by  Contzen  ;  but  it 
can  be  more  clearly  understood  from  the  Summa  Theologica  itself,  under 
Quaestiones ,  lxxvii.,  lxxviii.,  in  the  second  division  of  the  second  part. 
Some  useful  historical  information  on  Usury  is  given  by  Roscher  in  the 
notes  to  his  Political  Economy ,  bk.  iii.,  ch.  iv.,  §§  190,  191  (trans.  Lalor, 
Chicago,  1878  ;  ii.,  p.  128). 

There  is  no  good  account  of  early  legislation  on  economic  matters  :  the 
enactments  themselves  are  all  printed  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Statutes 
of  the  Realm ,  and  with  them  must  be  compared  the  municipal  regulations 
in  the  Munimenta  Gildhallae,  ed.  Riley  ;  and  the  ordinances  of  the  crafts, 
there  and  in  Riley’s  Memorials  of  London.  For  the  history  of  royal  policy 
with  regard  to  the  currency,  see  Keary,  Introd.  to  Catalogue  of  Eng. 
Coins  in  Brit.  Mus .,  I.  (1887),  and  Ruding,  Annals  of  the  Coinage  (3rd 
edit.,  1840),  and  for  foreign  trade,  Hubert  Hall,  The  Customs  Revenue  of 
England  (1885).  Most  of  the  authorities  referred  to  in  the  previous  chapter 
are  also  useful  here.] 


126 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


§15.  The  social  development  with  which  hitherto  we  have 
been  dealing  may,  in  a  sense,  be  called  spontaneous ;  we 
have  now  to  see  how  the  forces  of  Church  and  State  took 
hold  of  the  growing  society,  and  attempted  to  control  its 
activity.  The  nature  of  this  attempt,  however,  can  only  be 
understood  when  we  have  examined  the  ideas  by  which  it 
was  prompted. 

The  teaching  of  the  Gospel  as  to  worldly  goods  had  been 
unmistakable.  It  had  repeatedly  warned  men  against  the 
pursuit  of  wealth,  which  would  alienate  them  from  the 
service  of  God  and  choke  the  good  seed.  It  had  in  one 
striking  instance  associated  spiritual  perfection  with  the  sell¬ 
ing  of  all  that  a  man  had  that  he  might  give  it  to  the  poor. 
It  had  declared  the  poor  and  hungry  blessed,  and  had  pro¬ 
phesied  woes  to  the  rich.  Instead  of  anxious  thought  for  the 
food  and  raiment  of  the  morrow,  it  had  taught  trust  in  God  ; 
instead  of  selfish  appropriation  of  whatever  a  man  could 
obtain,  a  charity  which  gave  freely  to  all  who  asked.  And 
in  the  members  of  the  earliest  Christian  Church  it  presented 
an  example  of  men  who  gave  up  their  individual  possessions, 
and  had  all  things  in  common.1 

.  We  cannot  wonder  that,  with  such  lessons  before  them, 
a  salutary  reaction  from  the  self-seeking  of  the  pagan  world 
should  have  led  the  early  Christian  Fathers  to  totally  con¬ 
demn  the  pursuit  of  gain.  It  took  them  further — to  the 
denial  to  the  individual  of  the  right  to  do  what  he  liked 
with  his  own,  even  to  enjoy  in  luxury  the  wealth  he  pos¬ 
sessed.  “  What  injustice  is  there  in  my  diligently  preserving 
my  own,  so  long  as  I  do  not  invade  the  property  of  another  ?  ” 
44  Shameless  saying !  ”  says  S.  Ambrose.  “  My  own ,  sayest 
thou?  what  is  it?  from  what  secret  places  hast  thou 
brought  it  into  this  world?  When  thou  enterest  into  the 
light,  when  thou  earnest  from  thy  mother’s  womb,  what 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 27 


wealth  didst  thou  bring  with  thee?  .  .  .  That  which  is 
taken  by  thee,  beyond  what  would  suffice  to  thee,  is  taken 
by  violence.  Is  it  that  God  is  unjust,  in  not  distributing  to 
us  the  means  of  life  equally,  so  that  thou  shouldst  have  abun¬ 
dance  while  others  are  in  want  ?  Or  is  it  not  rather  that  He 
wished  to  confer  upon  thee‘marks  of  His  kindness,  while  He 
crowned  thy  fellow  with  the  virtue  of  patience.  Thou,  then, 
who  hast  received  the  gift  of  God,  thinkest  thou  thou  com- 
mittest  no  injustice  by  keeping  to  thyself  alone  what  would 
be  the  means  of  life  to  many  ?  ...  It  is  the  bread  of  the 
hungry  thou  keepest,  it  is  the  clothing  of  the  naked  thou 
lockest  up  ;  the  money  thou  buriest  is  the  redemption  of  the 
wretched.,,  2 

The  highest  moral  and  legal  philosophy  of  the  ancient 
world  strengthened  this  purely  religious  feeling,  by  bringing 
to  its  aid  the  doctrine  of  a  “  law  of  nature.”  Sir  Henry  Maine 
has  shown  how  this  conception  had  arisen,  and  how  it  had  in¬ 
fluenced  Eoman  law ;  he  has  pointed  out  how  that,  in  spite  of 
its  profound  influence  on  men’s  minds,  jurisconsults  were  by 
no  means  agreed,  either  as  to  whether  there  ever  had  been  a 
state  of  nature  in  the  past,  or  as  to  the  precise  tests  by  which 
to  distinguish  those  institutions  in  the  present  which  ac¬ 
corded  with  natural  law.  But  there  were  two  principles  on 
which  they  were  all  agreed,  and  which  they  succeeded  in 
impressing  upon  the  minds  of  educated  men  :  first,  that  the 
characteristics  of  nature  were  simplicity  and  similarity; 
and  secondly,  as  the  main  consequence  of  this,  that  all  men 
were  by  nature  equal.3  Christian  writers  and  preachers 
drew  from  these  principles  a  conclusion  which  the  lawyers 
seem  to  have  carefully  avoided, — the  conclusion  that  private 
property  was  contrary  to  nature.  Hence  it  was  that,  while 
the  ecclesiastical  law  of  the  later  Middle  Ages,  the  Corpus 
Juris  Canonici ,  began  by  distinguishing  natural  law  from 


123 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


civil  law  in  almost  the  very  words  of  Justinian’s  Institutes,  it 
went  on  to  add  to  marriage  and  the  nurture  of  children,  which 
are  the  only  definite  examples  of  natural  law  there  given, 
community  of  goods,  and  personal  liberty.4  “  The  use  of  all 
that  is  in  the  world,”  says  Clement,  “  ought  to  be  common  to 
all  men.  But  by  injustice  one  man  has  called  this  his  own, 
another  that,  and  thus  has  come  division  among  mortals.” 6 

This  view  as  to  tbe  origin  of  property  gave  Christian 
moralists  a  philosophical  basis  for  their  teaching.  To  seek 
to  enrich  one’s-self  was  not  simply,  they  could  argue,  to  incur 
spiritual  risk  to  one’s  own  soul ;  it  was  in  itself  unjust,  since 
it  aimed  at  appropriating  an  unfair  share  of  what  God  had 
intended  for  the  common  use  of  men.  If  a  man  possessed 
more  than  he  needed,  he  was  bound  to  give  his  superfluity 
to  the  poor ;  for  by  natural  law  he  had  no  personal  right  to 
it;  he  was  only  a  steward  for  God.  And  with  Christian 
teachers  such  injunctions  were  no  longer  mere  philosophical 
deductions:  they  came  with  all  the  weight  of  practical 
precepts,  pointing  to  duties  to  be  observed  and  sins  to  be 
avoided  on  pain  of  punishment  in  another  world.6 

If,  however,  to  seek  to  enrich  one’s-self  was  sinful,  was 
trade  itself  justifiable  ?  This  was  a  question  which  troubled 
many  consciences  during  the  Middle  Ages.  On  the  one  hand 
the  benefits  which  trade  conferred  on  society  could  not  be 
altogether  overlooked,  nor  the  fact  that  with  many  traders 
the  object  was  only  to  obtain  what  sufficed  for  their  own 
maintenance.  On  the  other  hand  they  saw  that  trade  was 
usually  carried  on  by  men  who  had  enough  already,  and 
whose  chief  object  was  their  own  gain  :  “  If  covetousness  is 
removed,”  argues  Tertullian,  “  there  is  no  reason  for  gain, 
and,  if  there  is  no  reason  for  gain,  there  is  no  need  of  trade.” 1 
Moreover,  as  the  trader  did  not  seem  himself  to  add  to  the 
value  of  his  wares,  if  he  gained  more  for  them  than  he 


Chaf.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 29 


had  paid,  his  gain,  said  S.  Jerome,  must  be  another’s  loss ; 
and,  in  any  case,  trade  was  dangerous  to  the  soul,  since  it 
was  scarcely  possible  for  a  merchant  not  sometimes  to  act 
deceitfully.8 

To  all  these  reasons  was  added,  by  many  of  the  more 
saintly  churchmen,  yet  another,  which,  had  it  been  listened 
to,  would  have  put  an  end  to  secular  activity  altogether. 
The  thought  of  the  supreme  importance  of  saving  the 
individual  soul,  and  of  communion  with  God,  drove 
thousands  into  the  hermit  life  of  the  wilderness,  or  into 
monasteries ;  and  it  led  even  such  a  man  as  Augustine  to 
say  that  “  business  ”  was  in  itself  an  evil,  for  “  it  turns  men 
from  seeking  true  rest,  which  is  God.” 9  It  needed  no  little 
courage  for  more  sober  churchmen,  such  as  Leo  the  Great,  to 
reply  that  it  is  the  way  in  which  a  man  carries  on  his  trade 
that  determines  whether  it  is  good  or  bad,  since  gain  may  be 
honourable  as  well  as  dishonourable.10  Yet  there  were  valid 
reasons  for  treating  clergy  and  laity  differently ;  and  accord¬ 
ingly  ecclesiastical  legislation  early  prohibited  the  clergy 
from  engaging  in  trade ;  if  they  must  needs  turn  their  atten¬ 
tion  from ,  divine  duties  in  order  to  provide  food  and  clothing 
for  themselves,  it  should  be  to  agriculture  or  handicraft ;  in 
these,  at  any  rate,  they  would  produce  some  useful  thing,  and 
they  vrould  be  free  from  the  temptations  which  commerce 
would  put  in  their  way.11 

Such  was  the  general  character  of  the  teaching  of  the 
Church  on  economic  matters  during  the  early  Middle  Ages. 
It  would  be  unprofitable  here  to  consider  how  far  such  teach¬ 
ing  might  be  beneficial  or  hurtful  under  modern  circum¬ 
stances  ;  nor,  since  we  are  now  dealing  only  with  the  social 
history  of  the  eleventh  and  succeeding  centuries,  need  we 
consider  whether  it  was  altogether  justified  in  the  age  when 
it  was  first  urged  upon  men’s  consciences.  Certainly  the 

K 


130 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


condition  of  western  Europe  long  after  the  establishment  of 
the  Teutonic  kingdoms  was  such  that  it  could  do  but  little 
harm,  and  probably  did  great  good.  It  could  do  little  harm, 
because  there  was  scarcely  any  commerce,  and  such  commerce 
as  there  was  was  directed  to  the  supply  of  articles  of  luxury 
for  princes  and  nobles.  The  condemnation  of  trade  there¬ 
fore,  if  indeed  the  clergy  continued  to  repeat  it,  might  weigh 
hardly  upon  individuals,  but  did  not  impede  any  useful 
circulation  of  goods.  And  by  stimulating  the  clergy  to 
rebuke  the  greed  and  violence  of  the  powerful,  by  creating 
a  public  opinion  on  the  side  of  contentment  and  charity, 
the  teaching  of  the  Church  on  worldly  goods  could  not  fail 
to  be  beneficial.12 

In  the  eleventh  century  began  a  great  moving  of  the 
stagnant  waters.  The  growth  of  towns,  the  formation  of  mer¬ 
chant  bodies,  the  establishment  of  markets, — even  if  they  did 
no  more  than  furnish  the  peasant  and  the  lord  of  the  manor 
with  a  demand  for  their  surplus  produce,  brought  men  face  to 
face  with  one  another  as  buyer  and  seller  in  a  way  they  had 
not  been  before.  But  they  did  more ;  they  prepared  the  way 
for  the  growth  of  a  new  class,  a  class  of  craftsmen,  who  could 
exist  only  on  condition  that  they  wrere  able  to  sell  their 
manufactures.  At  the  same  time,  new  needs  for  money 
appeared  both  in  the  crusades  and  in  the  passion  for  church¬ 
building,  which  the  religious  revival  of  the  tenth  century 
brought  with  it.  Hence  economic  questions,  especially  such 
as  concerned  the  relations  of  seller  and  buyer,  of  creditor  and 
debtor,  became  of  the  first  importance. 

To  deal  with  these  new  questions  a  new  jurisprudence 
presented  itself, — the  jurisprudence  based  on  the  revived 
study  of  Roman  law,  which  can  be  traced  in  Italy  towards 
the  end  of  the  eleventh  century,  and  which  found  a  centre 
for  itself  in  Bologna.  The  teaching  of  the  founder  of  the 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 3 1 


Bolognese  school  of  “  glossators,”  Irnerius,  and  of  his  succes¬ 
sors  “  the  four  doctors,”  attracted  crowds  of  pupils  ;  knowledge 
of  Roman  law  became  so  profitable  that  the  study  of  theology 
was  almost  abandoned,  and  council  after  council  in  the  twelfth 
century  had  to  prohibit  the  study  of  secular  law  to  the 
clergy.13  Now,  the  Roman  law,  in  the  finished  form  in  which 
the  codification  of  Justinian  presented  it,  rested  on  a  theory 
of  absolute  individual  property  which  was  entirely  alien  to 
the  usages  of  early  Teutonic  peoples,  among  whom  community 
of  ownership,  or  at  any  rate  community  in  use,  was  still  a 
prevalent  custom ;  and  it  recognized  an  unlimited  freedom 
of  contract,  which  may  have  been  suitable  to  the  active  com¬ 
merce  of  the  Mediterranean,  but  was  sure  to  be  the  instru¬ 
ment  of  injustice  when  appealed  to  in  the  midst  of  more 
primitive  social  conditions.14 

These  considerations  are  scarcely  weakened,  in  the  case  of 
England,  by  the  customary  statement  that  Roman  law  was 
never  recognized  in  this  country.  If  not  actually  quoted 
from  the  bench,  it  was  always  in  the  minds  of  lawyers  for 
guidance  or  comparison.  Stephen’s  order  did  not  succeed  in 
putting  an  end  to  the  study  of  civil  law  which  ’Vacarius 
introduced  at  Oxford.15  The  writers  of  text-books,  such  as 
Bracton,  made  large  use  of  the  civil  law,  and  the  judges  of 
the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries,  there  can  be  little  doubt, 
frequently  consulted  it  for  principles  to  guide  their  decisions.16 
Maritime  law  also  was,  as  we  know,  largely  borrowed  from 
the  Roman  jurisprudence ;  and  this  was  so  intimately  bound 
up  with  the  interests  of  the  mercantile  community  that  we 
cannot  suppose  other  questions  arising  from  trade  to  have 
been  unaffected  by  it. 

With  these  new  dangers  before  them,  churchmen  began 
once  more  to  turn  their  attention  to  economic  matters,  and  to 
meet  what  they  regarded  as  the  evil  tendencies  of  the  Roman 


132 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


law,  “  the  principle  of  the  world,”  by  a  fresh  application  of 
Christian  principles.  On  two  doctrines  especially  did  they 
insist, — that  wares  should  be  sold  at  a  just  price,  and  that 
the  taking  of  interest  was  sinful.  They  enforced  them  from 
the  pulpit,  in  the  confessional,  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts ; 
and  we  shall  find  that  by  the  time  that  the  period  begins  of 
legislative  activity  on  the  part  of  the  secular  power,  these 
two  rules  had  been  so  impressed  on  the  consciences  of  men 
that  Parliament,  municipality,  and  gild  endeavoured  of  their 
own  motion  to  secure  obedience  to  them. 

§  16.  What  Christian  morality,  as  represented  by'its  highest 
teachers,  aimed  at  was  not  merely  the  prevention  of  obvious 
injustice  or  deceit,  but  the  fulfilment  of  the  law  of  Christ, 
“  Whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do  ye 
also  unto  them.” 17  In  nothing  was  the  contrast  between 
this  precept  and  the  conduct  sanctioned  by  the  civil  law 
more  evident  than  in  purchase  and  sale.  Was  a  man  to  be 
satisfied  with  his  conduct,  if,  in  selling  an  article,  he  got  the 
highest  price  a  purchaser  was  willing  to  pay,  so  long  only  as 
he  did  not  fraudulently  mislead  him  as  to  the  character  of 
the  ware ;  or  was  he  to  aim  at  some  standard  of  fair  price, 
such  as  he  himself  would  be  willing  to  abide  by  if  he  were 
himself  a  purchaser  ?  The  principle  recognized  by  the  Roman 
law  had  been  that  price  was  entirely  a  matter  to  be  deter¬ 
mined  by  free  contract.  It  left  the  two  contracting  parties 
entirely  free  to  agree  upon  a  price  at  their  own  risk,  subject 
only  to  the  limitation  that  the  seller  was  bound  to  reveal 
faults  interfering  with  the  proper  enjoyment  of  the  thing  sold. 
This  was  stated  very  clearly  by  the  legist  Paulus,  early  in  the 
third  century :  “  In  buying  and  selling,  a  man  has  a  natural 
right  to  purchase  for  a  small  price  that  which  is  really  more 
valuable,  and  to  sell  at  a  high  price  that  wrhich  is  less  valuable, 
and  each  may  seek  to  overreach  the  other.”  The  last  clause  but 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 33 


echoes  the  dictum  of  Pomponius,  a  legist  of  the  previous 
century:  “In  purchase  and  sale  it  is  naturally  allowed  to 
the  contracting  parties  to  try  to  overreach  one  another.” 

Both  these  utterances  were  quoted  as  authoritative  in 
Justinian’s  digest.18  And  it  is  very  noticeable  that  the  one 
limitation  admitted  by  Roman  law  to  the  application  of  this 
principle,  a  limitation  introduced  by  a  rescript  of  Diocletian, 
aimed  only  at  protecting  the  seller.  It  was  enacted  that 
when  a  thing  was  sold  for  less  than  half  its  value,  the  seller 
could  recover  the  property  unless  the  buyer  chose  to  make  up 
the  price  to  the  full  amount.  It  was,  indeed,  contended  by 
many  later  jurists  that  this  applied  only  to  land,  because  the 
instance  actually  given  in  the  rescript  is  a  farm ;  and  it 
seems  probable  that  it  was  intended  to  meet  a  special  need, 
to  remedy  injustice  caused  by  forced  sale.19  It  is  referred 
to  by  the  Fathers  as  showing  that  even  the  civil  law  limited 
freedom  of  contract  in  an  extreme  case;  but  this  scarcely 
weakened  the  impression  which  the  civil  law  produced,  that 
buyer  and  seller  were  free  to  make  what  bargain  they  could. 
Against  this  the  Church  held  out  the  opposite  ideal,  that  of 
“  a  just  price  ”  unaffected  by  the  temporary  caprice  or  need  of 
either  party.  The  phrase  itself  seems  to  occur  first  in 
S.  Augustine  of  Hippo,  and  he  illustrates  it  by  what  to 
moderns  will  seem  an  extreme  example :  “  I  know  a  man 
who,  when  a  manuscript  was  offered  him  for  purchase,  and  he 
saw  that  the  vendor  was  ignorant  of  its  value,  gave  the  man 
the  just  price  though  he  did  not  expect  it.”  20 

We  shall  understand  better  how  the  doctrine  was  taken 
hold  of  and  developed  by  the  theologians  and  canonists  of 
the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries,  if,  instead  of  attempt¬ 
ing  to  draw  out  from  their  writings  a  number  of  abstract 
propositions,  we  try  to  follow  the  argument  of  the  greatest 
of  all  the  mediaeval  schoolmen,  S.  Thomas  Aquinas;  who, 


134 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


in  this,  as  in  all  the  speculation  of  his  time,  both  summed 
up  the  teaching  of  his  predecessors,  and  gave  a  foundation 
for  subsequent  construction.  There  is,  indeed,  no  reason 
to  suppose  that  Aquinas  took  any  special  interest  in  the 
economic  side  of  life.  His  reason  for  dealing  with  it  evi¬ 
dently  was  that  his  object  and  method  was  encyclopaedic, 
aiming  at  surveying  the  whole  field  of  thought.  But  it 
is  worth  while  noticing  both  how  wide  his  experience  had 
been  and  how  great  his  reputation  soon  became.  Born  about 
1225,  of  a  noble  family  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  he  became, 
when  a  mere  boy,  a  member  of  the  preaching  order  of 
Dominicans,  studied  at  Cologne  and  Paris,  for  many  years 
taught  at  Paris,  taking  his  share  in  the  struggle  between 
the  University  and  the  Friars,  and  finally  returned  to  Italy, 
to  work  for  eight  years  at  his  encyclopsedia,  the  Samma 
Theologica ,  and  to  die  in  1274.  Even  before  his  death  he 
had  been  recognized  as  the  greatest  of  theological  teachers ; 
and  he  soon  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  typical  representa¬ 
tive  of  theology,  of  intellect  applied  to  the  service  of  Chris¬ 
tian  truth.  His  position  in  mediaeval  thought  is  illustrated 
by  the  well-known  picture,  ascribed  to  Taddeo  Gaddi,  in  the 
church  of  S.  Maria  Novella,  in  Florence :  there  the  grave 
square-browed  figure  of  Aquinas  is  high  and  lifted  up  upon 
a  throne;  supporting  him  on  either  side  are  the  sacred  and 
profane  sciences,  each  with  its  best  representative  among 
men ;  while  beneath  his  footstool  are  the  arch-heretics, 
Arius,  Sabellius,  Averrhoes. 

Aquinas  had  been  discussing  the  intellectual  and  moral 
virtues :  he  had  come  to  justice ,  which  he  defines  as  “  the 
perpetual  and  constant  will  of  giving  to  every  one  that  which 
is  his  right;”  and  this  brings  him  to  the  subject  of  trade. 
And  the  first  question  he  puts  is,  whether  it  is  allowable  to  sell 
a  thing  for  more  than  it  is  worth.  His  method  usually  is  first  to 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 35 

give  the  arguments  against  the  proposition  that  he  intends 
himself  to  prove ;  then  some  crushing  dictum  against  these 
arguments,  from  the  Bible,  or  out  of  the  Fathers ;  then  the 
-conclusion  of  the  writer,  with  the  reasons  by  which  he  sup¬ 
ports  it ;  and  then  a  careful  disproof,  one  after  the  other,  of 
the  arguments  which  he  had  begun  by  quoting.  And  so 
here  he  begins  by  stating  various  reasons  which  might  be 
alleged  for  supposing  that  a  man  can  rightfully  sell  a  thing 
for  more  than  it  is  worth.  In  the  first  place,  “justice  ”  is 
that  which  is  according  to  the  civil  law ;  and  the  civil  law 
permits  buyer  and  seller  to  try  to  outwit  one  another.21 
The  authority  of  the  Boman  law,  we  see,  is  put  in  the 
forefront  of  the  argument.  The  next  argument  is  also 
one  that  might  be  expected  from  a  lawyer :  it  rests  on  an 
appeal  to  “  nature :  ”  every  one  wishes  to  buy  cheap  and 
sell  dear ;  but  what  is  common  to  all  must  be  natural,  and 
what  is  natural  cannot  be  a  sin.  The  third  reason  assigned 
is  sophistical :  if  you  accept  a  gift  from  a  friend  and  feel 
bound  to  give  something  in  return,  what  you  give  should 
be  in  proportion  to  the  benefit  you  have  received,  which  is 
sometimes  greater  than  the  intrinsic  worth  of  the  gift  itself ; 
and  if  you  can  thus  in  friendship  give  more  for  a  thing  than 
it  is  worth,  surely  you  can  by  a  contract  of  sale. 

But  all  these  arguments  are  clearly  opposed  to  the  words 
of  the  gospel :  “  Whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do 
unto  you,  do  ye  also  unto  them.”  For  no  one  likes  to  pay 
more  for  a  thing  than  it  is  worth,  therefore  no  one  ought  to  j 
take  more  for  a  thing  than  it  is  worth.  Aquinas’s  own  deci¬ 
sion  is  that  to  buy  a  thing  for  less  or  sell  a  thing  for  more 
than  its  value  is,  in  itself,  unallowable  and  unjust,  though 
special  circumstances  may  sometimes  make  it  permissible. 
His  reason  both  for  the  decision  and  the  exception  he  thus 
states.  We  may  put  on  one  side  cases  in  which  there  is 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  t 


136 

positive  deception :  they  are  clearly  sinful.  But  the  very 
institution  of  selling  and  buying  wares  must  have  been 
introduced  for  the  common  advantage  of  mankind.  If  that  is 
so,  it  ought  to  be  for  the  equal  advantage  of  both  parties. 
And  this  can  only  be,  if  each  gets  an  equal  value.  And  they 
do  not  get  an  equal  value  if  the  price  one  obtains  is  really 
more  than  the  article  sold  is  worth. 

But  suppose  one  man  wants  a  thing  greatly,  but  its 
possessor  will  suffer  by  giving  it  up,  a  price  may  justly  be 
arranged  above  the  real  value  so  as  to  compensate  for  the  hurt. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  seller  incurs  no  special  hurt,  but 
the  buyer  will  suffer  if  he  goes  without  it,  the  seller  has  no 
right  to  charge  more  highly  for  it  on  that  account;  the  hurt  is 
not  his  to  reckon  for.  The  buyer  under  these  circumstances 
may,  indeed,  from  good  feeling  give  something  over  and 
above  the  value,  but  this  is  to  be  decided  by  his  own  free  will. 

Then  Aquinas  turns  back  and  answers  the  arguments 
which  he  began  by  quoting.  First,  as  to  that  based  on  the 
Roman  law.  Human  law  cannot  prohibit  all  that  is  against 
virtue,  it  can  only  prohibit  what  would  break  up  society. 
Other  wrong  acts  it  treats  as  quasi-lawful,  in  the  sense  that, 
while  not  approving  them,  it  does  not  punish  them.  But 
Divine  law  leaves  nothing  unpunished  that  is  contrary  to 
virtue,  and  prescribes  in  sales  equal  justice.  The  second  he 
meets  by  denying  that  a  vice  is  made  less  a  vice  by  being 
common  to  all :  “  common,”  that  is  to  say,  “  to  all  who  go 
along  the  broad  road.”  And  here  he  quotes  what  Augustine 
says  of  “just”  price.  As  to  the  third,  commercial  justice  is 
a  different  thing  from  friendship — in  the  former  it  is  equality 
in  the  thing  itself  that  is  required,  in  the  latter  equality  in 
the  advantage  each  obtains :  an  answer  which  is  as  sophistical 
as  the  argument  it  meets.22 

Thus,  then,  Aquinas  meets  arguments  derived  from  the 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 37 


civil  law  or  from  a  supposed  “  nature,”  by  the  gospel  precept, 
which  he  confirms  by  an  argument  based  on  the  common 
weal  and  the  equal  rights  of  every  man.  And  throughout 
he  assumes  that  everything  has  one  definite  “just  price,”  or 
“what  it  is  worth,”  and  that  this  can  be  pretty  accurately 
ascertained. 

Such  a  treatment  of  the  subject  is  sure  to  seem  irritatingly 
vague  and  unsatisfactory  to  one  who  approaches  it  with  his 
mind  filled  with  recent  discussions  on  Yalue.  Modern 
economists,  beginning  with  a  definition  of  the  subject-matter 
of  their  science,  wealth,  as  that  which  has  exchange  value, 
have  believed  themselves  bound  to  enter  into  metaphysical 
and  philological  disquisitions  as  to  what  value  really  is,  and 
the  laws  by  which  it  is  determined.  Forty  years  ago  they 
seemed  to  have  come  to  the  end  of  their  task,  and  J.  S.  Mill 
declared  that  “  there  is  nothing  in  the  laws  of  value  for  any 
future  writer  to  clear  up.”  But  the  last  twenty  years, 
especially  since  the  publication,  in  1871,  of  Jevons’  Theory  of 
Political  Economy ,  have  seen  a  renewal  of  the  discussion  ;  and 
now  one  of  the  most  learned  and  moderate  of  recent  writers 
is  obliged  to  confess  that  “  the  opinion  that  the  doctrine  of 
value  is,  as  it  were,  the  sure  stronghold  of  certain  truth, 
lifting  Economics  as  an  exact  science  above  the  changing 
rules  of  human  conduct,  and  making  a  clear  distinction 
between  Economics  and  Ethics,  is  simply  a  huge  mistake.” 
The  modern  reader  of  Aquinas  asks  himself  what  relation 
this  “  valet”  of  the  great  schoolman,  or  the  “justum  pretium” 
of  Augustine,  can  bear  to  such  distinctions  as  those  between 
“  value  in  use  ”  and  “  value  in  exchange,”  between  “  market 
value  ”  and  “  normal  value,”  between  “  total  utility  ”  and 
“  final  utility.”  Yet  their  meaning  is  clearly  enough  under¬ 
stood  when  we  picture  to  ourselves  the  circumstances  of  the 
time,  and  compare  them  with  those  of  our  own  day.  The 


138 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


modern  “  consumer  ”  usually  buys  what  he  wants  at  a  shop, 
i.e.  of  a  middleman  who  stands  between  him  and  the  actual 
producer ;  usually,  indeed,  there  are  two  or  three  such 
middlemen  between  the  makers  and  the  users.  The  wares 
mostly  come  from  a  distance :  the  buyer  has  scarcely  any 
idea  of  the  original  cost  of  the  materials,  or  the  condition  of 
the  workmen.  Into  the  manufacture  of  most  articles,  again, 
enters  a  very  considerable  division  of  labour ;  so  that  it  is 
becoming  increasingly  difficult  to  estimate  how  much  recom¬ 
pense  is  due  to  each  sort  of  labour, — a  difficulty  enormously 
increased  by  the  number  of  different  qualities  of  the  same 
kind  of  goods,  and  the  frequent  changes  of  fashion.  But  in 
the  thirteenth  century  the  great  majority  of  articles  in  the 
daily  use  of  the  mass  of  the  people  were  bought  by  the 
consumer  from  the  actual  maker.  If  the  making  of  an  article 
was  divided  between  several  crafts,  as  e.g.  that  of  cloth 
between  weavers,  fullers,  and  dyers,  each  of  these  groups  of 
craftsmen  lived  within  a  narrow  circuit,  and  under  the  eyes 
of  most  of  those  who  ultimately  bought  their  manufactures. 
If  price,  therefore,  was  to  be  determined  by  the  rule  of  doing 
to  others  as  we  would  wish  that  others  should  do  to  us,  then 
the  maker  should  receive  what  would  fairly  recompense  him 
for  his  labour ;  not  what  would  enable  him  to  make  gain, 
but  what  would  permit  him  to  live  a  decent  life  according 
to  the  standard  of  comfort  which  public  opinion  recognized 
as  appropriate  to  his  class. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  what  mediaeval  moralists  aimed 
at  was  that  price  should  be  determined  by  the  permanent 
cost  of  production.  But  here  we  must  distinguish  between 
the  sense  such  a  phrase  bears  in  our  own  time,  and  the  sense 
that  must  be  attached  to  it  in  applying  it  to  the  earlier 
period.  It  has  been  the  doctrine  of  orthodox  English 
economists  that  normal  value ,  or  price  (i.e.  value  expressed  in 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 39 


terms  of  one  particular  commodity,  gold,  when  the  value  of 
the  latter  itself  does  not  fluctuate),  is,  in  the  case  of  the  vast 
majority  of  articles,  determined  by  cost  of  production.23  So 
that  it  might  seem  that  the  only  difference  between  the 
mediaeval  and  modern  point  of  view  was  that  we  trust  to 
competition  to  bring  about  the  result  which  the  moralists 
and  statesmen  of  the  Middle  Ages  sought  to  effect  by  teaching 
and  legislation.  But  let  us  consider  what  the  modern 
ecbncanist  understands  by  the  phrase.  “  The  term  cost  of 
production  includes  not  simply  the  cost  of  material  and  the 
wages  of  labour,  but  also  the  ordinary  profit  upon  the 
capital  employed.” 24  To  take  the  last  element  first ;  the 
presence  of  that  by  itself  makes  “  cost  of  production  ”  now 
a  different  thing.  Capital  now  plays  a  part  in  production 
almost  as  great  as  labour  itself,  and  public  opinion  recog¬ 
nizes  its  right  to  a  separate  reward,  even  when  there  is 
absolutely  no  personal  exertion  or  personal  risk.  But,  as 
has  been  shown,  in  the  period  of  which  we  have  been 
treating,  capital  was  only  beginning  to  come  into  exist¬ 
ence.  In  agriculture  and  industry  it  scarcely  appeared  at 
all ;  skill  was  far  more  important.  And  even  if  capital  had 
been  able  to  play  a  larger  part  in  industry,  moral  is  ts  and 
public  opinion  denied  that  it  had  a  right  to  reward. 

The  contrast  as  to  wages  is  almost  as  great.  Doubtless 
the  yardlings  and  cotters  and  craftsmen  sometimes  suffered 
from  famines ;  doubtless  their  surroundings  were  often 
unsanitary.  Still  there  was  a  standard  of  comfort  which 
general  opinion  recognized  as  suitable  for  them,  and  which 
prices  were  regulated  to  maintain.  But  now  we  are  content 
that  wages  should  be  determined  by  the  standard  of  comfort 
which  a  class  can  manage  to  maintain,  left  to  itself,  or, 
rather,  exposed  to  the  competition  of  machinery  and  immi¬ 
grant  foreign  labour. 


140 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


The  fundamental  difference  between  the  mediaeval  and 
modern  point  of  view  lies  deeper  than  this.  It  is  that,  with 
us,  value  is  something  entirely  subjective ;  it  is  what  each 
individual  cares  to  give  for  a  thing.  With  Aquinas  it  was 
something  objective;  something  outside  the  will  -of- the 
individual  purchaser  or  seller ;  something  attached  to  the 
thing  itself,  existing  whether  he  liked  it  or  not,  and  that 
he  ought  to  recognize.25  And  as  experience  showed  that 
individuals  could  not  be  trusted  thus  to  admit  the  real 
values  of  things,  it  followed  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
proper  authorities  of  State,  town,  or  gild  to  step  in  and 
determine  what  the  just  and  reasonable  price  really  was. 

Aquinas  then  turns  to  the  question,  whether  a  sale  is 
made  unlawful  by  a  defect  in  the  article  sold ,  meaning,  it  is 
clear  from  the  context,  when  the  article  is  not  of  the  sub¬ 
stance,  quantity,  or  quality  it  professes  to  be.26  There  are 
three  reasons  for  supposing  it  is  not  made  unlawful :  first, 
if  an  article  serves  all  the  human  wants  that  it  could  serve 
if  made  of  the  proper  substance,  it  is  not  unfair  to  sell  it, 
e.g.  alchemic  gold  for  real  gold  (or,  as  we  might  now 
say,  Aluminium  or  “  Abyssinian  gold  ”  for  real  gold) ; 
secondly,  as  to  measures,  they  differ  from  place  to  place,  and 
as  insufficient  measures  cannot  always  be  avoided,  they  are 
not  wrong, — a  mere  sophism  ;  thirdly,  as  to  quality,  great 
knowledge  is  required  to  tell  the  true  qualities  of  things, 
and  many  dealers  are  without  such  knowledge. 

Against  all  these  is  the  saying  of  Ambrose :  “  It  is  a 
manifest  rule  of  justice  that  to  deviate  from  the  truth,  to 
cause  any  one  unfair  injury,  or  to  be  in  any  way  guilty  of 
deceit,  does  not  become  a  good  man.”  Hence  the  conclusion 
of  Aquinas  :  to  sell  or  buy  one  thing  for  another,  without 
observing  due  quality  and  measure,  is  unlawful. 

There  are  three  sorts  of  defect.  As  to  defect  in  substance, 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  141 


if  the  vendor  is  aware  of  it  when  he  sells,  he  commits  a  fraud, 
and  so  acts  wrongfully.  So  also  as  to  measures;  he  who 
wittingly  uses  a  defective  measure,  acts  fraudulently,  and 
therefore  wrongfully.  As  to  quality  likewise ;  a  man  selling 
a  broken-down  hack  as  a  sound  horse,  if  he  does  it  wittingly, 
is  guilty  of  fraud.  In  all  such  cases,  the  seller  is  bound 
to  make  restitution.  If  the  defects  were  present  without 
his  knowing  it,  the  seller  has  not  indeed  committed  sin,  but 
is  equally  bound  to  restitution.  And  the  same  is  true  if 
a  buyer  has  got  a  thing  too  cheaply,  owing  to  the  ignorance 
of  the  seller. 

And  now  as  to  the  three  arguments.  That  based  on 
alchemic  gold  is  worthless ;  for  gold  is  esteemed,  not  only  for 
its  material  uses,  but  also  for  the  dignity  and  purity  of  its 
substance  and  for  its  medicinal  properties.  If  alchemy 
could  make  real  gold,  it  would  not  be  wrong  to  sell  it  as 
gold.  As  to  the  diversity  of  measures,  this  must  indeed  be 
the  case  from  place  to  place,  because  where  things  are  to  be 
had  in  greater  plenty,  the  measures  for  them  are  usually 
greater.  And  therefore  it  is  the  duty  of  the  rulers  of  every 
place  to  appoint  fitting  measures,  having  regard  to  the 
circumstances.  And  only  measures  thus  instituted  by  public 
authority  or  custom  ought  to  be  used.27  And  as  to  quality, 
what  has  to  be  considered  is  the  use  a  thing  is  to  be  put  to, 
and  this  depends  on  qualities  which  seller  and  buyer  can 
easily  learn. 

Thus  in  all  these  cases  Aquinas  takes  us  back  to  the 
question  whether  the  vender  knowingly  sells  a  thing  not  of 
the  quality  or  measure  that  the  buyer  thinks  it  to  be.  If 
so,  he  is  guilty  of  fraud  and  therefore  of  sin,  which  Divine 
law  will  prohibit  even  if  human  law  does  not. 

Aquinas  next  considers  a  question  of  even  greater 
practical  importance :  Is  the  seller  bound  to  reveal  a  fault  in  a 


142 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY. 


[Book  I. 


article  f  The  reasons  assigned  for  thinking  that  he  is  not, 
are  four  in  number.  First,  the  purchaser  is  not  compelled 
to  buy ;  it  is  left  wholly  to  his  judgment ;  and,  if  he  is  mis¬ 
taken  in  his  judgment,  that  is  no  fault  of  the  seller.28 
Secondly,  it  would  be  foolish  to  act  in  such  a  way  as  to 
prevent  your  carrying  on  your  business,  and  this  would  be 
the  result  of  revealing  faults  in  goods  for  sale.  Thirdly,  to 
know  the  way  of  virtue  is  much  more  important  for  a  man 
than  to  know  the  qualities  of  goods.  But  you  are  not  bound 
to  give  every  one  moral  advice,  therefore  you  are  not  bound 
to  advise  every  one  in  their  purchases.  Finally,  the  only 
reason  for  revealing  faults  in  articles  is  that  their  price  may 
be  lowered.  But  price  would  often  be  lowered  if  you  told 
other  things  besides  these ;  for  instance,  if  you  came  with  a 
supply  of  wheat  to  a  market  in  which  corn  was  scarce,  but 
knew  that  many  other  supplies  were  being  brought  up  behind 
you,  you  would  get  less  for  your  own  wheat  if  you  revealed 
that  fact.  But  you  are  not  supposed  to  be  bound  to  reveal 
such  a  fact ;  whence  it  follows  that  you  likewise  ought  not 
to  be  bound  to  reveal  defects. 

But  against  all  this  is  the  saying  of  S.  Ambrose  :  “  Faults 
in  sale  are  bound  to  be  revealed.”  Aquinas’s  conclusion  is 
worded  with  more  moderation ;  a  seller  may  sometimes 
justly,  to  avoid  injuring  himself,  keep  silence  about  the 
secret  faults  of  an  article,  provided  that  such  concealment  does 
not  turn  to  the  loss  or  peril  of  the  purchaser. 

It  is  always  wrong,  he  argues,  to  cause  peril  or  loss  to 
any  one,  and  this  is  what  you  do  if  you  sell  faulty  articles 
without  warning  :  causing  loss,  if  the  thing,  on  account  of  the 
defect,  is  really  worth  less,  and  the  price  is  not  proportionally 
reduced ;  peril,  if  the  use  of  the  thing  is  thereby  rendered 
dangerous — e.g.  if  a  lame  horse  is  sold  as  a  safe  one,  a  totter¬ 
ing  house  as  a  solid  one,  bad  meat  as  good.  And  if  the 


CiiAr.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 43 


defects  are  not  revealed,  the  seller  acts  fraudulently,  and  is 
bound  to  pay  compensation.  But  if  the  fault  is  obvious,  e.g. 
a  one-eyed  horse ;  or  if  the  article  does  not  suit  the  seller  but 
-may  suit  somebody  else;  and  provided  that  the  price  is 
proportionally  lessened,  the  seller  is  not  bound  to  speak 
about  the  fault,  for  if  he  does  the  buyer  may  perhaps  want 
to  have  the  price  reduced  more  than  would  be  fair.29 

And  as  to  the  arguments  on  the  other  side.  First,  judg¬ 
ment  can  only  be  exercised  upon  what  is  clearly  before  one,  so 
that  if  a  fault  is  hidden,  the  matter  is  not  altogether  left  to 
the  purchaser’s  judgment.80  Secondly,  you  need  not  send  the 
town  crier  round  to  proclaim  the  fault,  for  that  might  drive 
away  persons  to  whom  the  article  would  be  serviceable ;  but 
you  must  tell  any  individual  who  offers  to  buy,  that  he  may 
compare  the  good  and  bad  qualities  of  the  article.  Thirdly, 
though  you  are  not  bound  to  tell  the  truth  on  every  subject 
to  every  person,  yet  you  are  bound  to  tell  it  when  your  own 
act  may  result  in  injury  to  some  one.  The  fourth  argument 
ought  to  give  Aquinas  more  difficulty,  for  it  would  seem,  on 
the  principles  of  Christian  morality,  that  a  corn-dealer  was 
really  bound  to  tell  would-be  purchasers  that  other  dealers 
were  on  the  road.  Aquinas,  however,  makes  a  concession  to 
the  growing  commercial  spirit  of  the  time,  and  allows  that 
such  a  dealer  would  not  be  doing  wrong  by  keeping  silent, 
though  to  reveal  the  future  supply  or  sell  his  own  corn  at 
a  less  price,  in  consequence,  would  show  more  abundant 
virtue.  Accordingly  he  has  rather  lamely  to  argue  that  the 
cases  are  not  parallel, — that  the  value  of  the  corn  will  only  be 
lessened  by  the  arrival  of  the  other  supplies,  while  the  faulty 
article  is  already  of  less  value  owing  to  the  fault.31 

It  will  be  noticed  with  what  moderation  Aquinas  states 
his  position.  A  man  is  not  knowingly  to  cause  loss  or  hurt 
to  another  :  but  a  defective  article  may  still  be  worth  buying ; 


144 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I, 


if  it  is  not  useful  for  one  purpose,  it  may  be  for  another.  We 
have  an  amusing  instance  in  the  next  century  in  London, 
showing  how  regard  was  actually  paid  to  considerations  of 
this  kind.  In  1378,  a  certain  tanner  was  brought  up  before 
the  mayor  by  the  overseers  of  the  cordwainers’  craft,  for 
exposing  “  false  ”  hides  for  sale.  The  tanner  maintained  that 
though  these  hides  were  not  good  for  cordwainers,  they  were 
good  for  other  craftsmen.  Whereupon  a  jury  was  formed, 
consisting  of  two  saddlers,  one  pouchmaker,  one  girdler,  two 
leather  bottle  makers,  two  tanners,  two  curriers,  and  two 
cordwainers,  “  who  declared  upon  oath  all  the  said  hides  to 
be  raw,  and  in  their  then  state  to  be  of  no  service  to  any 
trade,”  and  accordingly  they  were  forfeited.32  Clearly  the 
tanner  would  have  escaped  if  he  could  have  proved  his  hides 
good  for  anything  at  all. 

The  three  previous  questions  have  concerned  the  relations 
of  agriculturists  and  of  master- craftsmen  to  the  public: 
Aquinas  has  left  to  the  last  the  question  most  difficult  for 
him  to  answer,  that  of  the  relation  of  the  non-manufacturing 
merchant  to  the  public.  As  we  have  seen,  the  earlier  Chris¬ 
tian  moralists  had  often  spoken  as  if  a  merchant’s  profession 
were  in  itself  a  sinful  one.  But  Aquinas  clearly  sets  out 
upon  the  discussion  Is  it  right  in  trade  to  buy  cheap  and  sell 
dear 1  with  the  intention  of  answering  the  query  in  the  affir¬ 
mative,  though  with  very  important  limitations.  There  are 
three  arguments  for  the  sinfulness  of  trade.  First,  it  must  be 
sinful,  because  Chrysostom  says  “  he  who  buys  a  thing  in 
order  to  sell  it,  unaltered,  for  gain,  is  the  merchant  driven 
from  the  Temple.”  Secondly,  it  has  already  been  proved  that 
it  is  wrong  to  sell  a  thing  for  more  or  buy  it  for  less  than  it 
is  worth ;  but  he  who  buys  cheap  and  sells  dear  must  do 
one  or  the  other.  Thirdly,  Jerome  tells  us  to  “  flee  as  from  a 
pestilence  from  the  priest  who  is  a  merchant  and  out  of 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 45 


poverty  becomes  rich,”  and  what  is  wrong  for  the  clergy, 
cannot  be  right  for  the  laity. 

But  Augustine  tells  us  that  though  the  covetous  trades¬ 
man  curses  at  a  loss  and  lies  about  prices,  these  are  vices  of 
the  man  and  not  of  the  occupation,  which  may  be  carried  on 
without  them.  Aquinas’s  own  decision  is  that  it  is  per¬ 
missible  to  trade  in  order  to  obtain  the  necessaries  of  life ; 
but  to  trade  for  the  sake  of  gain  is  in  itself  base,83  unless 
the  gain, ds  for  some  ionourable  purpose. 

Aristotle,  he  says,  distinguishes  between  two  kinds  of 
exchange.  There  is,  first,  the  natural  exchange,  where  one 
thing  is  exchanged  for  another,  or  wares  for  money,  on 
account  of  necessity  ;  but  this  sort  of  exchange  is  rather  that 
of  housekeepers  or  of  statesmen,  who  have  to  provide  neces¬ 
saries  for  a  family  or  a  State.  And  there  is  the  second  sort 
of  exchange,  wdiere  money  is  given  for  money  or  goods  for 
money,  for  the  sake  of  gain.  Such  trade  is  in  itself  base, 
for  it  is  the  servant  of  lust  for  gain,  which  knows  no  limit.31 
So  that  trade  in  itself  is  base,  in  so  far  as  it  implies  no  neces¬ 
sary  or  honourable  end.  Yet  gain ,  the  object  of  trade,  is  not 
in  itself,  contrary  to  virtue  (meaning  that  gain  is  not  wrong, 
only  the  measureless  desire  for  gain).  And  as  there  is  nothing 
to  prevent  gain  being  devoted  to  some  necessary  or  even 
honourable  object,  this  would  make  trade  lawful ;  as,  for 
instance,  when  a  man  seeks  in  trade  a  moderate  gain  for  the 
maintenance  of  his  family  or  the  relief  of  the  poor ;  still  more 
when  trade  is  carried  on  for  the  public  good,  that  a  country 
may  not  be  without  the  necessaries  of  life,  and  the  merchant 
looks  upon  the  gain,  not  as  the  object,  but  as  the  reward  of 
his  labour.85 

Aquinas  has  accordingly  no  difficulty  as  to  the  saying  of 
Chrysostom.  Trade  is  indeed  sinful,  he  says,  when  gain 
itself  is  the  ultimate  object,  still  more  when  the  article  is 

L 


14  6 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


sold  un changed  for  a  higher  price.  If  the  article  is  im¬ 
proved  in  the  meanwhile,  the  gain  is  but  reward  for  the 
additional  labour;  and  even  gain  may  be  lawfully  aimed 
at  when  it  is  for  some  necessary  or  honourable  purpose.  He 
meets  the  second  objection  by  drawing  a  distinction  between 
buying  cheap  merely  in  order  to  sell  dear,  and  buying  cheap 
and  then  for  some  other  reason  selling  dear.  This  latter  may 
justly  happen  when  the  article  has  been  improved  mean¬ 
while;  or  in  cases  where  the  price  at  some  other  place  or 
time  happens  to  be  different;  or  because  of  the  danger  in¬ 
curred  in  transferring  the  article  from  one  place  to  another. 
Elsewhere  Aquinas  distinctly  recognizes  a  right  to  a  higher 
price  on  account  of  the  labour  of  bringing  an  article  to 
another  market.  As  to  the  prohibition  to  the  clergy,  it 
does  not  follow  from  that  that  trade  is  sinful,  for  the  clergy 
ought  to  avoid  what  has  even  the  appearance  of  evil. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  look  at  the  teaching  of 
Aquinas  as  a  whole.  He  clearly  considers  that  in  any 
particular  country  or  district  there  is  for  every  article,  at  any 
particular  time,  some  one  just  price  :  that  prices,  accordingly, 

I  should  not  vary  with  momentary 36  supply  and  demand,  with 
individual  caprice,  or  skill  in  the  chaffering  of  the  market. 
It  is  the  moral  duty  of  buyer  and  seller  to  try  to  arrive,  as 
nearly  as  possible,  at  this  just  price.  Moreover,  there  are 
for  all  articles  proper  measures  and  qualities,  and  these  also 
must  be  secured ;  and  if  the  wares  have  any  haws  or  defects, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  vender  to  state  them. 

As  to  trade,  though  he  hesitates  at  the  exact  point  at 
which  the  line  is  to  be  drawn,  he  clearly  would  draw  a 
line  between  licit  and  illicit.  The  distinction  is  rather  one 
depending  on  the  motive  of  the  trader  :  if  he  aims  not  so 
much  at  gain,  as  at  supplying  himself  and  his  family,  or, 
through  himself,  the  poor,  with  the  necessaries  of  life ;  or 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 47 


if  he  imports  into  his  country  goods  of  which  it  has  a  real 
need,  and,  while  he  accepts  what  gain  he  can  get  as  a  reward, 
is  not  bent  merely  on  making  gain;  then  this  is  trade  that  is 
worthy  of  approbation.  But  if  it  is  just  the  desire  for  gain 
that  impels  a  man,  such  trade  is  mean,  base.  And,  what  is 
still  more  important,  Aquinas  absolutely  condemns  all  merely 
speculative  trading,  all  attempt  to  make  gain  by  a  skilful  use 
of  market  cEanges.  He  does  not  indeed  tell  us  how  the 
just  price  of  an  article  brought  by  a  trader  to  a  distant 
market  is  to  be  determined;  but  it  seems  to  follow  from 
what  he  says  of  the  sort  of  trading  that  is  justifiable,  that  he 
would  deem  it  to  be  such  as  would  cover  the  just  price  paid 
for  it  by  the  merchant  himself,  together  with  such  gain  as 
would  secure  for  the  merchant  what  public  opinion  regarded 
as  the  necessaries  of  life  for  a  man  of  his  class. 

The  only  form  of  state  action  that  Aquinas  himself  dis¬ 
tinctly  recommends  is  the  regulation  of  weights  and  measures. 
But  the  inevitable  result  of  such  teaching  as  to  what  was, 
sinful  and  what  not  in  the  economic  sphere  would  be  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  of  State,  municipality, 
and  gild  first  to  correct  particular  evils,  and  then,  as  the 
number  of  evils  to  be  corrected  increased,  to  control  industry 
and  trade  in  every  direction.  For  it  was  not  until  compara¬ 
tively  recent  times  that  either  public  opinion  or  legislative 
theory  drew  the  distinction  between  law  and  morality. 
Whatever  was  wrong,  men  thought  might  fitly  be  forbidden 
under  penalty.  There  were  disputes  as  to  the  proper  limits 
between  the  authority  of  the  two  great  powers,  spiritual  and 
temporal ;  there  were  diverse  theories  as  to  what  constituted 
the  supreme  temporal  authority  in  a  State ;  and  there  were 
conflicts  between  the  various  organs  of  the  State,  as,  for 
instance,  between  the  central  authorities  and  municipalities. 
But  there  was  nothing  like  the  modern  feeling  that  certain 


148 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


sorts  of  actions  are  matters  entirely  for  the  individual  con¬ 
science,  and  not  rightly  to  be  “  interfered  with  from  outside.” 

§  17.  The  teaching  of  the  Church  on  the  subject  of  usury , 
i.e.  the  taking  of  any  payment  for  a  loan  of  money,  was  due, 
even  more  directly  than  the  doctrine  of  just  price,  to  the 
lessons  of  the  Gospel.  It  began  with  the  very  natural 
attempt  to  enforce  the  precept,  “  Lend,  hoping  for  nothing 
again,” 87  as  part  of  the  duty  of  brotherly  love  among  Chris¬ 
tians;  and  as  having  the  force  of  a  Divine  command,  and 
therefore  to  be  obeyed,  even  had  the  precept  not  appealed,  as 
to  most  of  the  Fathers  it  seemed  to  do,  directly  to  the  con¬ 
science.  At  first  the  prohibition  of  lending  money  for  gain 
was  a  disciplinary  regulation  binding  only  on  the  clergy ;  the 
Council  of  Nica?a,  in  325,  forbade  the  clergy  to  take  usury 
on  pain  of  degradation  from  their  clerical  office,  and  the 
duty  of  abstaining  from  such  base  gain  was  repeatedly 
insisted  upon  by  the  decrees  of  synods  and  in  the  writings 
of  the  Fathers.  The  prohibition  was  extended  to  the  laity 
in  western  Europe  by  the  capitularies  of  Charles  the  Great, 
and  the  councils  of  the  ninth  century.88  But  for  some  time 
after  this  the  subject  is  very  little  noticed  in  contemporary 
records;  probably  because  cases  in  which  individuals  had 
command  of  large  sums  of  money  were  so  rare,  and  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  the  Church  was  so  considerable,  that  instances  in 
which  payment  was  obtained  for  loans  very  seldom  occurred. 
We  cannot  fail  to  connect  the  renewed  attention  given 
by  churchmen  to  the  sin  of  usury,  from  the  twelfth  century 
onward,  with  the  revived  study  of  Bom.an  law  in  the  West. 
No  legislator  or  judge  could  remain  ignorant  that  the  code 
which  men  looked  on  as  the  highest  embodiment  of  human 
wisdom  and  statecraft  distinctly  permitted  loans  for  gain, 
and  provided  means  for  enforcing  the  payment  of  usury 
as  well  as  capital.39  The  greatest  of  the  “  glossators,”  Accur- 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 49 

sius  of  Bologna  (1182-1260),  entirely  ignored  the  Canon 
Law  in  his  interpretation  of  the  section  of  Justinian’s  code 
concerning  usury;  and,  indeed,  specially  refers  to  Irnerius 
and  his  pupil  Bulgarus,  in  the  previous  century,  as  authorities 
for  saying  that  a  contract  to  pay  usury  is  entirely  justifi¬ 
able.40  If  contemporary  satire  can  be  trusted,  Accursius  was 
not  afraid  to  illustrate  his  theory  by  practice ;  to  his  gains 
as  a  professor  he  is  said  to  have  added  those  of  a  money¬ 
lender,  even  to  his  own  pupils.41  It  is  interesting  to 
Englishmen  to  notice  that  this  jurist’s  son  was,  for  at  least 
seven  years,  in  the  service  of  Edward  I.  as  a  member  of  his 
inner  council.42 

Papal  legislation,  to  meet  what  was  deemed  a  growing 
evil,  had  begun  as  early  as  1179.  Among  the  canons  of  the 
great  Lateran  Council  held  by  Alexander  III.  in  that  year, 
one  ran  as  follows  :  46  Since  in  almost  every  place  the  crime 
of  usury  has  become  so  prevalent  that  many  persons  give  up 
all  other  business  and  become  usurers,  as  if  it  were  per¬ 
mitted,  regarding  not  its  prohibition  in  both  testaments,  we 
ordain  that  manifest  usurers  shall  not  be  admitted  to  com¬ 
munion,  nor,  if  they  die  in  their  sin,  receive  Christian  burial, 
and  that  no  priest  shall  accept  their  alms.”  Clergy  disobeying 
this  order  were  to  be  suspended  from  their  office  until  they 
had  satisfied  their  bishop.43  The  same  pope,  in  letters  to  the 
Archbishop  of  Salerno  and  the  Bishop  of  Piacenza,  had  pro¬ 
nounced  that  usurers,  and  even  the  heirs  of  usurers,  ought  to 
be  compelled  to  restore  their  unjust  gains  under  similar 
penalties.44 

The  rise  of  the  mendicant  and  preaching  orders  in  the 
early  part  of  the  following  century,  both  of  them  vowed 
to  absolute  poverty,  gave  fresh  impulse  to  the  effort  to 
lessen  the  evils  of  usury  by  the  power  of  the  Church  : 
the  former  order  contained  a  large  party  anxious  to  imitate 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


ISO 

S.  Francis  in  his  entire  contempt  for  worldly  goods;  the 
latter  systematized  Church  teaching,  and  their  greatest 
representative,  Aquinas,  threw  the  argument  against  usury 
into  a  philosophical  form.  Up  to  this  point  none  hut 
spiritual  penalties  had  been  threatened  against  usurers,  and 
no  attempt  had  been  made  to  directly  influence  the  secular 
authorities  of  the  various  states.  It  was  at  another  great 
council,  that  of  Lyons  in  1274,  that  Gregory  X.  ventured  to 
make  a  fresh  advance  in  both  of  these  directions.  In  one 
he  ordains  that  no  community,  corporation,  or  individual 
should  permit  foreign  usurers  to  hire  houses,  or  indeed  to 
dwell  at  all  upon  their  lands,  but  rather  should  expel  them 
within  three  months ;  and  he  forbids  any  one  to  let  houses 
to  them.  The  disobedient,  if  they  are  prelates,  are  to  have 
their  lands  put  under  interdict;  if  laymen,  to  be  visited  by 
their  ordinary  with  ecclesiastical  censures.45  This  latter 
provision  was  not  likely  to  be  very  effective ;  consequently 
the  more  importance  must  be  attached  to  the  next  canon, 
which  ordained  that  the  wills  of  unrepentant  usurers, — of 
usurers  who  did  not  make  restitution, — should  be  without 
validity.46  This  brought  usury  definitely  within  the  juris¬ 
diction  of  the  ecclesiastical  courts,  which  had  everywhere 
gained  a  monopoly  of  testamentary  business. 

The  last  step  was  taken  in  1311,  when  Clement  Y.  boldly 
declared  all  secular  legislation  in  favour  of  usury  null  and 
void,  and  branded  as  heresy  the  belief  that  usury  was  un- 
sinful.  The  canon  appears  from  its  wording  to  be  addressed 
primarily  to  town  authorities,  and,  it  would  seem,  especially 
to  those  of  Italy  and  southern  France.  “  Whereas,”  it  runs, 
“  grievous  information  has  come  to  us  that  certain  commu¬ 
nities,  offending  against  God  and  their  neighbour,  against 
Divine  and  human  laws  alike,  permit  by  their  statutes  usury 
to  be  demanded  and  paid,  and  compel  debtors  to  pay  the  same, 


Chap.  TIL]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 5 1 


we  therefore  decree,  with  the  approval  of  this  sacred  council 
(of  Yienne),  that  whatever  authorities,  captains,  rectors, 
consuls,  judges,  councillors,  or  any  other  presume  to  make  in 
-future  any  statutes,  either  that  debtors  shall  pay  usury  or  that 
a  usurer  is  not  bound  to  restitution,  shall  incur  sentence  of 
excommunication.”  They  are  to  incur  the  same  penalty 
if,  within  three  months,  they  do  not  abrogate  all  such 
statutes.  Usurers  are  to  be  compelled  to  produce  their  books 
when  any  case  arises.  And  “  if  any  one  fall  into  the  error 
of  daring  pertinaciously  to  affirm  that  to  engage  in  usury  is 
not  a  sin,  we  decree  that  he  shall  be  punished  as  a  heretic, 
and  enjoin  all  ordinaries  and  inquisitors  to  proceed  with 
rigour  against  all  suspected  of  this  heresy.47 

We  cannot  be  surprised  that,  with  such  a  warning  before 
him,  the  legist  Bartolus  (1314-1357),  the  founder  of  the 
second  great  school  of  civilians,  should  take  up  a  very 
different  position  on  the  subject  from  Accursius.  He  comments 
in  the  usual  fashion  on  the  law  of  Justinian  concerning 
,  interest,  but  frequently  remarks  that  the  taking  of  usury 
is  now  forbidden  by  civil  law  as  well  as  by  the  canon  law.4d 
But  the  change  in  the  teaching  of  the  civilians  had  been 
gradual.  Even  the  law  of  Justinian  had  placed  certain 
limitations  on  the  lending  of  money;49  and,  in  explaining 
these,  the  civilians  had  naturally  tended  to  introduce  some  of 
the  arguments  of  the  theologians.50  We  shall  see  later  that 
it  was  during  this  period  that  secular  legislation  itself  began 
to  follow  the  example  of  ecclesiastical ;  and  the  legist  Baldus 
(1327-1400),  whose  authority  was  especially  great  in 
merchant  law,  frequently  refers  to  the  prohibition  of  usury 
as  enforced  in  his  time  in  all  the  secular  courts.51 

Let  us  turn  now  to  the  arguments  by  which  theologians 
and  lawyers  justified  the  prohibition.  Of  these  the  most 
important,  as  has  already  been  said,  was  the  gospel  precept. 


152 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


which  was  held  to  he  conclusive  in  itself,  so  that  it  was 
seldom  considered  necessary  to  explain  the  reasons  which 
had  led  to  it.  As  secondary  proof  from  Holy  Writ,  reference 
was  made  to  the  Mosaic  law  prohibiting  the  taking  of  usury 
by  one  Hebrew  from  another,  especially  the  warning,  “  If 
thou  lend  money  to  any  of  My  people  that  is  poor,  thou  shalt 
not  be  to  him  as  an  usurer,  neither  shalt  thou  lay  upon  him 
usury.62  Later  writers  referred  to  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle 
that  money  was  itself  barren,  and  that  therefore  fruit  or 
payment  cannot  justly  be  demanded  for  the  use  of  it.  This, 
of  all  the  theoretic  arguments,  was  the  one  most  readily 
grasped  by  the  public  mind,  and  the  one  consequently  that 
appears  most  frequently  in  literature :  as  in  the  well-known 
passage  in  the  “  Merchant  of  Venice,”  where  Antonio  taunts 
Shylock  with  taking  “  a  breed  for  barren  metal.”  But  the 
main  argument  by  which  the  great  schoolmen  and  legists 
maintained  that  the  taking  of  usury  was  of  itself  opposed 
to  natural  reason  and  unjust,  was  one  much  more  subtle  than 
this,  and  careful  attention  must  be  given  to  it.  It  turned 
upon  a  distinction  derived  from  Roman  law,  though  applied 
in  a  manner  foreign  to  Roman  law,  between  consumptibles , 
things  such  as  corn,  that  are  consumed  or  spent  in  use,  and 
fungibles ,  such  as  a  house,  which  is  not  consumed  by  use. 
Money,  it  was  said,  belonged  to  the  first  class.  So  that  to 
demand  usury  was,  as  it  were,  to  sell  a  thing,  and  then 
make  a  charge  for  the  use  of  it,  which  was  unjust.  The 
modern  reader  will  probably  object  that  the  lending  of 
money  can  hardly  be  called  a  sale.  But  it  had  been  a  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Roman  law,  that  when  money  had  passed  into 
the  hands  of  the  borrower,  he  obtained  not  merely  the  pos- 
sessio  but  the  dominium ,  i.e .  the  absolute  right  of  property  in 
it,  and  therefore  the  canonists  argued  that  the  transaction 
must  be  regarded  as  a  sale  in  which  the  payment  of  the 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 53 

price  was  deferred.  And  to  any  who  still  objected  that 
some  payment  ought  to  be  made  for  the  loss  of  time  in  wait¬ 
ing  for  the  price,  the  canonists  replied  that  time  was  common 
'  PZ2PebtX»-aril(l  not  1°  be  s°ld- 

The  argument  based  on  this  distinction  had  appeared 
comparatively  early ;  in  the  Decretum  it  is  attributed  to  S. 
Chrysostom.  But  it  will  be  worth  while  here  to  quote  it  in 
the  shape  in  which  it  was  stated  by  Aquinas,  from  whom  it 
was  taken  and  commented  upon  by  all  the  later  theologians 
and  legists. 

“  To  take  usury  for  a  loan  of  money  is  in  itself  unjust : 
for  it  is  to  sell  what  does  not  exist,  which  is  an  inequality, 
and  therefore  an  injustice.  To  understand  this,  it  must  be 
known  that  there  are  some  things  whose  use  consists  in  the 
consuming  of  them,  as  when  we  consume  wine  by  drinking 
it,  or  corn  by  eating  it.  In  articles  of  this  kind,  therefore, 
the  use  of  the  thing  must  not  be  reckoned  separately  from 
the  thing  itself ;  he  who  is  given  the  use  is  thereby  given 
the  thing.  And  accordingly  in  lending  a  thing  of  this 
kind,  all  the  rights  of  ownership  are  handed  over.  If  there¬ 
fore  a  man  wanted  to  sell  wine  and  the  use  of  the  wine 
apart  from  one  another,  he  would  be  either  selling  the 
same  thing  twice  (meaning  that  the  use  is  the  wine),  or 
would  be  selling  what  did  not  exist.  Wherefore  he  would 
manifestly  be  committing  injustice  and  sinning.  For  the 
same  reason,  he  would  commit  injustice  who  lent  wine 
or  corn,  seeking  for  himself  two  rewards,  the  restitution  of  an 
equal  amount  of  the  article,  and  also  a  payment  for  its  use, 
called  usury. 

“  But  there  are  some  things,  the  use  of  which  is  not  in  the 
consuming  of  them ;  thus  the  use  of  a  house  is  to  dwell  in  it, 
not  to  destroy  it.  And,  accordingly,  in  cases  of  this  kind  the 
two  things  can  be  granted  separately,  as  when  a  man 


154 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I 


transfers  the  ownership  of  a  house  to  another,  but  reserves 
to  himself  the  use  of  it  for  a  certain  time,  or  conversely. 
Therefore  a  man  may  lawfully  receive  a  price  for  the  use  of 
a  house,  and  besides  this  demand  the  restoration  of  the  house 
itself  at  the  end  of  some  period  agreed  upon.  But  money,  as 
Aristotle  says  in  the  fifth  book  of  the  Ethics  and  the  first  of 

I  the  Politics,  has  been  devised  for  the  making  of  exchanges. 
So  that  the  first  and  chief  use  of  money  is  its  consumption  or 
spending.  Wherefore  it  is  in  itself  wrong  to  receive  (besides 
the  return  of  the  money  itself)  a  price  for  the  use  of  the 
money.” 63 

It  will  be  shown  in  a  later  section  how,  in  the  sixteenth 
century,  instead  of  the  theory  that  all  taking  of  reward  was 
usurious,  arose  the  theory  that  it  was  only  the  taking  more 
than  a  certain  percentage;  and  when  we  come  to  our  own 
century  we  shall  see  how  the  practical  difficulties  involved 
in  such  a  distinction,  together  with  the  belief  in  the  natural 
right  of  every  man  to  make  what  terms  he  pleased  in  money 
bargains,54  caused  all  legal  restraints  to  be  removed.  There 
was  a  period  when  to  defend  usury  laws  was  to  obtain  the 
character  of  a  sentimental  reactionary.  But  the  political 
dangers  which  complete  freedom  of  contract  in  the  matter  of 
loans  has  caused  in  central  and  eastern  Europe,  dangers  so 
great  as  to  induce  the  German  legislature  to  retrace  its  steps 
and  bring  back  the  legal  prohibition  of  usury  in  a  more 
workable  form,65  may  dispose  us  to  consider  what  sort  of 
justification  the  ideas  we  have  been  stating  may  have  had  in 
relation  to  the  circumstances  of  the  time  in  which  they  were 
dominant.  But,  first,  we  must  put  on  one  side  the  argument 
in  favour  of  interest  which  will  probably  suggest  itself  to 
nine  out  of  ten  who  think  about  the  matter :  “  A  man  who 
has  money  is  not  bound  to  lend  it ;  if  he  does  choose  to  lend 
it,  surely  he  is  free  to  make  what  conditions  he  pleases.”  To 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  155 


this  the  mediaeval  theorist  would  reply,  “True,  he  is  not 
hound  to  lend  it;  but  if  he  does,  he  can  only  do  so  on  just 
conditions.  If  he  persists  in  making  unrighteous  conditions, 
he  is  to  be  punished  by  spiritual  penalties,  and,  if  these  do 
not  suffice,  by  secular  penalties.  A  man  has  not  the  right 
to  do  what  he  likes  with  his  own.” 

Now,  speaking  generally,  it  may  be  said  that,  during  the 
period  from  the  eleventh  to  the  fourteenth  century,  there  was 
but  a  very  small  field  for  the  investment  of  capital.56  In 
the  trading  centres  there  were,  indeed,  during  the  later  part 
of  the  period,  occasional  opportunities  for  a  man  to  take  part 
in  a  commercial  venture,  and  no  obstacle  was  put  by  the 
Church  or  public  opinion  to  a  man’s  investing  his  money  in 
this  way,  when  no  definite  interest  was  stipulated  for,  but 
he  became  a  bona  fide  partner  in  the  risk  as  well  as  the  gain.57 
But  such  opportunities  were  still  rare.  We  must  not  forget 
that  England  was  almost  entirely  an  agricultural  country, 
and  that  its  agriculture  wTas  carried  on  under  a  customary 
system  which  gave  little  opportunity  for  the  investment  of 
capital.  Even  in  the  rising  manufactures  of  the  time  there 
was  little  room  for  “  enterprise  ”  or  “  extension  of  business :  ” 
the  demand  was  too  small,  the  available  workmen  too  few, 
for  any  such  rapid  increase  in  production  as  we  are  nowadays 
familiar  with.  Under  such  circumstances,  when  money  was 
borrowed,  it  was  usually  to  meet  some  sudden  stress  of 
misfortune,  or  for  “  unproductive  ”  expenditure,  e.g.  by  a 
knight  to  go  on  crusade,  or  by  a  monastery  to  build  a  church. 
A  good  example  is  furnished  by  the  history  of  S.  Edmunds- 
bury,  on  which  Carlyle  has  commented  in  Past  and  Present . 
The  old  abbot  mismanaged  the  convent  revenues ;  the  Camera 
fell  into  ruins;  and  £27  had  to  be  borrowed  of  a  Jew  to 
rebuild  it, — a  debt  which,  by  the  accumulation  of  compound 
interest,  had,  at  the  end  of  four  years,  risen  to  £SS0.58 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


156 

In  cases  like  these  it  seemed  unjust  that  a  person  pos¬ 
sessing  money  which  he  could  put  to  no  productive  use 
himself  should  make  gain  out  of  the  necessities  or  piety  of 
another.  Ample  security  was  usually  given  for  the  return 
of  the  money  lent ; 59  and  as  the'  alternative  to  lending  was 
that  the  money  remained  idle  in  the  hands  of  its  possessor, 
he  was  in  just  the  same  position  when  his  money  came  back 
to  him  as  if  he  had  never  parted  with  it.  Surely,  under 
these  circumstances,  we  cannot  blame  the  moralists  who 
thought  that  the  evils  of  usury  were  so  great  that  they  did 
well  to  prohibit  the  payment  of  interest  altogether.  And 
such  an  opinion  was  likely  to  be  strengthened  by  the  grievous 
results  before  their  eyes  of  such  usury  as  was  permitted, — 
that  exercised  by  the  Jews.  The  Jews  of  history  were  not 
cringing  cowards,  but  too  often  merciless  bullies,  confident 
of  the  royal  protection.  We  can  hardly  blame  them.  They 
were  shut  out  by  law  or  prejudice  in  almost  every  country 
from  engaging  in  agriculture,  industry,  or  commerce,  and 
were  thus  almost  driven  to  trade  in  money.  It  was  in  vain 
that  Innocent  III.  called  upon  all  Christian  princes  to 
compel  the  Jews  to  give  up  their  usuries;  they  were  too 
profitable  a  source  of  revenue  to  be  parted  with,  until 
sovereigns  could  show  self-denial  and  cruelty  enough  to 
drive  them  out  of  the  kingdom  altogether,  like  Edward  I.  in 
1290.  The  ecclesiastical  courts  were  obliged  to  shut  their 
eyes  to  them.  Since,  moreover,  the  extreme  penalties  that 
until  1274  the  courts  could  inflict  were  exclusion  from  com¬ 
munion  and  the  refusal  of  Christian  burial,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  the  Jews  could  have  been  hindered  in  their  business, 
even  had  the  courts  been  bold  enough  to  attempt  it.60 

It  is  scarcely  denied  by  competent  modern  critics  that,  at 
some  period  at  any  rate,  during  the  Middle  Ages  there  was 
such  an  absence  of  opportunities  for  productive  investment 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 57 


as  relatively  to  justify  this  strong  prejudice  against  interest ; 
the  only  difference  of  opinion  is  as  to  how  late  that  period 
reaches.  One  writer  is  of  opinion  that  even  before  the  twelfth 
century  the  economic  condition  of  things  was  such  that  the 
papal  decrees  could  not,  possibly  meet  with  obedience :  he  can 
only  regard  the  effort  of  the  Church  as  a  vain  struggle  against 
irresistible  tendencies.61  To  another  the  prohibition  seems 
justifiable  far  into  the  fifteenth  century.62  On  the  one  hand, 
it  is  clear  that  the  growth  of  commerce  from  the  thirteenth 
century  onward  must,  by  widening  the  field  for  profitable 
investment,  have  lessened  the  injustice  of  taking  usury.  If, 
for  instance,  a  man  could  make  twenty  per  cent,  on  a  certain 
capital  in  commerce,  it  might  seem  hard  to  prevent  his 
borrowing  money  at  ten  per  cent.  It  was  impossible  to 
maintain  that  money  was  in  all  cases  barren  after  Innocent 
III.  had  expressly  ordered  that  dowry  in  certain  cases  was  to 
be  “  committed  to  a  merchant  ”  in  order  that  “  honourable 
gain  ”  might  be  obtained.63  On  the  other  hand,  we  can 
scarcely  suppose  that  the  prohibition  of  usury  would  have 
been  maintained  by  public  opinion,  enacted  by  statute,  and 
enforced  in  the  courts  throughout  the  fourteenth  century,  as 
it  certainly  was,  if  cases  had  been  of  frequent  occurrence  in 
which  it  really  prevented  legitimate  commercial  enterprise, 
or  hindered  the  growth  of  manufactures.  We  may,  perhaps, 
conclude  that  on  the  whole  it  was  suited  to  the  economic 
condition  of  western  Europe,  though  there  may  sometimes 
have  been  cases  in  the  active  commercial  life  of  the  towns 
where  it  was  felt  to  be  a  burden. 

Later  writers,  especially  those  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
occupying  themselves  in  the  work  of  systematizing  canon 
law,  and  in  applying  it  to  new  cases  as  they  arose,  arrived 
at  certain  theoretic  conceptions  concerning  capital,  money,  and 
value  which  seemed  to  them  to  underlie  the  particular  pre- 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


I53 

cepts.  They  showed  how  these  conceptions  were  related  to 
one  another,  and  in  this  way  there  came  to  be  formulated  for 
the  first  time  a  general  economic  theory.  This  theory  Ende- 
mann  has  explained  with  great  fulness  ;  and  his  argument 
implies  that  because  certain  general  conceptions  seem  to  be 
the  logical  basis  of  definite  regulations,  these  conceptions 
must  have  been  in  the  minds  of  those  who  issued  the  regula¬ 
tions.  But  the  ideas  which  we  have  already  explained  appear 
quite  sufficient  to  account  for  the  rules  and  maxims  of,  at 
any  rate,  the  period  down  to  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth 
century.  It  seems  advisable,  therefore,  to  postpone  the  con¬ 
sideration  of  the  general  canonist  theory,  as  well  as  the 
exceptions,  limitations,  and  pretexts  for  evasion  which  were 
gradually  devised,  until  we  come  to  the  later  centuries. 

We  must,  however,  notice  the  application  of  the  prohibi¬ 
tion  to  cases  other  than  money  loans.  The  repayment  of  a 
loan  together  with  usury  in  money  had,  of  course,  been  the 
first  subject  of  prohibition  ;  but  even  the  Fathers  of  the  fourth 
and  fifth  centuries  had  rebuked  those  who  pretended  that 
usury  consisted  only  in  taking  money  reward.  If  you  lend 
money  to  a  man  expecting  to  receive  from  him  more  than 
you  have  given,  whether  it  is  in  money  or  in  corn,  wine, 
oil,  or  anything  else,  you  are  a  usurer,  says  S.  Augustine. 
Jerome,  in  almost  the  same  words,  lays  down  that  usury  is  to 
receive  more  than  you  have  given,  and  condemns  those  who 
for  money  they  have  lent  “  are  wont  to  receive  small  presents 
of  various  kinds ;  ”  while  S.  Ambrose  declares  “usury  is 
whatever  is  added  to  the  capital,  whether  it  be  food,  clothing, 
or  whatever  else  you  like  to  call  it.”  All  these  definitions 
were  included  by  Gratian  in  his  Decretum.Qi  Gregory  IX. 
drew  the  deduction  that  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  on  condition 
that  you  should  be  repaid  at  a  future  time  in  wares — “  a 
certain  number  of  measures  of  grain,  wine,  or  oil,” — when  you 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 59 


knew  that  before  that  time  the  value  of  those  articles  would 
rise  above  that  sum,  was  also  usury.65  Such  a  transaction 
could  be  called  either  a  loan  or  a  purchase ;  and  though  the 
prohibition  did  not  interfere  with  a  sale  where  the  purchaser 
had  no  idea  whether  at  the  time  of  delivery  the  value  of 
the  goods  would  be  greater  or  less,  it  certainly  stood  in  the 
way  of  speculative  trading,  where  the  purchaser  expected  that 
values  would  rise.66  For  it  Tvas  not  so  much  the  actual 
receipt  of  greater  gain,  as  the  intention  to  obtain  greater  gain 
that  was  sinful. 

A  second  deduction,  probably  even  more  important,  was 
that,  since  it  was  wrong  in  return  for  a  loan  to  receive 
back  the  principal  in  money  together  with  usury  in  kind, 
or  to  receive  in  kind  more  than  the  value  of  the  money, 
it  must  also  be  wrong,  if  you  do  receive  the  value  in  kind, 
then  in  addition  to  demand  the  capital  sum  in  money. 
The  application  of  this  was  to  those  cases  'where  land  had 
been  pledged  in  security  for  a  debt.  When  the  lender  had 
taken  possession  of  the  land  and  had  kept  it  long  enough  to 
receive  from  its  produce  the  value  of  the  sum  originally  lent, 
he  was  bound  to  restore  the  land.  Cases  of  this  kind  must 
have  been  especially  numerous.  The  canon  drawn  up  on  the 
subject  at  the  Council  of  Tours  in  1163  dealt  only  with  the 
misconduct  of  the  clergy ;  the  prohibition  of  such  unjust 
gain  by  the  laity  occurs  in  a  Bull  of  Alexander  III.,  addressed 
to  the  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  and  his  suffragans  :  “  Since 
to  pursue  the  gains  of  usury  is  dangerous  not  only  to  the 
clergy  but  to  all  others,  we  enjoin  you  to  compel  by  eccle¬ 
siastical  penalty  those  who  have  received  the  capital  they 
lent  (together  with  the  expenses  of  management)  from  the 
possessions  or  woods  they  are  known  to  hold  in  pledge,  to 
restore  the  same  pledges.”  67  And  in  the  following  century 
the  rule  was  repeated  in  a  canon  issued  by  S.  Edmund  Rich 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book! 


l60 

of  Canterbury :  “We  forbid  that  any  one  should  endeavour  to 
retain  a  pledge,  after  from  the  fruits  of  it  he  has  received  the 
sum  he  lent,  together  with  expenses,  since  to  do  so  is  usury.”  68 
The  transition  was  easy  from  usury,  strictly  so  called,  to 
usurious  practices  in  ordinary  trade.  Thus  all  payment  of 
money  in  return  for  the  giving  of  credit , — all  bargains  in  which 
goods  were  sold  at  a  price  higher  than  their  real  value  in  con¬ 
sideration  of  the  seller’s  having  to  wait  some  time  before  he  was 
paid, — were  deemed  usurious.  For  it  was  the  same  as  if  the 
seller  were  to  charge  usury  for  lending  the  goods  themselves, 
or  the  amount  of  money  which  was  the  just  price  of  the  goods, 
to  the  buyer,  for  the  period  during  which  the  seller  waited 
for  payment.  It  is  significant  that  the  direct  prohibition  of 
such  practices  should  appear  first  in  a  Bull  directed  by  Alex¬ 
ander  III.,  in  1176,  to  the  Archbishop  of  Genoa, — which  city 
was  then  struggling  with  Pisa  for  commercial  supremacy  in 
the  Mediterranean, — and  that  the  wares  specially  mentioned 
should  be  spiceries.  It  was  the  trade  in  spice  which  produced 
probably  the  first  body  of  ivholesale  merchants  dealing  in  a  special 
commodity,  namely  the  grocers ;  and  we  may  perhaps  con¬ 
jecture  that  cases  of  purchase  on  credit,  such  as  the  letter  speaks 
of,  would  be  likely  enough  to  occur  on  the  part  of  the  small 
general  dealers  from  the  greater  merchants.  “  You  tell  us  it 
often  happens  in  your  city  that  people  buy  pepper,  or  cinna¬ 
mon,  or  other  wares,  at  the  time  not  worth  more  than  five 
pounds,  promising  to  pay  those  from  whom  they  received  them 
six  pounds  at  an  appointed  time.  Though  contracts  of  this 
kind  and  under  such  a  form  cannot  strictly  be  called  usuries, 
yet  nevertheless  the  venders  incur  guilt,  unless  they  are 
really  doubtful  whether  the  wares  will  be  worth  more 
or  less  at  the  time  of  payment.  Your  citizens  therefore 
will  do  well,  for  their  own  salvation,  to  cease  from  such 
contracts.” 69 


Chap.  Ill]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  I  Cl 


It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  theory  of  usury,  when  it  had 
once  been  developed  to  this  point,  would  come  to  be  inter¬ 
woven  with  the  theory  of  just  price,  until  the  one  could  in 
fiaany  doubtful  cases  be  brought  to  strengthen  the  other.  It 
will  be  worth  while  to  conclude  this  section  with  two  quota¬ 
tions  which  will  show  how  the  teaching  was  presented  in  a 
popular  form.  Hitherto  we  have  referred  only  to  the  writ¬ 
ings  of  Fathers  and  Schoolmen,  the  canons  of  Councils,  and 
the  decrees  of  Popes :  the  following  are  taken  from  the  Ayen- 
bite  of  Inwyt ,  a  sort  of  manual  for  confessors,  of  wide  use  in 
the  later  Middle  Ages,  itself  a  translation  made  in  1340  by  a 
certain  Dan  Michel,  a  monk  of  Kent,  from  a  French  treatise 
written  in  the  previous  century.  “  The  eighth  bough  of 
Avarice  is  chaffering,  wherein  men  sin  in  many  ways,  for 
worldly  gain,  and  especially  in  seven  ways.  The  first  is  to 
sell  things  as  dear  as  one  can,  and  buy  things  as  cheap  as  one 
can.  The  next  is  lying,  swearing,  and  forswearing,  the  higher 
to  sell  their  wares.  The  third  is  by  weights  and  measures, 
and  that  may  be  in  three  ways  :  the  first  when  a  man  has  divers 
weights  or  divers  measures,  and  buys  by  the  greater  weights 
or  measures  and  sells  by  the  lesser ;  the  second  when  a  man 
has  right  weights  and  measures  but  makes  an  untrue  use  of 
them,  as  when  taverners  fill  a  measure  with  scum ;  the  third 
when  in  weighing  a  thing  it  is  made  to  appear  heavier  than 
it  is.  The  fourth  manner  of  sin  in  chaffering' is  to  sell  to 
time  [referring  doubtless  to  such  sales  on  credit  as  have 
just  been  explained].  The  fifth  manner  is  to  sell  otherwise 
than  one  hath  showed  before,  as  the  scriveners  do  who  begin 
with  words  fairly  written.  The  sixth  is  to  hide  the  truth 
about  the  thing  one  sells,  as  do  horsedealers.  And  the 
seventh  is  to  contrive  that  the  thing  sold  should  appear 
better  than  it  is ;  as  when  cloth-dealers  sell  their  cloth  in  a 
dim  light.,’  Usury  is  also  divided  into  seven  kinds.  “  The 


162 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


first  when  a  loan  is  made  in  money,  and  the  lender  receives 
profits  in  money,  or  in  horses,  or  corn,  or  wine,  or  fruits  of  the 
land  which  he  takes  in  pledge,  over  and  above  the  capital 
sum,  and  without  reckoning  them  as  part  payment.  What 
is  worse,  a  creditor  will  sometimes  demand  payment  several 
times  in  the  year,  to  raise  the  rate  of  usury,  even  when  at 
each  term  he  receives  a  gift;  and  he  will  often  turn  the 
interest  into  the  principal  debt.  These  are  usuries  evil  and 
foul.  The  courteous  lender  is  he  that  lendeth  without  making 
bargains  for  profit.  .  .  .  The  next  manner  of  usury  is  that 
of  those  who  do  not  lend  themselves,  but  retain  what  their 
fathers,  or  those  whose  wealth  they  have  inherited,  have 
received  through  usury.  The  third  way  is  that  of  those 
who  are  ashamed  to  lend  with  their  own  hand,  but  lend 
through  their  servants  or  somebody  else.  They  are  thus 
master  money-lenders  ;  and  of  such  sin  those  great  ones  are 
not  free  who  support  Jews  and  other  usurers,  that  destroy 
the  country,  receiving  from  them  the  ransom  money  of  the 
goods  of  the  poor.  The  next  way  is  that  of  those  who 
borrow  at  a  low  rate  of  interest  themselves  and  lend  at  a 
greater, — the  little  usurers.  The  fifth  manner  is  when  a 
man  sells  a  thing  for  more  than  it  is  worth  at  the  time ; 
or,  what  is  worse,  when  he  sells  at  a  time  when  his  wares  are 
greatly  needed  for  twice  or  thrice  as  much  as  they  are  worth. 
Such  trade  is  ruinous  to  the  knights  who  follow  tournaments  ; 
they  get  from  them  their  estates  in  pledge  and  never 
release  them.  Others  buy  articles,  such  as  corn  or  wine,  for 
half  as  much  as  they  are  worth,  and  sell  them  for  more  than 
twice  as  much  as  they  are  worth ;  or  buy  them  in  harvest 
time,  or  when  they  are  especially  cheap,  with  intent  to  sell 
them  again  when  they  are  dear,  wishing  for  a  time  of 
scarcity ;  while  others,  again,  buy  corn  in  the  blade,  and 
vines  in  the  flower.  The  sixth  manner  of  usury  is  to  lend 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 63 


money  to  merchants  on  condition  that  they  shall  share  in 
gains  but  not  in  losses.  .  .  .  And  finally  the  seventh  manner 
is  that  of  those  who  lend  a  little  to  their  poor  neighbours 
when  they  are  in  need,  on  condition  that  they  shall  work  for 
them,  and  get  out  of  them  three  pennyworth  of  work  for 
every  penny  they  have  lent.”  70 

Nothing  could  better  illustrate  than  this  last  passage  the 
way  in  which  the  two  rules,  to  sell  at  a  fair  price  and  to 
avoid  usury,  had  come  to  be  almost  identified  with  one 
another  even  in  the  mind  of  the  writer  of  a  manual  for  the 
confessional.  It  has  now  to  be  seen  how  it  was  attempted 
in  secular  legislation  to  give  expression  to,  and  to  enforce, 
these  principles. 

§  18.  Most  of  the  economic  questions  which  presented 
themselves  to  mediaeval  thought  were  met  by  the  proposition 
that  for  every  commodity  or  service  there  was  a  just  money 
equivalent.  But  that  practical  effect  should  be  given  to 
such  a  principle,  it  was  necessary  that  a  country  should 
possess  a  trustworthy  currency.  Moreover,  the  sole  right 
of  coinage  had  been  expressly  claimed  by  Boman  law  as  a 
prerogative  of  the  head  of  the  State,  an  example  which 
could  not  fail  to  commend  itself  to  the  sovereigns  whose 
kingdoms  arose  upon  the  ruins  of  the  empire.  For  both 
these  reasons,  to  maintain  a  prerogative,  and  to  satisfy  a 
general  need,  the  princes  of  the  young  states  of  western 
Europe  began  very  early  to  issue  currencies  of  their  own. 
And  thus  the  provision  of  a  medium  of  exchange  was  the 
first  assistance  which  the  organization  of  the  state  rendered 
to  society.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  deal  at  somewhat 
greater  length  with  a  subject  to  which  brief  reference  has 
already  been  made. 

The  earliest  function  of  a  currency  in  early  societies  was 
not  so  much  that  of  a  medium  of  exchange  as  of  a  store  of 


I64  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  tBooK  L 

value.  There  was  little  regular  traffic  or  purchase  of  com¬ 
modities  :  men  lived  upon  the  produce  of  their  lands,  tilled  by 
themselves  or  by  their  dependents.  Still,  occasions  sometimes 
arose  in  which  men  might  need  or  desire  to  buy  for  them¬ 
selves  food,  land,  or  slaves ;  adventurous  traders  sometimes 
arrived  at  a  great  man’s  house  with  jewels  or  robes  for  sale  ; 
sometimes  there  was  a  wergild  to  be  scraped  together.  And 
even  if  the  store  were  not  parted  with,  the  very  possession  of 
things  universally  desired  as  ornaments,  would  increase  the 
respect  in  which  a  man  was  regarded.  Such  a  purpose  was 
served  among  the  English  as  among  the  Scandinavian  nations 
by  gold  armlets  or  rings,71  and  by  the  few  Eoman  gold  coins 
left  behind  after  the  barbarian  conquest  or  brought  by  traders. 
The  first  new  and  independent  coinage  in  western  Europe 
was  struck  by  the  Merovingian  princes  ;  it  was  in  gold,  and 
in  imitation  of  a  small  Eoman  coin.72  The  introduction  of 
Christianity  into  England,  bringing  with  it  new  ideas  of  royal 
duties  and  powers,  and  a  closer  connection  with  the  Conti¬ 
nent,  led  almost  at  once  to  an  imitation  of  the  Merovingian 
currency.  These  first  English  coins  were  of  gold ;  probably 
very  few  were  struck.  The  pieces  comprising  such  a  cur¬ 
rency  were  far  too  valuable  to  be  used  conveniently  in  trade. 
Moreover  the  Teutonic  peoples  had  long  shown  a  preference 
for  silver  over  gold.  Accordingly,  with  the  rise  of  trade  along 
the  Frisian  shores,  and  the  increasing  importance  of  the  Aus- 
trasian  Franks,  there  appeared  a  silver  coinage  along  the  lower 
Bhine.73  The  example  was  followed  in  the  English  kingdoms 
which  carried  on  trade  with  those  countries,  namely  Kent, 
Essex,  and  Mercia ;  and  the  silver  coins  then  struck,  known 
as  sceattas ,  were  almost  certainly  the  first  coins  that  came  into 
general  use  in  England  for  the  purpose  of  trade.74  They  were 
not  destined,  however,  to  play  any  considerable  part  in  the 
history  of  English  currency  :  about  a  century  later  they  were 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 65 

replaced  by  a  coinage  of  a  different  character,  the  silver 
penny,  which  from  the  end  of  the  eighth  to  the  middle  of 
the  fourteenth  century  was  the  only  coin  in  general  use  in 
this  country.  This  also  was  a  direct  imitation  of  the  “new 
pennies  ”  issued  by  Pepin  the  Short  in  the  Frank  kingdom, 
about  755  ; 75  and,  as  we  might  expect,  it  was  issued  first  by 
Offa,  who  was  in  constant  communication  with  the  Carling 
princes.  For  some  time  Northumbria  had  a  copper  coinage 
of  its  own ;  but  towards  the  end  of  the  ninth  century  this 
also  gave  way  to  a  silver  penny  currency,  similar  to  that  of 
the  south.76 

It  is  probable  that  the  right  of  coinage  was  from  the  first 
in  England  regarded  as  specially  attached  to  the  royal  dignity. 
The  sceattas  indeed  bear  no  inscriptions ;  but  the  silver  pen¬ 
nies  have  on  the  one  side  the  name  of  the  moneyer  who  struck 
them,  and  on  the  other  usually  that  of  the  king  by  whose 
authority  they  were  issued.  From  this  evidence,  it  appears 
that  each  of  the  kingdoms  then  existing  in  England — Kent, 
East  Anglia,  Northumbria,  Mercia,  and  Wessex — had  its 
own  issue,  as  long  as  it  was  governed  nominally  by  a  king, 
even  when  it  had  fallen  into  the  position  of  a  vassal  state. 
And  although  the  great  ealdormen  of  later  centuries  became 
practically  semi-independent  princes,  they  never  issued 
money  with  their  own  names  upon  it.  To  the  rule  that  the 
coinage  was  issued  by  royal  authority  there  are,  however, 
three  remarkable  exceptions.  There  are  a  number  of  pennies 
extant  bearing  the  names  of  “  Edmund,  king,”  or  “  S.  Ed¬ 
mund,”  struck,  it  would  seem,  at  the  end  of  the  ninth  and 
beginning  of  the  tenth  century.  It  is  probable  that  these 
were  made  to  be  worn  in  memory  of  the  martyred  king  of 
East  Anglia,  and  that  they  scarcely  came  into  general 
circulation.77  Much  more  important  than  these  were  the 
two  archiepiscopal  coinages:  that  of  Canterbury,  bearing 


1 66  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

the  name  of  its  archbishops,  from  circ.  766  to  circ.  914; 
and  that  of  York,  consisting  of  copper  stycas  (or  pieces), 
with  the  names  of  the  archbishops,  from  circ.  734  to  circ. 
900,  and  of  silver  pennies,  bearing  the  name  of  S.  Peter, 
during  the  first  half  of  the  ninth  century.78  In  the  almost 
continuous  anarchy  during  the  reigns  of  the  later  North¬ 
umbrian  kings,  both  Anglian  and  Danish,  the  Archbishop 
of  York  gained  a  unique  position  as  the  one  representative 
of  order  in  the  northern  half  of  England.  The  primate  of 
Canterbury  also  had  an  influence  and  authority  that  made  it 
advisable  for  Egbert  to  enter  into  alliance  with  him  as  with 
an  equal  potentate.79  It  is  easy  enough,  therefore,  to  under¬ 
stand  why  the  two  archbishops  should  have  been  allowed  to 
exercise  rights  which  the  kings  usually  reserved  to  them¬ 
selves.  But  it  does  not  seem  fanciful  to  suggest  that  this 
was  also  due  to  the  feeling  that  the  Church  was,  in  an  especial 
way,  the  guardian  of  morality  in  matters  of  trade,  and  there¬ 
fore  that  it  was  fitting  that  the  all-essential  goodness  of  the 
currency  should  be  guaranteed  by  putting  its  issue  into  the 
hands  of  the  great  pastors.  Even  after  the  archbishops  of 
Canterbury  had  ceased  to  issue  coins  bearing  their  own  name, 
they  retained  the  right  of  appointing  two  out  of  the  seven 
moneyers  employed  in  the  city  of  Canterbury,  while  the 
abbot  of  Christ  Church  nominated  one ;  and  at  Bochester  the 
bishop  appointed  one  out  of  three.80  Doubtless,  as  we  find  by 
later  grants,  the  right  of  having  a  moneyer  implied  also  the 
receipt  of  certain  profits. 

In  954,  the  Danish  kingdom  in  Northumbria  came  to  an 
end.  Henceforward  the  only  king  in  England  was  the  ruler 
of  Wessex.81  About  the  same  time,  moreover,  the  West 
Saxon  kings  began  to  assume  titles  implying  imperial  power, 
such  as  Basileus ,  Imperator ,  and  Caesar ,82 — partly,  no  doubt, 
to  assert  their  own  overlordship  over  all  other  princes  within 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 67 

Britain,  but  also  partly,  it  is  probable,  to  claim  for  themselves 
a  dignity  such  as  they  supposed  belonged  to  Boman  em¬ 
perors.  A  natural  consequence  was  the  assertion  of  the 
king’s  exclusive  prerogative  of  issuing  money.  “Let  no 
man  have  a  money er  except  the  king,”  appears  among  the 
laws  of  Ethelred  in  Q97.83  But  it  was  long  before  the  work 
of  minting  was  confined  to  one  place  immediately  under  the 
supervision  of  royal  officials.  It  would  seem  that  moneyers 
were  allowed  to  establish  themselves,  or  were  employed  at 
intervals,  in  all  important  trading  centres,  though  little  is 
known  of  their  status  or  of  the  precise  way  in  which  the 
coins  got  into  circulation.  It  was  the  growing  trade  in  the 
towns,  especially  at  the  ports,84  which  made  a  currency  in¬ 
creasingly  necessary,  and  the  minters  in  each  town  may  be 
regarded  as  primarily  working  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
traders  of  that  particular  place.  Indeed,  it  was  so  im¬ 
possible  to  maintain  the  standard  of  quality  and  weight 
unless  the  minting  was  done  publicly  in  towns,  under  the 
constant  watch  of  the  reeve,  that  it  was  enacted  that  it 
should  be  carried  on  nowhere  else  on  pain  of  death.85 

So  far  England  had  only  followed  the  same  course  of 
development  as  the  other  countries  of  western  Europe ;  but 
from  the  tenth  century  onward  it  presented  a  striking  con¬ 
trast  to  them.  In  France,  Germany,  and  Italy  the  right  of 
coinage  was  gained  by  all  the  more  important  princes  and 
cities ;  in  England,  the  king’s  sole  prerogative  was  never  in 
danger  except  during  the  anarchy  of  Stephen’s  reign.  Then, 
indeed,  baronial  mints  appeared.  The  claim  to  strike  their 
own  coin  was  justly  regarded  by  contemporaries  as  an  en¬ 
croachment  on  the  rights  of  sovereignty.  But  Henry  II. 
had  no  difficulty  in  putting  an  end  to  this  “adulterine” 
coinage ; 86  and  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  king’s  sole  right 
of  regulating  the  currency  was  afterwards  asserted,  not  only 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


1 68 

as  n  gainst  individual  barons,  but  also  as  against  Parliament. 
A  provision  of  the  Ordainers,  that  no  charge  should  be  made 
on  the  coin  of  the  realm  without  the  consent  of  the  barons 
in  Parliament,  was  repealed  in  1322.87 

Down  to  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII.  the  kings  of  Eng¬ 
land  were  honourably  free  from  the  crime  of  debasing  the 
currency, — therein  a  striking  contrast  to  their  French 
neighbours.  For  a  brief  space  there  was  danger.  William 
Rufus  seems  to  have  exacted  or  threatened  to  exact  a  pay¬ 
ment  from  his  subjects  known  as  moneyage ,  monetagiumi — a 
recognition,  apparently,  of  his  right  to  alter  the  coinage,  and 
a  bribe  not  to  do  so.87  But  this,  among  other  innovations, 
was  expressly  renounced  by  Henry  I.  From  that  time  the 
efforts  of  the  sovereigns  or  of  their  ministers  were  steadily 
directed  towards  securing  a  sound  currency  for  the  country. 
There  were  two  main  dangers :  lest  the  moneyers  should 
elude  the  vigilance  of  the  local  authorities,  and  issue  coins 
of  base  metal,  and  lest  coins  should  be  clipped  as  they  passed 
from  hand  to  hand.  The  former  evil  was  met  and  overcome 
by  ruthless  severity  in  the  punishment  of  fraudulent 
moneyers.  Their  hands  were  to  be  cut  off  and  set  upon 
the  mint-smithy,  says  a  law  of  Athelstan ;  they  were  to  be 
put  to  death,  says  a  law  of  Ethelred.88  Henry  I.  fell  back 
upon  the  earlier  punishment  of  dismemberment ;  and  in  one 
swoop  of  avenging  justice  inflicted  it,  in  1125,  on  every 
moneyer  in  England.89  It  is  clear  from  the  chroniclers  that 
Henry’s  conduct  was  seen  with  gratitude  by  the  nation. 
Only  two  years  before,  a  council  at  Rome,  under  Pope 
Calixtus,  had  pronounced  upon  such  criminals  the  highest 
penalty  that  an  ecclesiastical  authority  could  inflict,  and  had 
separated  from  the  congregation  of  the  faithful  whoever 
knowingly  made  or  purposely  circulated  false  money,  as  men 
accursed,  oppressors  of  the  poor,  disturbers  of  the  State.90 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 69 

The  Government  in  the  main  succeeded :  the  difficulties  which 
arose  in  the  following  centuries  were  due  to  the  importation 
of  base  money  from  abroad.  The  other  danger  was  greater, 
and  was  but  partially  avoided.  The  practice  of  clipping  the 
coinage  was  carried  on  so  generally  that  it  was  often 
necessary  to  prohibit  the  use  of  the  old  currency,  and  cause 
a  new  one  to  be  issued,  as  in  1180  and  1248.91  Henry  I. 
endeavoured  to  lessen  it  by  ordering  that  all  who  lived 
within  towns  should  take  an  oath  to  preserve  the  coinage  ; 92 
the  ministers  of  John,  by  a  proclamation  in  1205  that  none 
were  to  keep  clipped  money  in  their  possession  on  pain  of 
seizure,93  and,  in  the  following  year,  by  an  Assize  fixing  one- 
eighth  as  the  limit  of  allowable  under-weight,  and  ordering 
the  use  of  a  jury  of  inquest  to  discover  who  were  guilty  of 
clipping.94 

It  was  impossible  altogether  to  put  an  end  to  this  form 
of  fraud  so  long  as  the  process  of  minting  was  as  rude  as  it 
remained  until  the  seventeenth  century.  Perfectly  round 
coins  could  not  be  produced  until  the  die  struck  by  the 
hammer  had  been  replaced  by  the  “  mill ;  ” 95  and  the  fact 
that  coins  as  issued  from  the  moneyers  already  differed 
somewhat  in  size  rendered  the  work  of  the  clipper  easy.  It 
was  all  the  more  important,  therefore,  that  such  uniformity 
should  be  secured  as  was  possible.  In  1208,  all  the  moneyers, 
assayers,  and  keepers  of  dies  were  summoned  from  London, 
Winchester,  Exeter,  Chichester,  Canterbury,  Kochester, 
Ipswich,  Norwich,  Lynn,  Lincoln,  York,  Carlisle,  Northamp¬ 
ton,  Oxford,  S.  Edmundsbury,  and  Durham,  to  appear  at 
Winchester  with  their  old  dies ;  these  were  taken  from  them, 
and  they  were  sent  back  with  new  ones  all  of  one  pattern, 
— a  precaution  often  repeated.96  This  expedient  had  the 
additional  advantage  of  hastening  the  slow  tendency  towards 
uniformity  in  the  “  type  ”  or  pattern  of  the  coins.  As  early 


170  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

as  the  reign  of  Henry  II.  the  number  of  types  had  been 
reduced  to  two,  and  at  last,  under  Edward  I.,  it  was  limited 
to  one.  The  first  recorded  public  trial  of  the  quality  of  the 
coins  issued  was  in  1248; 97  in  1270  a  general  assay  of  the 
coins  in  use  throughout  the  kingdom  was  ordered ; 98  and 
the  first  regular  “  trial  of  the  pix,” — an  examination  of  the 
coins  recently  struck  at  the  mints  of  London  and  Canter¬ 
bury,  by  the  barons  of  the  Exchequer, — was  in  1281  or 
1282.99  And  gradually  we  find  the  local  mints  brought  to 
some  extent  under  a  central  authority,  and  their  number 
reduced.  In  1279,  a  skilled  coiner  from  Marseilles  was 
made  master  of  the  mint,  with  authority  to  make  money 
at  London,  Canterbury,  Bristol,  and  York;  and  under 
Edward  III.  pennies  were  struck  only  at  London,  York, 
Durham,  and  perhaps  Canterbury,  and  gold  coins  only  at 
London.100 

The  quality  of  the  metal  of  which  the  English  penny  was 
composed  was  almost  uniformly  good ;  but  in  its  weight 
there  were  considerable  variations.  In  this,  as  in  all  other 
parts  of  their  administration,  the  English  sovereigns  were 
greatly  influenced  by  the  example  of  the  Frank  kingdom. 
Charles  the  Great  had  taken  for  his  standard  a  pound  con¬ 
siderably  heavier  than  that  by  which  the  Merovingian 
moneyers  had  reckoned;  his  pennies  averaged  22*5  grains 
troy  ;  and  the  English  penny,  weighing  at  first  about  18 
grains,  nearly  reached  this  standard  under  Egbert  and  Ethel- 
wulf.  But  as  the  unity  of  the  Frank  empire  disappeared 
under  the  later  Carlings,  western  Francia  reverted  to  its 
older  standard,  and  the  deniers  issued  during  the  reign  of  the 
Capetian  kings  weighed  only  about  16J  grains  troy.  This 
change  was  not  without  its  influence  in  England  :  the  extra¬ 
ordinary  lightness  of  many  of  Canute’s  pennies,  some  only 
weighing  12  grains  troy,  may  be  explained  as  due  to  imi- 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  171 


tation  of  the  equally  light  Scandinavian  “pening;”  hut  the 
Confessor’s  coins  were  as  light  as  those  issued  by  his  con¬ 
temporaries  in  France,  and  no  improvement  took  place 
under  the  Norman  kings.  Meanwhile,  however,  the  Caroline 
standard,  “the  pound  of  Charles  the  Great,”  had  remained  in 
use  in  the  eastern  kingdom,  the  later  kingdom  of  Germany ; 
and  the  penny  based  upon  it  came  to  be  known  in  England 
and  France  as  the  sterling  penny,  in  contradistinction  especi¬ 
ally  to  the  French  denier,  based  on  the  lighter  livre  Tournois. 

It  seems  to  have  been  Henry  II.  who  at  last  caused 
England  to  definitely  revert  to  the  earlier  and  heavier 
standard;  215  of  the  pence  issued  in  1180  are  said  to  have 
weighed  as  much  as  240  of  those  previously  in  circulation. 
From  this  time  forth  our  whole  system  of  weights  and 
measures  was  based  on  the  sterling  penny  of  22\  grains  troy 
or  32  wheat  grains.  The  Assize  of  Weights  and  Measures , 
variously  assigned  to  Henry  III.  and  Edward  I.,  begins 
thus  :  “  By  consent  of  the  whole  realm,  the  king’s  measure 
was  made,  so  that  an  English  penny  called  sterling,  round 
and  without  clipping,  shall  weigh  32  grains  of  wheat  in  the 
midst  of  the  ear.  Twenty  pence  make  an  ounce,  and  twelve 
ounces  make  a  pound,  and  eight  pounds  make  a  gallon  of 
wine,  and  eight  gallons  of  wine  make  a  bushel  of  London.” 101 

Not  only  did  the  Government  strive  thus  to  maintain  and 
improve  the  ancient  coinage  of  the  kingdom;  it  took  the 
initiative  in  introducing  into  circulation  money  of  other 
denominations  than  that  to  which  the  people  were  accustomed, 
when  it  saw  that  they  were  called  for  by  the  new  needs  of 
the  time.  The  round  silver  halfpennies  and  farthings,  issued 
in  the  first  half  of  the  thirteenth  century,  were  needed,  not 
only  in  the  retail  trade  which  accompanied  the  multiplication 
of  gilds  and  markets,  but  also  to  facilitate  the  commutation 
of  agricultural  services.  The  gold  coinage  of  Henry  III. 


172 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


was  indeed  premature ;  but  that  of  Edward  III.  was  almost 
at  once  felt  to  satisfy  a  want.  Yet  so  strong  was  the 
prejudice  in  favour  of  the  usual  penny  piece,  that  neither  of 
these  new  coinages  was  at  first  popular ; 102  and  we  can  hardly 
doubt  that  if  the  supply  had  been  left  to  private  initiative, — 
supposing  that  to  have  been  even  conceivable, — the  country 
would  have  had  to  wait  much  longer  than  it  did  for  these 
useful  instruments  of  exchange.103  It  must,  however,  be 
noticed  that  the  inconvenience  of  possessing  a  coinage  all  of 
one,  and  that  a  comparatively  low,  denomination  was  obvi¬ 
ated,  so  far  as  the  reckoning  of  payments  and  the  keeping  of 
accounts  were  concerned,  by  the  use  of  what  is  called  money 
of  account ,  i.e.  a  unit  or  units  of  reckoning  not  actually  existing 
as  coins,  but  standing  in  some  clear  and  universally  accepted 
relation  to  the  coins  actually  in  circulation.  Such  were  in 
England,  from  a  period  certainly  earlier  than  the  Norman 
Conquest,  the  pound,  mark,  and  shilling.  It  was  not  until 
the  reign  of  Henry  VII.,  that  pieces  named  shillings  and 
pounds  were  actually  struck.  The  difficulties  caused  by  the 
practice  of  clipping  were  also  doubtless  largely  overcome  by 
the  plan,  frequently  resorted  to,  of  making  large  payments 
by  weight  and  not  by  tale}01 

England  had  thus  been  provided  with  a  satisfactory 
currency;  but  without  the  constant  vigilance  of  the  Govern¬ 
ment  it  would  soon  have  been  lost.  Counterfeit  coin  was 
struck  abroad  in  great  quantities,  and  brought  by  adven¬ 
turers  into  England.  A  statute,  ascribed  to  the  reign  of 
Edward  II.,  distinguishes  .  between  the  money  “  with  a 
mitre,”  of  which  twenty  shillings  weigh  only  sixteen  shillings 
and  fourpence  of  English  money ;  two  sorts  of  money  “  with 
lions,”  equally  light ;  money  made  of  copper  and  blanched ; 
money  made  in  Germany  of  the  same  weight  as  the  mitre 
money  but  bearing  the  name  of  Edward ;  copper  coin  thinly 


Chap.  ffi.J  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 73 


plated  with  silver,  and,  finally,  clipped  coin.  “  The  moneys 
which  are  made  or  dipt  out  of  England  are  chiefly  brought 
by  merchants,  and  because  they  know  that  search  is  made 
for  them  at  Dover,  they  put  them  into  clothes  or  bales  ;  then 
they  come  not  to  Dover  or  Sandwich,  but  they  come  to 
London,  or  into  Essex,  or  into  Suffolk  or  into  Norfolk  or  to 
Hull,  or  into  Lindsay,  or  to  some  other  ports  of  England  where 
they  expect  to  find  no  hindrance.  The  which  things,  if  they 
should  be  long  permitted  to  be  so,  would  bring  the  money  of 
England  to  nothing.”  105 

This  importation  of  base  coin,  like  the  clipping  of  money 
within  England  itself,  was  an  evil  from  which  the  country 
to  some  extent  suffered  throughout  the  Middle  Ages :  the 
Government  tried  to  meet  it  by  very  similar  measures,  and 
especially  by  visiting  the  crime,  when  an  offender  was  caught, 
with  loss  of  life  and  goods.106  Yet,  as  the  danger  was  really 
greater,  it  called  for  a  special  organization  to  cope  with  it. 
Accordingly  it  was  ordered,  by  the  statute  De  Falsa  Moneta 
of  1299,  that  the  commonalty  of  every  port  should  choose  two 
wardens  to  enforce  the  prohibition.  All  whom  they  dis¬ 
covered  bringing  false  money  into  England  they  were  to  send 
to  the  county  gaol.  Merchants  bringing  money  into  England, 
whatever  it  might  be,  w^ere  bound  to  give  it  up  to  the 
wardens  :  if,  after  assay,  the  money  proved  to  be  good  “  ster¬ 
lings,” — apparently  whether  struck  in  England  or  no, — it  was 
to  be  returned,  and  could  be  used  in  England;  but  all  “  money 
that  runs  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  King  of  France,”  being,  as 
we  have  seen,  of  less  weight  and  also  of  baser  metal,  was  to  be 
retained,  and  its  value  given  to  the  merchants  in  English 
money.  A  later  statute  entirely  prohibits  the  circulation  of 
any  other  coin  in  this  country  than  that  of  the  King  of 
England,  Ireland,  and  Scotland.107  Merchants  were  to  take 
to  the  Tables  of  Exchange,  set  up  at  Dover  and  other  ports, 


174 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


all  the  bullion,  silver  plate,  and  silver  coin  they  brought 
with  them,  and  were  there  to  receive  English  coin  where¬ 
with  to  carry  on  their  trade.108  But  if  foreign  money  was 
not  to  be  brought  in,  it  was  again  and  again  enacted  that 
English  money  should  not  be  taken  out  without  special 
license  of  the  king.109  Englishmen  about  to  travel  abroad 
were  to  take  their  money  to  the  king’s  Exchange  at  the 
port  of  embarkation,  and  were  there  to  receive  its  equivalent 
in  foreign  money.  But  special  license  to  take  English 
money  was  certainly  given  in  exceptional  cases,  where  the 
merchants  were  able  to  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
Government  that  such  permission  was  necessary  for  their 
business.  The  prohibition  went  beyond  the  exportation  of 
coin,  and  included  silver  in  plate  or  in  any  other  form ;  and 
to  this  Edward  III.,  in  1335,  looking  forward  to  his  new 
coinage,  added  vessels  of  gold.  Such  measures  seem,  at  first 
sight,  remarkably  like  those  prompted  by  the  “  mercantile  ” 
theory  in  the  sixteenth  century,  when  the  policy  of  the 
Government  was  directed  towards  increasing  the  national 
store  of  the  precious  metals.  But  throughout  the  legislation 
of  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries  there  is  no  trace  of 
any  desire  to  increase  the  amount  of  gold  and  silver  in  the 
country ;  its  one  motive  is  to  retain  within  England  the 
currency  that  had  with  so  much  trouble  been  created.110  The 
only  enactment  that  seems  at  all  of  mercantilist  colour  is  that 
in  a  statute  of  1340,  that  exporters  of  wool  shall  give  surety 
to  import  within  three  months  and  bring  to  the  king’s 
exchange  for  every  sack  of  wool,  silver  to  the  value  of  two 
marks.111  But  this  may  be  regarded  as  an  awkward  device  for 
securing  for  the  royal  mints  the  bullion  necessary  to  replace 
the  wear  and  tear  of  the  currency,  rather  than  as  a  deliberate 
plan  for  increasing  the  stock  of  silver  in  the  country.  The 
later  “  mercantilism,”  whether  in  the  earlier  form  which  aimed 


Chap.  1IL]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 75 


at  preventing  money  leaving  England  by  direct  prohibition, 
or  in  the  later  form  which  aimed  at  increasing  the  national 
store  of  money  through  the  “balance  of  trade,”  regarded  the 
trade  of  England  as  a  whole ,  and  compared  it  with  that  of 
other  countries.  But  we  have  seen  that  such  a  view  of 
English  trade  had  scarcely  yet  begun  to  be  entertained.112 

We  are  so  accustomed  to  the  governmental  monopoly 
of  the  business  of  coinage,  that  we  take  it  as  a  matter  of 
course,  as  a  service  falling  naturally  within  “  the  limit  of 
State  duty.”  J.  S.  Mill  thought  that  “no  one,  even  of  those 
most  jealous  of  State  interference,  has  objected  to  this  as  an 
improper  exercise  of  the  powers  of  Government, ”4  though  “  no 
reason  can  be  assigned,  except  the  simple  one  that  it  con¬ 
duces  to  general  convenience.” 113  But  there  have  not  been 
altogether  wanting  theorists  who  have  argued  that  it  would 
have  been  better  for  the  State  to  have  left  the  currency 
altogether  alone.  Let  individuals,  it  has  been  urged,  issue 
money,  if  they  think  it  profitable,  and  can  induce  people  to 
receive  it,  and  let  us  trust  to  self-interest  to  prevent  a  bad 
currency  getting  into  circulation.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  not 
content  with  arguing  that  the  Government  monopoly  is  a 
“breach  of  the  law  of  equal  freedom,”  and  causes  society 
“  to  pay  more  for  its  metallic  currency  than  would  otherwise 
be  necessary,”  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  “  the  debasement  of 
coinage,  from  which  our  forefathers  suffered  so  much,  was 
made  possible  only  by  legal  compulsion,  and  would  never 
have  been  possible  had  the  currency  been  left  to  itself.” 114 
The  justification,  however,  for  the  action  of  Government, 
both  as  to  false  or  unauthorized  moneyers  in  England,  and 
as  to  the  money  of  foreign  countries,  rests  on  the  circumstance 
noticed  by  Sir  Thomas  Gresham  in  the  sixteenth  century, 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  bad  money  drives  out  good,  and  good 
money  cannot  drive  out  bad.  This  Gresham's  law  or  theorem 


ECONOMIC  HIS  TOE  Y  AND  THEORY.  [Book  t. 


176 

is  true  whether  the  currency  is  depreciated  in  consequence 
of  the  issue  of  had  money  or  not.U5  If  it  is  not  depreciated, 
and  the  false  coins  pass  at  their  nominal  value,  it  will 
become  the  interest  of  all  those  who  have  to  pay  considerable 
sums  to  pay  in  the  light  or  base  money ;  the  good  coins  will 
be  withdrawn  from  circulation  by  coiners,  melted  and  re¬ 
coined  with  alloy  or  of  deficient  weight,  and  reissued,  or 
else  exported  as  bullion  to  foreign  markets  and  mints.  If 
it  is  depreciated,  the  good  money  will  sink  in  common  estima¬ 
tion  as  much  as  the  bad ;  most  people,  indeed,  will  scarcely  be 
able  to  tell  the  difference ;  and  it  will  become,  in  the  same 
manner,  the  interest  of  all  those  who  can  discern  the  differ¬ 
ence,  to  keep  back  the  good  coins  and  melt  them  down  to  be 
recoined  into  a  greater  amount  of  base  money.  Thus  the 
inevitable  result  of  free  trade  in  coinage  would  be,  not  that 
the  good  would  be  preferred  to  the  bad,  but  that  the  bad 
would  altogether  drive  out  or  absorb  the  good,  and  become 
progressively  worse.  And  this,  in  an  early  stage  of  trade, 
would  probably  have  the  further  result  that  people  would 
become  suspicious  of  every  coin,  and  try  to  do  without  the 
use  of  money  altogether,  falling  back  on  barter.  Thus  the 
very  purpose  of  a  coinage,  to  assist  trade  to  rise  above  mere 
barter,  would  be  defeated. 

But,  it  may  be  further  urged,  why  should  not  the  Govern¬ 
ment,  while  taking  measures  to  prevent  false  money  circu¬ 
lating,  have  permitted  good  money  to  be  exported  and 
imported  according  as  individuals  deemed  it  advantageous. 
Ricardo  has  argued,  and  most  economists  have  agreed  with 
him,  that  if  complete  liberty  existed  in  this  matter,  a  country 
would  nevertheless  always  have  the  amount  of  currency  needed 
for  its  exchanges.  For  if  a  country,  under  its  own  special 
conditions  as  to  rapidity  of  circulation,  had  less  currency  in 
proportion  than  other  countries,  it  would  be  impossible  to 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  If? 


give  as  much  money  for  a  commodity  there  as  abroad ;  that 
is  to  say,  commodities  would  be  cheaper  there  than  elsewhere. 
It  would  then  become  the  interest  of  foreign  merchants  to 
buy  such  commodities  in  that  country,  and  for  that  purpose 
to  take  money  there,  since  they  could  obtain  more  for  it 
there  than  at  home.  In  the  opposite  case,  of  a  superfluity  of 
currency,  prices  would  rise,  and  it  would  be  the  interest  of 
the  merchants  of  that  country  to  export  money  to  purchase 
goods  elsewhere.  So  that,  merely  by  the  fluctuation  of  price, 
a  country  must,  as  a  rule,  retain  the  amount  of  money 
necessary  for  its  exchanges.  “  Money,”  says  Eicardo,  “  can 
never  be  exported  to  excess;”  never  to  such  an  extent  “as 
to  occasion  a  void  in  the  circulation.”  m 

We  need  not  consider  here  whether  such  a  proposition 
would  be  entirely  true,  even  under  modern  conditions  and 
with  complete  freedom  of  trade.  But  it  must  be  noticed 
that,  even  if  such  an  equilibratory  movement  of  prices  had 
been  possible  in  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  century,  it 
would  have  been  attended  with  serious  evils.  For,  through¬ 
out  the  Middle  Ages,  Europe,  and  therefore  each  nation,  had 
a  supply  of  the  precious  metals  extremely  small  when  com¬ 
pared  with  that  after  the  discovery  of  America.  It  has 
been  roughly  estimated  that  the  amount  in  circulation  from 
the  ninth  to  the  fifteenth  century  was  but  a  tenth  of  what 
it  had  become  by  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century.117  Thus 
a  withdrawal  of  money,  small  in  itself,  would  have  had  a 
most  embarrassing  effect  on  domestic  trade.  Prices  might 
easily  have  gone  down  to  an  extent  which  would  have 
checked  production, — especially  as  the  difficulties  of  com¬ 
munication  were  so  great  that  each  market  was  practically 
dependent  on  the  amount  of  money  localhj  current.  In  the 
long  ran,  money  might  have  been  drawn  to  England  by 
low  prices;  but,  meanwhile,  production  would  have  been 


N 


173 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


impeded,  and,  what  is  still  more  important,  the  whole 
economic  teaching  of  the  Church  and  the  whole  economic 
policy  of  the  State  would  have  been  rendered  imprac¬ 
ticable.  For  what  that  teaching  and  policy  aimed  at  was 
a  fair  price,  which  it  was  believed  could  only  be  found  in 
a  stable ,  regulated  price.  And  free  withdrawal  of  currency 
would  have  made  such  stability  and  regulation  of  price 
impossible. 

§  19.  Next  in  importance  to  a  trustworthy  currency  were 
trustworthy  weights  and  measures.  “Let  there  be  just 
weights  and  measures,”  ran  the  decree  of  a  council  at  Mainz, 
quoted  in  the  Corpus  Juris  Canonici.  “  If  any  one  presume  to 
alter  just  weights  and  measures  for  the  sake  of  gain,  let  him 
do  penance  for  thirty  days  on  bread  and  water.”  118  We  have 
seen  that  Aquinas,  while  laying  down  general  principles  as 
to  trade,  carefully  abstains  from  prescribing  the  authorities 
by  whom  or  the  means  by  which  these  principles  are  to  be 
enforced ;  it  is  all  the  more  significant,  therefore,  that  in  this 
one  matter  he  departs  from  his  usual  practice,  and  distinctly 
assigns  to  the  secular  authorities  the  duty  of  fixing  standards 
of  weight  and  quantity.119 

As  early  as  the  tenth  century,  English  kings  had 
attempted  to  prevent  the  use  of  fraudulent  measures ;  and 
the  laws  of  Edgar,  Ethelred,  Canute,  and  William  the 
Conqueror  contain  general  precepts  that  men  should  avoid 
false  measures,  or  that  they  should  make  their  measures 
correct.120  But  there  was  no  definition  of  what  true  weights 
and  measures  were,  except  in  the  enactment  of  Edgar  that 
weights  and  measures  should  everywhere  be  the  same  as  at 
London  and  Winchester ;  and  it  is  obvious  that  the  task  of 
preventing  fraud  would  be  rendered  all  the  greater  if  the 
Government  came  into  conflict  with  the  natural  prejudice 
of  every  district  in  favour  of  its  own  standards. 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 79 


Not  before  tbe  end  of  the  twelfth  century  was  it  possible 
to  set  about  the  work  in  good  earnest.  By  that  time  a 
strong  administrative  system  had  been  created.  The  plan 
of  calling  upon  some  four  or  six  men  in  every  county  and 
town  to  assist  the  Government  in  enforcing  its  measures  had 
been  found  practicable;  and  these  local  agents  of  the  execu¬ 
tive  were  supervised  and  controlled  by  itinerant  judges. 
The  method  which  had  been  effective  in  taxation  and  judicial 
procedure  might,  the  ministers  of  Bichard  I.  thought,  be 
applied  to  this  even  more  difficult  matter.  Accordingly,  in 
1197,  was  issued  the  Assize  of  Measures .m  It  enacted  that 
weights  and  measures  should  everywhere  be  the  same  ;  that 
four  or  six  lawful  men  in  every  city  or  borough  should  be 
assigned  to  carry  out  the  assize ;  and  that  offenders  should 
be  commited  to  prison  and  their  chattels  forfeited.  According 
to  a  later  tradition  of  the  city  of  London,  all  measures  then 
in  use  were  at  the  same  time  examined,  and  made  to  agree, 
and  standards  were  deposited  in  London.122  Next  year  the 
itinerant  justices  were  ordered  to  inquire  whether  the 
assigned  guardians  of  the  assize  in  each  town  were,  doing 
their  duty.123  The  regulation  apparently  met  with  general 
approval,  for  it  was  inserted  among  the  articles  of  the  Great 
Charter,  with  the  addition  that  the  measure  of  corn  was  to 
be  the  London  quarter.124 

The  rule  of  uniformity, — not  that  the  same  measures  were 
to  be  used  for  all  articles,  but  that  the  same  measure  should 
be  used  in  each  place  for  the  same  articles, — was  frequently 
repeated  by  subsequent  assize,  writ,  and  statute,  especially 
by  the  assize  of  measures  ascribed  to  1303,  which  took  the 
sterling  penny  of  32  corn  grains  (or  22^-  grains  troy)  as 
the  unit  of  reckoning.125  Under  Edward  II.,  the  Treasurer 
hit  upon  the  plan  of  having  model  brass  ell-yards  and 
bushels  made  in  London,  and  distributed  over  the  country. 


I  SO  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  IBook  I. 

Yet  it  is  clear  that  the  central  executive  would  have  been 
unable  to  enforce  regulations  which  could  so  easily  be  evaded, 
had  they  not  been  assisted  by  the  local  authorities;  and 
whatever  doubt  we  may  have  as  to  the  efficacy  of  the  earlier 
royal  enactments,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  the  four¬ 
teenth  century  the  municipal  authorities  in  the  chief  towns 
took  the  matter  vigorously  in  hand,  and  did  succeed  in 
compelling  the  use  in  each  town  of  certain  standards.126  But 
though  these  enactments  did  much  to  lessen  fraud,  they  did 
not  secure  uniformity  of  standard  throughout  the  country ; 
and  local  differences,  as,  for  instance,  in  the  number  of  ounces 
in  the  pound,  remain  until  the  present  time. 

The  peculiar  importance  of  the  English  cloth  manufacture 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that,  while  Bichard’s  assize  of  measures 
did  not  for  any  other  commodity  prescribe  that  it  was  only 
to  be  sold  in  certain  quantities,  it  did  prescribe  a  neces¬ 
sary  length  and  width  for  every  piece  of  cloth  offered  for 
sale :  “  It  is  ordained  that  woollen  cloths,  wherever  they  are 
made,  shall  be  made  of  the  same  width,  to  wit,  of  two  ells 
within  the  lists,  and  of  the  same  goodness  in  the  middle  and 
sides.”  This  rule  was  repeated  by  the  Great  Charter,  in 
spite  of  the  opposition  which  merchants,  especially  at  the 
Stamford  fair,  had  offered  to  its  execution.  Under  Edward 
I.  a  special  officer  was  appointed  to  see  that  the  assize  was 
carried  out,  with  “  the  custody  of  aulnage  and  of  the  assize 
of  cloth  both  English  and  foreign  sold  throughout  England.” 
The  office  of  aulnager  existed  until  the  reign  of  William  III., 
with  an  importance  increasing  for  the  first  century  of  its 
history,  but  thenceforward  steadily  diminishing.  With  the 
appearance  of  new  qualities  of  cloth,  in  consequence  of 
the  immigration  of  Flemish  weavers  in  the  second  half  of 
the  fourteenth  century,  the  simple  regulation  as  to  two  ells 
gave  way  to  careful  distinctions  and  numerous  standards. 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  l8l 

And  in  1353  there  was  a  significant  change.  In  a  statute  of 
that  year  it  was  enacted  that,  whereas  foreign  merchants  are 
deterred  from  coming  to  England  because  they  forfeit  their 
cloth  if  it  be  not  of  assize,  henceforth  cloth  shall  not  be 
forfeited,  but  “  the  king’s  aulnager  shall  measure  the  cloth 
and  mark  the  same,  by  which  mark  a  man  may  know  how 
much  the  cloth  containeth,  and  by  as  much  as  the  cloth  shall 
be  found  less  than  the  assize,  allowance  or  abatement  shall 
be  made  to  the  buyer.”127  The  Government  gave  up  the 
attempt  to  secure  that  all  cloths  offered  for  sale  should  be 
of  a  certain  size;  but  it  did  not  give  up  the  attempt  to 
promote  honest  trade  by  enabling  the  customer  to  easily 
ascertain  for  what  he  was  paying.  To  give  a  public 
guarantee  of  the  size  and  quality  of  certain  goods,  while 
still  leaving  customers  and  dealers  to  make  what  bargains 
they  pleased,  is  a  service  which  the  Government  could  in 
many  cases  perform  both  safely  and  advantageously ;  as  late 
as  1776  Adam  Smith  speaks  with  approbation  of  the  stamp 
on  cloth,  as  affording  some  real  security  to  purchasers. 

§  20.  The  public  authorities  were  not  content  with  having 
thus  provided  society  with  mere  instruments  of  exchange  ; 
with  the  growing  trade  of  the  thirteenth  century  they  felt 
themselves  bound  to  regulate  every  sort  of  economic  trans¬ 
action  in  which  individual  self-interest  seemed  to  lead  to 
injustice.  This  regulation  was  guided  by  the  general 
principle  that  just  or  reasonable  •price  only  should  be  paid, 
and  only  such  articles  sold  as  were  of  good  quality  and 
correct  measure.  Most  of  the  enactments  and  rules  were 
aimed  at  preventing  some  particular  form  of  fraud,  usually 
in  some  particular  article ;  and  no  hard  and  fast  lino  can  be 
drawn  between  the  action  of  the  central  authority  and  that 
of  local  authorities  of  town  or  gild.  Still,  some  of  the 
regulations  were  of  the  nature  of  general  rules  of  trade ;  and 


I  82 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


some  commodities  were  felt  to  be  of  such  general  importance 
as  to  make  it  necessary  for  the  Government  to  give  special 
attention  to  them.  It  will  be  convenient  to  follow  this 
division  in  describing  the  measures  in  question. 

The  rules  of  most  far-reaching  consequence  were  those 
prohibiting  the  allied  practices  of  forestalling ,  engrossing ,  and 
regrating , — terms  which  came  later  to  have  each  a  separate 
meaning,  but  in  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries 
seem  to  have  been  used  almost  as  synonymous  for  any  action 
which  prevented  goods  from  being  brought  by  the  producer 
or  bona  fide  merchant  to  open  market, — the  forestaller  or 
engrosser  buying  them  wholesale,  either  outside  the  town  or 
in  the  market  itself,  and  then  securing  by  means  of  monopoly 
a  higher  price  than  would  otherwise  have  been  paid.  How 
such  tricks  of  trade  were  regarded  is  clearly  shown  in  the  first 
legal  definition  of  the  offence,  which  occurs  in  a  statute  or 
ordinance  variously  ascribed  to  51  Henry  III.  and  13  Edward 
I. :  “  Especially  be  it  commanded  on  the  part  of  our  lord  the 
king,  that  no  forestaller  be  suffered  to  dwell  in  any  town, — 
a  man  who  is  openly  an  oppressor  of  the  poor,  and  the  public 
enemy  of  the  whole  community  and  country ;  a  man  who, 
seeking  his  own  evil  gain,  oppressing  the  poor  and  deceiving 
the  rich,  goes  to  meet  corn,  fish,  herrings,  or  other  articles 
for  sale  as  they  are  being  brought  by  land  or  water,  carries 
them  off,  and  contrives  that  they  should  be  sold  at  a  dearer 
rate.  He  deceives  merchant  strangers  bringing  merchandise 
by  offering  to  sell  their  wares  for  them,  and  telling  them 
that  they  might  be  dearer  sold  than  the  merchants  expected ; 
and  so  by  craft  and  subtlety  he  deceives  his  town  and  his 
country.  He  that  is  convict  thereof,  the  first  time  shall  be 
amerced  and  lose  the  things  so  bought,  and  that  according  to 
the  custom  and  ordinance  of  the  town ;  he  that  is  convict  the 
second  time  shall  have  judgment  of  the  pillory ;  at  the  third 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 83 

time  he  shall  be  imprisoned  and  make  fine ;  the  fourth  time 
he  shall  abjure  the  town.  And  this  judgment  shall  be  given 
upon  all  manner  of  forestalled,  and  likewise  upon  those 
that  have  given  them  counsel,  help,  or  favour.”  128  Among 
other  methods  of  forestalling,  ordinances  of  the  same  period 
especially  mention  those  who  buy  wares  in  a  town  before  the 
hour  fixed  for  the  opening  of  the  market;  and  those  who 
in  ports  go  out  to  ships  laden  with  merchandise  as  they 
enter,  and  46  do  buy  the  merchandise  in  gross  and  then  do 
sell  them  at  greater  and  dearer  prices  than  the  first  mer¬ 
chants  would  do,  to  the  grievance  of  the  common  people.”  129 
In  the  later  years  of  Edward  III.  the  prohibition  of  fore¬ 
stalling  was  again  and  again  renewed  by  statute.130  It  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  during  this  period  that  greater  freedom  of 
trade  was  allowed  between  foreign  merchants  and  English¬ 
men,  and  with  the  advantages  of  trade  came  also  some  of  the 
disadvantages  peculiar  to  its  early  stages. 

The  prohibition,  it  is  clear  from  the  wording  of  the 
statutes,  had  primary  reference  to  those  who  endeavoured  to 
secure  local  and  temporary  monopolies  of  the  supply  of  food, 
especially  of  corn';  though  it^  was  wide  enough  to  cover  all 
similar  attempts  with  other  wares.  The  records  of  the  city 
of  London  furnish  two  excellent  examples,  both  of  the  offence 
and  of  the  w in  which  the  local  authorities  dealt  with  it. 
The  first  of  these  is  in  the  year  1311.  Thomas  Lespicer  of 
Portsmouth  had  brought  to  London  six  pots  of  Nantes 
lampreys.  Instead  of  standing  with  his  lampreys  for  four 
days  after  his  arrival  in  the  open  market,  under  the  wall  of 
S.  Margaret’s  Church  in  Bridge  Street,  he  took  them  to  the 
house  of  Hugh  Matfrey,  a  fishmonger;  there  stowed  them 
away ;  and  sold  them  a  couple  of  days  after  to  Matfrey,  and 
without  bringing  them  to  open  market  at  all.  They  were 
both  Drought  before  the  mayor  and  aldermen,  confessed  their 


1 84  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY. 


[Book  I. 


fault,  and  were  forgiven ;  Thomas  taking  oath  that  hence¬ 
forward  he  would  always  sell  lampreys  at  the  proper  place 
only,  and  Hugh  that  he  would  always  tell  strangers  where 
they  ought  to  take  their  lampreys.  The  other  is  in 
1364,  and,  as  it  concerns  wheat,  is  probably  even  more 
typical.  John-at-Wood,  baker,  was  charged  before  the 
common  sergeant  with  the  following  offence  :  “  Whereas  one 
Robert  de  Cawode  had  two  quarters  of  wheat  for  sale  in 
common  market  on  the  Pavement  within  Newgate,  he,  the  said 
John,  cunningly  and  by  secret  words  whispering  in  his  ear, 
fraudulently  withdrew  Cawode  out  of  the  common  market ; 
and  then  they  went  together  into  the  Church  of  the  Friars 
Minor,  and  there  John  bought  the  two  quarters  at  1 5|d.  per 
bushel,  being  2 \d.  over  the  common  selling  price  at  that  time 
in  that  market ;  to  the  great  loss  and  deceit  of  the  common 
people,  and  to  the  increase  of  the  dearness  of  corn.”  At- Wood 
denied  the  offence,  and  “  put  himself  on  the  country.”  There¬ 
upon  a  jury  of  the  venue  of  Newgate  was  empanelled,  who 
gave  as  verdict  that  At- Wood  had  not  only  thus  bought  the 
corn,  but  had  afterwards  returned  to  the  market,  and  boasted 
of  his  misdoing ;  “  this  he  said  and  did  to  increase  the  dear¬ 
ness  of  corn.”  Accordingly  he  was  sentenced  to  be  put  into 
the  pillory  for  three  hours,  and  one  of  the  sheriffs  was  directed 
to  see  the  sentence  executed  and  proclamation  made  of  the 
cause  of  his  punishment.131 

Such  violent  interference  with  the  liberty  of  the  subject 
seems  to  come  into  hopeless  collision  with  all  modern  prin¬ 
ciples  of  freedom  of  contract.  Not  only  does  it  conflict  with 
“  natural  rights :  ”  it  is  apt  to  seem  obviously  futile  and 
childish,  one  of  the  curious  follies  of  the  Dark  Ages.  “  The 
popular  fear  of  engrossing  or  forestalling  may  be  compared 
to  the  popular  terrors  and  suspicions  of  witchcraft,”  says  Adam 
Smith.  “  The  unfortunate  wretches  accused  of  this  latter 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 85 


crime  were  not  more  innocent  of  the  misfortunes  imputed  to 
them,  than  those  who  have  been  accused  of  the  former.” 182  He 
argues  that  the  corn  merchant  performs  a  most  important 
service  to  the  community  by  equalizing  supply :  it  is  his 
interest  to  keep  back  corn  until  a  time  of  scarcity,  and  by 
selling  it  then,  even  at  a  high  price,  he  prevents  the  price 
being  so  high  as  it  would  have  been  had  the  supply  been 
consumed  when  prices  were  low.  But  it  must  be  noticed 
that  these  laws  did  not  force  the  producer  to  sell  at  any 
particular  time ;  and  Mr.  Rogers,  whose  authority  is  highest 
on  mediaeval  prices,  tells  us  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  “producers 
were  very  acute  in  doling  out  their  supplies  to  the  market. 
The  most  critical  sales  of  the  year  were  those  effected  in 
early  summer,  when  the  amount  of  the  last  year’s  produce 
was  known  pretty  correctly,  and  the  prospects  of  the  ensuing 
harvest  could  be  fairly  guessed.” 133  An  argument  on  which 
Adam  Smith  lays  even  greater  stress  is  that  the  prohibition 
of  forestalling,  by  forcing  the  farmer  to  sell  his  corn  by  retail, 
compelled  him  “  to  divide  his  capital  between  two  different 
employments :  to  keep  one  part  of  it  in  his  granaries  and 
stockyard  for  supplying  the  occasional  demands  of  the  market, 
and  to  employ  the  other  in  the  cultivation  of  his  land.” 
This  made  corn  dearer  in  two  ways :  by  locking  up  part  of 
the  farmer’s  capital  for  a  time,  it  “  obstructed  the  improve¬ 
ment  of  the  land,  and  therefore  tended  to  render  corn  scarcer 
than  it  would  otherwise  have  been ;  ”  and  by  making  the  sale 
of  corn  the  work  of  men  who  had  other  occupations  it  pre¬ 
vented  all  those  economies  and  advantages  which  accompany 
division  of  employments.  But  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
this  argument  has  much  correspondence  with  actual  fact,  even 
with  the  large  farming  of  our  own  time.  Whether  corn  is 
sold  a  month  or  six  months  after  harvest,  the  farmer  will 
need  barns ;  it  would  certainly  not  be  the  best  way  to  get  a 


1 86  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

profit,  for  the  farmer  always  to  look  forward  to  “  selling  his 
whole  crop  to  a  corn  merchant  as  fast  as  he  could  thresh  it 
out.”  The  oxen  or  horses  which  draw  the  plough,  may  be  used 
without  additional  expense  to  carry  the  corn  to  market.  If 
the  farmer  sells  his  corn  immediately  after  harvest,  he  will 
indeed  receive  money  in  hand ;  but  if  the  farm  is  well  culti¬ 
vated  already,  he  will  not  wish  to  set  his  men  to  work  earlier 
than  usual;  and  the  bailiff  or  yardling  in  the  fourteenth 
century  could  not  put  his  money  in  a  bank  and  get  interest 
on  it. 

But  even  if  we  grant  that,  under  modern  circumstances, 
the  producer  who  added  to  the  business  of  production  that  of 
distribution  would  need  to  employ  as  much  capital  in  the 
additional  business  as  the  man  who  was  a  distributer  and 
nothing  else,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  would  require  the 
same  profit.  To  suppose  that  he  would  is  to  assume,  as  most 
economists  have  assumed,  that  “  the  rate  of  profit  tends  to  be 
the  same,  not  only  on  capitals  of  the  same  amount,  but  also 
on  capitals  of  different  amounts.”  But  as  Professor  Sidgwick 
has  pointed  out,134  the  trouble  of  management  by  no  means 
necessarily  increases  in  the  same  proportion  as  the  capital  to 
be  managed.  Even  Mill  allows  that  a  farmer  “  will  expect 
the  ordinary  profit  ”  only  “  on  the  bulk  of  his  capital.  When 
he  has  cast  in  his  lot  with  the  farm  ...  he  will  probably  be 
willing  to  expend  capital  on  it  in  any  manner  which  will 
afford  him  a  surplus  profit,  however  small ,  beyond  the  value  of 
the  risk  and  the  interest  ...  he  can  get  for  his  capital  else¬ 
where.”  135  So  that,  both  because  he  would  probably  not 
deserve  the  same  rate  of  profit  on  all  his  capital,  and  also 
because  he  could  probably  not  insist  on  getting  it,  a  producer 
who  also  acts  as  dealer  may  sell  his  goods  even  more  cheaply 
than  a  man  whose  capital  is  all  in  trade. 

The  above  discussion  touches  only  on  the  theoretic  justi- 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 87 


fication  of  Adam  Smith’s  argument.  A  more  useful  point  of 
view  perhaps  is  this.  The  forestaller  or  engrosser  tried  to 
get  a  temporary  monopoly, — to  create  what  we  now  call 
“  corners.”  We  do  not  interfere  with  such  speculation  now, 
not  from  any  belief  in  the  usefulness  of  such  speculation,  but 
only  because  we  do  not  believe  it  can  to  any  large  extent 
succeed.  But  the  very  attempt  is  still  regarded  with  general 
disapprobation,  and  there  are  signs  that  “  corners  ”  would  not 
be  uninterfered  with  by  the  State  if  they  were  successful  with 
any  commodity  of  great  social  importance.136  During  the 
Middle  Ages  it  may  be  said  that  economic  conditions  were 
such  that  individuals  could,  if  unrestrained,  control  or  get 
into  their  power  the  supply  of  commodities.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  the  supply,  in  the  case  of  corn  and  other 
food  stuffs,  was  necessarily  a  local  one.  Then  came  centuries 
during  which  supply  was  furnished  from  so  many  directions 
that  individuals  could  not  control  it.  At  the  present  time, 
with  the  increasing  centralization  of  business  and  facility 
of  communication,  it  seems  to  be  again  becoming  possible  for 
individuals  to  control  the  supply,  not,  as  in  the  fourteenth 
century,  of  a  town  only,  but  of  the  civilized  world.  And  if 
such  attempts  succeed,  we  may  come  to  look  upon  mediaeval 
legislation  with  somewhat  more  sympathy. 

§  21.  Of  all  articles,  bread  is  that  in  the  price  of  which 
the  community  is  most  interested.  Hence  it  was  the  very 
first  to  be  directly  dealt  with  by  the  Government.  It  did 
not  seem  possible  to  fix  an  unalterable  price  for  corn.  The 
men  of  the  time  might  perhaps  have  argued  that  if  the  agri¬ 
culturist  gave  each  year  the  same  amount  of  labour  to  his 
land  he  ought  to  receive  much  the  same  reward,  and  this 
could  not  be  unless  he  got  a  higher  price  when  the  harvest 
was  deficient.  All  that  the  legislation  we  have  just  noticed 
attempted  to  do  was  to  prevent  any  speculation  in  corn,  and 


i88 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


any  unnecessary  interference  of  middlemen.  There  is,  indeed, 
in  the  London  records,  circ.  1291-1307,  an  entry  referring  to 
“  men  sworn  to  watch  that  no  one  sold  his  corn  above  the 
just  price.” 137  And  the  town  magistrates  were  ready  to 
punish  with  pillory  or  imprisonment  any  persons  fraudulently 
enhancing  prices ;  as,  for  example,  in  1347,  a  man  who 
caused  two  bushels  of  corn  belonging  to  him  to  be  brought 
to  market,  and  then,  “  to  the  increase  of  the  dearness  of  corn, 
offered  for  a  bushel  of  his  own  wheat  1  \d.  beyond  the  common 
selling  price  of  the  bushel  of  wheat  in  that  market  on  the 
same  day  sold.”  138  Somewhat  later  there  is  a  case  in  which 
a  man  was  sent  to  the  pillory  merely  for  following  a  servant 
about  in  the  market  with  a  sample  of  wheat  in  his  hand,  and 
saying  that  “  such  wheat  as  that  he  would  not  be  able  to  buy 
at  a  lower  price  than  21  pence  per  bushel ;  whereas,  on  the 
same  day,  and  at  that  hour,  the  same  servant  could  have 
bought  such  wheat  for  18  pence.”  139  But  it  is  clear,  even 
from  these  examples,  that  the  fair  price  was  left  to  be  deter¬ 
mined  by  free  chaffering  of  the  market-place. 

And  accordingly,  in  limiting  the  price  of  bread,  it  was 
not  attempted  to  establish  an  invariable  standard,  but  only  a 
sliding  scale,  according  to  which  the  weight  of  the  farthing 
loaf  should  vary  with  the  price  of  the  quarter  of  wheat.  Such 
an  Assize  of  Bread  was  first  proclaimed  in  1202,  coming  in 
natural  sequence  after  Henry  II.’s  reformation  of  the  coinage 
and  Richard  I.’s  assize  of  measures.140  In  later  reissues  the 
various  sorts  of  bread  were  distinguished,  and  the  relation  in 
which  their  weights  should  stand  to  “  wastel  bread  of  a 
farthing,  white  and  well  baked,”  was  carefully  fixed.  The 
most  important  of  these  ordinances  is  the  Assize  of  Bread  and 
Ale  attributed  to  51  Henry  III.141  This  contains  a  scale 
fixing  the  change  in  weight  of  the  farthing  loaf  for  each 
variation  of  sixpence  in  the  price  of  the  quarter  of  wheat 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 89 

from  twelve  pence  to  twelve  shillings  :  it  allowed,  therefore, 
for  prices  considerably  lower  and  considerably  higher  than 
were  at  all  usual,  for  during  the  period  1259-1400  the 
average  was  5s.  lOf  d. ;  it  fell  but  once  below  3s .,  namely 
in  1287,  and  then  only  to  2s.  10 \d. ;  only  in  the  two  years  of 
famine,  1315-1316,  did  it  rise  above  12s.142  The  assize  declared, 
on  the  authority  of  the  king’s  bakers,  that,  at  the  appointed 
weights,  “  a  baker  in  every  quarter  of  wheat  may  gain  four- 
pence  and  the  bran,  together  with  two  loaves  for  the  furnage 
(for  the  cost  of  the  oven,  or  for  oven-dues?),  three  halfpence 
for  three  servants  (journeymen),  a  halfpenny  for  two  lads 
(apprentices) ;  for  salt  a  halfpenny,  for  kneading  a  half¬ 
penny,  for  candle  a  farthing,  for  wood  twopence,  for  the 
sieve  three  halfpence.”  143  If  a  baker  violates  the  assize  he 
is  to  be  fined ;  if  the  deficiency  of  weight  is  great  he  is  to  be 
put  into  the  pillory.  The  contemporary  ordinance  called 
Judicium  Pilloriae ,  which  orders  that  six  lawful  men  in  each 
town  shall  have  the  supervision  of  weights  and  measures, 
directs  them  to  inquire  into  the  price  of  wheat  last  market 
day,  and  fix  the  weight  of  “  wastel  of  a  farthing”  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  assize.144  The  enforcement  of  the  assize  soon 
became  part  of  the  work  of  the  ordinary  municipal  authori¬ 
ties.  It  is  ordered  by  a  statute  of  Edward  II.  that  officers 
in  cities  or  boroughs  who  by  reason  of  their  offices  ought  to 
keep  assizes  of  victuals,  so  long  as  they  are  attendant  to 
those  offices,  shall  not  merchandise  for  victuals,  neither  in 
gross  nor  by  retail.145  At  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century 
the  maintenance  of  the  assize  was  added  to  the  duties  of  the 
justices  of  the  peace.146 

How  it  was  enforced  may  be  illustrated  by  a  case 
which  came  before  the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  London  in 
1321. 147  A  certain  William  le  Bole,  a  partner  with  another 
baker  in  an  oven  in  Bread  Street, — clearly  the  home  of  the 


190 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


London  bakers, — was  charged  with  making  light  or  “  cocket  ” 
bread  of  less  than  the  proper  weight.  Two  “  bladarii,” 
or  corn-dealers,  gave  evidence  that  on  the  last  Wednesday 
market  day  the  quarter  of  good  wheat  was  sold  for  eight 
shillings ;  “  to  this  twelve  pence  being  added  for  the  wages 
of  the  bakers  and  other  necessaries  in  baking,  the  quarter  is 
worth  nine  shillings.,,  The  halfpenny  loaf  of  light  bread 
should,  therefore,  they  say,  “  weigh  43 s.  3  Jd.”  William  le  Bole 
foolishly  declared  the  bread  was  not  of  his  baking,  and  that 
he  was  not  a  partner  in  the  bakery  in  question.  At  that,  the 
sheriff  was  bidden  empannel  a  jury  of  twelve  men  of  the  ward 
of  Bread  Street,  and  of  other  neighbouring  wards  ;  and  these 
gave  verdict  that  the  accused  was  a  partner,  and  that  his 
bread  was  3s.  10^d.  under  due  weight.  Whereupon,  for  the 
double  offence  of  breach  of  the  assize  and  denial  of  the 
co-partnership,  William  le  Bole  was  condemned  to  be  drawn 
through  the  city  on  the  hurdle.  This  penalty  for  bakers 
fraud  is  said  to  have  been  first  imposed  by  the  mayor  in 
1283;  and  it  was  not  discontinued  until  the  reign  of 
Henry  VI.148 

From  bread  the  legislator  naturally  turned  his  attention 
to  the  other  necessary  of  mediaeval  life,  ale .  The  Judicium 
Pilloriae  adds  to  its  rules  as  to  bread  and  as  to  forestalling, 
a  short  scale  fixing  the  number  of  gallons  of  ale  to  be  sold 
for  a  penny,  according  to  variations  in  the  price  of  the  quarter 
of  barley :  when  the  quarter  is  at  2s.,  then  4  gallons  for  a 
penny ;  at  2s.  6d.,  then  3^  gallons ;  3s.,  then  3  gallons  ; 
3s.  6d,  then  2J  gallons;  4s.,  then  2  gallons;  and  so  down¬ 
wards,  half  a  gallon  less  for  every  sixpence.149  The  average 
price  of  barley  during  the  period  was  4s.  3f d.,  so  that  the 
consumer  had  probably  to  be  satisfied  as  a  rule  with  two 
gallons  of  ale  for  his  penny.  As  the  average  annual  price 
only  four  times  during  this  period  fell  below  2s.  6d .,  the 


Chap.  HI.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION .  19I 


legislator  seems  to  have  been  unduly  hopeful  in  his  fore¬ 
cast.160  Henceforward  bread  and  ale  were  always  associated : 
brewers  were  supervised  in  the  same  way  as  bakers,  and 
punished  in  the  same  way  if  they  violated  the  assize. 

There  was  a  very  considerable  importation  of  French, 
especially  of  Gascon,  wine  into  this  country.  Its  average  price 
was  little  more  than  twice  the  price  of  ale ;  and  there  is  good 
evidence  that  it  was  consumed  pretty  generally  by  the  middle 
classes,  and  especially  in  the  towns.161  As  early  as  1199  the 
Government  had  attempted  to  regulate  its  price,  both  whole¬ 
sale  and  retail ;  but  instead  of  devising  some  sort  of  sliding 
scale,  it  adopted  the  less  satisfactory  plan  of  fixing  rates 
beyond  which  the  prices  of  the  various  sorts, — wine  of  Anjou, 
wine  of  Poitou,  and  French  wine, — were  not  to  rise.  But 
“  the  merchants  could  not  endure  this  assize,”  and  they  were 
granted  permission  to  sell  wine  at  a  price  half  as  large 
again.162  Yet  the  same  plan  of  fixing  a  maximum  price  was 
adhered  to  throughout  the  next  century.  A  “sextary” 
for  twelve  pence  was  the  appointed  price  :  if  taverners 
demanded  more  than  this,  the  mayor  or  bailiff  was  to  cause 
their  shop  doors  to  be  shut,  and  prevent  their  carrying 
on  trade  until  they  gained  permission  from  the  king ; 163  and 
the  municipal  authorities  were  urged  not  to  wait  until  the 
arrival  of  the  king’s  justices  before  they  inquired  into 
violations  of  the  assize.164  It  is  apparent,  however,  from  a 
statute  of  1330,  that  these  measures  were  not  put  into 
execution.  In  that  year,  Parliament  complained  that  the 
increasingly  large  number  of  taverners  in  the  realm  sold 
unwholesome  wine,  and  also  charged  unduly  high  prices 
“because  there  was  no  punishment  ordained  for  them  as 
hath  been  for  them  that  have  sold  Bread  and  Ale.”  It  was 
accordingly  enacted  “  that  none  be  so  hardy  to  sell  wines 
but  at  a  reasonable  price,  having  regard  to  the  price  at  the 


192 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  L 


ports,  and  the  expenses,  such  as  the  carriage  from  the  port 
to  the  place  of  sale.”  Twice  a  year  the  mayors  or  bailiffs 
of  towns  were  to  make  assay  of  wines,  and  pour  away  all 
that  was  found  corrupt.155  It  would  seem,  however,  that 
this  statute  only  extended  to  other  towns  what  had  been 
ordered  by  royal  writ  for  London  in  1311 :  doubtless  the 
men  appointed  by  the  municipal  authorities  every  half-year 
to  examine  the  quality  of  wine,  exercised  the  power  which 
we  know  they  had  in  London,  of  at  the  same  time  fixing 
the  price  of  wine  of  each  sort  until  the  next  assay.156 

After  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century  the  price  of 
wine  at  least  doubled, — a  rise  easy  to  explain  by  the  plague 
and  the  French  war.167  From  that  time  onward  it  became 
increasingly  difficult  to  regulate  prices  ;  and  the  government 
tried  in  vain  to  influence  the  price  at  which  wine  was 
imported  by  alternately  prohibiting  and  encouraging  Eng¬ 
lish  traders  to  export  it  themselves  from  France  instead  of 
leaving  the  business  in  the  hands  of  Gascogners.  But 
these  difficulties  fall  outside  the  period  we  are  here  consider¬ 
ing.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  great  fight  in  the 
streets  of  Oxford  in  1354,  between  town  and  gown,  arose  from 
a  dispute  between  a  scholar  and  a  taverner  over  a  quart  of 
wine,  and  that  one  of  the  results  of  it  was  to  cause  the  king 
to  “  grant  to  the  chancellor  of  the  university,  excluding  the 
mayor  entirely,  the  complete  supervision  of  the  assize  of  bread, 
ale,  and  wine,  and  all  victuals.” 158 

In  curious  contrast  with  its  anxiety  about  the  price  of 
bread,  the  central  Government  left  the  regulation  of  the  price 
of  meat  entirely  to  the  local  authorities,  contenting  itself 
with  the  enactment  that  butchers  selling  unwholesome  meat 
should  be  severely  punished.159  In  London  the  butchers  were 
under  the  supervision  of  wardens,  whose  duty  it  was  to  bring 
unwholesome  meat  before  the  mayor  and  alderman.  The 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  1 93 


accused  had  the  right  of  demanding  “inquisition  ”  by  a  jury 
into  the  character  of  the  meat ;  and  if  it  was  condemned  he  was 
•  punished  by  being  put  into  the  pillory,  and  having  the  meat 
burnt  before  his  face.160  The  municipal  authorities  also,  at 
least  as  early  as  the  later  years  of  Edward  I.,  fixpd  maximum 
prices  for  the  carcases  of  oxen,  cows,  sheep,  and  pigs.161 

The  town  magistrates,  indeed,  were  not  less  anxious  than 
were  Parliament  and  the  ministers  to  keep  the  trade  in 
articles  of  food  under  due  control.  Besides  carrying  out  the 
assizes  of  bread,  ale,  and  wine,  they  issued  ordinances  regu¬ 
lating  the  prices  of  poultry  and  fish,  appointing  the  markets 
at  which  each  sort  of  food  was  to  be  sold,  and  providing  for 
their  supervision.162  Accounts  of  punishments  inflicted  on 
persons  selling  unwholesome  food  form  a  very  considerable 
part  of  the  town  records.163 

Among  craftsmen  some  were  more  than  others  subject  to 
regulation  by  the  town  magistrates.  They  were  such  as  had 
no  fixed  shops,  but  moved  about  from  place  to  place  to  perform 
particular  pieces  of  work,  “carpenters,  masons,  plasterers, 
daubers,  tilers,  and  the  servants  of  such.”  164  An  ordinance  of 
the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  London  in  the  reign  of  Edward  I. 
fixed  the  wages  of  “  masters  ”  in  all  these  crafts  at  fourpence 
a  day  between  Michaelmas  and  Martinmas,  or  three  halfpence 
and  food  at  the  employer’s  table,  whichever  the  employer  may 
prefer ;  between  Martinmas  and  Candlemas  threepence,  or 
“  one  penny  and  the  table  ;  ”  between  Candlemas  and  Easter 
fivepence,  or  “  twopence  and  the  table.”  Journeymen  are 
to  receive  less.  “  Paviours  ”  are  at  all  seasons  to  receive  two¬ 
pence  for  making  a  piece  of  pavement,  feet  long  and  1  foot 
wide;  carters  for  every  cart  of  sand  or  gravel  of  a  certain 
quantity,  one  penny.  “  If  any  man  of  the  city  give  more  to 
any  workman  than  is  here  written  and  commanded,  let  him 
be  amerced  to  the  city  in  forty  shillings,  without  any  pardon.” 


194 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY,  [Book  L 


There  were,  however,  but  few  other  cases  in  which  the 
municipal  authorities  attempted  to  regulate  wages  or  prices 
before  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century.  It  will  be  well, 
for  the  present,  to  confine  ourselves  to  the  period  preceding 
the  Black  Death,  and  to  leave  the  question  what  effect  that 
calamity  had  upon  industrial  policy  to  a  later  section.  No 
doubt  the  town  magistrates  claimed  the  right  to  regulate 
wages  when  they  thought  proper ;  and  this  right  they  occa¬ 
sionally  exercised ;  e.g.  in  London,  to  regulate  blacksmiths’ 
charges  for  shoeing  horses.165  This  was  a  matter  in  which 
a  traveller  in  a  hurry  might  be  at  the  mercy  of  a  blacksmith. 
So  also  the  charges  to  be  made  by  curriers166  and  leather- 
dressers  167  were  limited.  But,  as  a  rule,  the  price  of  manu¬ 
factured  goods  seems  to  have  been  left  to  be  determined  by 
the  rules  of  the  gilds ;  the  limitation  in  London  of  the  price 
of  spurs  by  civic  ordinance  is  an  almost  solitary  example 
to  the  contrary.168  Unfortunately  we  have  too  little  evi¬ 
dence  to  be  able  to  speak  with  confidence  as  to  how  the  gilds 
regulated  prices.  In  many  crafts  the  artisan  did  not  pur¬ 
chase  the  material  himself,  but  received  it  from  a  customer 
to  be  made  up,  and  received  a  payment  for  his  service  :  these 
payments  in  each  craft  were  doubtless  fixed  by  custom 
and  common  consent,  and  overcharges  seem  to  have  been 
punished.169  The  amount  of  remuneration  when  the  artisan 
only  did  the  work  and  did  not  provide  the  material  would 
doubtless  help  to  determine  the  price  to  be  paid  for  an 
article  when  it  was  bought  ready  made.  The  weak  point 
in  the  system  was  that  when  once  the  gilds  became  firmly 
established  they  tended  to  limit  their  numbers  and  to  raise 
prices.  This  was  a  danger  very  apparent  in  the  later  years 
of  the  fourteenth  century,  but  even  as  early  as  1321  it  had 
begun  to  show  itself  in  the  conduct  of  the  London  weavers. 
The  weavers’  gild  had  been  the  earliest  to  come  into  ex- 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  195 


istence :  it  had  been  forced  to  carry  on  a  long  struggle  with 
the  municipal  authorities  for  the  very  right  of  existence; 
und  now,  within  twenty  years  after  its  final  victory,  it  is 
found  limiting  the  supply  of  cloth  and  the  number  of  men 
in  the  trade.  Yet  the  gilds  were  not  left  altogether  without 
check  :  for  the  wards  of  Candlewick  (i.e.  Cannon)  Street  and 
Walbrook  presented  the  weavers  before  the  king’s  justices, 
on  the  charge  that  “  by  confederacy  and  conspiracy,  in  the 
Church  of  S.  Margaret  Pattens,  they  ordained  among  them¬ 
selves  that  for  weaving  each  cloth  they  should  take  sixpence 
more  than  anciently  they  had  been  wont ;  ”  and  it  would 
appear,  though  the  record  is  imperfect,  that  they  were 
obliged  to  return  to  the  old  charges.170 

§  22.  The  direct  action  of  the  Government  influenced  the 
economic  life  of  society  in  many  other  respects,  both  in  the 
way  of  facilitating  trade,  and  also  by  limiting  it  in  certain 
directions.  Of  these  limitations  the  most  important  was  the 
prohibition  of  usury.  In  the  compilation  known  as  the  Laics 
of  Edward  the  Confessor ,  drawn  up  probably  early  in  the 
twelfth  century,  Edward  is  said  to  have  ordained  forfeiture 
and  outlawry  as  the  penalty  for  usury :  “  the  king  used  to 
say  that  he  had  heard,  when  he  was  staying  in  the  court  of 
the  king  of  France,  that  usury  was  the  root  of  all  vices.”  171 
But  with  the  growth  of  separate  ecclesiastical  courts,  cases  of 
usury  were  removed  from  lay  jurisdiction  :  the  author  of  the 
Dialogue  on  the  Exchequer ,  writing  about  1178,  is  careful  to 
point  out  that  “  against  an  usurious  clerk  or  Christian  layman 
the  royal  power  has  no  action,  while  he  is  yet  alive,  but  he  is 
reserved  to  the  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction  to  be  condemned 
according  to  his  rank ;  ”  though,  upon  his  death,  if  he  had 
not  worthily  repented, — i.e.  directed  by  will  that  restitution 
should  be  made  to  those  from  whom  he  had  obtained  his 
unjust  gains, — his  chattels  were  forfeited  to  the  king.172 


196 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


This  compromise  between  the  two  jurisdictions  was  con¬ 
firmed  by  a  statute  of  1341  :  “  The  king  and  his  heirs  shall 
have  the  cognisance  of  usurers  dead,  and  the  ordinaries  of 
Holy  Church  shall  have  the  cognisance  of  usurers  living, 
as  to  them  pertaineth,  to  compel  them  by  the  censures  of 
Holy  Church  for  their  sin,  to  make  restitution  of  the  usuries 
they  have  taken  against  the  laws  of  Holy  Church.” 173  But 
so  far  were  ecclesiastics  from  being  in  advance  of  public 
opinion,  that  in  the  later  years  of  the  fourteenth  century 
Parliament  frequently  complained  of  the  laxity  of  the 
Church  courts :  and,  as  early  as  1363,  the  municipality  of 
London  were  specially  empowered  by  the  king  to  make 
regulations  against  the  evil.  In  a  case  brought  before  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  in  1377,  the  usurer  was  sentenced  to 
forfeit  double  the  interest  he  had  demanded.174 

In  spite  of  the  law  of  England  and  Christendom,  a  trade 
in  money  which  the  opinion  of  the  time  regarded  as  usurious 
was  carried  on  in  the  thirteenth  century  by  the  Caursines, 
and  in  the  fourteenth  century  by  Lombards.  The  means  by 
which  they  evaded  the  penalties  of  the  ecclesiastical  courts 
are  of  especial  interest,  as  showing  the  development  of  a 
theory  which  in  the  sequel  did  much  to  weaken  the  force 
of  the  prohibition  of  usury,  the  theory  namely  of  “  interest” 
in  the  original  sense  of  that  word.  According  to  Boman  law, 
when  one  party  to  a  contract,  whether  of  sale,  hiring,  or 
of  any  other  sort,  did  not  perform  his  part,  he  could  be  forced 
not  only  to  perform  the  promised  act  or  pay  an  equivalent, 
but  also  to  recompense  the  other  party  for  any  loss  which 
might  have  accrued  to  him  by  the  non-fulfilment, — to  make 
up  id  quod  interest ,  i.e.  for  the  difference  between  the  man’s 
present  position  and  what  it  would  have  been  if  the  con¬ 
tract  had  been  fulfilled.  Thus,  suppose  you  had  bargained 
to  sell  a  horse  and  did  not  transfer  the  horse  to  the  pur- 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 97 


chaser  at  the  appointed  time,  and  suppose  the  latter  were 
a  doctor  and  had  lost  the  fee  he  might  have  earned  through 
being  unable  to  ride  to  a  patient,  you  might  be  compelled 
not  only  to  restore  the  pure  hase-money  but  also  to  make  up 
for  the  loss  sustained.176  Early  mediaeval  legists  divided  the 
cases  in  which  such  a  claim  could  be  put  forward  to  those  of 
damnum  emergens  and  lucrum  cessans ,  loss  arising ,  or  gain  pre¬ 
vented,  by  the  non-fulfilment  of  an  obligation.  And  they 
urged  that  such  a  claim  might  be  properly  put  forward  by 
a  lender  if  the  borrower  did  not  repay  a  loan  at  the  ap¬ 
pointed  time.  The  doctrine  was  early  accepted  by  the 
schoolmen  and  canonists,  so  far  as  resultant  loss  was  con¬ 
cerned  :  and  Aquinas  grants  that  this  recompense  may  justly 
be  previously  bargained  for :  “  A  man  who  lends  may, 
without  sin,  contract  with  the  creditor  [to  receive]  recom¬ 
pense  for  a  loss.  .  .  .  This  is  not  to  sell  the  use  of  money 
[ i.e .  usury ]  but  merely  to  avoid  loss.”  But  the  claim  of  recom¬ 
pense  for  the  cessation  of  gain  was  one  which  the  canonists 
could  not  on  their  own  principle  accept.  They  held  that 
with  the  transfer  of  coins  went  the  right  to  use  them  and 
make  what  profit  was  possible;  and  that  accordingly  the 
lender,  when  he  handed  over  the  coins,  gave  up  any  such 
claim.  “Recompense  for  loss  deemed  to  arise  from  the 
money  not  bringing  any  gain  cannot  be  bargained  for,”  says 
Aquinas,  “for  a  man  ought  not  to  sell  what  he  has  not 
got.”  176  Accordingly  it  was  for  a  long  time  difficult  for  civil 
lawyers  to  lay  stress  on  this  ground  for  compensation,  and 
consequently  they  turned  with  all  the  more  zest  to  the  con¬ 
sideration  of  damnum  emergens .  They  began  by  laying  down 
the  rule,  “  Interest  is  only  owing  where  there  has  been 
delay. ”177  To  have  argued  that  the  mere  fact  that  money 
was  lent  implied  in  itself  a  loss  or  inconvenience  to  the 
lender  which  called  for  reward,  would  have  brought  them 


198 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


into  violent  conflict  with  the  whole  doctrine  of  usury.  Only 
when  the  time  for  repayment  had  passed,  and  the  debtor  still 
did  not  pay,  did  the  creditor  begin  to  gain  a  right  to  more 
than  the  bare  sum  lent.  What  the  inconveniences  or  losses  of 
the  waiting  creditor  might  be  were  not  very  clearly  defined  : 
the  lawyers  contented  themselves  with  imagining  cases  in 
which  the  creditor  might  suffer  loss,  as,  e.g.  by  inability  to 
pay  taxes.378  But  they  came  to  this  pregnant  conclusion : 
since  it  is  allowable  to  a  man  to  avoid  loss  to  himself,  he 
may  justly  bargain  for  a  definite  reward  to  be  paid  for  the 
loss  he  will  receive  by  a  delay  in  payment. 

The  proceedings  of  the  Caursines  in  England  show  the  use 
which  could  be  made  of  such  a  principle.  How  the  town  of 
Cahors  gained  so  evil  a  reputation  as  the  home  of  usurers  that 
Dante  puts  it  by  the  side  of  Sodom,  the  home  of  fleshly  sin, 
in  his  “  Inferno,”  does  not  seem  to  be  known ;  the  term 
“  Caursine  ”  was  probably  very  loosely  applied  in  England 
to  money-merchants  from  southern  France,  and  sometimes 
perhaps  to  merchants  from  Italy.  They  first  came  to  Eng¬ 
land  about  1235,  as  “papal  merchants,”  i.e .  to  assist  in  the 
collection  of  papal  revenues  in  England,  and  in  sending 
them  to  Borne:  and  Matthew  Paris  tells  us  how  even  the 
king  was  heavily  in  their  debt ;  and  how  they  cozened  the 
needy,  “  pretending  not  to  know  that  whatever  is  added  to 
the  capital  is  usury,  however  it  may  be  called.”  Boger, 
bishop  of  London,  in  vain  admonished  them  to  desist  from 
their  enormities.  He  went  so  far  as  to  excommunicate  them, 
and  to  order  them  to  withdraw  from  his  diocese,  especially 
from  the  city  of  London,  “  which  up  to  that  time  had  been 
ignorant  of  such  a  pestilence.”  But,  the  same  chronicler  tells 
us,  the  Caursines  had  such  influence  at  Borne  that  the  bishop 
was  summoned  thither,  and  forced  to  give  up  his  attempt 
to  expel  them.179  In  1240,  “the  king’s  eyes  were  opened,” 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  1 99 

and  they  were  banished ;  but  many  were  able  by  means  of 
bribery  to  conceal  themselves  in  England.180  Most  of  these, 
however,  left  in  1245,  when  the  papal  legate  was  ordered 
to  withdraw.181  But  in  1251  they  were  again  numerous  and 
prosperous  in  London,  and  establishing  themselves  in  great 
palaces;  defying  the  prelates  as  merchants  of  the  pope,  and 
defying  the  populace  through  the  protection  of  the  magnates, 
some  of  whom  Matthew  Paris  accuses  of  intrusting  money 
to  the  Caursines  to  trade  with.  But  the  king’s  conscience 
was  aroused,  and  many  of  them  were  in  that  year  brought 
before  the  secular  courts,  and  condemned  to  imprisonment.182 

How  it  was  that  they  were  able  to  evade  the  laws  both 
of  Church  and  State,  and  so  make  it  possible  for  the  popes 
to  protect  them,  is  seen  from  the  form  of  acknowledgment 
of  debt  which  they  obtained  from  those  to  whom  they  had 
lent  money.  A  copy  is  preserved  by  Matthew  Paris. 

“N  the  Prior,  and  the  convent  of  M,  to  all  who  shall 
see  this  present  writing,  greeting  in  the  Lord.  Know  that 
we  have  received  at  London  .  .  .  from  A  and  B,  for  them¬ 
selves  and  their  partners,  citizens  and  merchants  of  the  city 
of  C,  a  hundred  and  four  marks  of  good  and  lawful  sterlings. 
.  .  .  Which  marks  aforesaid  we  promise  by  lawful  agree¬ 
ment,  and  are  bound  in  the  name  of  ourselves  and  our  Church 
wholly  to  restore  and  repay,  to  the  aforesaid  merchants,  or 
to  one  of  them,  or  to  an  agent  of  theirs  who  shall  bring  with 
him  this  letter,  ...  on  August  1,  at  New  Temple  in  London, 
the  year  of  Our  Lord’s  Incarnation  1235  :  with  this  added 
condition,  that  if  that  money  is  not  paid  at  the  appointed 
place  and  time,  then,  the  appointed  period  being  over,  we 
promise  thereafter  ...  to  pay  them  .  .  .  every  two  months 
one  mark  for  every  ten  marks  as  a  recompense  for  losses 
[pro  recompensatione  damnorum], — such  losses  and  expenses 
as  they  may  thereby  incur  or  suffer  ;  so  that  [recompense  for] 


200  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  t. 

losses,  and  expenses,  and  the  capital  may  be  sued  for,  together 
with  the  expenses  of  one  merchant  with  one  horse  and  one 
servant,  wherever  the  merchant  may  be,  until  the  full  pay¬ 
ment  of  all  the  aforesaid.  The  expenses  also  caused  or  that 
shall  be  caused  in  the  recovery  of  the  money  we  will  pay 
and  restore  to  the  merchants,  or  one  of  them,  or  their  agent. 
This  recompense  for  losses,  interest,  and  expenses  [recom- 
pensatio  damnorum,  interesse ,  et  expensarum],  we  promise  not 
to  reckon  as  part  of  the  principal.  ...  To  fulfil  the  above 
promises  we  bind  ourselves  and  our  Church  and  our  successors, 
and  all  our  property  and  that  of  our  Church,  moveables  and 
immoveables,  ecclesiastical  and  secular,  present  and  to  come, 
wherever  found,  to  the  aforesaid  merchants  and  their  heirs, 
until  full  payment  of  the  above,  recognizing  that  we  hold 
our  property  at  their  good  will.  And  for  the  aforesaid  we 
are  willing  to  answer  anywhere  and  before  any  tribunal  [in 
omni  foro  conveniri],  renouncing  for  ourselves  and  our  suc¬ 
cessors  any  aid  from  either  canon  or  civil  law,  privilege 
of  clergy  and  (clerical)  jurisdiction,  .  .  .  from  customs  or 
statute,  letters,  indulgences,  or  privileges  obtained  or  that 
may  be  obtained  on  behalf  of  the  king  of  England  and  his 
subjects  from  the  Apostolic  see,  .  .  .  the  benefit  of  restitu¬ 
tion,  the  benefit  of  appeal,  letters  of  inhibition  from  the 
king  of  England,  and  every  other  objection  against  this 
instrument.  In  witness  whereof  we  have  placed  our  seal 
to  this  present  document,  April  19,  1235.”  183 

In  this  example,  doubtless  a  genuine  one,  a  sum  of  money 
is  borrowed  nominally  only  for  a  little  over  three  months. 
If  the  convent  chanced  to  be  able  to  repay  it  on  August  1, 
nothing  would  have  to  be  paid  for  the  loan :  but  from  that 
date  onward  they  were  to  pay  for  the  loan  at  the  rate  of 
sixty  per  cent,  per  annum,  seventeen  per  cent,  higher  than 
the  Jews  were  permitted  to  bargain  for.  It  is  obvious  that 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  7 HE0R1ES  AND  LEGISLATION.  201 

if  this  were  permitted,  all  that  the  money  lender  needed  to 
do  to  make  himself  safe  was  to  allow  a  period  during  which 
the  loan  was  gratuitous :  but  this  period  could  be  made  very 
short,  and  the  lender  was  not  likely  to  make  loans  except  to 
those  who  were  not  likely  to  pay  on  the  nominal  settling 
day.  Yet  it  is  interesting  to  notice  the  care  the  lender  takes 
to  make  the  borrower  renounce  auy  protection  he  might 
receive  from  the  canon  law  and  from  ecclesiastical  courts. 
The  terminology  of  the  agreement  is  still  a  little  obscure  :  it 
is  not  quite  clear  whether  the  payment  of  one  mark  for  ten 
every  two  months  is  the  only  obligation  of  the  borrower, 
beside  the  repayment  of  the  capital ;  but  it  is  probable  that 
is  the  meaning,  and  the  repetition  of  the  words  “  loss  ”  and 
“  expense  ”  is  only  in  order  to  give  an  apparent  justification 
for  the  monthly  payment.  Probably  this  was  not  the  only 
formula  used  by  the  Caursines.  Grossteste  is  represented  as 
lamenting  on  his  deathbed  over  these  extortions  of  “the 
merchants  and  exchangers  of  our  lord  the  pope :  ”  they  force 
a  man,  he  says,  who  borrows  a  hundred  marks  from  them 
promising  to  pay  a  hundred  pounds  at  the  end  of  the  year, 
to  sign  an  acknowledgment  that  he  has  received  a  hundred 
pounds ;  and  they  are  harder  than  the  Jews,  for  if,  after  a 
short  time,  the  borrower  offers  to  repay,  they  will  not  take 
less  than  a  hundred  pounds,  while  the  Jews  would  only  ask 
for  the  interest  on  a  hundred  marks  for  the  time  the  bor¬ 
rower  has  actually  kept  the  money.184 

Just  as  the  pressure  of  need  led  prelates  and  religious 
communities,  themselves  perfectly  aware  of  the  prohibition 
of  usury,  to  borrow  money  from  usurers,  so  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  some  of  the  popes,  engaged  at  this  time  in 
their  struggle  with  the  Emperor  Frederick  II.,  and  anxious 
for  all  the  aid  the  Caursine  merchants  could  give  them  in 
raising  money,  were  disposed  to  protect  them  however  near 


202 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


they  might  sail  to  the  wind,  provided  they  did  not  break  the 
letter  of  the  canon  law.  It  is  indeed  very  evident  that 
legislation,  both  papal  and  royal,  was  due  far  more  to  the 
teaching  of  theologians  and  to  a  strong  public  opinion  than 
to  abiding  dislike  of  usury  on  the  part  of  the  legislators 
themselves.  This  is  strikingly  brought  out  by  the  history 
of  the  Jews  in  England.  Their  unpopularity  is  not  suffi¬ 
ciently  explained  merely  by  the  statement  that,  while  the 
king  pillaged  them,  he  permitted  them  to  pillage  the  Chris¬ 
tian  population :  it  was  rather  because,  to  gain  protection 
for  themselves,  they  were  obliged  to  make  themselves  the 
means  by  which  the  king  pillaged  the  nation.185  In  1194, 
it  was  ordered  by  Kichard  I.  that  loans  made  by  Jews  should 
in  each  town  be  made  only  in  the  presence  of  two  appointed 
Christians  and  two  appointed  Jews  and  two  clerks:  the 
acknowledgment  of  debt  was  to  be  duplicated,  one  copy 
given  to  the  Jew  lender,  the  other  put  in  a  chest  or  coffer, 
under  the  charge  of  the  officials  before  mentioned.  No 
change  was  to  be  made  save  in  the  presence  of  the  wardens 
of  the  chest.  When  the  debt  was  repaid,  the  creditor  gave 
the  debtor  a  release,  which  he  had  to  present  to  the  wardens, 
receiving  from  them  thereupon  the  copy  of  the  acknowledg¬ 
ment  (carta)  in  the  coffer.  Such  coffers  existed  in  about 
twenty-six  towns.186  On  this  basis,  and  probably  about  the 
same  time,  was  created  the  Exchequer  of  the  Jews  at  West¬ 
minster, — a  branch  of  the  great  Exchequer,  with  its  own 
justices  and  officials,  and  with  cognizance  of  all  suits  between 
Christians  and  Jews.  At  intervals  the  king  imposed  heavy 
tallages  on  the  Jews, — bringing  in  an  amount  equal  on  an 
annual  average  to  about  a  thirteenth  of  his  revenue.187 
Before  the  order  was  issued  it  was  usual  to  command  a 
scrutiny  or  registration  to  be  made  of  all  the  charters 
contained  in  the  chests  in  the  various  towns,  and  after  this 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  203 


had  been  done  the  chests  were  sealed  up.  A  considerable 
number  of  Jews  were  sure  not  to  be  able  to  pay  the  tallage, 
whereupon  their  “  debts  ”  were  confiscated :  the  charters 
acknowledging  debts  to  them  were  sent  up  to  the  Exchequer 
of  the  Jews,  and  their  creditors  were  forthwith  called  upon 
to  pay  the  king  or  make  terms  with  him.188  The  king’s 
right  of  tallaging  the  Jews  was  therefore  an  indirect  right 
of  tallaging  the  people :  hence  the  clauses  of  Magna  Carta 
ordering  that  interest  shall  not  accumulate  during  a 
minority,  and  that  wives  of  dead  debtors  should  have  their 
dower,  were  really  directed  against  the  king  :  and  the  ex¬ 
pulsion  of  the  Jews  in  1290  is  to  be  placed  by  the  side 
of  “  the  confirmation  of  the  charters,”  as,  like  it,  a  con¬ 
cession  to  a  constitutional  demand.  And  just  as  great  men 
were  accused  of  making  usurious  profit  on  money  which 
they  put  into  the  hands  of  the  Caursines,  so  it  was  com¬ 
plained  by  the  barons,  in  1257,  that  the  Jews, — doubtless 
to  buy  protection, — sometimes  transferred  their  debts  to 
powerful  men,  who  took  the  opportunity  thus  given  to  them 
to  obtain  possession  of  lands  which  had  been  pledged  to  the 
Jews  for  payment.189 

The  rate  of  “  gain  ”  that  Jews  were  permitted  to  receive 
and  usually  did  receive  during  the  thirteenth  century,  was 
twopence  per  week  on  every  pound,  i.e.  about  43 J  per  cent, 
per  annum.190  It  was  to  meet  the  troubles  caused  by  poor 
Oxford  scholars  borrowing  at  such  an  exorbitant  rate,  that 
Grossteste,  while  chancellor,  established  the  first  “chest,” 
that  of  S.  Frideswide.  Out  of  this  loans  were  made  gra¬ 
tuitously  to  scholars  whose  annual  income  was  less  than 
two  marks,  and  in  it  were  placed  the  articles  of  clothing  or 
books  which  they  gave  in  pledge.191  This  example  was 
followed  by  benevolent  persons,  until  in  the  fifteenth 
century  there  were  a  dozen  or  more  of  such  chests.192 


204  ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 

§  23.  Lastly,  mention  must  be  made  of  the  great  service 
which  the  Government  rendered  to  commerce  and  trade  by 
the  establishment  of  a  simple  procedure  to  enforce  the  pay¬ 
ment  of  ordinary  mercantile  debts.  This  was  by  the  Statute 
of  Merchants  or  of  Acton  Burnell  in  1283.  Merchants,  the 
preamble  begins,  have  often  been  injured  by  there  being 
“no  speedy  law”  to  have  recovery  of  their  debts,  and 
many  merchants  have  consequently  refrained  from  coming 
into  the  country.  In  future  a  merchant  is  to  have  the 
power  of  bringing  his  debtor  before  the  mayor.  If  he 
proves  the  debt,  the  debtor  must  affix  his  seal  to  a  “  bill 
obligatory,”  binding  himself  to  pay  on  a  certain  day.  If 
he  does  not  do  so,  he  can  be  brought  again  before  the 
mayor,  who  shall  at  once  cause  his  movables  to  be  sold  up 
to  the  amount  of  the  debt.  If  no  buyer  can  be  found,  mov¬ 
ables  up  to  the  amount  are  to  be  given  over  to  the  creditor ; 
if  the  debtor  has  no  movables  within  the  mayor’s  jurisdic¬ 
tion,  the  mayor  is  to  send  the  necessary  information  to  the 
chancellor,  who  shall  then  cause  a  writ  to  be  sent  to  the 
sheriff  within  whose  county  the  debtor  has  movables,  order¬ 
ing  them  to  be  distrained  upon.  If  the  debtor  has  no 
movables,  he  is  to  be  imprisoned  until  he  comes  to  terms, 
or  his  friends  make  terms  for  him,  the  creditor  meanwhile 
providing  him  with  bread  and  water,  the  cost  of  which  is 
to  be  added  to  the  debt.  If  the  debtor  has  secured  sureties, 
they  are  to  be  proceeded  against  in  the  same  way,  though 
not  unless  the  debtor  has  not  sufficient  property  himself  to 
pay.  Foreign  merchants  are  empowered  to  add  to  the  sums 
owing  to  them  the  cost  of  their  own  maintenance  while 
waiting  for  the  debts  to  be  paid.193 

The  statute  was  of  too  innovating  a  character  not  to 
meet  with  difficulties  in  its  execution.  Two  years  later  it 
was  re-enacted  more  precisely,  because  “sheriffs  sometimes 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  205 


by  malice  and  false  interpretation  delayed  the  .execution  of 
the  statute.” 194  In  1311,  it  was  enacted  among  the  ordi¬ 
nances  that  this  statute  should  only  apply  to  merchants, 
and  to  debts  arising  from  the  sale  of  goods  :  at  the  same  time 
the  number  of  places  at  which  such  suits  might  be  heard 
was  increased  from  the  three  (London,  York,  Bristol)  men¬ 
tioned  in  the  statute  of  the  preceding  king  to  twelve :  New¬ 
castle,  York,  and  Nottingham,  “  for  the  counties  beyond 
Trent,  and  the  merchants  there  coming  and  abiding ;  ” 
Exeter,  Bristol,  and  Southampton,  for  “  the  parts  of  the 
south  and  west ;  ”  Lincoln  and  Northampton  for  merchants 
there ;  London  and  Canterbury,  Shrewsbury  and  Norwich.195 

From  this  time  onward  foreign  merchants  would  find  no 
great  difficulty  in  recovering  debts  owing  to  them  from 
native  traders  :  especially  after  the  Carta  Mercatoria,  in  1303, 
had  established  the  rule  that  in  suits  between  foreigners  and 
Englishmen  the  juries  should  be  composed  half  of  English, 
half  of  natives  of  the  place  whence  the  foreigner  came.  But 
difficulties  long  remained  in  the  way  of  the  recovery  of  debts 
by  an  Englishman  from  a  foreigner  no  longer  residing  in 
this  country.  In  such  cases  the  English  municipal  authori¬ 
ties  had  been  wont  to  confiscate  any  goods  they  might  be 
able  to  seize,  belonging  to  any  merchant  from  the  same 
town.  This  rude  method  of  retaliation  was  but  gradually 
given  up.  Henry  III.,  in  the  later  years  of  his  reign, 
granted  letters  of  protection  to  Ghent,  Bruges,  Ypres, 
Douai,  S.  Omer,  and  Liibek,  promising  that  their  citizens 
trading  in  England  should  be  held  responsible  only  for 
their  own  debts,  or  debts  for  which  they  had  made  them¬ 
selves  sureties.196  But  this  rule  was  not  made  of  universal 
application  until  1353.  In  a  statute  of  that  year  it  was 
enacted  that  merchants  should  only  be  sued  for  their  own 
debts  or  those  of  persons  whose  “  pledges  ”  they  had  been ; 


20  6 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  IBook  1. 


but  if  English  subjects  were  injured  by  the  lord  of  any 
foreign  land  or  her  subjects,  the  king  threatens  to  exercise 
the  right  of  reprisal,  if  the  foreign  prince,  having  been  duly 
warned,  fail  to  provide  that  justice  should  be  done.197  It  has 
been  shown  in  an  earlier  section  that  the  usual  practice  at 
the  middle  of  the  century,  when  a  debtor  residing  abroad 
refused  to  pay,  was  for  the  English  municipal  authorities  to 
write  to  the  authorities  of  the  foreign  town  to  which  he 
belonged,  threatening  reprisal  unless  the  debt  were  paid. 

We  are  now,  perhaps,  in  a  position  to  sum  up  the  cha¬ 
racteristics  of  the  period  we  have  been  considering.  It  was 
one  in  which,  out  of  and  alongside  of  a  village  economy , — a 
condition  of  things  in  which  almost  all  the  economic  life  of 
the  country  was  concentrated  in  a  number  of  agricultural 
groups, — had  grown  up  a  town  economy ,  where  manufactures 
and  trade  were  fostered  and  monopolized  by  civic  com¬ 
munities,  becoming  more  and  more  unlike  the  agricultural 
population,  yet  stimulating  agriculture  by  providing  mar¬ 
kets.  Within  the  manor  groups,  though  there  was  little 
apparent  change  in  everyday  life,  the  plan  of  commutation 
of  services  was  preparing  the  ground  for  the  more  violent 
changes  that  were  to  come :  within  the  towns,  the  burgher 
monopoly  was  slowly  broken  down  by  native  artisans  and 
foreign  merchants.  Dealings  between  man  and  man  were 
influenced  by  principles  which  have  almost  disappeared 
from  modern  life,  but  which  were  then,  to  at  least  a  large 
extent,  enforced  by  the  authority  of  Church  and  State.  The 
royal  authority  secured  for  society  trustworthy  instruments 
of  exchange ;  and  by  helping  to  break  down  the  privileges 
of  isolated  town  communities,  prepared  the  way  for  the 
idea  of  a  national  economy  to  make  its  appearance  in  the 
sixteenth  century.198 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  20  f 


NOTES. 

1.  (a)  S.  Matt.  vi.  19,  20,  24 :  S.  Mark  iv.  19 :  ( b )  S.  Matt.  xix.  23,  24 ; 
S.  Luke  xviii.  24,  25 :  (c)  S.  Matt.  xix.  21 ;  S.  Lukexviii.  22 ;  this  was  the 
message  which  moved  Francis  of  Assisi  to  the  vow  of  poverty  :  ( d )  S.  Luke 
vi.  20,  21,  24,  25:  ( e )  S.  Matt.  vi.  25-32 :  (/)  S.  Luke  vi.  29-34;  ( g )  Acts 
iv.  32,  34,  35. 

2.  Qu.  in  Corp .  Jur.  Canonici ,  Decreti  I.,  distinetio  47,  c.  8  (ed.  1618, 
p.  54). 

3.  Ancient  Law ,  ch.  iv.  “  Similarity  ”  is,  perhaps,  a  fitting  term  for 
some  of  the  most  important  meanings  of  laorris,  “  the  principle  of  equal 
distribution,”  and  of  aequitas ,  “  levelling,”  or  “  the  neglect  of  demarca¬ 
tions  ;  ”  ib.  58-61. 

4.  Justinian’s  Institutes ,  ed.  Moyle,  i.  92 ;  Cor.  Jur.  Canonici ,  Deer.  7., 
dist.  i.,  c.  vii. ;  “Jus  naturale  est  commune  omnium  nationum,  eo  quod 
ubique  instinctu  naturae  non  constitutione  aliqua  habetur,  ut  viri  et 
foeminae  conjunctio,  liberorum  successio  et  educatio,  communis  omnium 
possessio  et  omnium  una  libertas ,”  to  which  it  goes  on  to  add,  not  very 
logically,  “  Acquisitio  eorum  quae  coelo,  terra,  marique  capiuntur,  item 
depositae  rei  vel  commendatae  pecuniae  restitutio,  violentiae  per  vim 
repulsio.” 

5.  Qu.  in  Corp.  Jur.  Canonici ,  Deer.  77.,  causa  12,  quaestio  2.  See  also 
the  quotations  in  Kautz,  Geschichtliche  Entwickelung  der  National-Oeko- 
nomik  (1860),  i.  205. 

6.  The  contrast  between  Christian  teaching  and  that  of  the  Stoics  is 
pointed  out  by  Lecky,  Hist,  of  European  Morals ,  i.  203,  204 ;  ii.  1-4 ;  cf. 
Ecce  Homo ,  pref.  to  fifth  ed.,  xi.  (ed.  1883).  Koscher  points  out  that 
mediaeval  theology  regarded  the  relief  of  the  poor  not  as  a  matter  of 
voluntary  charity,  but  as  an  obligation, — what  Aquinas  calls  debitum 
legale ;  Gescli.  der  Nat.  Oekonomik ,  6. 

7.  Tertullian,  De  Idolatr.,  11 ;  qu.  Knies,  P.  Oe.  vom  Geschicht .  Stand - 
puncte ,  116,  n.  3. 

8.  Kautz,  209. 

9.  “Merito  dictum  negotium,  quia  negat  otium,  quod  malum  est, 
neque  quaerit  veram  quietem,  quae  est  Deus ;  ”  in  Corp.  Jur.  Canonici , 
Dear .  7,  dist.  88,  c.  12  (ed.  1618,  p.  95,  col.  2). 

10.  Epist.  ad  Rusticum ,  c.  9  :  “  Qualitas  lucri  negotiantem  aut  excusat 
aut  arguit ;  quia  est  honestus  quaestus  aut  turpis ;  ”  qu.  Knies,  116,  n.  4. 

11.  Deer.  7,  dist.  91,  c.  3:  “Clericus  victum  et  vestimentum  sibi  arli- 
ficiolo  vel  agricultural  absque  officii  sui  duntaxat  detrimento,  paret.” 


208 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Booe  I 


Cf.  on  the  subject  generally,  Endemann,  Die  Nationalohmomischen 
Grundsdtze  der  canonistischen  Lehre ,  §  17. 

12.  Of.  Roscher,  Gescliichte,  6  :  “  Bei  der  Beurtheilung  dieser  aske- 
tischen  Einseitigkeit  darf  man  niclit  iiberselien,  dass  sie  im  Zeitalter  der 
ffiikeren  Kirchenvater  eine  ebenso  naturliche  wie  lieilsam  Reaction  war 
gegen  den  Egoismus  des  romischen  Recbts,  und  dass  nachmals  ilire  Fort- 
dauer  wahrend  des  germaniscben  Mittelalters  gegeniiber  dein  Faust- 
rechte,  dem  alle  niedereu  Kulturstufen  huldigen,  ebenfalls  nur  wohlthatig 
wirken  konnte.” 

13.  Ortolan,  Roman  Law  (Engl,  trans.),  528,  532.  Cf.  Lyte,  Eist.  of 
TJniv.  of  Oxford ,  (1886),  55. 

14.  Cf.  Maine,  Ancient  Law ,  261;  Early  Hist,  of  Institutions,  391; 
Early  Law  and  Custom ,  343,  344. 

15.  Lyte,  11,  and  references  there  given. 

16.  Maine,  82,  13,  44. 

17.  S.  Matt.  vii.  12;  S.  Luke  vi.  31. 

18.  Digest  IV.,  iv.  16  (4) ;  XIX.,  ii.  22  (3)  ;  “  Quemadmodnm  in  emendo 
et  vendendo  naturaliter  concessum  est  quod  pluris  sit  minoris  emere,  quod 
minoris  sit  pluris  vendere,  et  ita  invicem  se  circumscribere,  ita  in  loca- 
tionibus  quoque  et  conductionibus  juris  est.” 

19.  Codex  IV.,  xliv.  2:  “Rem  majoris  pretii  si  tu  vel  pater  tuus 
minoris  pretii  distraxit,  humanum  est,  ut  vel  pretium  te  restituente 
emptoribus  fundum  venditum  recipias  auctoritate  intercedente  judicisf 
vel,  si  emptor  elegerit,  quod  deest  justo  pretio  recipies.  Minus  autem 
pretium  esse  videtur  si  nec  dimidia  pars  veri  pretii  soluta  est  ”  ( ib .  ii.,  179) 
See  Hunter,  Roman  Laic,  318. 

20.  Augustine,  de  Trin .,  13,  3 :  “  Scio  ipse  hominem,  quum  venalis 
codex  ei  fuisset  oblatus,  pretiique  ejus  ignarum  et  ideo  quiddam  exiguum 
poscentem  cemeret  venditorem,  justum  pretium,  quod  multo  amplius  erat 
nec  opinanti  dedisse.”  See  Knies,  117.  The  phrase  “justum  pretium” 
occurs  in  the  later  Roman  law,  as  in  the  rescript  quoted  in  the  previous 
note,  so  that  the  statement  in  the  text  is  scarcely  accurate ;  but  its  use 
by  the  later  Fathers  and  schoolmen  seems  to  have  been  derived  from 
Augustine. 

21.  Summa  Theologica,  Secunda  Secundae ,  quaestio  lxxvii.,  articulus  i. : 
“Justum  enim  in  commutationibus  humanae  vitae  secundum  leges  civiles 
determinatur.  Sed  secundum  eas  licitum  est  emptori  et  venditori  ut  se 
invicem  decipiant”  (ed.  Paris,  1664,  t.  22,  p.  144).; 

22.  Aquinas  is,  however,  especially  careful  to  point  out  that  though 
everything  really  has  some  one  just  price,  this  cannot  always  be  exactly 
determined,  and  therefore  restitution  should  not  be  insisted  upon  unless 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  2QC) 


the  injury  done  by  a  wrongful  price  is  considerable :  “  Lex  divina  nihil 
impunitum  relinquit  quod  sit  virtute  contrarium.  Unde  secundum  divi- 
nam  legem  illicitum  reputatur  si  in  emptione  et  venditione  non  sit 
aequalitas  justitiae  observata;  et  tenetur  ille  qui  plus  habet,  recompensare 
ei  qui  damnificatus  est,  si  sit  notabile  damnum.  Quod  ideo  dico,  quia 
istud  pretium  rerum  non  est  •punctualiter  determinatum,  sed  magis  in 
quadam  aestimatione  consistit ;  ita  quod  modica  additio  vel  minutio  non 
videtur  tollere  aequalitatem  justitiae,”  ib. 

23.  J.  S.  Mill,  Political  Economy ,  bk.  iii.,  ch.  3.  The  explanation  of 
mediaeval  Church  teaching,  as  aiming  at  determining  price  by  the  cost  of 
production,  was  probably  first  suggested  by  Knies,  part  ii.,  §  3  (ed.  1883, 
p.  116) ;  cf.  Cunningham,  Engl.  Industry  and  Commerce ,  §  43,  pp.  171-173. 

24.  Fawcett,  Manual  of  Pol.  Econ.,  bk.  iii.,  ch.  4  (sixth  ed.,  p.  339).  For 
purposes  of  comparison  this  modern  theory  is  here  stated  without 
criticism ;  but  Mr.  Sidgwick  has  recently  pointed  out  ( Principles  of  Pol. 
Econ bk.  ii.,  ch.  2)  that  “cost  of  production  cannot  be  assumed  to  be 
independent  of  demand.”  The  quotation  on  p.  137,  as  to  the  doctrine  of 
value  not  being  “  the  sure  stronghold,”  is  from  Gustav  Cohn,  professor  at 
Gottingen;  System  der  Nationalohonomie ,  (1885),  i.  488. 

25.  Cf.  Endemann,  Studien  in  der  romanisch-canonistischen  Wirth - 
schafts -  und  Bechts-lehre ,  ii.  37. 

26.  “  Utrum  venditio  reddatur  illicita  propter  defectum  rei  venditae  ” 
is  the  heading  to  articulus  2. 

27.  lb. :  “  In  unoquoque  loco  ad  Rectores  civitatis  [probably  meaning 
primarily  city  authorities]  pertinet  determinare  quae  sint  justae  mensurae 
rerum  venalium,  pensatis  conditionibus  locorum  et  rerum.  Et  ideo  has 
mensuras  publica  auctoritate  vel  consuetudine  institutas  praeterire  non 
licet.” 

28.  Ib .,  artic.  3:  “Cum  enim  venditor  emptorem  ad  emendum  non 
cogat,  videtur  ejus  judicio  rem  quam  vendit  supponere.  .  .  Non  ergo 
videtur  imputandam  venditori,  si  emptor  in  suo  judicio  decipitur,  prae- 
cipitantur  emendo,  absque  diligenti  inquisitione  de  conditionibus  rei.” 

29.  lb.,  “  Si  vero  vitium  sit  manifestum ;  puta  cum  equus  est  mono- 
culus ;  vel  cum  usus  rei  etsi  non  competat  venditori,  potest  tamen  esse 
conveniens  aliis ;  et  si  ipse  propter  liujusmodi  vitium  subtrahat  quantum 
oportet  de  pretio ;  non  tenetur  ad  manifestandum  vitium  rei ;  quia  forte 
.  .  .  emptor  vellet  plus  subtrahi  de  pretio  quam  esset  subtrahendum.” 

30.  Ib. :  “Dicendum  quod  judicium  non  potest  fieri  nisi  de  re  mani- 
festa.  .  .  .  Unde  si  vitia  rei  quae  vendenda  proponitur  sint  occulta,  nisi 
per  venditorem  manifestentur  non  suflicienter  eommittitur  emptori 
judicium.” 

P 


210 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY. 


[Book  1. 


31.  Ib. :  “  Dicendum  quod  vitium  r.ei  facit  rem  in  presenti  esseminoris 
valoris  quam  videatur.  Sed,  in  casu  premisso,  in  futurum  res  expectatur 
esse  minoris  valoris  per  superventum  negotiatorum  qui  ab  ementibus 
ignoratur.  Unde  venditor  qui  vendit  rem  secundum  pretium  quod  invenit , 
non  videtur  contra  justitiam  facer e  si  quod  futurum  est  non  exponat.  Si 
tamen  exponeret  vel  de  pretio  subtraheret,  abundantioris  esset  virtutis, 
quamvis  ad  hoc  non  videatur  teneri  ex  justitiae  debito.” 

32.  Biley,  Memorials  of  London ,  420. 

33.  Artie.  4:  “Negotiari  propter  res  necessarias  vitae  consequendas 
omnibus  licet ;  propter  lucrum  vero,  nisi  id  sit  ordinatum  ad  aliquem 
honestum  finem,  negotiari  ex  se  est  turpe.” 

34.  Ib.:  “Secunda  autem  juste  vituperatur;  quik,  quantum  est  de  se 
deservit  cupiditati  lucri,  quae  terminum  nescit,  sed  in  infinitum  tendit.” 
This  is  derived  from  Aristotle,  Politics ,  bk.  i.,  chaps.  8, 9.  As  to  Aristotle’s 
use  of  7r €pas,  see  Jowett,  Politics ,  vol.  ii.,  part  i.,  p.  30. 

35.  lb. :  “  Lucrum  tamen,  quod  est  negotiationis  finis,  etsi  in  sua  ratione 
non  importat  aliquid  honestum  vel  necessarium,  nihil  tamen  importat  in 
sua  ratione  vitiosum  vel  virtuti  contrarium.  Unde  nihil  prohibet  lucrum 
ordinari  ad  aliquem  finem  necessarium,  vel  etiam  honestum;  et  sic  nego¬ 
tiate  licita  redditur.  Sicut  cum  aliquis  lucrum  moderatum  quod  ne- 
gotiando  quaerit  ad  domus  suae  sustentationem,  vel  etiam  ad  subveniendum 
indigentibus ;  vel  etiam  cum  aliquis  negotiationi  intendit  propter  publicam 
utilitatem,  ne  scilicet  res  necessariae  ad  vitam  patriae  desint,  et  lucrum 
expetit  non  quasi  finem  sed  quasi  stipendium  laboris.” 

36.  The  qualification  “  momentary  ”  is  here  inserted  because  Aquinas 
distinctly  recognizes  that  variation  in  supply  must  cause  variation  in 
price,  as  in  his  example  in  artic.  3,  of  “caristia  frumenti.”  But  the 
canonists  never  conceded  that  price  could  be  determined  by  the  arbitrary 
will  of  buyer  or  seller.  They  argued  that  in  each  state  of  the  market 
there  was  a  just  price  which  dealers  ought  to  recognize.  As  to  the  later 
doctrine  of  the  canonists  and  the  difficulties  into  which  they  fell,  see 
Endemann,  Studien,  ii.  44-46.  For  an  illustration  of  the  practical 
working  of  this  maintenance  of  “  the  common  selling  price  in  a  particular 
market  on  a  particular  day,”  see  Memorials  of  London ,  236. 

37.  S.  Luke  vi.  35,  as  quoted  from  the  Vulgate :  “  Mutuum  date,  nihil 
inde  sperantes.” 

38.  For  the  history  of  the  prohibition,  see  Endemann,  Grundsatze  der 
Canonistischen  Lehre ,  §  2. 

39.  The  law  of  Justinian  had  limited  the  rate  of  interest  to  twelve 
per  cent,  for  loans  on  cargoes,  eight  per  cent,  on  loans  for  business  pur¬ 
poses,  in  other  cases  to  six  and  four  per  cent;  “Jubemus  illustribus 


Chap.  1IL]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  21 1 


quidem  personis  sive  eas  praecedentibus  minime  licere  ultra  tertiam 
partem  centesimae  usurarum  in  quocumque  contractu  vili  vel  maximo 
stipulari ;  illos  vero  qui  ergasteriis  praesunt  vel  aliquam  licitam  negotia- 
. tionem  gerunt  usque  ad  bessem  centesimae  suarn  stipulationem  moderari : 
in  trajecticiis  autem  contractibus  vel  specierum  fenori  dationibus  usque 
ad  centesimam  tantummodo  licere  stipulari  nec  earn  excedere,  licet  veteribus 
legibus  hoc  erat  concessum :  ceteros  autem  omnes  homines  dimidiam  tan  turn 
modo  centesimae  usurarum  posse  stipulari  et  earn  quantitatem  usurarum 
etiam  in  aliis  omnibus  casibus  nullo  modo  ampliari  in  quibus  citra  stipu¬ 
lationem  usurae  exigi  solent.  Nec  liceat  judici  memoratam  augere  taxa- 
tionem  occasione  consuetudinis  in  regione  obtinentis ;  ”  Codex ,  iv.  xxxii. 
26,  §  2.  The  centesima  was  one-hundredth  each  month,  i.e .  twelve  per  cent. 
See  also  Knies,  118. 

40.  Endemann,  Studien ,  i.  119. 

41.  Ortolan  (Engl,  trans.),  542. 

42.  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist .,  ii.  116  and  n.  2.  Francesco  d’Accorso  with 
his  wife  resided  for  some  time  in  the  King’s  Hall,  in  the  northern  suburb 
of  Oxford.  Lyte,  Hist  of  Oxford ,  89,  thinks  “  he  must  surely  have  given 
lectures  on  Roman  law  at  Oxford.” 

43.  Decretales  Gregorii  (quoted  as  “X”),  lib.  5,  tit.  19  (de  usuris ), 
cap.  3  (ed.  1618,  p.  694). 

44.  lb.,  cc.  5,  9. 

45.  Liber  Sextus  (quoted  as  “  VI.”),  lib.  5,  tit.  5  (de  usuris),  c.  1. 

46.  Ib .,  c.  2. 

47.  Clementinarum,  lib.  v.,  tit.  5  (de  usuris),  cap.  unicum. 

48.  Endemann,  Studien ,  i.  27. 

49.  See  n.  39  above,  and  cf.  Cunningham,  Usury,  1,  8. 

50.  Endemann,  u.s .,  i.  19. 

51.  lb.,  27-28. 

52.  Exodus  xxii.  25.  But,  as  Aquinas  saw,  it  might  be  argued  that 
the  prohibition  of  taking  money  from  a  brother  Jew  implied  permission  to 
take  it  from  Gentiles.  Aquinas  grants  this,  but  says  that  it  was  allowed 
on  account  of  the  hardness  of  their  hearts :  “  Quod  autem  ab  extraneis 
usuram  acciperent  non  fuit  eis  concessum  quasi  licitum,  sed  permissum 
ad  majus  malum  vitandum;  ne  scilicet  a  Judaeis  Deum  colentibus 
usuras  acciperent,  propter  avaritiam  cui  dediti  erant ;  ”  Secunda  Secundae, 
quaestio  lxxviii.,  art.  1.  The  Pipe  Roll  of  4  Rich.  I.  contains  an  entry  of 
a  fine  paid  by  Judas,  a  Jew  of  Bristol,  “  that  it  might  be  found  by  inquest 
in  a  chapter  of  the  Jews,  whether  a  Jew  might  take  usury  of  a  Jew;” 
Madox,  Exchequer,  166  and  n.  (u). 

53 . “  Pecunia  ....  principaliter  est  inventa  ad  commutationes 


212 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


faciendas:  et  ita  proprius  et  principalis  pecuniae  usus  est  ipsius  con- 
sumptio,  sive  distiactio,  .  .  .  .  et  propter  hoc  secundum  se  est  illicitum 
pro  usu  pecuniae  mutuatae  accipere  pretium,  quod  dicitur  usura.”  In 
the  Decretum ,  distinctio  lxxxviii.,  c.  xi.,  this  argument  appears  in  a 
quotation  from  a  work  there  assigned  to  S.  Chrysostom.  He  is  met  by  the 
argument,  How  is  the  man  who  takes  interest  worse  than  a  man  who 
lets  a  house  or  an  estate  and  receives  rent  for  it?  “Qui  agrum  locat 
ut  agrariam  recipiat,  aut  domum  ut  pensiones  recipiat,  nonne  est  similis 
ei  qui  pecuniam  dat  ad  usuram?  Absit.  Primum,  quidem,  quoniam 
pecunia  non  ad  aliquem  usum  deposita  est,  nisi  ad  emendum.,, 

54.  Jeremy  Bentham  thus  begins  his  celebrated  Letters  on  Usury 
(1787):  “The  proposition  I  have  been  accustomed  to  lay  down  to  myself 
on  this  subject  is  the  following  one,  viz.,  that  no  man  of  ripe  years  and 
sound  mind,  acting  freely,  and  with  his  eyes  open,  ought  to  be  hindered, 
with  a  view  to  his  advantage,  from  making  such  bargain  in  the  way  of 
obtaining  money,  as  he  thinks  fit ;  nor  (what  is  a  necessary  consequence), 
anybody  hindered  from  supplying  him,  upon  any  terms  he  thinks  proper 
to  accede  to.  This  proposition,  were  it  to  be  received,  would  level  at  one 
stroke  all  the  barriers  which  law,  either  statute  or  common,  have  in  their 
united  wisdom  set  up  against  the  crying  sin  of  usury.”  These  letters, 
with  an  often-quoted  letter  of  Calvin,  and  with  an  interesting  speech  of 
Richard  Dana  in  the  Massachusetts  House  of  Representatives  (1867),  are 
reprinted  in  convenient  pamphlet  form  as  Tract  IF.,  published  by  the 
American  Society  for  Political  Education,  1881. 

55.  The  later  history  of  usury  laws,  especially  in  Germany,  is  ex¬ 
cellently  sketched  by  Wagner,  in  Schonberg’s  Handbuch  der  Politischen 
(Ekonomie,  i.  313-316.  He  points  out  that  the  object  of  the  recent 
German  legislation  is  to  retain  the  idea  that  usury  is  a  criminal  offence, 
but  without  fixing  a  hard  line  of  distinction  between  usury  and  lawful 
interest. 

56.  Cf.  Roscher,  Pol.  Econ .,  bk.  iii.,  cli.  4,  §  190  (Amer.  trans.,ii.  128). 

57.  This  is  expressly  allowed  by  Aquinas  (qu.  78,  art.  2).  It  is 
apparently  condemned  by  a  decretal  of  Gregory  IX. ;  A.,  lib.  5,  tit.  19, 
cap.  19:  “Naviganti .  .  .  mutuans  pecuniae  quantitatem,”  etc.  But  see 
hereon  Neumann,  Gesch .  des  Wuchers,  17,  18. 

58.  Past  and  Present ,  bk.  ii.,  ch.  4. 

59.  Landowners  usually  borrowed  on  the  security  of  land,  and  other 
borrowers  induced  their  friends  to  be  sureties,  “pledges,”  or  “main¬ 
pernors.”  The  frequency  of  this  latter  plan  is  shown  by  the  provisions 
of  the  Statute  of  Merchants,  1283,  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  54. 

60.  Endemann,  Studien ,  ii.,  p.  383  seq.  The  stories  about  crucifixions 


Chap.  TIL]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  213 


and  the  like  crimes  committed  by  Jews  are  doubtless  mythical.  What 
cannot  be  doubted  is  that  they  were  sometimes  guilty  of  openly  insulting 
the  faith  of  the  people  among  whom  they  lived.  Thus,  on  one  occasion, 
.  Ascension  Day,  1263,  “  as  a  long  procession  of  clergy  was  wending  its 
way  towards  the  cemetery  of  S.  Frideswide’s  to  hear  the  public  sermon, 
which  the  chancellor  of  the  university  was  wont  to  preach  on  that  day, 
a  number  of  Jews  made  a  sudden  attack  on  the  cross-bearer,  and  hav¬ 
ing  wrenched  the  cross  out  of  his  hands,  trampled  it  under  foot  igno- 
miniously  ;  ”  Lyte,  Oxford ,  67. 

61.  Endermann,  Studien ,  i.  13. 

62.  Cunningham,  City  Opinion  on  Usury ,  in  Banker's  Journal,  February, 

1887. 

63.  X.,  lib.  iv.,  tit.  20,  c.  7. 

64.  Deer .,  causa  14,  quaest.  3,  cc.  1-4.  Endemann,  Grundsatze,  §  4. 

65.  This  is  clearly  the  meaning  of  X,  lib.  v.,  tit.  19,  cap.  19,  which 
lays  down  that  a  man  is  not  to  be  reckoned  a  usurer  who  does  as  a 
matter  of  fact  receive  a  greater  value,  if  “  utrum  plus  vel  minus  solutionis 
tempore  fuerint  valiturae,  verisimiliter  dubitatur.,, 

66.  Endemann,  Grundsatze ,  21,  22. 

67.  X,  lib.  v.,  tit.  19,  c.  2. 

68.  Lyndwood,  Provinciate ,  lib.  3,  tit.  10  (ed.  Oxford,  1677,  p.  160). 
The  Pipe  Roll  of  9  John  (Madox,  Exchequer ,  170)  contains  an  entry 
recording  the  petition  of  a  certain  baron  that,  instead  of  his  lands,  which 
were  pledged  to  the  Jews,  passing  into  their  hands,  he  should  keep  them, 
paying  their  yearly  value  to  the  Jews  until  the  debt  was  discharged : 
“  Rogerus  de  Berkele  (debet)  lx.  marcus  :  ut  inquiratur  quantum  valeat 
per  annum  terra  ejusdem  Rogeri  .  .  .  cum  pertinentiis,  quae  est  vadium 
Judseorum  Bristolliae  et  Gloecestriae  pro  debito  quod  eis  debet :  et  quod 
ipse  in  manu  sua  teneat  terrain  illam,  et  predictis  Judseis  valorem  illius 
terrae  singulis  annis  reddat,  quousque  praedictum  debitum  suum  eis 
persolvatur.’, 

69.  X.,  lib.  5,  tit.  5,  c.  6. 

70.  Freely  translated  from  the  Ayenbite  of  Inwyt ,  ed.  Early  Engl. 
Text  Soc.,  pp.  35,  44. 

71.  Keary,  Introd,  to  Cat.  Engl .  Coins.,  vi.,  vii.  As  to  a  store  of  value , 
cf.  Jevons,  Money,  15,  16. 

72.  Keary,  lb.,  xi. 

73.  lb.,  xvi.,  xvii.  The  early  beginnings  of  Frisian  trade  is  illustrated 
by  the  mention  in  Bede,  Eccl.  Hist.  v.  22,  of  a  Frisian  merchant  to  whom 
a  slave  was  sold  in  London,  “whose  chains  fell  off  when  masses  were 
sung  for  him’.” 


214 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY .  [Book  I. 


74.  Keary,  Introd .,  xix.,  xx. 

75.  Ib.,  xxiii. 

76.  Ib .,  xxviii.,  xxix. 

77.  /&.,  ii.,  xxix.,  xxx. 

78.  Ib .,  ii.,  iii.,  xxxi. 

79.  Cf.  Green,  Conquest  of  England,  72,  73. 

80.  Laws  of  Athelstan,  n.  ( Concilium  Greatanleagense ),  14,  §  2,  in 
Schmid,  Gesetze  der  Angelsaclisen ,  140. 

81.  Except,  of  course,  during  the  two  years’  rule  of  Edgar  over  England 
north  of  the  Thames,  while  Edwy  was  recognized  in  the  south ;  and  also 
during  the  divided  rule  of  the  kingdom  by  Edmund  Ironside  and  Canute. 

82.  Freeman,  Norman  Conquest ,  i.  554,  seq. 

83.  Ethelred,  m.  ( Concilium  Wanetungense),  c.  8 ;  in  Schmid,  216. 

84.  See  lists  in  Schmid,  p.  140 ;  in  Ruding,  vol.  i. 

85.  Athelstan,  in.  14  ;  Ethelred,  hi.,  c.  17  ;  in  Schmid,  138,  219. 

86.  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist.  (Libr.  ed.),  i.  378,  549.  For  France,  see 
Hallam,  Middle  Ages ,  (ed.  1878),  i.  205 ;  for  Italy  and  Germany,  Raumer, 
Holienstaufen ,  v.  344. 

87.  Ducange  defines  monetagium  as  “  praestatio  quae  a  tenentibus  et 
vassalis  domino  fit  tertio  quoque  anno,  ea  conditione  ut  monetam  mutare 
ei  non  liceat.”  See  article  5  in  Henry  I.’s  Charter  of  Liberties  (in  Select 
Charters,  101),  and  cf.  Ruding,  i.  163. 

88.  Athelstan,  ii.  14,  §  1 ;  Ethelred,  ii.  8 ;  in  Schmid,  140,  216. 

89.  English  Chronicle ,  s.a.  1125. 

90.  Ruding,  i.  164. 

91.  Ib.,  i.  171,  184.  Of  the  coinage  of  1180,  Ralph  de  Diceto  says 
(ii.  7,  Rolls’  ed.),  “  Philippus  Aymari,  natione  Turonicus,  mandato  regis 
in  Angliam  veniens,  numismatis  innovandi  procurationem  suscepit. 
Hyemali  siquidem  festo  beati  Martini  moneta  veteri  reprobata,  nummus 
in  forma  rotunda  commerciis  hominum  passim  est  per  regnum  expositus.” 

92.  Rymer,  Foedera,  i.  12.  Henry  to  Samson,  bishop,  and  Urso 
d’Abetot,  and  all  barons  French  and  English  in  Worcestershire : 
“  Sciatis  quod  volo  et  precipio  quod  omnes  burgenses  et  omnes  illi  qui 
in  burgis  morantur,  tarn  Franci  quam  Angli,  jurent  tenere  et  servare 
monetam  meam  in  Anglia,  et  non  consentiant  falsitatem  monetae  meae.” 
This  illustrates  the  way  in  which  the  increasing  importance  of  the  cur¬ 
rency  was  due  to  the  growth  of  town  life. 

93.  Ruding,  i.  178. 

94.  lb.  No  money  was  to  be  current  wanting  more  than  2s.  6d.in  the 
pound :  such  pennies  as  were  more  defective  were  to  be  bored  through 
and  returned  to  their  owners,  never  again  to  be  used. 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  21 5 


95.  Macaulay,  chap.  xxi.  The  supply  of  coin  was  so  small  that  the 
government  of  Edward  I.  ordered,  in  1300,  the  compulsory  circulation 
even  of  'pollards  and  crockards  ( polled ,  i.e.  clipped,  and  crooked  pennies), 
at  the  rate  of  two  for  a  penny ;  Memorials ,  42  ;  Liber  Custumarum ,  563. 

96.  Ruding,  i.  179.  As  to  the  general  tendency  towards  uniformity  of 
type,  cf.  Keary,  in  Coins  and  Medals ,  ed.  Lane-Poole  (1885),  p.  107. 

97.  Ruding,  i.  70. 

98.  16.,  i.  187. 

99.  16.,  i.  70. 

100.  16.,  i.  193. 

101.  The  statements  in  the  two  preceding  paragraphs  are  all  based  on 
E.  W.  Robertson,  Historical  Essays  (1872),  41-45,  60-67.  For  the  Assize 
of  Weights  and  Measures,  see  Statutes  of  the  Realm ,  i.  204. 

102.  See  Ruding,  and  for  Edward’s  gold  coinage,  St.  of  Realm ,  i.  301. 

103.  Mention  must  also  be  made  of  the  coinage  of  groats  and  half - 
groats.  This  is  assigned  by  the  continuer  of  Murimuth  (p.  182),  fol¬ 
lowed  by  Walsingham  (Rolls’  ed.  i.,  275),  to  1351 :  “  William  of  Edyngdon, 
bishop  of  Winchester,  treasurer  of  the  kingdom,  and  a  man  of  great  pru¬ 
dence,  who  loved  the  good  of  the  king  more  than  that  of  the  community, 
devised  and  caused  to  be  coined  a  new  money,  namely,  the  groat  and 
half-groat ;  but  these  were  of  less  weight  than  the  like  sum  of  sterling. 
This  was  afterwards  the  cause  that  food  and  merchandise  became  dearer 
throughout  the  whole  of  England.”  The  chronicler  does  no  more  than 
echo  the  popular  discontent  at  a  novelty  ;  the  great  plague  of  two  years 
before  and  its  consequences  are  quite  sufficient  to  account  for  increased 
prices. 

104.  For  English  money  of  account,  see  Jevons,  Money ,  71 ;  and  Keary, 
Introd.  to  Catal .,  xxxiii.-xxxv.  As  to  payments  by  weight,  see  the  account 
of  Exchequer  practice  in  the  Dialogus  de  Scaccario ,  1.,  ch.  7,  in  Select 
Charters ,  p.  193. 

105.  Statutes  of  the  Realm ,  i.  219. 

106.  16.,  132;  respite  of  penalty,  134;  lightened,  200. 

107.  16.,  219  (assigned  to  12  Ed.  II.). 

108.  16.,  273  (1335). 

109.  Ib.,  132,  272.  As  to  the  licences  granted  to  individual  mer¬ 
chants,  see  Ochenkowski,  Englands  Wirthschaftliche  Entwickelung ,  205. 

110.  Ochenkowski,  212,  213. 

111.  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  291. 

112.  The  working  of  mediaeval  legislation  on  the  coinage  is  made  the 
more  easy  to  understand  when  it  is  noticed  that  the  business  of  exchange 
was  a  royal  monopoly.  Cambium  is  at  first  used  for  both  mint  and  ex - 


216 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I 


change ;  and  for  a  long  time  the  work  of  exchanging  was  entrusted  to 
the  royal  moneyers.  The  writ  of  Henry  I.  before  quoted  (Rymer,  i.  12) 
adds,  “Defendo  ne  aliquis  monetarius  denarios  mutat  nisi  in  comitatu 
suo,  et  hoc  coram  duobus  legitimis  testibus.  .  .  .  Et  nullus  sit  ausus 
cambire  denarios  nisi  monetarius.”  John  committed  the  “cambium 
totius  Angliae  ”  to  one  person  for  a  large  payment :  probably  he  ap¬ 
pointed  local  exchangers.  This  plan  of  appointing  an  exchanger  for 
the  whole  kingdom,  paying  usually  an  annual  sum  to  the  king  for  the 
privilege,  was  long  retained.  Frequent  statutes,  from  1354  onward,  for¬ 
bade  under  the  severest  penalties  any  “  exchange  for  profit  ”  by  un¬ 
authorized  persons ;  and  this  prohibition  was  maintained  till  1539,  when 
its  removal  was  largely  due  to  the  representations  of  Sir  Thomas 
Gresham.  See  Ruding,  ii.  138,  seq. 

113.  Political  Economy,  bk.  v.,  ch.  1,  §  2  (i.  387). 

114.  Social  Statics ,  ch.  xxix. 

115.  Jevons,  Money ,  81. 

116.  Ricardo,  High  Price  of  Bullion.  See  criticism  by  Walker,  Money 
(1878),  p.  48,  seq. 

117.  These  estimates,  which  are  frequently  referred  to  in  economic 
literature,  are  derived  from  Jacob,  Inquiry  into  the  Precious  Metals  (1831). 
They  will  be  found  summarized  in  Walker,  Money ,  p.  124,  seq. 

118.  X,  lib.  iii.,  tit.  xvii.,  c.  2. 

119.  Summa ,  Secunda  Secundae,  quaestio  lxxvii.,  artic.  2. 

120.  Schmid,  Gesetze ,  and  Glossar.  s.v.  Gemet ;  for  Edgar’s  law,  p.  192. 

121.  Roger  of  Hoveden  (Rolls’  Series),  iv.  33. 

122.  Liber  Custumarum ,  383.  The  citizens  of  London,  objecting  in 
14  Edward  II.  to  an  ordinance  that  the  gallon  for  ale  should  be  larger 
than  that  for  wine,  “  dixerunt  quod  una  mensura  vini  et  cervisiae  erit 
concordans  per  totam  Angliam,  sicut  continetur  in  Magna  Charta  de  Liber- 
tatibus  Angliae :  et  sicut  usi  sunt  semper,  et  maxime  a  tempore  Regis 
Ricardi,  ab  anno  regni  ipsius  viii. ;  quando  omnes  mensurae  Angliae 
examinatae  fuerunt  et  factae  Concordes,  et  in  Londonia  standarda  regia 
posita.”  This  reference,  with  much  other  help  in  §§  19,  21,  is  given  by 
Schanz. 

123.  Hoveden,  iv.  62. 

124.  Roger  of  Wendover  gives  an  interesting  piece  of  information, 
which  shows  how  very  largely  the  work  of  government  depended  on  the 
personal  action  of  the  sovereign.  He  tells  us  that  Henry  III.,  on  his  journey 
from  York  to  London  in  1228,  “  mensuras  bladi,  vini,  et  cervisiae  falsi- 
tatis  arguens,  quasdam  confregit,  et  comburere  nonnullas  praecepit ;  et 
vasa  substituens  capaciora,  panem  majoris  ponderis  jussit  fieri,  et  hujus 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  21 7 


statuti  contemptores  poena  gravi  pecuniaria  multari  praecepit :  **  in 
Matthew  Paris,  Chronica  Majora  (Polls*  ed.),  iii.  143. 

125.  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  204. 

126.  See  Schanz,  580,  and  references  there  given  to  Munimenta 
Gildhallae.  See  also,  in  Memorials  of  London ,  78,  the  oath  exacted 
from  turners  not  to  make  false  measures  (1310). 

127.  Stat.  of  R.,  i.  330.  A  few  sentences  are  here  taken  from  my 
Woollen  Industry ,  31-34. 

128.  Stat.  of  R.,  i.  203,  204.  For  later  distinctions  bet ween  forestallers, 
engrossers ,  and  regrators ,  see  5  and  6,  Ed.  IV.,  c.  14 ;  Stat.  of  Realm ,  iv.  148. 
But  for  use  of  regrator  in  the  sense  in  which  forestaller  is  used  in  the 
ordinance  quoted  in  the  text,  see  Doomsday  of  Ipswich  in  Black  Book  of 
the  Admiralty  (Rolls*  Series),  ii.  101.  Engross  and  forestall  seem  to  he 
used  as  equivalents  in  27  Ed.  III.,  st.  1,  cap.  5,  in  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  331. 

129.  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  202 ;  Black  Book  of  Admir .,  i.  71. 

130.  E.g.  in  1350-1,  1353,  1357,  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  315,  331,  353. 

131.  Memorials  of  London,  83,  318. 

132.  Wealth  of  Nations ,  ed.  Rogers,  ii.  103-111. 

133.  Six  Centuries  of  Work  and  Wages,  144. 

134.  Principles  of  Pol.  Economy ,  205  (bk.  ii.  ch.  2,  §  8). 

135.  Pol.  Economy ,  i.  523,  524  (bk.  ii.,  ch.  16,  §  4). 

136.  An  article  in  the  Spectator  for  Dec.  31,  1887,  on  The  Monopoly 
of  Copper ,  strikingly  illustrates  the  impotence  of  the  modern  abstract 
economist  in  handling  practical  problems.  The  writer  declares  that  the 
French  journalists  who  demand  state  interference  with  the  syndicate  are 
“  economically  **  in  the  wrong ;  because,  if  high  prices  continue,  there 
will  be  an  increase  of  production,  new  mines  being  opened,  etc.,  until  the 
excess  of  supply  forces  prices  down  again ; — disregarding  the  enormous 
waste  of  capital  and  labour  which  is  involved  in  opening  new  mines 
which  after  a  short  time  have  to  be  shut  again.  He  buys  down  that  “  it 
is  quite  impossible  to  show  that  cornering  or  engrossing  is  immoral, 
when  the  article  purchased  does  not  involve  human  life,** — a  conception 
of  morality  which  is  probably  less  satisfactory  than  that  of  mediaeval 
schoolmen.  Yet  he  seems  to  think  that  if  the  application  of  the  existing 
French  laws  against  engrossing  could  destroy  the  practice,  this  might 
properly  be  deemed  satisfactory  by  the  public,  though  not  by  “  sound 
economists.** 

137.  Liber  Albus,  692. 

138.  Memorials  of  London ,  236. 

139.  lb 314  (1363).  Mention  ought  to  have  been  mode  in  the  text 
of  the  action  of  the  Government  in  the  matter  of  the  export  of  corn.  The 


2 1 8 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


general  rule,  certainly  from  1177,  probably  from  a  much  earlier  date, 
was  that  export  was  entirely  forbidden  except  by  royal  licence.  Dr. 
Faber,  in  his  Entstehung  des  Agrarschutzes  in  England  (Strassburg,  1888), 
p.  65,  argues  that  the  policy  of  the  executive  was  influenced  in  the 
thirteenth  century  chiefly  by  a  wish  to  secure  cheap  food,  in  the  four¬ 
teenth  century  to  increase  the  royal  revenue.  The  Carta  Mercatoria 
gave  permission  to  foreign  merchants  to  export  corn  on  paying  a  duty  of 
3s.  in  the  pound :  a  privilege  which  shared  the  history  of  the  rest  of  the 
provisions  of  that  charter.  Vide  supra ,  107,  108,  and  Faber,  75-77. 

140.  Matthew  Paris,  Chronica  Majora  (Rolls’  Series),  ii.  480.  The 
earliest  extant  enactment  on  the  subject  occurs  among  the  regulations 
drawn  up  for  the  crusaders  by  Richard  and  Philip  Augustus,  at  Messina, 
in  1190 :  “  Statutum  est  a  domino  rege  anglorum  et  constabulariis  et 
justitiis  et  marescallis  exercitus  regis  Angliae,  quod  mercator  de  qua- 
cunque  mercatione  sit  non  potest  emere  panem  ad  revendendum  in  exer- 
citu,  neo  farinam  [i.e.  to  forestall]  ...  Si  autem  aliquis  bladum  emerit 
et  de  eo  panem  fecerit,  tenetur  lucrari  in  salma  [a  seam,  or  quarter  of 
grain],  unum  terrim  [the  Sicilian  coin  called  tarenus ,  weighing  20  grains 
of  gold]  tantum,  et  brennon  [the  bran].  Alii  vero  mercatores,  de  qua- 
cunque  mercatione  sint  mercatores,  in  decern  denarios  tenentur  lucrari 
unum  denarium.  .  .  .  Et  ne  aliquis  carnem  mortuam  emat  ad  reven¬ 
dendum,  nec  bestiam  vivam,  nisi  earn  occiderit  in  exercitu.  Nullus 
vinum  suum  post  primam  conclamationem  carius  vendat.  Nullus  panem 
faciat  nisi  ad  unum  denarium ;  ”  Benedictus,  Gesta  Henrici  IL  et  Ricardi 
J.,  ii.  131  (ed.  Stubbs,  Rolls’  Series). 

141.  St  at.  of  Realm ,  i.  199. 

142.  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric .,  i.  217. 

143.  As  the  translation  is  not  altogether  certain,  it  will  be  well  to 
give  the  text  here :  “  Sciendum  est  quod  pistor  potest  lucrari  in  quolibet 
quarterio  frumenti,  ut  probatum  est  per  pistores  domini  regis,  quatuor 
denarios  et  furfur  [et  duos  panes]  ad  furnagium,  tribus  servientibus 
denarium  et  obolum,  duobus  garcionibus  obolum.  In  sale  obolum.  In 
gesto  obolum ;  in  candela  quadrantem.  In  bosco  [ii.  denarios].  In 
bultello  habendo  [denarium  et  obolum].”  The  amounts  given  within 
brackets  differ  in  the  copy  preserved  in  the  London  Liber  Horn. 

144.  Stat.  of  Realm,  i.  201. 

145.  Statute  of  York,  c.  6,  12  Ed.  II.  in  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  178.  The 
prohibition  includes  the  sale  of  wine. 

146.  Cf.  Schanz,  637,  638.  For  the  office  of  Justice  of  the  Peace,  see 
Gneist,  Self-Government ,  (1871),  §  1L 

147.  In  the  London  archives  is  a  folio  volume  of  164  leaves  (34  blank), 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION.  2ig 


marked  Assisci  Fanis ,  containing  a  register  of  the  weights  of  bread  as 
fixed  from  time  to  time,  and  of  many  of  the  cases  of  violation  of  assize 
that  were  brought  before  the  mayor.  Extracts  are  printed  in  the 
Appendix  to  Munimenta  Gildliallae ,  iii.  For  William  le  Bole’s  case,  see 
p.  411.  The  plan  of  reckoning  the  price  of  the  quarter  at  the  market 
price  of  the  wheat  plus  the  cost  of  baking,  seems  to  be  different  from  that 
prescribed  in  the  copy  of  the  assize  printed  in  the  Statute  Book. 

148.  Glossary  to  Mun.  Gildh.,  iii.  304,  s.v.  “Claie.” 

149.  Stat.  of  Realm.,  i.  202.  An  article  in  the  Assize  of  Bread  ( ib ., 
200),  makes  a  distinction  between  town  and  country  prices :  “  When  a 
quarter  of  wheat  is  sold  for  3s.  or  3s.  4 d.,  and  a  quarter  of  barley  for  20 d. 
or  2s.,  and  a  quarter  of  oats  for  16d.,  then  brewers  in  cities  ought  and 
may  well  afford  to  sell  two  gallons  of  ale  for  a  penny,  and  out  of  cities  to 
sell  three  gallons  for  a  penny.  And  when  in  a  town  three  gallons  are 
sold  for  a  penny,  out  of  a  town  they  ought  and  may  well  afford  to  sell 
four.” 

150.  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  i.  219. 

151.  lb.,  618,  623. 

152.  Hoveden,  iv.  99.  See  Schanz,  i.  642,  seq. 

153.  Statute  of  Bakers,  in  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  203. 

151.  Statute  of  Gloucester,  ib.,  i.  50. 

155.  lb.,  264. 

156.  The  king’s  writ  of  1311  orders  that  “the  mayor  and  aldermen 
shall  cause  eight  or  twelve  good  and  lawful  men  to  be  chosen,  who  are 
the  most  skilled  in  wines,  and  shall  make  them  swear  well  and  lawfully 
to  assay  the  wines  in  all  the  taverns  of  London,  and  in  the  suburbs  of 
the  liberties  thereof ;  and  they  shall  cause  the  tuns  to  be  marked,  each  at 
its  value,  with  the  mark  that  shall  be  thereunto  ordained,  that  is  to 
say  :  The  gallon  of  the  best  wine  to  be  sold  at  five  pence,  the  next  best 
at  four  pence,  and  the  rest  at  three  pence  per  gallon,  for  this  year.  And 
let  every  wine  bo  set  at  its  value  without  mixture ;  and  let  each  tun  be 
marked  at  the  end  in  front,  that  so  the  buyer  may  readily  see  the  value 
of  the  wine.  And  let  every  buyer  see  his  wine  drawn,  that  so  he  may 
not  be  deceived ;  ”  Memorials,  82  ;  cf.  182. 

157.  Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  i.  622. 

158.  Rob.  of  Avesbury,  de  miribilibus  gestis  Edwardi  tertii  (ed.  Hearne, 
1720),  197. 

159.  In  Stat.  of  Bakers,  Stat.  of  Realm,  i.  203. 

160.  Memorials,  133, 139. 

161.  Liber  Custumarum ,  304  ;  Liber  Albus,  713. 

162.  The  Assize  of  Poultry  of  14  Ed.  II.  is  given  in  the  Liber  Custu - 


220 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I 


marurn ,  304 :  “  Et  a  ceste  assise  gardier,  soient  ordonez  par  les  Meire, 
Aldermans,  et  Viscountes,  vi.  prodeshommes  de  la  cite,  qe  ne  soient  pas  du 
mestier ;  issint  qe  les  iii.  soient  assignez  a  garder  lassise  a  la  Sale  de 
Plom  [i.e.  Leadenhall],  entre  les  foreinz  [ i.e .  non-burghers],  et  les  autre 
iii.  soient  a  la  Poletrie  [i.e.  the  Poultry],  pur  garder  lassise  entre  les 
denzeins.”  As  to  the  Leadenhall  market,  see  Memorials ,  220,  221. 

163.  E.g.  Memorials ,  90,  119,  121,  132,  139. 

164.  Liber  Albus ,  728.  For  conditions  of  labour  in  rural  districts,  see 
Rogers,  Hist,  of  Agric.,  i.  253. 

165.  Liber  Albus,  liii.,  733. 

166.  lb.,  719. 

167.  Memorials ,  234. 

168.  Liber  Albus ,  Introd.  liii. 

169.  To  judge  from  §  24  of  the  ordinances  of  the  weavers,  28  Ed.  I.,  in 
Liber  Custumarum ,  126 :  see  translation  in  Mun.  Gildh.  ii.  pt.  2,  p.  550. 

170.  Liber  Custumarum,  416,  seq.  Cf.  Engl.  Woollen  Industry,  45-47. 

171.  Schmid,  Gesetze,  518. 

172.  Dialogus,  n.,  ch.  10,  in  Select  Charters,  229.  The  writer  draws 
a  distinction  between  “  public  ”  and  “  private  ”  usury.  “  Publicas  igitur 
et  usitatas  usuras  dicimus  quando,  mora  Judaeorum,  in  eadem  specie  ex 
conventione  quis  amplius  percepturus  est  quam  commodavit ;  sicut  libram 
pro  marca,  vel  pro  libra  argenti  duos  denarios  in  septimana  de  lucro 
praeter  sortem  [the  rate  permitted  to  the  Jews] ;  non  publicas  autem  sed 
tamen  damnabiles  cum  quis  fundum  aliquem  vel  ecclesiam  pro  commodato 
suscipit,  et  manente  sortis  integritate,  fructus  ejus,  donee  sors  ipsa  soluta 
fuerit,  sibi  percipt.  Hoc  genus  propter  laborem  et  sumptum  qui  in 
agriculturis  soient  impendi  licentius  visum  est ;  sed  procul  dubio  sordi- 
dum  est  et  inter  usuras  computandum  merito.”  We  have  seen  ( supra. , 
p.  159)  that  it  was  expressly  forbidden  by  Alexander  III. 

173.  Stat.  of  Realm,  i.  296.  Madox,  Exchequer,  237,  gives  five  examples, 
from  the  Pipe  Rolls  of  the  later  years  of  Henry  II.,  of  the  forfeiture  of  the 
“pecunia”  and  “  catalla”  of  usurers. 

174.  See  Cunningham,  in  Journal  of  Institute  of  Bankers,  Feb.  1887. 

175.  Endemann,  Studien,  ii.  243,  seq.  The  most  important  passage  in 
Roman  law  on  this  matter  is  Codex,  vn.  47 :  “  Cum  pro  eo  quod  interest 
dubitationes  antiquae  in  infinitum  productae  sunt,  melius  nobis  visum  est 
hujusmodi  prolixitatem  prout  possibile  est  in  angustum  coartare.  Sanci- 
mus  itaque  in  omnibus  casibus,  qui  certam  habent  quantitatem  vel 
naturam,  veluti  in  venditionibus,  et  locationibus  et  omnibus  contractibus, 
hoc  quod  interest  dupli  quantitatem  minime  excedere :  in  aliis  autem 
casibus,  qui  incerti  esse  videntur,  judices,  qui  causas  dirimendas  suscipiunt, 


Chap.  III.]  ECONOMIC  THEORIES  AND  LEGISLATION  221 


per  suam  subtilitatem  requirere,  ut  quod  re  vera  inducitur  damnum,  hoc 
reddatur  et  non  ex  quibusdam  machinationibus  ...  in  circuitus  inextri- 
cabiles  redigatur.  .  .  .  Et  hoc  non  solum  in  damno  sed  etiam  in  lucro 
nostra  amplectitur  constitution 

176.  Summa ,  Secunda  Secundae,  quaestio  lxxviii.,  artic.  2. 

177.  “  Interesse  non  debetur  nisi  ex  mora ;  n  Endemann,  u.s.  253,  254. 

178.  lb.,  272. 

179.  Chronica  Majora ,  (Rolls*  Series),  hi.  328,  331. 

180.  lb.,  iy.  8. 

181.  Ib .,  iv.  422. 

182.  lb.,  iy.  245.  Here  the  phrase  occurs  “  Transalpine  quos  Causinos 
appellamus.” 

183.  Ib.,  in.  329. 

184.  lb.,  v.  404. 

185.  Hitherto  the  best  available  sources  of  information  concerning  the 
position  of  the  Jews  in  England  before  the  expulsion  were  Prynne’s 
Demurrer,  and  the  chapter  on  the  Exchequer  of  the  Jews  in  Madox*s 
Exchequer,  from  which  all  later  accounts,  such  as  Tovey’s  Anglia  Judaica 
were  drawn.  But  these  are  now  superseded  by  the  valuable  paper  of  Dr. 
Gross,  The  Exchequer  of  the  Jews  in  England  (London,  Jewish  Chronicle 
Office,  1887),  based  largely  on  the  manuscript  and  hitherto  unused  Botuli 
Judaeorum  in  the  Public  Record  Office. 

186.  For  the  Capitula  de  Judaeis  of  1194,  see  Select  Charters,  262. 
The  list  of  towns  possessing  chests  is  given  by  Gross,  Exchequer  of  the 
Jews ,  20 :  they  were  Bedford,  Berkhamstead,  Bristol,  Cambridge,  Canter¬ 
bury,  Colchester,  Devizes,  Exeter,  Gloucester,  Hereford,  Huntingdon, 
Lincoln,  London,  Marlborough,  Northampton,  Nottingham,  Norwich, 
Oxford,  Stamford,  Sudbury,  Wallingford,  Warwick,  Wilton,  Winchester, 
Worcester,  and  York.  The  following  towns  obtained  grants  from  Henry 
III.  and  Edward  I.,  prohibiting  Jews  to  settle  there: — Derby,  Leicester 
(grant  from  Simon  de  Montfort),  Newbury  in  Berks,  Newcastle,  Romsey, 
Southampton,  Winclielsea,  Windsor,  Wycombe,  and  the  following  Welsh 
boroughs,  Bala,  Beaumaris,  Carnarvon,  Conway,  Criccieth,  Flint,  Harlech, 
Newborough,  and  Rhuddlan  (ib.,  23).  Mr.  Gross  points  out  (p.  4)  that  “  in 
Germany  the  authorities  of  a  town  frequently  besought  the  king  to  allow 
Jews  among  them;**  the  explanation  of  this  contrast  lying  in  the  fact 
that  the  central  power  was  so  much  weaker  in  Germany  that  the  towns¬ 
men  were  able  to  reap  the  advantages  from  the  presence  of  the  Jews, 
which  in  England  the  monarch  kept  to  himself. 

187.  lb.,  28. 

188.  Ib.,  30-34. 


222 


ECONOMIC  HISTORY  AND  THEORY.  [Book  I. 


189.  Select  Charters ,  385,  §  25. 

190.  Gross,  40.  Of.  supra,  n.  172.  Hence  it  appears  that  Lyte,  Uist.  of 
Oxford ,  44,  is  mistaken  in  supposing  that  the  order  to  this  effect  in  1248 
imposed  a  new  restriction. 

191.  Lyte,  40. 

192.  Ib.,  101. 

193.  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  54. 

194.  Ib.,  i.  99. 

195.  Ib .,  i.  165. 

196.  Ochenkowski,  Englands  wirthscliaftliche  Entwickelung ,  179. 

197.  27  Ed.  III.,  stat.  2,  c.  17,  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  339.  A  statute  two 
years  earlier  (25  Ed.  III.,  stat.  5,  c.  23,  Stat.  of  Realm ,  i.  324),  enacted 
that  the  companies  of  Lombard  merchants  should  be  answerable  for  the 
debts  of  their  members :  “  so  that  another  merchant  which  is  not  of  the 
company  shall  not  be  thereby  grieved  or  impeached.” 

198.  As  to  the  general  course  of  development,  cf  Schmoller,  Studien 
liber  die  ivirtlischaftliche  Politik  Friedrichs  des  Grossen ,  ii.  (in  Jahrbuch 
fur  Gesetzgebung ,  etc.,  im  Deutschen  Reich.,  Jahrg.  viii.,  Hft.  1,  1884). 


INDEX. 


Abingdon  market,  98 
Accounts,  the  keeping  of,  33 
Accursius  of  Bologna,  149 
Acre  strips,  6 
Alderman,  72 

Ale,  regulation  of  the  price  of,  190 
Amiens,  106,  109 
Antwerp,  112 
Apprenticeship,  89 

Aquinas,  S.  Thomas,  133,  seq.,  178, 
197,  207,  211 
Aristotle,  145,  152,  154 
Artisan  system,  76 
Assay  of  wines,  192,  219 
Assize  of  Bread  and  Ale ,  188,  seq.,  219 
Assize  of  Measures ,  179,  181,  188 
Assize  of  Poultry ,  220 
Assize ,  the  new  and  the  old ,  30 
Athelstan,  48 
Aulnager ,  180 
Ayenbite  of  Inwyt ,  161 

Bagehot,  Mr.,  122 
Bailiff,  10 
Bakers,  189,  190 
Balance  of  Trade ,  175 
Baldus,  151 
Balks ,  6 

Barley,  price  of,  190 
Bartolus,  151 
Beauchamp,  manor  of,  23 
Bedrips,  9 
Bentham,  212 
Berwick,  67,  72,  75 
Bill  obligatory ,  204 


Blac^  Death,  194 
Bladarii ,  190 
Boldon  Booky  3 
Bologna,  130 
Boondays,  9 
Bordar,  8 

Boston  fair,  101,  106 

Bracton,  4,  99,  131 

Bread,  regulation  of  price  of,  187,  seq. 

Brent ano,  Prof.,  67,  84,  91 

Brewers,  191 

Bridges,  98 

Bristol,  96,  100,  108,  170,  204 
Bruges,  110,  112,  205 
Burellers,  86 
Burgage  tenants,  73 
Burgesses,  80,  103,  seq.,  114 
Burton,  Abbot  of,  38 
Burton  Chartulary,  3 
Butchers,  192 

Cahors,  198 
Calais,  112 

Calendar  of  LetterSy  108 
Cambium ,  216 
Canterbury,  169,  170,  205 
Canterbury,  Archbishop  of,  165 
Capital,  42,  43,  93,  155 
Carling  princes,  165,  170 
Carlisle,  169 

Carlyle,  Thomas,  115,  155 
Carta  Mercatoria,  106,  205,  218 
Carting,  service  of,  9,  31 
Caursines,  196,  198 
Censariiy  22 


INDEX. 


224 

Charles  the  Great,  148,  170 
Charter,  holding  by,  22 
Charter,  the  Great,  179,  202 
Chest  of  S.  Frideswide,  203 
Chests  of  Jews,  202,  221 
Chichester,  169 
Cinque  Ports,  35 
Clement,  128 
Clerks,  itinerant,  33 
Cloth,  74,  180 
Coinage,  48,  163,  seq. 

- ,  “adulterine,”  167 

Cologne,  110,  134 
Common  fields,  7 
Commune ,  the,  72 
Commutation,  20,  29,  seq. 
Consumptibles ,  152 
Corbie,  106 
Cord  wain  ers,  95, 144 
Corn,  trade  in,  182,  seq.,  218 
Corners ,  187 

Corvesars,  or  leather-dressers,  81 
Cost  of  production,  138,  139,  209 
Cotter ,  8 

Coulanges,  M.  Fustel  de,  5 
Council  of  Lyons,  150 
— —  at  Mainz,  178 

- of  Nicaea,  148 

- of  Tours,  159 

- of  Yienne,  151 

Court  Baron ,  33 

- Customary ,  61 

- Feet,  34,  79 

- of  London  weavers’  gild,  86 

- of  pie-powder,  101 

Courts,  Ecclesiastical,  196 
Credit,  160 
Crockards ,  215 

Cunningham,  Mr.,  52,  118,  125 
Custom-dues,  107,  111 
Customary  tenants,  31 
Customer s-lond ,  64 

Daily  works ,  9 
Damnum  emergens ,  196 
Danegeld ,  48 
Danish  settlement,  19 
Dante,  198 

Debts,  recovery  of,  203,  seq . 


Decretum ,  the,  153 
Demesne,  7 

Dialogus  de  Scaccario ,  46,  195 
Diceto,  Ralph  de,  23 
Dies  for  coining,  169 
Dimidii  virgarii ,  24 
Division  of  labour,  77 
Dizena ,  45 

Domesday  Book ,  3,  18,  114 
Domesday  of  S.  Paul's ,  3,  23 
Douai,  205 
Dover,  173 

Droitwich  salt-works,  35 
Durham,  169,  170 

Echevins ,  72 

Edward  the  Confessor,  195 

Edward  I.,  39,  48,  87,  156,  182,  193 

Edward  II.,  31,  172,  179,  189 

Edward  III.,  49,  170,  174,  183 

Ell-yards,  179 

Endemann,  W.,  124,  158 

Engrossing ,  182-184 

Essart ,  27 

Exchange,  216 

Exchequer  of  the  Jews,  202 

Exeter,  169,  204 

Fairs,  99,  seq. 

Falsa  Moneta,  De ,  173 
False  work,  90,  120,  144 
Farthings,  silver,  171 
Fields,  intermixed,  17 
Firma  or  ferm ,  34,  45 
Firma  burgi,  37 
Firmarius ,  44 

Flanders,  49,  99,  100,  104,  109 
Fleta ,  4,  9,  seq. 

Florence,  109 
Forestalling ,  182,  seq. 

France,  78,  99,  104,  109,  150,  167, 
191, 192 

Frank  empire,  170 
Frank  homme ,  83 
Frederick  II.,  Emperor,  201 
Freedom  of  trade,  183 
Freeman,  Professor,  16,  115 
Freemen,  14,  18 
- commended,  19 


Fungibles ,  152 
Furlong ,  6 
Fur  nag  e,  189 


INDEX. 


225 


Gascony,  104 

Gain,  128,  145,  157,  203 

Genoa,  160 

German  legislation  on  usury,  154, 212 
Germany,  78,  104,  110,  167 
Ghent,  205 

Gild,  the  merchant,  67,  seq.,  79,  80 
Gilds,  “adulterine,”  81 

- ,  craft,  67,  74,  76,  seq.,  194 

Glanvill,  38,  72,  116 
Gratian,  Decretum  of,  124,  158 
Gresham's  law ,  175 
Groats,  215 
Grocers,  160 
Gross,  Dr.,  67,  221 
Grossteste,  201,  203 
Guerard,  M.,  5 
Guienne,  35 

Hale,  Archdeacon,  44 
Half-groats,  215 
Halfpennies,  silver,  171 
Hall-moot,  62 
Hanse,  70 

- of  London,  104,  106,  109,  123 

- ,  Teutonic,  104,  109 

Hanssen,  Georg,  4 
Henry  I.,  23,  47,  168 
Henry  II.,  71,  82,  86,  171,  188 
Henry  III.,  49,  105,  171,  188,  198, 
205 

Henry  VII.,  172 
Heriot ,  37,  48 
Hildebrand,  43 
Homage ,  the,  26,  59 
Hull,  173 
Husband ,  8 
Husbandland ,  7 

Inland ,  7 
Inns,  98 

Interest,  132, 148,  seq. ;  original  sense, 
196,  seq. 

Ipswich,  169 
Irnerius,  149 


Iron,  35 

Italy,  105,  150,  160,  167 
Jevons,  Mr.,  137 

Jews,  155,  156,  200,  seq.,  212-3,  221 

■ - ,  Exchequer  of,  202 

- ,  Expulsion  of,  203 

John,  King,  21,  82,  169 
Journeymen,  89 
Judges,  itinerant,  179 
Judicium  Filloriae ,  189,  190 
Juris  Canonicif  Corpus ,  178 
Jurisdiction,  ecclesiastical,  195 

- ,  manorial,  14,  18 

Justices  of  the  peace,  189 
Justinian,  128,  131,  133,  149,  151, 
210 

Kemble,  J.  M.,  4 
Kent,  165 

Knies,  Karl,  65,  125 
Kytchen,  John,  5 

Labourers,  32,  93 
Lammas  lands,  7 
Land  at  rent ,  23 

- at  work ,  23 

Lassalle,  Ferdinand,  65 

Lateran  Council,  149 

Law,  Canon,  124,  127,  seq.,  200 

- ,  maritime,  131 

- ,  merchant,  113 

- of  nature,  127,  135 

- ,  Roman,  15,  131,  seq.,  152,  163, 

196 

Laws  of  Edward  the  Confessor,  195 

- of  Ethelred,  167,  168 

- ,  Welsh,  16 

Leicester,  65,  72,  seq. 

Liber  Niger  of  Peterborough ,  3,  18 
Liberi  homines ,  18 
Lincoln,  169,  204 
Livre  Tournois ,  the,  171 
Lombards,  196 

London,  70,  72,  81,  seq.,  96,  106,  110, 
169,  170,  173,  179,  183,  189,  192- 
193,  205 

London,  bushel  of,  171 
- ,  quarter  of,  179 


Q 


226 


INDEX. 


London,  Book  of  Customs ,  83 

- ,  Roger,  Bishop  of,  198 

Lord  of  the  manor,  6 
Loveboons ,  9 
Liibeck,  110,  205 
Lucrum  cessans ,  1 96 
Lynn,  108,  169 

Magna  Carta ,  105 
Maine,  Sir  Henry,  5,  127 
Manor,  6,  seq. 

Mark  system,  7 
Markets,  48,  69,  98,  99,  193 
Masons,  88 
Maurer,  Georg  von,  4 
Mayors  of  the  staple,  112 
Meat,  192 

Mendicant  Orders,  149 
Mercantile  theory,  174 
Merceries,  107 
Merchant  Adventurers,  84 
Merchants,  77,  80,  seq.,  144, 160,  203 

- ,  foreign,  103,  seq.,  192,  198, 

204,  205 

- ,  papal,  198 

Merchants ,  Statute  of ,  203 
Mercia,  165 

Merovingian  princes,  164 
Messor,  32 

Mestiers  (i.e.  crafts),  95 
Mill,  J.  S.,  65,  137,  175,  186 
Mills,  34,  62 
Millstones,  36 
Minting,  167,  169 
Molmen ,  21,  56 
Money,  46,  163,  seq. 

- - ,  a  store  of  value,  164 

- ,  foreign,  173,  seq. 

- of  account ,  172 

Moneyage ,  168 

Moneyers,  48,  49,  114,  165,  seq. 

- ,  Merovingian,  170 

Morning-speeches,  71,  115 

Nasse,  Erwin,  4 
Nesle,  106 
Netherlands,  78 
Newcastle,  204 
Nicaea,  Council  of,  148 
Noke,  28 


Norfolk,  18 
Normal  value,  138 
Northampton,  169,  205 
Northumbria,  165,  166 
Norway,  36 

Norwich,  114,  169,  205 
Nottingham,  204 

Ochenkowski,  67 
Offa,  165 

Oxford,  81,  98,  101, 169,  192 
- University,  99,  192 

Paris,  Matthew,  198,  199 
Paulus,  132 
Paviours,  193 

Payments,  in  kind  and  in  money,  46 

- ,  by  weight,  172 

Pening ,  the,  171 
Penny,  165,  170 

- ,  sterling ,  171 

Pepin  the  Short,  165 
Pisa,  160 
Plague,  the,  192 
Ploughing,  10 
Pollards ,  215 
Pomponius,  133 

Pope,  Alexander  III.,  149,  159,  160 

- Calixtus,  168 

- Clement  V.,  150 

- Gregory  IX.,  158 

- Gregory  X.,  150 

- Innocent  III.,  156 

- Leo  the  Great,  129 

Portmanmote,  79 
Portsmouth,  183 

Pound  of  Charles  the  Great,  the,  171 
Precariae,  9 

Price,  “just,”  or  “reasonable,”  133, 
137,  146,  178,  181,  191,  210 

Reeve,  10,  167 
Pegrating,  182 
Pepselver,  115 
Ricardo,  176,  177 
Richard  I.,  179,  188,  202 
Roads,  97 
Rochester,  169 

- ,  Bishop  of,  166 

Rogers,  Mr.  Thorold,  4,  5,  68,  185 


INDEX. 


227 


Roscher,  W.,  66,  125 
.Rotuli  Hundredorum,  4 

S.  Ambrose,  126,  140,  142,  158 
S.  Augustine  of  Hippo,  129,  133,  158, 
208 

S.  Chrysostom,  144,  153 
S.  Edmund  Rich,  159 
S.  Edmundsbury,  101,  169 
S.  Ives,  101 

S.  Jerome,  129,  144, 158 
S.  Omer,  205 
Salt,  35 
Sceattas ,  164 
Scutage ,  48 

Seebohm,  Mr.,  5,  15,  25 
Servi,  17 
Serving-men,  90 
Shrewsbury,  205 
Sidgwick,  Professor,  186 
Skins,  trade  in,  70,  74 
Slaves,  8,  70 

Smith,  Adam,  77,  181,  184,  185 
Socy  19 
Socage ,  25 
Socmen ,  18,  25 

Southampton,  72,  75,  100,  108,  204 

Spain,  iron  from,  36 

Spencer,  Mr.  Herbert,  175 

Spiceries,  107,  160 

Stamford,  101,  180 

Standard  of  comfort,  139 

Staple,  the,  111,  seq. 

Statute  of  Acton  Burnelly  204 

- of  Merton ,  26 

Steelyard,  the,  111 
Steward,  office  of,  10 
Stourbridge  fair,  99 
Stubbs,  Bishop,  5,  14,  118 
StycaSy  166 
Suffolk,  18 
Sussex,  35 

Tables  of  Exchange,  173 
Tar,  36 

Taverners,  191,  192 
Tenure,  servile,  21 ;  free,  21 
Terrae  operariae ,  24 
'Tertullian,  128 


Tolls,  98,  100 
Totnes,  72,  80 
Trade,  foreign,  102,  seq. 

Trade,  internal,  96,  seq. 

Trial  of  the  pi x,  170 
Tuckers,  96 
Type  of  coins,  169 

Usury,  148,  seq.,  195,  seq.,  212 

Vacarius,  131 

Value ,  theories  of,  137 

Villatay  12 

Villeins,  8 
Villenage,  land  in,  7 
Virgatey  7 

Wages,  regulation  of,  193,  194 
Wagner,  Adolf,  66 
Wallace,  Mr.,  12 
Wallingford,  98 
Waste-land,  26 
Wax-chandlers,  88 
Weavers,  27 
— — ,  Flemish,  180 
Weavers’  gilds,  81,  86,  106,  194 
Week  work,  9 

Weight,  payments  by,  172 
Weights  and  measures,  147, 161, 171, 
178,  seq. 

Welsh,  survival  of,  17 
Wergild ,  164 
Wessex,  165 
White-tawyers,  91 
William  I.,  70 
William  II.,  100 
William  III.,  180 

Winchester,  99,  seq.,  108,  169,  178 
Wine,  regulation  of  the  price  of,  191, 
192 

Wistas,  7 

Worcester  Priory,  30,  35 
Work-landy  24,  57 

Yardlandy  7 
Yardling ,  8 
York,  169,  170,  204 

- ,  Archbishop  of,  166 

Ypres,  205 


PRINTED  BY  WILLIAM  CLOWES  AND  SONS,  LIMITED, 
LONDON  AND  BECCLES. 


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